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Chapter 1
Introduction
Following the publication of Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-
Fashioning in 1980,1 few observers could have predicted the speed and 
temerity with which new historicism and cultural materialism came to 
dominate the study of early modern English literature. New historicism 
and cultural materialism demystifi ed and repoliticised canonical liter-
ary texts by bringing structuralist-Marxist and post-structuralist theory 
to bear on them. The radical critique of the essentialist humanism to 
which most previous Shakespeare criticism appeared prone proved irre-
sistible. Awakening from years spent in the apolitical slumber of New 
Criticism and formalism, the academy was plainly ripe for change. As 
Catherine Belsey recalls: ‘within a very short time [of the publication 
of Renaissance Self-Fashioning], it seemed that every American English 
department needed its resident early modern new historicist, and every 
Renaissance studies doctoral candidate’s research paper began with a 
historical anecdote’.2 By 1985, Jonathan Dollimore was able to state 
in his introduction to Political Shakespeare that ‘it would be wrong to 
represent idealist criticism as still confi dently dominant in Shakespeare 
studies’;3 in new historicism and cultural materialism, the so-called 
‘Crisis in English Studies’4 fi nally seemed to have found its solution. 
The discipline was reinvigorated by the prospect of dissident politics, 
‘reading against the grain’, Althusserian ideology critique, Foucauldian 
analyses of power, and feminist deconstructions of gender and sexuality; 
all of which must have felt like a breath of fresh air in 1985.
As Peter Erikson notes, by the mid-1980s new historicism and, by 
implication, cultural materialism had completed their ‘initial phase of 
development . . . and . . . entered a transitional stage marked by uncer-
tainty, growing pains, internal disagreement, and reassessment’.5 By the 
mid-1990s, new historicism and cultural materialism had secured their 
grip on Shakespeare studies and entered a period of what Hugh Grady 
calls ‘institutionalization and popularization’.6 Key essays by their 
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major practitioners were collected in anthologies, and summarised and 
critiqued in book-length treatments.7 One seminal volume of criticism, 
Alternative Shakespeares, which included several key cultural historicist 
essays, even spawned sequels.8 In 1995, Ivo Kamps declared: ‘material-
ist criticism has successfully entered virtually all aspects of Shakespeare 
studies’.9 In short, new historicism and cultural materialism – or ‘cul-
tural historicism’10 for the sake of brevity – became ‘the new orthodoxy 
in many Literature departments’.11 The bold, pioneering works of the 
1980s had become modern classics of twentieth-century Shakespeare 
criticism;12 what once provided a radical challenge to the status quo had 
itself become the dominant approach.
In 1996, Kiernan Ryan noted that the issues surrounding cultural his-
toricism were ‘no longer being debated with the same ferocity and fre-
quency’ as they were during the 1980s, and while this might have seemed 
to be ‘a sign that their charm has already faded and their credibility is 
in decline’, it was, in fact, a sign of how entrenched and pervasive the 
cultural historicist view had become.13 Almost fi fteen years later, Ryan’s 
observation still stands and it needs to be taken seriously. Today, as one 
group of critics put it, cultural historicism is ‘overwhelmingly the domi-
nant conceptual matrix of literary study’.14 Just as the pervasiveness of 
essentialist humanism before 1980 produced a climate in which critics 
stopped questioning their own latent assumptions, criticism today faces 
a similar ‘crisis’ provoked by the pervasiveness of cultural historicism’s 
anti-essentialist, anti-humanist ideas. If literary critics do not pause to 
refl ect upon their assumptions, intellectual stagnation and acquiescence 
in the academic status quo become real possibilities. For some critics this 
has already happened. In the view of Stephen Cohen, for example, ‘New 
Historicism has largely ceased to be a source of theoretical innovation 
in literary studies’; ‘the decades-long hegemony of New Historicism’s 
insistence on the political and ideological implication of literature’, he 
argues, has left us in the ‘critical doldrums’.15 Marcus Nordlund agrees 
and wonders ‘will a new dominant paradigm emerge and rescue literary 
studies from its increasing disenchantment with postmodern histori-
cism?’16 Joseph Carroll puts it more bluntly: ‘it cannot last’.17
It is worth pointing out here that it is not the aim of this book to 
dismiss the achievements of cultural historicism. We read and write 
about Shakespeare today, not as the victims of a constricting orthodoxy 
but as the inheritors of a critical legacy that succeeded in changing the 
character of Shakespeare studies signifi cantly. New historicism and 
cultural materialism have been not only instrumental in reinvigorating 
the study of early modern English literature but also politically vital for 
a generation of academics and students whose voices might otherwise 
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have been silenced by the quietism characteristic of New Criticism and 
traditional historicist scholarship. This book aims to rethink aspects of 
cultural historicism that have been hitherto under-theorised. It searches 
for radical political agency in the lives of individuals who face many 
constraints from a variety of determinants and is consistent with the 
original aims of both new historicism and cultural materialism.
Furthermore, it seems to me that, despite appearances, a groundswell 
of change is already well under way. This is not diffi cult to see if one 
casts a glance at Table 1.1, where I have mapped out the myriad ‘isms’ 
that exist in the current state of Shakespeare studies and listed their 
leading proponents.18 Although cultural historicists still hold a signifi -
cant majority, the ‘dissenter’ camps have been gaining traction as most 
of the fi rst-generation cultural historicists have been reaching their late 
sixties and early seventies. We seem to be on the verge of a sea change.
Ewan Fernie has noted a ‘new turn in criticism towards empiricism 
and the aesthetic’,19 which highlights two major debates in current 
Shakespeare studies. These are: fi rst, the reopened debate about human 
nature, which has been triggered partly by the advances made in this area 
by evolutionary psychology and neurobiology, advances that appear to 
contradict the radical anti-humanist critique of essentialist humanism; 
and second, the renewed concern with form and language. In other 
words, there are two general shifts in focus: the fi rst from culture to the 
individual, the second from context to text. I wish to centre my study of 
cultural historicism and Shakespeare’s history plays on the debate about 
human nature. However, before elaborating on my reasons for this, it 
is worth noting a few features of the ‘Revenge of the Aesthetic’,20 or, as 
Stephen Cohen dubs it, ‘historical formalism’,21 not least because they 
share several of the grounds for my critique of cultural historicism in the 
fi rst fi ve chapters of this book.
Cohen objects to the ‘pan-textualism’ of cultural historicism which, 
despite claims to the contrary,22 ‘render[s] it incapable of satisfactorily 
accounting for heterogeneity, confl ict, or historical change’. For Cohen, 
the problem is that cultural historicists ‘invite the effacing of the formal 
elements that set the literary text apart from other texts’. He proposes 
instead a type of criticism which can explore the ‘mutual implication’ 
of ‘literature’s formal individuation and its historical situation’.23 
Richard Levin, who has long struggled with cultural historicists on a 
variety of issues (see Chapters 2 and 3), has more of a problem with the 
way cultural historicists treat literary texts. He views their overwhelm-
ing concern with ‘certain ideological issues’ as a narrowing of focus. 
‘Typically’, he says, they ‘frame an argument, then turn selectively to 
passages in one or more texts’ to support it – a tendency which limits 
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stylistic analyses and discourages what Levin calls ‘a kind of alertness’ 
to the details and nuances of each play.24 Kiernan Ryan makes a similar 
argument; he speaks of ‘the tunnel vision to which so much radical 
criticism seems to be congenitally predisposed’, and complains about 
‘the neglect of formal techniques, structural implications and dramatic 
parentheses, whose import changes the meaning of the narrative they 
articulate’.25
These are arguments to which I am sympathetic; however, the main 
thrust of my critique of cultural historicism is theoretical. I believe that 
many of the problems faced by literary criticism today, especially in 
Shakespeare studies, are rooted in the anti-essentialist, anti-humanist 
theoretical framework that cultural historicism adopted in the 1980s. 
We need to update and, where necessary, overhaul our theories if we 
are to avoid languishing in the ‘critical doldrums’ of which Cohen 
speaks. Since the turn of the new millennium – when David Scott Kastan 
assumed that he was writing ‘after theory’, and Terry Eagleton declared 
‘the golden age of cultural theory’ to be over26 – the references to 
Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Macherey, Louis Althusser, Raymond Williams 
and Michel Foucault have slipped from the footnotes along with serious 
engagement with their respective theories. Yet their infl uences endure, 
hidden, disavowed and unquestioned. Scott Cutler Shershow’s axi-
omatic statement that ‘Shakespeare, like any other writer, like any other 
writing or reading or effort of thought, like language itself, can fi nally be 
nothing more nor less than what Marx calls the “product” and the “pres-
ence” of the community’27 is still tacitly if not overtly endorsed by many 
in the fi eld of Shakespeare studies. This statement seems to preclude the 
autonomy of the individual: if Shakespeare is truly ‘nothing more’ than 
the product of his community, then his ability to think things through 
for himself and come to his own conclusions is put into question. In the 
same volume, Shershow, along with Jean E. Howard, wonders: ‘How do 
we fi nd ourselves at a point in which the realm of the esthetic, last refuge 
of a universal humanism, has been cordoned off from history and sup-
posedly cut loose from market values?’28 Humanists might well wonder 
the same thing: how have we come to a point at which the belief in fun-
damental human universals has been cordoned off from the discussion 
of history or politics and ghettoised in the ‘realm of the esthetic’?
This monograph will critically assess the anti-humanist assumptions 
of cultural historicism and their impact on the reading and understand-
ing of Shakespeare’s plays. It posits that a writer of Shakespeare’s intelli-
gence and complexity requires a mode of criticism sensitive to the many 
nuances that distinguish his voice from the other voices of his world 
and time. To this end, I will scrutinise the assumptions and methods of 
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new historicism in Chapter 2 and of cultural materialism in Chapter 3 
to identify the problems they pose in practice. I will then put forward 
an argument against the anti-humanist assumptions that unite new 
historicists and cultural materialists in Chapter 4, before proposing an 
alternative set of assumptions in Chapter 5 that are more conducive to 
appreciating Shakespeare’s startling insights into the issues raised by the 
question of personal agency in history and ideology. In Chapter 6, with 
these issues in mind, I will survey the range of views in sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-century historiography to which Shakespeare might 
have been exposed, while maintaining that he had agency enough to 
make up his own mind about such matters. In Chapter 7 I will turn to 
the Henry VI plays to analyse Shakespeare’s close focus on individuals 
and their scope for agency in history; and in Chapter 8 I will turn to the 
second tetralogy to look at the complex understanding of ideology and 
power that Shakespeare develops in those plays.
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New Historicism
‘Arbitrary Connectedness’: ‘The Consequences of the 
Synchronic – or the Dangers of Spatializing Time’
It has been commonly believed that new historicism and cultural mate-
rialism constitute ‘a reaction against formalism’.1 The story goes that 
where the structuralists and New Critics found a self-contained unity in 
the literary text, the cultural historicists fi nd an expanse of intertextual 
relations. This is the kind of story Jeremy Hawthorn retells at the end of 
Cunning Passages:
After decades of literary criticism dominated by the formalisms of the New 
Critics, the structuralists, and the post-structuralists, the achievements of 
new historicism and, especially, cultural materialism, are allowing students 
of literature not just to observe but to take part in the social struggles that 
literature arises from and gives access to. The opportunity should be grasped. 
The doors to the ivory towers fi lled with prisoners taken by fi fty-seven varie-
ties of formalism have been unlocked. Let’s take a look outside.2
Hawthorn speaks here as if the new historicists and cultural mate-
rialists have led literary criticism to a new promised land, free from 
the chains of the structural totalities that characterised the formalist 
systems that they replaced. And before ‘freeing’ the students in this 
way, they scaled the walls of the old academy and shattered the political 
 conservatism  perpetuated by an apolitical formalism. Scott Wilson tells 
a similar tale:
The cultural materialist academic may no longer function as ‘the man of 
culture’ judging and evaluating the great works of a national tradition, the 
traditional scholar and critic, exposed by Marxist theory as an institutional 
‘state functionary’, the Capitalist lackey of an ideological state apparatus 
ensuring the uneventful reproduction of an exploitative mode of production 
for the ruling class.3
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New historicism and cultural materialism are thus said to supplant 
liberal-humanist scholarship with its outmoded, diachronic conception 
of ‘a unitary past’,4 and its view of history as a grand narrative of human 
progress, putting in its place ‘the idea of an epistemological rupture’ so 
prevalent in Althusserian and Foucauldian notions of a discontinuous 
history.5 Cultural historicism is said to replace the close reading required 
by the humanist’s formalism – which rests on assumptions of unity and 
ideological pretensions to scholarly objectivity – with the ‘methodologi-
cal anarchy’ celebrated by H. Aram Veeser.6
However, a brief engagement with other views of the cultural his-
toricist project tells a rather different story. In a seminal essay, Walter 
Cohen found that new historicism was not as radically opposed to for-
malism as it appeared to be:
The strategy is governed methodologically by the assumption that any one 
aspect of a society is related to any other. No organising principle determines 
these relationships: any social practice has at least a potential connection to 
any theatrical practice. Hence new historicist studies of Shakespeare have a 
radically unpredictable quality. This implicit commitment to arbitrary con-
nectedness produces impressive results . . . yet [this] commitment . . . inevita-
bly limits the persuasiveness of much new historicist work . . . Contradictions 
between essays arise as a matter of course.7
Cohen recognises the assumption in cultural historicism that any two 
parts of a culture will necessarily have signifi cance for each other on the 
grounds that they are the products of this same culture. Thus they will 
share certain ideological or discursive features, and might both be said 
to reproduce or to resist power. Cohen’s key criticism is that:
The assumption of arbitrary connectedness seems to preclude a systematic 
survey of the available evidence, leading instead to a kind of synecdoche in 
which a single text or group of texts stands in for all texts and thus exhausts 
the discursive fi eld.8
Rather than supplanting formalism, in other words, as Jeremy Hawthorn 
and Scott Wilson suggest it does, cultural historicism might be said to 
represent the fi fty-eighth variety to be manufactured by the formalist 
factory.
Others since Cohen have gone further, fi nding in this conception of 
culture, paradoxically, a type of ‘hidden formalism’. Among the most 
vehement has been David Scott Kastan, whose conclusions about new his-
toricism are similar to Cohen’s. Kastan characterises the typical new his-
toricist essay as ‘offering some bizarre incident as the point of generation 
of a cultural principle that is then discovered in a canonical text’.9 Like 
Cohen, he sees this move as ‘arbitrary connectedness’, one that assumes
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a society in which nothing is truly variant or discontinuous . . . The anecdote, 
however, clearly functions not as evidence but as trope – a synecdoche – 
assuming . . . that the part can stand for the whole, that culture is radically 
coherent . . . [New historicism and cultural materialism] are not properly 
historical at all but rather formalist practices, discovering pattern and order, 
unity and coherence, in the culture . . . exactly as an earlier generation of 
formalist critics found them in works of literature.10
This scathing assessment extends Cohen’s diagnosis of ‘arbitrary con-
nectedness’ and thraldom to synecdoche by making the bold claim that 
new historicism fi nds ‘unity and order’ in culture. Kastan accuses new 
historicism of formalism at the level of method. Richard Lehan also 
criticises new historicism for a perceived formalism, but fi nds another 
problem. For him, the new historicist ‘drains meaning from history’ by 
subscribing to the anti-humanist notion that history is discontinuous. 
To subscribe to that notion, Lehan continues, is to ‘spatialize time and 
rob it of sequence, direction, and agency’. He accuses new historicism 
of locking history into ‘part of a tropological frieze’, which begs the 
question of ‘how . . . we get from frieze to frieze, or from what Foucault 
would call episteme to episteme’. Lehan argues ultimately for the recov-
ery of ‘the diachronic nature’ of history and insists upon ‘the belief 
that meaning is built into time’ upon the fundamental logic of cause 
and effect. His solution is to re-establish ‘the idea of historical process’ 
by retracing ‘the connection’ between epistemes.11 Despite differences, 
what Kastan and Lehan have in common is their claim that new his-
toricism is not ‘historical’ at all and therefore can only, to use Hayden 
White’s phrase, ‘give offence to historians in general’ as well as reducing, 
rather than illuminating, the literary texts they appropriate.12
Before moving on, I want to ask a series of questions about the under-
lying assumptions and the consequences of cultural historicism that arise 
after reading Cohen, Kastan and Lehan. On what basis are the cultural 
historicists able to connect arbitrarily disparate aspects of culture? Is 
cultural historicism really a type of formalism? If so, can it be said to 
offer a real alternative to formalism, in the way its advocates announce? 
What are the consequences of employing a disjunctive theory of history 
in literary analysis? And to what extent does such a theory serve to deny 
political agency and rob history of meaning? I also want to ask a couple 
of further questions that these critics do not entirely take into account: 
fi rst, what is cultural historicism’s relationship with deconstruction 
and how does this affect its conceptualisation of culture? And second, 
does this synchronic approach to culture have any worth for the liter-
ary critic? With these questions in mind, let us turn to two of the key 
studies of new historicism: Jonathan Goldberg’s James I and the Politics 
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of Literature and Stephen Greenblatt’s essay ‘Martial Law in the Land 
of Cockaigne’.
James I and the Politics of Literature
In James I and the Politics of Literature, viewed by many as the arche-
typal new historicist text, ‘indicative of the conceptual dilemmas that 
haunt’ new historicism,13 Goldberg advances the argument that the 
theatrical works of the Jacobean era reproduce sovereign power. To 
make this argument he draws principally on Michel Foucault: ‘To adopt 
the voice of power is, in Foucault’s defi nition, to speak beyond oneself, 
ascribing one’s powers elsewhere, saying one thing and meaning another 
. . . Denying itself, contradiction defi nes the essence of the discourse of 
power.’14 Hence during James I’s rule, the poet’s work is ascribed to 
the ruler whose power is always already transcendent. The king and the 
playwright are inextricably linked by this power relation. Goldberg goes 
on to demonstrate this in a range of texts, most notably in the chapter 
‘The Royal Masque: Ideology and Writing’.15 In this chapter Goldberg 
introduces his version of the concept of ‘ideology’ – so thoroughly dis-
credited and disavowed by Foucault’s own thought – and he does so 
without reference to Marx, Gramsci, Mannheim, Althusser, Hall or 
any other major theorist of ideology. This is most telling in Goldberg’s 
virtual confl ation of the state with the fi gure of the king. Goldberg’s 
study paints a picture of Jacobean England as the virtual extension of 
the king’s will. The Marx of Capital might have found something dis-
tinctly Hegelian about this landscape:
To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, 
which, under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independ-
ent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the 
external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’.16
Goldberg’s theoretically disengaged application of the term ‘ideology’ 
leaves his conception of sovereign power open to the charge of ideal-
ism. So it is unsurprising when he turns to Ben Jonson, and fi nds that 
the Jacobean masque ‘represents the king’, that the masque and the king 
mirror each other to refl ect ‘the mysteries of the state’.17
Goldberg’s treatment of Measure for Measure is virtually identical. 
Here he announces that ‘the crucial note that links theatre and culture 
in James’s time [is]: representation’.18 The king was always engaged in 
some form of symbolic action because he ‘represented’ the state, the 
theatre was also in the game of ‘representation’, and the playwrights 
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who wrote for its stage were also ‘representing’ things in their plays. 
Parallels and linkages are seen not only as possible but also as necessary 
to make. Thus for Goldberg:
In the Duke [of Measure for Measure], Shakespeare has written a role that 
represents his power as a playwright as coincident with the powers of the sov-
ereign . . . dramatist and monarch represent each other, a doubleness housed 
in a single person.19
So, because Shakespeare, Duke Vincentio and James I all happen to 
have been engaged in the act of representing something else, they now 
not only imply each other but also actually constitute the same person. 
And, by extension, Measure for Measure is effectively a substitute or 
‘double’ for sovereign power. The substitutions and doubling that occur 
in the play are seen ultimately as emblematic of this relationship. With 
this established, Goldberg is able to highlight the ways in which the 
Duke and James I are similar, not least because they are in effect the 
same person. Let us not forget that the Duke is also Shakespeare and 
that Shakespeare is also James I, as if they form some unholy trinity. 
Hence, given this triple identifi cation, ‘the power of authority takes root 
in language itself’. There is no escape, especially when one considers 
that language is ‘endlessly reduplicative, endlessly representing’.20 If one 
extends Goldberg’s logic, because James I is the node of representation 
and words themselves are ‘endlessly’ representative, all words become 
ascribed to his power; in fact, all words used in Jacobean England are 
James himself and James I is Jacobean England – he has no ‘private self’. 
Alan Sinfi eld is justifi ed in his conclusion that
Goldberg sees language . . . as the vehicle of a royal power which has always 
already incorporated all possibilities . . . Power = representation produces the 
same outcome as power / subversion: an unbreakable circle of power, pro-
ceeding from and returning to the monarch.21
This image of monarch-as-representation chimes with Foucault’s 
description of Don Quixote in The Order of Things:
[Don Quixote] is himself like a sign, a long, thin graphism, a letter that has 
just escaped from the open pages of a book. His whole being is nothing but 
language, text, printed pages, stories that have already been written down. 
He is made up of interwoven words; he is writing itself, wandering through 
the world among the resemblances of things.22
Like Don Quixote, Goldberg’s James I becomes nothing but the system 
of representation he aspires to, and, by analogy, so do the Duke and 
Shakespeare himself.
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When faced with such a bizarre circular argument, one must ask what 
its theoretical basis is. The synecdochic tendency that both Cohen and 
Kastan recognised is here pursued ad absurdum. Given the similarity to 
his description of Don Quixote, one might suggest that it is Foucault at 
work here. In The Order of Things, he describes ‘the madman’, who is
alienated in analogy . . . he takes things for what they are not, and people for 
one another . . . for him, the crown makes the king . . . he is Different only in 
so far as he is unaware of Difference, he sees nothing but resemblances and 
signs of resemblance everywhere; for him all signs resemble one another and 
all resemblances have the value of signs.23
Against this fi gure he sets ‘the poet’, who
beneath the named, constantly expected differences, rediscovers the buried 
kinship between things, their scattered resemblances . . . he hears another 
deeper, discourse, which recalls the time when words fl ittered in the universal 
resemblance of things . . . The poet brings similitude to the signs that speak 
it, whereas the madman loads all signs with a resemblance that ultimately 
erases them.24
It is not clear whether Goldberg is the poet or the madman, but what is 
clear is that Foucault does not advocate either as a position for serious 
analysis.
For the time being, we can see that reading Foucault does not neces-
sarily inform Goldberg’s method; Goldberg and Foucault are plainly not 
engaged in the same practice and it would be misleading to present them 
in that way. As Catherine Belsey explains, ‘Foucault commonly contrasts 
one epoch with another’, whereas Goldberg’s ‘inclination [is] to isolate 
synchronic moments rather than situate them in a differential relation 
to what came before and after’.25 When one considers what Goldberg 
is actually doing with the fi gures of James I, Shakespeare and the Duke 
of Measure for Measure, the analysis ‘seem[s] close to the formalism of 
New Criticism’.26 We might remember Howard Felperin’s point that 
Goldberg’s ultimate aim is to show how different Renaissance culture is 
from our own. Despite this, curiously, contra Foucault and contra post-
structuralism, Goldberg takes similitude rather than difference as his key 
analytical tool. James, Shakespeare and the Duke are seen to have many 
structural similarities, as if they are poetic devices in some wider text. 
Their relationship is like that of the end words of a tercet rhymed aaa, in 
which the rhyme serves to bind these disparate words together in union: 
‘Precisely! The[ir] nature is single, one, unifi ed.’27
However, Goldberg’s position is more sophisticated than that. His 
insistence upon the ‘endlessly reduplicative’ nature of language and 
the virtual fusion of the real James I with the textual, symbolic king 
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 suggests the infl uence of post-structuralist thought and especially that of 
Derrida.28 In New Literary Histories, Claire Colebrook describes the key 
difference between structuralism and post-structuralism: whereas ‘struc-
turalism posited the idea of a closed system of signs’ (as in Saussurean 
linguistics), post-structuralism explodes that notion by arguing that it 
is impossible to fi nd any discursive category that is not always already 
an effect of structural difference; in other words, there is no ‘outside’ 
of the structure which leads to the ‘necessarily undecidable’ nature of 
its determination.29 Even a seemingly concrete concept such as ‘being’ 
(a ‘true’ concept that is beyond doubt in Cartesian empiricism) is only 
understood in relation to ‘nothing’, rather than as something intrinsic, 
tangible and provable. The concept, then, is said to be ‘necessarily unde-
cidable’ because our understanding of it is a negotiation between it and 
a second concept; the ‘meaning’ of the thing itself is always deferred. 
Furthermore, unlike in structuralism, the concepts of both textual unity 
and binary opposition are discredited, because there are no formal limits 
to the structural totality. Colebrook argues that in the United States 
Derrida’s ‘necessarily undecidable’ was misread as ‘complete indetermi-
nacy or relativism’, to the extent that East Coast American deconstruc-
tion ‘has been seen to harbour an apolitical, ahistorical and dangerously 
conservative relativism’. In a system of such complete relativism, ‘no 
meaning is possible and . . . all moral claims are unsustainable’. For 
Colebrook, American deconstruction is ‘a formalist dead-end’. The 
endless play of difference, and the resultant infi nite deferral of meaning, 
paradoxically limit all reading to the same conclusion: that meaning is 
endlessly indeterminable. Deconstructionist practice is thus seen as little 
more than ‘a demonstration of the “truth” of this philosophy’. In this 
way, Colebrook shows how American deconstruction is ‘just another 
form of closed formalism’.30 Goldberg’s study stops short of making 
such truth claims, but it borrows from deconstruction two key ideas: 
fi rst, the notion that there are no formal limits to the structural totality, 
so that binary opposites imply each other, and textual and non-textual 
discourse merge in the endless doubling of ‘representation’; and second, 
the notion that language therefore offers ‘complete indeterminacy’.
Thus, Goldberg inherits formalism from three distinct sources: fi rst, 
and most explicitly, from the structuralism of Foucault; second, more 
obliquely, through the institutional formalism of New Criticism, which 
manifests itself in the way he reads culture like an enormous poem, 
spotting the moments of emphatic stress or repetition; and third, in 
the concepts he borrows from the Yale-infl uenced school of American 
deconstruction. His practice cannot be accused of the ‘arbitrary con-
nectedness’ that Cohen complains of, because it has its own internal 
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logic that links separate fi gures – the players of a masque and the king, 
or Shakespeare, the Duke and the king – according to their structural 
relations. However, Cohen’s charge that new historicism ‘exhausts’ the 
discursive fi eld through the employment of synecdoche still stands; the 
king becomes the ultimate synecdoche, who not only ‘stands in’ for all 
texts but also becomes all texts by ascribing all discourse to his own 
power. Goldberg’s brand of new historicism thus represents a type of 
formalism, one that is abstracted to the level of ‘culture’, a realm that 
draws no distinctions between text and context to the point where dif-
ferent individuals merge under the pressure of culture’s structural cohe-
sion. James I is seen as a physical manifestation of the sovereign state 
and the strength of his discourse is so transcendent that it has the power 
to transform language itself, and in doing so reconstitutes all it touches 
– in effect, all of Jacobean culture, and especially the theatre – in its own 
image.
The key danger of this type of formalism is that it places the text 
under a grossly distorting lens. Goldberg’s logic is coherent, in as much 
as ‘representation’ can be seen reproducing itself; but the argument 
that the sovereign was able to exercise such complete hegemony over 
the entire category of ‘representation’ is less convincing. The spread 
of James’s power is predicated on a formalist conception of culture, 
one that insists that the links between the disparate discursive fi elds of 
society (and the texts and individuals that constitute them) are similar, if 
not identical, to the separate lines or images of a poem. Where the fun-
damental organising principle for the formalist (whether a New Critic 
or a structuralist) is the text itself, the organising principle for Goldberg 
is the text of ‘culture’. He takes on board fully the post-structuralist 
notion that texts and contexts are inseparable and pushes it to its logical 
conclusion. But in doing so, ‘culture’ becomes the ultimate formalist 
text. Goldberg is guilty of reading ‘culture’ in precisely the way that the 
New Critics he opposes read literary texts. Edward Pechter argues that 
in new historicism ‘ideology retains a privileged or sub-structural posi-
tion, preceding and determining discourse’,31 but it is diffi cult to see any 
such distinction between ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’ here. For Goldberg, 
language is sovereign power and the discourse is the ideology. This can 
partly account for why he is able to use ‘power’, ‘culture’, ‘ideology’ 
and ‘discourse’ so interchangeably, because they all amount to the same 
thing: the master-text of the Jacobean era.
Quite apart from the problems associated with this kind of formalist 
analysis per se, a further problem emerges when one asks the question: 
‘does culture really work in this way?’ This treatment of culture as a 
‘master-text’ involves a strikingly ahistorical fl attening of the diachronic 
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fi eld because Goldberg’s analysis, like any purely formalist analysis, can 
consider only synchronic relations. Hayden White saw this in 1989:
New historicism is reductionist in a double sense: it reduces the social to the 
status of a function of the cultural, and then further reduces the cultural to 
the status of a text . . . How could one possibly redress the balance of a pre-
dominantly formalist approach to the study of literary history by substituting 
for it . . . a specifi cally ‘synchronic’ treatment?32
Yet during the deluge of reassessments that new historicism underwent 
around the same time as White’s article, this ‘synchronic’ treatment 
was precisely what was heralded as the answer, not only in Alan Liu’s 
famous essay on new historicism, ‘The Power of Formalism’,33 but also, 
ironically, in the work of critics who claimed to be against formalism. 
These reassessments can be read as a bid to tackle the residue of ‘formal-
ist ideology’ found in the American academy with an advanced type of 
formalism in the shape of post-structuralism.
Carolyn Porter offers one of the most prominent critiques. She com-
plains that new historicism continues ‘to exhibit the force of a formalist 
legacy whose subtle denials of history – as the scene of heterogeneity, 
difference, contradiction, at least – persist’. Porter argues, along similar 
lines to the above analysis of Goldberg’s study, that in new historicism 
‘the social turns out to be read as we have been trained to read a literary 
text, that is, in traditional formalist terms’.34 But, whereas my analysis 
draws attention to the assumption that culture is a master-text consti-
tuted only of synchronic internal relations, Porter is more concerned 
with the prevalence of ‘close reading’ (especially in its use of anecdotes) 
in new historicist practice and its political ramifi cations. She writes as 
if ‘close reading’, because of its associations with New Criticism, which 
‘has been relentlessly attacked and discredited’,35 is itself responsible 
for this formalist tendency.36 Porter therefore views formalism as the 
enemy: ‘insofar as new historicist work relies upon the anecdotalization 
of the discursive fi eld now opened for interpretation, it can only expand 
the range of the very formalism which it so manifestly wants to chal-
lenge’. Porter then makes the paradoxical move of attempting to combat 
this by proposing a post-structuralist (and therefore still formalist) solu-
tion: to construct ‘the discursive fi eld as fl at’ by doing away with the 
artifi cial binary oppositions imposed by ‘formalist ideology’. She argues 
that seeing both terms of a binary opposition ‘on the same plane would 
enable us to bring again into view the “memory of hostile encounters” 
such binaries serve to deny, to erase from memory’.37 This, in effect, is 
a deeply synchronic model, which eliminates the possibility of ‘vertical’ 
signifi cation along the ‘diachronic axis’;38 Richard Lehan’s nightmare 
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vision of a world without cause, effect or meaning is fully realised. It is 
the replacement of the hierarchical, ‘essentially topographical’, herme-
neutic fi eld with an ever-expanding spatial fi eld that has no readily iden-
tifi able limits, that cannot be grasped as an intelligible structure’, with 
‘precise identities assigned on its regional levels’.39
The only difference between Goldberg’s formalism and Porter’s 
apparent ‘solution’ is thus a matter of emphasis. Whereas the fi gures 
in Goldberg’s Jacobean state are simply ‘double-voiced’, in that they 
must each deliver a discourse disseminated by an all-powerful monarch, 
Porter’s fi gures are: 
‘Double-voiced’ in Bakhtin’s sense . . . they may be understood not as always 
already neutralised by the ideologies they must speak through in order to be 
heard, but rather as infl ecting, distorting, even appropriating such ideologies, 
genres, values so as to alter their confi guration . . . [These are] multi-voiced 
discourses in which both dominant and oppositional ideological strains are at 
work . . . Once they are seen as belonging to the same discursive fi eld as their 
dominant opponents . . . they cannot be denied agency.40
Porter succeeds in overturning the hegemony of Goldberg’s all-powerful 
monarch, but she does so on Goldberg’s own terms. The organising 
principle she must appeal to remains the master-text of culture. The 
‘multi-voiced discourses’ are still linked to ‘their dominant opponents’ 
by a purely synchronic relation – that of the ‘discursive fi eld’ – so, 
ironically, despite her earlier concerns, Porter ends up extending the very 
formalism she so staunchly opposes. By making the search for political 
agency the focus of her study, the wider problem, that this sort of syn-
chronicity is both formalist and deeply ahistorical, goes begging. Porter 
succeeds in creating a post-colonial and feminist inversion of Goldberg, 
one that fi nds a sense of agency for the lost voices of subordination, but 
the problems that were inherent in Goldberg’s method remain intact.
‘Martial Law in the Land of Cockaigne’
With this issue in mind, I will turn now from Goldberg and Porter to the 
‘cultural poetics’ of Stephen Greenblatt. Whereas most studies of new 
historicism take the essay ‘Invisible Bullets’ as their point of departure, 
I want to concentrate on another essay in Shakespearean Negotiations: 
‘Martial Law in the Land of Cockaigne’, mainly because this subtler 
essay is more representative of what Greenblatt means by ‘cultural 
poetics’ and of Greenblatt’s practice in general; furthermore it is less stig-
matised by the endlessly quoted maxim ‘There is subversion, no end of 
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subversion, only not for us’. The fi rst thing to say about this essay is that 
it does not proceed in the standard academic way from coherent hypoth-
esis to stable conclusion. Greenblatt does not work towards making 
a fi nal grand statement, but opts rather to comment on a number of 
things in passing. In four loosely connected sections, Greenblatt argues 
that ‘fi ctive representations have themselves helped to empower [the] 
practice’ of salutary anxiety, and he embarks on a lengthy treatment of a 
possible source of The Tempest, William Strachey’s account of a tempest 
that struck an English fl eet headed for Jamestown.41 He also considers 
an ostensibly unrelated story told by H. M. Stanley, in which he burns 
a copy of Shakespeare’s Complete Works (Chandos edition) in order 
to save his ‘precious notebook, with its sketches and ethnographic and 
philologic details’.42 The essay ends on the seemingly understated note 
that the Stanley anecdote demonstrates that while Shakespeare is central 
to our culture, ‘we should remind ourselves that there are usually other 
discourses – here the notes and vocabulary and maps – that are instru-
mentally far more important . . . but without Shakespeare we wouldn’t 
have the notes’.43 This conclusion bears only the most general relation to 
the twenty-odd pages that precede it, but it is in precisely this elliptical 
approach that Greenblatt delights. Indeed, as has been mentioned, for 
him this scattershot effect is the stuff of ‘real life’. However, the fi rst two 
sections of the essay, which account for the bulk of it, do present a fairly 
coherent set of theses and it is on these that my own analysis will focus.
‘Martial Law in the Land of Cockaigne’ starts, characteristically 
enough, with an anecdote about a sermon Hugh Latimer delivered 
before Lady Catherine Bertie. In the sermon Latimer tells an anecdote 
of his own about a time when he and Thomas Bliney visited a prison 
and came across a woman who had been accused of murdering her own 
child. To summarise this anecdote briefl y: the woman claims the child 
had been sick and died of natural causes. Latimer believes her, obtains a 
pardon from Henry VIII, and goes back to see the woman who, having 
now delivered her baby, believes that she is to be executed. As a Catholic, 
she is fearful of dying without fi rst being cleansed of ‘the stain associ-
ated with any blood or discharge’. As he is a staunch Protestant, Latimer 
withholds the pardon until the woman accepts his doctrinal point, only 
fi nally revealing it when she relents. This brings Greenblatt to his fi rst 
major contention: ‘I want to suggest that this little story reveals char-
acteristic Renaissance beliefs and practices.’ It is already possible to see 
that the anecdote is being used as a synecdoche in precisely the manner 
Kastan claims. Greenblatt then proceeds to make a number of observa-
tions about the gender relations at work in the anecdote. He suggests 
that Latimer ‘re-establishes male dominance in a moment of appar-
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ent inferiority’ (as the sermon is delivered to Lady Bertie), ‘reinforced 
by Latimer’s saving of the woman’, and if one follows ‘the implied 
 analogical relations’: ‘the woman is to man as man is to God’.44
After making these comments about gender relations, Greenblatt 
shifts gear once again to bring into focus another claim, the idea that 
Latimer ‘transcoded’ the practice of purifi cation from the religious to 
the civil sphere. This is a move he sees refl ected in The Winter’s Tale, 
when Leontes denies Hermione ‘“the child-bed privilege” because 
he believes her adulterous body is defi led beyond redemption . . . the 
secularized ritual is disrupted by a primal male nausea at the thought 
of the female body’.45 Greenblatt dwells no further on this; it is a brief 
illustrative point. One might ask why the ‘ritual’ is ‘secularized’ here: 
why is ‘the child-bed privilege’ necessarily ‘secularized’? It is true in the 
context of The Winter’s Tale that these lines are spoken in a court of 
law over which Leontes presides as monarch, which is a secular ritual 
of sorts. But – given that the ultimate appeal is made to, and judgement 
passed by, a pagan god, the ‘sealed-up oracle, by the hand delivered / 
Of great Apollo’s priest’ (3.2.125–6) – in the terms of the play itself 
there is no evidence either of the pregnant woman’s Catholic beliefs or 
of the transcoding to the civil sphere supposedly carried out by Latimer. 
Greenblatt’s intention here is to draw a quick parallel to demonstrate a 
similar scenario in Shakespeare before moving swiftly on. Superfi cially, 
he fi nds his parallel; it cannot be denied that Hermione has recently 
given birth to a child in that scene or that Leontes imprisoned her when 
she should have been cleansed and resting. However, in Greenblatt’s 
analysis, the ritual is just as ‘transcoded’ in The Winter’s Tale as it is 
in the Latimer anecdote, even though it is not clear that Leontes makes 
the same move as Latimer. For the analogy to work at all, Leontes must 
take the role of Henry VIII and the state, and Hermione the role of the 
woman, but Latimer himself has no parallel in The Winter’s Tale. Given 
that Latimer is the agent of ‘transcoding’ the ritual from the religious 
to the civil sphere, and given that no such agent exists in The Winter’s 
Tale, it can only be concluded that the ‘childbed privilege’ (3.2.101) 
Hermione speaks of is neither ‘transcoded’ nor ‘secularized’. The state-
ment that The Winter’s Tale ‘at once symbolically rehearses and reverses 
the ritual pattern we glimpse in Latimer: the tainting of the female, her 
exclusion from the social contacts that normally govern her sex, and 
her ultimate reintegration into a renewed community’,46 is ultimately 
insubstantial. The two texts are only similar because they share, to 
borrow Roland Barthes’s phrase, ‘cardinal functions’ on the level of nar-
rative.47 The deeper political analysis of ‘transcoding’ truly applies only 
to the Latimer story. For Greenblatt, the fact that it bears a fairly close 
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similarity to The Winter’s Tale is enough for the same analysis to apply 
to both texts; in short, Greenblatt is guilty of indulging in some subtle 
‘transcoding’ of his own.
This is typical of Greenblatt’s strategy throughout the rest of the 
essay. After the comment about The Winter’s Tale, within a few words 
Greenblatt has shifted into another gear. He doubles back on himself 
to focus once again on Latimer’s ‘strategic practice’ and introduces yet 
another concept to the analysis: ‘anxiety’.48 What interests Greenblatt 
about the Latimer story in particular is Latimer’s tactic of letting the 
woman believe she is going to be executed in order to coerce her into 
accepting his doctrinal point. Greenblatt is reminded of Measure for 
Measure. The Duke employs exactly the same strategy in letting his 
subjects believe they are to be executed, only to pardon them at the last 
minute. Given this undoubted and striking similarity, we are told:
The resemblance between the tales arises not because Latimer’s sermon is 
one of Shakespeare’s sources but because Latimer is practicing techniques of 
arousing and manipulating anxiety, and these techniques are crucial elements 
in the representational technology of Elizabethan and Jacobean theater.49
This is the closest thing to a crux in Greenblatt’s essay, and for the long 
second and third sections it is the hinge on which it ultimately turns. 
The crucial term here is ‘anxiety’, which is never prefaced or elaborated 
upon. One assumes that it is meant in its conventional sense of ‘the state 
of being anxious’. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defi nes the 
most common usage of ‘anxious’ as follows:
a.  Troubled or uneasy in mind about some uncertain event; being in painful 
or disturbing suspense; concerned, solicitous.
b.  Const., of an issue dreaded (obs.); for an issue desired; about a thing or 
person involved in uncertain issues.
Thus, for ‘anxiety’ to be felt, there is one clear prerequisite: the person 
must be faced with some ‘dreaded’ or ‘uncertain’ event or issue in an 
unknown future. By this defi nition, it is beyond doubt that the woman of 
Latimer’s anecdote and (at least) Claudio of Measure for Measure expe-
rience ‘anxiety’. However, Greenblatt makes the term do much more 
work than that; he turns his attention to ‘the staging of anxiety’. And 
in this wider context – where he is considering Shakespearean theatre 
in general rather than the single case of Measure for Measure – the 
meaning of ‘anxiety’ is transfi gured to encompass a much wider sphere 
of reference than the ‘uncertain event’ of the OED defi nition. A kind 
of dualism emerges in Greenblatt’s description of Renaissance theatre, 
which is aligned with ‘love, courtship, music, dance, and poetry’, on the 
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one hand, and on the other with anxiety, which is seen as ‘seasoned by 
fear, grief, and the threat of shame or death’. ‘Fear’ and ‘the threat of 
shame or death’ reside safely in the domain of ‘anxiety’, but is it accu-
rate to include ‘grief’ in the register of ‘anxiety’? As the term becomes 
ever looser, this sense of ‘anxiety’ as ‘grief’ soon transforms itself into 
‘suffering’ in general.50 Greenblatt’s dependence on this wider sense 
of ‘anxiety’ gives him scope to appropriate any text he fancies for his 
analysis as long as there is a degree of human pain or suffering involved.
That said, Greenblatt offers a much subtler analysis of Shakespeare’s 
treatment of sovereign power in Measure for Measure than Goldberg. 
Because the social sphere of the theatre is always ‘subordinated to the 
overriding need to give pleasure’, it can only offer an ersatz version of 
anxiety. It produces what Greenblatt calls ‘represented anxiety’, which 
amounts to a mere simulacrum of the real thing: ‘salutary anxiety’.51 Due 
to this crucial difference, Greenblatt offers arguably the closest thing to 
the subversion of power we glimpse in Shakespearean Negotiations: ‘If 
Shakespeare in Measure for Measure seems to represent the protago-
nist’s task as infl icting anxiety for ideological purposes, he also clearly 
calls that task into question.’ The Duke’s failed attempt to force Juliet to 
succumb to his doctrine, and the drunken fi gure of Barnardine at the end 
of the play, undermine his effort, following Latimer, to arouse ‘anxiety’. 
Through Shakespeare’s ‘complex ironic scrutiny’ ‘salutary anxiety’ is 
punctured and shown to be occasionally fallible as a method of control, 
though it remains none the less an effective technique of coercion.52 
Greenblatt’s conception of culture is diverse and heterogeneous enough 
to make a distinction between the fi gures and social spheres of James I 
and Shakespeare, although it still elides James and the Duke.
However, there is also an assumption in his reading of Measure for 
Measure that ‘power’ exists in culture like an identifi able essence. The 
assumption is that it is possible to expose the machinations of state 
power, disseminated as it is throughout culture, by taking any part of 
that culture and looking for it, ‘buried and hidden’, in the fabric of its 
constitution. In this essay, Greenblatt treats the technique of arousing 
anxiety like a DNA sequence, which contains, ‘encoded’ within it, the 
genetic blueprint for the entire organism. In biology, one can fi nd the 
same DNA ‘blueprint’ for the entire organism regardless of where it 
comes from. In principle, at least, whether the object of study is a strand 
of hair, a piece of skin, a bone or a drop of blood, if it came from the 
same animal it is possible – through the ‘blueprint’ – to recreate that 
animal in its entirety. To cite Belsey once more: ‘in its homogenizing 
impulse new historicism . . . reproduces the values of American func-
tionalism, which implies that the local features of a society all work, in 
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the last analysis, to maintain the social order as a whole’.53 This echoes 
the work of the sociological functionalist, Talcott Parsons, who was 
hugely infl uential in America in the 1960s, much more so than Foucault 
or Althusser.54
The functionalist belief that one can compare society to a living 
organism is precisely what one fi nds at work in Greenblatt. Greenblatt 
states that ‘the ruling elite believed that a measure of insecurity and fear 
was a necessary, healthy element in the shaping of proper loyalties, and 
Elizabethan and Jacobean institutions deliberately invoked this insecu-
rity’. He goes on to demonstrate this with yet another anecdote about 
the time James I unexpectedly pardoned Lords Grey and Cobham and 
Sir Gervase Markham on the day of their planned execution. This is fol-
lowed by the claim that ‘the great virtue of this technique is that it blocks 
secret wrath and inward grudging’. Then comes the functionalist move: 
these techniques of arousing ‘anxiety’ ‘are already implicated in cultural 
practices that are essential to the making and staging of plays . . . The 
theatre is a virtual machine for deploying these techniques in a variety 
of registers.’55 This statement comes as a bolt from the blue, obeying 
a bewildering logic that will be familiar to readers of Goldberg. The 
sovereign state uses ‘spectacle’ in its overt staging of power and mercy, 
and therefore apprehends and conditions the theatre’s use of ‘spectacle’ 
and its staging of ‘represented power’ and ‘represented mercy’. The sov-
ereign state is involved in the fashioning of texts for its state legislature, 
and therefore apprehends and conditions the theatre’s fashioning of 
texts for the stage. The state and the stage are thus complicit (just as in 
Goldberg), in as much as the latter is in thrall to the former.
The absurdity of this logic becomes apparent when one considers how 
tumultuous the Tudor and early Stuart periods were. Did the attempted 
regicide undertaken by Guy Fawkes and his co-conspirators in the 
Gunpowder Plot merely replicate the state executions authorised by 
James I? Were the Babington and Ridolfi  plots a function of the state’s 
technique of arousing anxiety? The assumptions underlying Goldberg’s 
and Greenblatt’s interpretations belittle the struggles and political differ-
ences of the period by arbitrarily connecting them and ascribing absurd 
levels of symbolic power to the sovereign state. However, it is the over-
whelming reliance on synecdoche rather than ‘arbitrary connectedness’ 
that ultimately undermines Greenblatt’s essay. It does not follow that the 
Stuart sovereign state and theatre ‘implicate’ each other by virtue of the 
fact that both were involved in the staging of ‘spectacles’ or the induce-
ment of ‘anxiety’. Greenblatt’s analysis displays great subtlety when it 
suggests that the theatre is different enough from sovereignty to give it a 
‘complex ironic treatment’, but, almost paradoxically, it  maintains that 
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the theatre is also a ‘virtual machine’ that disseminates the techniques 
of state power as a matter of course, because it is  constituted by those 
techniques.
Hence it is possible to conclude that, despite marked differences, 
Goldberg and Greenblatt share the assumption that culture functions 
synchronically as a massive monolithic text. This assumption is the 
basis for their linking of seemingly disparate aspects of culture, because, 
in the fi nal analysis, each aspect of the culture will necessarily bear 
the imprint of the unifi ed whole. In the essay that immediately follows 
Walter Cohen’s in Shakespeare Reproduced, Don E. Wayne notes that, 
by assuming this:
We run the risk of aestheticizing power in a new formalism that traces rela-
tionships among historical documents of various kinds. Such intertextual 
relations in a given historical moment will then operate in our criticism in 
the way that generic categories, narrative functions, and stylistic devices did 
formerly.56
James Holstun also recognised this risk in 1989:
[New historicism] totalizes prematurely by arguing that all cultural confl icts, 
all exercises of power and resistance necessarily register themselves inside 
canonical cultural artefacts. This sort of argument assumes that culture is 
a logical structure that can be captured by an artwork forming a structure 
homologous to it. A view of culture as a material entity, on the other hand, 
studies the relation between the way a subculture articulates itself and the 
way it is articulated by another subculture.57
This analysis goes further than Wayne’s in making the suggestion that 
culture does not have a coherent or logical structure. It recognises that 
in reality culture does not function like a living organism with a DNA 
‘blueprint’; it is vast, heterogeneous and multifaceted. Therefore, one 
aspect of that culture will not necessarily illuminate or have any signifi -
cance for another.
The implication of this monolithic conception of early modern culture 
in Goldberg’s and Greenblatt’s work leaves them both open to a further 
charge beyond that of ‘functionalism’: namely, the charge of resurrect-
ing something approaching the essentialism of the ‘Hegelian expressive 
unity of culture’.58 As Jürgen Pieters explains: ‘[Greenblatt] conceives 
of cultural totalities in terms of organized, dynamic systems that are 
subdivided into separate, through interrelated “zones” (the zone of reli-
gions, the zone of economy, the zone of theatre, the zone of politics).’59 
The binding force that maintains unity in this heterogeneous structure 
is ‘the notion of social energy’, which Pieters fi nds ‘too underdeveloped’ 
and describes as an ‘all too vague concept’.60 Of course, new historicists 
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and cultural materialists have always been adamant in their opposi-
tion to humanist essentialism. Neither Greenblatt nor Goldberg would 
object to Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s anti-humanist diagnosis of an earlier 
 manifestation of essentialism, New Criticism:
Studying ‘formal properties’ in detachment tends to efface differences 
between readers and hence makes it easy to absolutize the reading position 
of the teacher. This has facilitated the assumption, in Englit., of an essential 
humanity, supposedly informing both text and critic, and hence contributing 
to the oppression of the out-groups. If a lower-class person, woman, student, 
person of colour, lesbian or gay man did not ‘respond’ in an ‘appropriate’ 
way to ‘the text’, it was because they were reading without insight, sensitivity, 
perceptiveness – i.e. not from the privileged academic position.61
It would be inaccurate to suggest that either Goldberg or Greenblatt 
maintains any notion of an ‘essential humanity’. But, if one replaces 
this concept with that of an ‘essential culture’ (in a specifi c historical 
moment), then the analysis might still stand, with, of course, the marked 
difference that the only ‘out-groups’ that new historicism can feasibly 
be accused of ‘oppressing’ are those of Shakespeare’s own  audience 
and culture. The academic position is ‘privileged’ in Goldberg and 
Greenblatt, because the critic has the benefi t of hindsight and historical 
and cultural difference to draw on. The crucial term of Dollimore and 
Sinfi eld’s analysis is ‘detachment’. As Lehan points out, Goldberg and 
Greenblatt treat the ‘formal properties’ of culture ‘in detachment’ from 
diachronic history in that the cultural moment (or ‘episteme’) is consid-
ered in isolation, as discontinuous with those that preceded or succeeded 
it. The emphasis on ‘formal properties’ also produces a ‘detachment’ 
when considering the individual texts, artefacts and inhabitants of a 
culture. As I have shown, it ‘tends to efface differences’ between them, 
making artifi cial connections between disparate aspects of culture. It 
is Goldberg who is guilty of making these connections. Greenblatt can 
recognise a crucial difference between the distinct discursive fi elds of 
sovereignty and the theatre. But, despite this – by transposing his own 
analysis of anecdotes on to texts whose relationship to those anecdotes 
is ‘arbitrary in the extreme’62 – his practice still presupposes an irreduc-
ibly ‘essential’ notion of a unifi ed culture. To avoid confusion with the 
older tradition of essentialism – to which new historicists are plainly 
opposed – I will follow Catherine Belsey in her adoption of the term 
‘culturalism’ to describe this type of ‘cultural essentialism’.63
I have already shown how this culturalism can partly be seen as the 
residue of the academic formalism found in New Criticism and decon-
struction in the years preceding new historicism, but the problem is too 
deep-rooted to be explained away so easily. The question that must be 
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asked at this juncture is: in terms of theory, where does this cultural-
ism in new historicism come from? Both Lentricchia and Pieters lay the 
blame at Foucault’s door, making the comparison between Greenblatt’s 
underdeveloped notion of ‘social energy’ and Foucault’s similarly mys-
terious and pervasive notion of ‘power’. But the above analysis shows a 
marked difference in the respective methodologies of Foucault and new 
historicism: while Foucault’s analysis is predicated on an assumption 
of fundamental difference at the level of infrastructure (i.e. something 
similar to Gramsci, the perpetual confrontation or struggle of ‘power-
relations’), both Goldberg and Greenblatt work on the assumption of 
an implied infrastructural similitude (i.e. generic traits that pervade 
a culture). Neither is this an idea inherited from the structuralism 
of Althusser, whose entire philosophical project was to divest Marx of 
Hegelian essentialism:
The reduction of all the elements that make up the concrete life of a histori-
cal epoch . . . to one principle of internal unity, is itself only possible on the 
absolute condition of taking the whole of concrete life of a people for the 
externalization-alienation of an internal spiritual principle, which can never 
defi nitely be anything but the most abstract form of that epoch’s conscious-
ness of itself . . . its own ideology . . . its most abstract ideology.64
It is this reading of Hegel that is implied in the Dollimore and Sinfi eld 
critique of essentialism quoted above. In such moments it becomes 
clear that the cultural materialists have the theoretical advantage, or as 
Felperin puts it, ‘an enormous headstart’,65 over their new historicist 
counterparts thanks to their Marxist origins. As a secondary point, it is 
worth noting that formalism does not necessitate either essentialism or 
the maintenance of unity. In so far as they represent a branch of French 
structuralism, both Foucault and Althusser can be broadly described as 
‘formalist’ thinkers and neither necessarily falls into the same culture-as-
unifi ed-text trap in which the new historicists fi nd themselves. Indeed, 
the work of Roland Barthes is exemplary on this point. In his analysis 
of Balzac’s Sarrasine in S/Z he characterises the literary text as ‘the frag-
ment, the shards, the broken or obliterated network’ of structures: in 
other words, anything but a structural unity or ‘essence’.66
The evidence thus seems to point to Vincent P. Pecora’s suggestion 
that this habit has been inherited from Clifford Geertz. For Geertz:
Our double task is to uncover the conceptual structures that inform our sub-
jects’ acts, the ‘said’ of social discourse, and to construct a system of analysis 
in whose terms what is generic to those structures, what belongs to them 
because they are what they are, will stand out against the other determinants 
of human behaviour.67
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Although Geertz dispenses with the concept of a human essence, in 
the phrase ‘generic . . . structures [that] are what they are’ there is the 
implication that there is something approaching a cultural ‘essence’. His 
insistence upon ‘locality’ mirrors formalism’s insistence on textual isola-
tion and replicates it at the level of culture. It is already clear how this 
sort of analysis could lapse into employing synecdoche when it comes to 
the point of reaching conclusions. Pecora argues that Geertz’s analysis of 
local structures seems incapable of taking a broader historical or politi-
cal context into account. For example, Geertz’s reading of Indonesian 
history appears blind to the wider context of global politics that invari-
ably informs what goes on inside that country. After a long and impres-
sive account of the Sukarno coup of 1965, Pecora demonstrates that 
in Geertz ‘neither American involvement [in the coup] nor Indonesia’s 
wholesale swing to a pro-Western orientation [afterwards] is ever men-
tioned’.68
It is possible to detect this provincialism in Goldberg and Greenblatt. 
As Peter Erikson notes, they share ‘a reluctance to confront the slime of 
politics’.69 Their respective studies provide little in the way of a wider 
understanding of a cultural or historical context beyond the sketches 
and the anecdotes they draw on. In Greenblatt’s ‘Martial Law and the 
Land of Cockaigne’, for example, there is no attempt to understand 
the use of ‘salutary anxiety’ in the broader context of Europe. And 
there is no hint at all of an attempt to account for the major political 
events that occurred between the delivery of Latimer’s sermon in 1522 
and the writing of Measure for Measure over eighty years later. For 
Greenblatt’s analysis to cohere truly, Latimer’s ‘transcoding’ of the 
purifi cation process from the religious to the civil sphere has to hold fast 
through Henry VIII’s Reformation, Edward VI’s harsh Protestantism, 
the brutal executions of Protestants under the Catholic reign of Mary 
I, over forty years of relative religious toleration under Elizabeth I, 
and, fi nally, a period of monarchic absolutism under James I. Faced 
with these tumultuous political and religious changes, Latimer’s anec-
dote is given disproportionate importance by Greenblatt. How is it 
that this seemingly small incident involving a Protestant martyr and 
an unknown Catholic woman can be given such weight in over eighty 
years of English history spanning the reigns of fi ve monarchs? Latimer’s 
tactics are taken to be a paradigm of the entire episteme of Renaissance 
religious and political thought. Although this is a bold move, it is also, 
historically speaking, highly suspect; it effectively fl attens the complex-
ity of the political and religious upheavals of England under the Tudors 
and effaces the explicit and obvious differences between its rulers. As 
Jonathan Bate remarks, Greenblatt’s ‘method produces dubious history 
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but good narrative’.70 Geertzian ‘localisation’ is thus reductive on two 
counts: fi rst, its insistence on maintaining such a narrow scope for its 
study renders it blind to wider continental or global political contexts; 
and, second, its formalist search for the ‘generic’ rules that govern 
human behaviour artifi cially fl attens history, so that important historical 
events are, in effect, ignored. When coupled with the deconstructionist 
 insistence on  synchrony over diachrony, the problem is compounded.
In conclusion, my analysis has found new historicism to be fatally 
compromised by the residues of formalism, functionalism and cultural-
ism discernible in its assumptions and methodology – the very things 
it sought to challenge and defeat in the 1980s. It inherits formalism 
primarily from three sources: New Criticism, American deconstruction 
and the structuralism of Foucault. It inherits functionalism institution-
ally (i.e. indirectly) from Talcott Parsons. And it inherits culturalism 
primarily from Clifford Geertz. The product of these inheritances is a 
criticism that is ahistorical, arbitrarily connecting monarchs and play-
wrights, anecdotes and literary texts, in a practice that relies ultimately 
upon the unity of a cultural master-text for its fi ndings. It would be 
wrong, however, to claim that new historicism has no value at all as a 
mode of criticism. Its main strength remains, as it always has been, the 
remarkable range of stimulating and unexpected readings it generates. 
The critic is given a virtually free rein to make the connections that he 
or she wishes. The problem with new historicism is not in its use of 
synecdoche, formalist techniques and arbitrary connections, or with the 
freedom that they afford per se, but with the conception of culture that 
underpins this practice. The synecdoche, for example, can be a power-
ful analytical tool; indeed, my own study has used two examples of new 
historicism to make a wider critique. These techniques only run into 
problems when they are used in conjunction with the implicit assumption 
that culture has some fundamental, retrievable ‘essence’. At worst, new 
historicism can be reductive and historically misleading and neither of 
those tendencies is a virtue. However, it is important to recognise what 
new historicism does well – the ingenuity, suggestiveness and diversity 
of its readings, its attention to the neglected margins and hitherto silent 
voices of past cultures, and, above all, its commitment to exploring what 
lies beyond the frontiers of the literary text in the cultural context that 
shaped it. But it is also important to divest ourselves of the less helpful 
and productive  assumptions and habits of thought that it has inherited 
and developed.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   29 17/02/2012   12:23
 30    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Notes
 1. Jean E. Howard, ‘The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies’, English 
Literary Renaissance, 16 (Winter, 1986), p. 14. The phrase ‘arbitrary 
connectedness’ was fi rst coined in Walter Cohen, ‘Political Criticism 
of Shakespeare’, in Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in History and 
Ideology, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor (New York and 
London: Methuen, 1987), p. 34. ‘The Consequences of the Synchronic – 
or the Dangers of Spatializing Time’ is taken from Richard Lehan, ‘The 
Theoretical Limits of New Historicism’, New Literary History, 21:3 
(Spring, 1990), p. 533.
 2. Jeremy Hawthorn, Cunning Passages: New Historicism, Cultural 
Materialism and Marxism in the Contemporary Literary Debate (London: 
Arnold, 1996), p. 228.
 3. Scott Wilson, Cultural Materialism: Theory and Practice (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), p. 15.
 4. Ewan Fernie, ‘Shakespeare and the Prospect of Presentism’, in Shakespeare 
Survey 58: Writing About Shakespeare, ed. Peter Holland (New York and 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 172.
 5. Etienne Balibar, ‘On the Basics of Historical Materialism’, in Reading 
Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (rpr. London: New Left Books, 1986), pp. 
204–5.
 6. H. Aram Veeser, ‘The New Historicism’, in The New Historicism Reader, 
ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 8.
 7. Cohen, ‘Political Criticism of Shakespeare’, p. 34.
 8. Ibid., p. 38.
 9. David Scott Kastan, Shakespeare After Theory (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1999), p. 29.
10. Ibid., p. 30.
11. Lehan, ‘The Theoretical Limits of New Historicism’, pp. 538, 540, 543, 
542–3, 552.
12. Hayden White, ‘New Historicism: A Comment’, in The New Historicism, 
ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), p. 294.
13. Jean E. Howard, ‘Old Wine, New Bottles’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 35:2 
(Summer 1984), p. 237.
14. Jonathan Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 7.
15. Ibid., pp. 56–63.
16. Karl Marx, Capital, ed. David McLennan (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 11.
17. Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature, p. 57.
18. Ibid., p. 237. 
19. Ibid., pp. 232–3.
20. Ibid., p. 238.
21. Alan Sinfi eld, ‘Power and Ideology: An Outline Theory and Sidney’s 
Arcadia’, ELH, 52:2 (Summer 1985), p. 260.
22. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 
p. 51. 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   30 17/02/2012   12:23
New Historicism     31
23. Ibid., p. 54.
24. Ibid., p. 55.
25. Catherine Belsey, Shakespeare and the Loss of Eden (London: Macmillan, 
1999), p. 18.
26. Stephen Mullaney, ‘After the New Historicism’, in Alternative Shakespeares, 
Volume 2, ed. Terence Hawkes (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 
p. 24. 
27. Cleanth Brooks, ‘The Language of Paradox’, in Literary Theory: An 
Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 
p. 68.
28. See Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
29. Claire Colebrook, New Literary Histories (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), p. 223.
30. Ibid., pp. 225, 234, 223–4, 225.
31. Edward Pechter, ‘The New Historicism and its Discontents: Politicizing 
Renaissance Drama’, PMLA, 102:3 (May 1987), p. 294.
32. White, ‘New Historicism: A Comment’, pp. 294, 300.
33. Alan Liu, ‘The Power of Formalism: The New Historicism’, English 
Literary History, 56:4 (Winter 1989), pp. 721–71. 
34. Carolyn Porter, ‘History and Literature: After New Historicism’, New 
Literary History, 21:2 (Winter 1990), pp. 253, 257.
35. Ibid., pp. 254–5.
36. This was the gist of the immediate reaction to Porter’s article. See Rena 
Fraden, ‘Response to Professor Carolyn Porter’, New Literary History, 
21:2 (Winter 1990), pp. 273–8.
37. Porter, ‘History and Literature’, pp. 261, 265–6. As well as drawing on 
Derrida, Porter draws on quite a number of different critics and theorists 
for this idea, most prominently: Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism, or the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, New Left Review, 146 (November–
December, 1984), 53–64; John Berger, ‘The Moment of Cubism’, in The 
Moment of Cubism and Other Essays (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1969), pp. 1–32; and Ernesto LaClau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd edn (New 
York and London: Verso, 2001).
38. Mullaney, ‘After the New Historicism’, p. 25.
39. LaClau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 267.
40. Carolyn Porter, ‘History and Literature’, pp. 268, 269.
41. Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social 
Energy in Renaissance England (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 147.
42. Ibid., p. 162.
43. Ibid., p. 130.
44. Ibid., pp. 130–1.
45. Ibid., p. 132.
46. Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, pp. 132–3.
47. Roland Barthes, Image-Music-Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill 
& Wang, 1978), p. 85.
48. Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, p. 133.
49. Ibid., p. 133.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   31 17/02/2012   12:23
 32    Shakespeare’s History Plays
50. Ibid., pp. 134, 142.
51. Ibid., pp. 135.
52. Ibid., p. 138.
53. Belsey, Shakespeare and the Loss of Eden, pp. 17–18. 
54. See, for example, Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (1938; 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). For a broader overview of functional-
ism, see John Holmwood, ‘Functionalism and its Critics’, in Modern Social 
Theory, ed. Austin Harrington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
pp. 87–109. For a comparison of Parsons and his French structuralist 
counterparts (especially Althusser) see Nancy DiTomaso, ‘“Sociological 
Reductionism” from Parsons to Althusser: Linking Action and Structure 
in Social Theory’, American Sociological Review, 47:1 (February 1982), 
14–28. 
55. Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, pp. 135–6, 138.
56. Don E. Wayne, ‘Power, Politics, and the Shakespearean Text: Recent 
Criticism in England and the United States’, in Shakespeare Reproduced: 
The Text in History and Ideology, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. 
O’Connor (New York and London: Methuen, 1987), p. 61. 
57. James Holstun, ‘Ranting at the New Historicism’, English Literary 
Renaissance, 19:2 (Spring 1989), pp. 198–9.
58. Frank Lentricchia, ‘Foucault’s Legacy: A New Historicism?’, in The New 
Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 
1989), p. 237. 
59. Jürgen Pieters, ‘New Historicism: Post-modern Historiography between 
Narrativism and Heterology’, History and Theory, 39:1 (February 2000), 
p. 32.
60. Ibid., pp. 33, 34.
61. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfi eld, ‘Culture and Textuality: Debating 
Cultural Historicism’, Textual Practice, 4:1 (1990), p. 100.
62. Howard, ‘The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies’, p. 24.
63. Catherine Belsey, Culture and the Real (New York and Oxford: Routledge, 
2005), pp. 9–10.
64. Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (1969; New York and 
London: Verso, 2005), p. 103.
65. Howard Felperin, The Uses of the Canon: Elizabethan Literature and 
Contemporary Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 157.
66. Roland Barthes, S / Z, trans. Richard Miller (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1975), p. 32.
67. Clifford Geertz, ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept 
of Man’, in The Interpretation of Cultures: Sketched Essays (New York: 
Basic, 1973), p. 27.
68. Vincent P. Pecora, ‘The Limits of Local Knowledge’, in The New Historicism, 
ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), p. 258.
69. Peter Erikson, ‘Rewriting the Renaissance, Rewriting Ourselves’, 
Shakespeare Quarterly, 38:3 (Autumn 1987), p. 332.
70. Jonathan Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 341n.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   32 17/02/2012   12:23
Chapter 3
Cultural Materialism
Politics and Subjectivity in Cultural Materialism
As we have seen, new historicism is dogged by the problems associated 
with inadvertently replicating formalism at the level of culture. Cultural 
materialism, on the other hand, circumnavigates many of these prob-
lems by its more rigorous reading of Louis Althusser and Raymond 
Williams. Indeed, cultural materialism has been characterised as writing 
explicitly ‘under the sway of Althusser’.1 When Walter Cohen consid-
ered cultural materialism he concluded that, of its theoretical sources, 
‘perhaps Althusser has exercised the greatest infl uence’.2 Michael D. 
Bristol has claimed that Jonathan Dollimore is ‘writing in the tradi-
tion of Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and Raymond Williams’.3 
And, of course, the term ‘cultural materialism’ itself is derived from 
Williams. The crucial point of convergence between these two very 
different Marxist thinkers is that they both insist on a specifi cally 
materialist analysis of culture. Both theorists also recognise Antonio 
Gramsci as their point of departure. In his conception of ideology, 
Althusser acknowledges that ‘to my knowledge, Gramsci is the only 
one who went any distance down the road I am taking’.4 In his use of 
the theory of hegemony, Williams is similarly indebted: ‘it is Gramsci’s 
great contribution to have emphasised hegemony, and also to have 
understood it at a depth which is, I think, rare’.5 This common heritage 
has perhaps led cultural materialists to treat Althusser and Williams as 
fundamentally compatible, which is at odds with the mutual antagonism 
between the Althusserians and Williams’s allies of the British left, such 
as John Lewis and E. P. Thompson, which dominated leftist debate in 
the 1970s.6
That said, cultural materialists have used Althusser and Williams 
in different ways. Jonathan Dollimore, for example, was particularly 
taken with Althusser’s decentring of the human subject and his ardent 
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 anti-humanism.7 And, throughout her career, Catherine Belsey has 
echoed Althusser in ‘stressing the materiality of ideology, [wherein] 
beliefs are inscribed in practices, particularly ritualistic practices’.8 For 
Alan Sinfi eld:
Much of the importance of Raymond Williams derives from the fact that 
at a time when Althusser and Foucault were being read in some quarters as 
establishing ideology and / or power in a necessarily unbreakable continuum, 
Williams argued the co-occurrence of subordinate, residual, emergent, alter-
native, and oppositional cultural forces alongside the dominant, in varying 
relations of incorporation, negotiation, and resistance. Cultural materialism 
seeks to discern the scope for dissident politics of class, race, gender, and 
sexual orientation, both within texts and in their roles in culture.9
Despite this apparent allegiance to Williams, later in Faultlines Sinfi eld 
ratifi es certain Althusserian ideas on a number of occasions: for example, 
when he argues that ‘the strength of ideology derives from the way it 
gets to be common sense; “it goes without saying”’, or when he states 
that Althusser’s idea that ideological subjects ‘work by themselves’ is 
‘substantially right’.10 Hence, we might say that, broadly speaking, the 
cultural materialist tendency is to use an adaptation of Althusser’s ‘ide-
ology’ (for which, in some cases, such as Richard Wilson’s, Foucault’s 
‘power’ is substituted) and couple it with Williams’s concept of resist-
ance – an unhappy marriage, to say the least.
This underlying tension between Althusser and Williams plays out 
explicitly in cultural materialism as a constant struggle between power 
(Althusser’s ideology) and subversion (Williams’s ‘resistance’). It is this 
struggle, above all else, that has come to dominate cultural materialist 
studies. So much so that, while cultural materialism has divested itself 
of many of the methodological problems of new historicism, it produces 
problems of its own by constantly reducing the texts it studies to the 
terms of this duality. Michael D. Bristol, a cultural materialist himself, 
criticises new historicism on the grounds that:
Power is everywhere, it is insidious, it has a million disguises. Like ‘Hegelian 
spirit’ or for that matter like the Old Historicist ‘order’ it works inexorably 
and continuously towards its own historical self-regulation . . . A ghostly 
entity, infused with will and intelligence, that is at once telos and unmoved 
mover.11
But this analysis might be turned back on to Bristol and his fellow cul-
tural materialists. The continual search for subversion within a material-
ist methodology does not in itself remove the concept of an all-pervasive 
power.
This overriding concern with power and its subversion has given rise 
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to the charge that cultural materialism is a fundamentally subjective and 
self-centred type of criticism. Again, we can turn to Scott Wilson for the 
typical claim that ‘cultural materialism . . . does not pretend to neutral-
ity, but declares its partiality or bias’, that it is ‘a moral thing’.12 Wilson 
continues:
For cultural materialism it is ultimately always a question of the good (or 
bad) production, distribution and consumption of good goods: good signs, 
good meanings, positive identities; or bad, ideological signs, cultural tokens, 
negative images, and so on . . . Cultural materialism normalizes in the absence 
of a norm, just as it moralizes in the absence of an absolute moral value . . . 
He, or happily now, she knows that God does not exist, but must continue to 
moralize anyway in his place, in his very absence; she, or he, disbelieves the 
Church’s mumbo jumbo about universal, transcendent meetings and timeless 
value, but is unwilling to get out of the cultural beyond.13
It seems strange that Wilson should treat this maintenance of a stringent 
moral duality – the contrast of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ – in 
such positive terms. Wilson’s hypothetical cultural materialist knows 
God does not exist but one wonders whether she, or he, also considers 
Nietzsche’s point that: ‘To recognise untruth as a condition of life: that 
is certainly to impugn the traditional value in a dangerous manner, and 
a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself 
beyond good and evil.’14 Implicitly, through its penetrating analysis of 
ideological formations, cultural materialism should have moved ‘beyond 
good and evil’. What terms could be more ideological than ‘good’ and 
‘evil’? However, from Wilson’s description, it is diffi cult to see how cul-
tural materialism is ultimately anything more than a form of atheist (or 
Marxist) moralism, a dogmatic attempt to oppose its political rivals by 
countering their truth claims with its own truth claims.
This has been the point of departure for many humanist attacks on 
cultural materialism in Shakespeare studies. Often taking the form of 
polemics, the suspicion in these attacks is that, driven by their political 
conviction, cultural materialists replicate the subjectivity and rigidity of 
Tillyard’s Old Historicism. Graham Bradshaw offers one of the most 
penetrating and erudite attacks in Misrepresentations, which it will be 
necessary to quote from at length. Like Scott Wilson, Bradshaw spots 
a disturbing moralistic tendency in Dollimore and Sinfi eld, but instead 
of championing them for it as Wilson does, he mocks them for it relent-
lessly. Bradshaw claims that for cultural materialists there is always a 
‘humanist Enemy’, who harbours ‘an “essentialist”, quasi-theological 
concern with “man”, but that to identify the target in this way is 
itself a theological move, which creates and demonizes the “human-
ist” Other’.15 Marcus Nordlund has also picked up on this tendency 
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of cultural materialists: ‘once they have been defi ned as essentialist 
. . .  alternative views have typically been associated with a reactionary 
outlook . . . and then been assigned to the critical dustbin’.16 Bradshaw 
accuses Dollimore and Sinfi eld of developing a fundamentally reduc-
tive, ‘oppositional caricatured’ view of humanism, ignoring the many 
critiques of Tillyard that came from his contemporaries and from the 
humanists of the 1950s and 1960s. According to Bradshaw, the cultural 
materialists do not ‘want the past to be intelligent, since the material-
ist cavalry could not ride so excitingly to the rescue’. Thus Tillyard 
‘had only to be exhumed, propped up on his horse like El Cid, and 
sent back to the fi eld . . . We are to believe that blind essentialist mam-
moths roamed and ruled the literary landscape’ until the advent of 
cultural materialism.17 He further accuses Dollimore and Sinfi eld of the 
same ‘one-eyed “What Shakespeare ‘really’ means” readings’ that were 
typical of Tillyard; he describes them as ‘the other side, ideologically, of 
the same bad methodological coin’.18 Bradshaw is particularly unforgiv-
ing to Dollimore, who
substitutes an evil, reactionary, and repressively authoritarian Shakespeare 
[the Shakespeare described in his and Sinfi eld’s reading of Henry V, discussed 
presently] for the good crypto-materialist Shakespeare [the Shakespeare of 
Radical Tragedy] whose true content and intentions were allegedly misrepre-
sented and suppressed by the essentialist-idealist-liberal-humanist Enemy. As 
ever, the contradiction doesn’t matter as long as the critically contradictory 
readings advance the ideological objective . . .
. . . Primitive neo-Tillyardian materialists like Dollimore and Sinfi eld assume, 
like Tillyard, that the Shakespearian Meaning exists, but also assume, since 
Tillyard is the ideological Enemy, that the Meaning must be somewhere 
else, or something else. So this approach delivers either the good, subversive 
crypto-materialist Shakespeare, whom the ‘essentialist humanists’ appropri-
ate, misrepresent and suppress because They Are Evil; or the evil, authoritar-
ian Bard whom ‘essentialist humanists’ take to be Good, again because They 
Are Evil.19
It remains to be seen whether Bradshaw’s vicious character assassination 
is justifi ed, but the analysis is clear enough. Cultural materialists view 
the social milieu in polarised terms, defi ning themselves as a ‘good’, 
marginal subculture against the ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ humanist centre; and this 
polarisation necessarily colours their reading of Shakespeare or any 
other text. Richard Levin found the same tendency in a similarly fero-
cious attack, complaining that cultural materialists ‘posit a fundamental 
confl ict between right and wrong’ and artifi cially ‘confl ate this confl ict 
with the opposition . . . associating formalism (and so  humanism) 
with the upper class or patriarchy and their own approach with the 
victims’.20
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‘History and Ideology, Masculinity and Miscegenation: 
The Instance of Henry V’
With these strong criticisms in mind, this is perhaps the right juncture at 
which to turn to the primary target of Bradshaw’s attack, Dollimore and 
Sinfi eld’s essay, ‘History and Ideology, Masculinity and Miscegenation: 
The Instance of Henry V’. Immediately it is possible to spot major dif-
ferences between the style and practice of these critics and the new 
historicism of Goldberg and Greenblatt. For a start, the former are 
markedly more historical, in the conventional sense. Dollimore and 
Sinfi eld do not employ arbitrary anecdotes but rather draw on our his-
torical understanding of the politics and social changes of the period to 
arrive at their conclusions. This essay, unlike Greenblatt’s, also has a 
coherent structure and through-line. It has three chief movements: fi rst, 
‘Warring Ideologies’, a critique of the humanist academics of the past; 
second, ‘Aesthetic Colonizations’, which looks at the attempt made in 
Henry V to establish and maintain a sense of national unity; and third, 
‘Masculinity’ and ‘Miscegenation’, which analyse gender construction 
in the play. In terms of methodology, cultural materialism is far closer 
to Tillyard’s ‘old historicism’ than to the cavalier, ‘relatively freewheel-
ing’21 style of new historicism.
The fi rst section starts, characteristically enough, with a quotation 
from Tillyard. Dollimore and Sinfi eld fi nd much to admire in his rejec-
tion of universalistic readings of Shakespeare that preceded him but 
regret ‘inadequacies in [his] theorizing of ideology’ and his entrapment 
in ‘idealist philosophy’.22 Contrary to Bradshaw’s claims, Dollimore 
and Sinfi eld go on to consider the humanists that followed (and 
opposed) Tillyard’s ‘Elizabethan World Picture’ readings in the 1960s. 
In particular, they look at Jan Kott’s infl uential existentialist reading in 
Shakespeare Our Contemporary and Wilbur Sanders’s broadly liberal 
humanist work, The Dramatist and the Received Idea. Despite marked 
differences between these critics, Dollimore and Sinfi eld conclude that 
‘the fundamental error in all these accounts of the role of ideology is 
falsely to unify history and / or the individual subject’.23 This leads to the 
main premise of their study of Henry V:
Theories of the ultimate unity of both history and the human subject derive, 
of course, from a Western philosophical tradition where, moreover, they have 
usually implied each other: the universal being seen as manifested through 
essences that in turn presuppose universals. Often unawares, idealist literary 
criticism has worked within or in the shadow of this tradition, as can be seen 
for example in its insistence that the universal truths of great literature are 
embodied in coherent and consistent characters.24
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However, they do not posit the exact opposite of this, ‘chaos and subjec-
tive fragmentation’, as an alternative, but call rather for a deeper under-
standing of ‘ideology’.
In the fi rst instance, Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s conception of ideology 
is essentially Gramscian:
Ideology is composed of those beliefs, practices and institutions that work to 
legitimate the social order – especially by the process of representing sectional 
or class interests as universal ones. This process presupposes that there are 
other, subordinate cultures that, far from sharing the interests of the domi-
nant one, are in fact being exploited by it.25
Compare Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s account with Gramsci’s theorisa-
tion of ‘relations of force’ in ‘The Modern Prince’ section of his Prison 
Notebooks:
Germinated ideologies become ‘party’, come into confrontation and confl ict, 
until only one of them tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate 
itself throughout society – bringing about not only a unison of economic 
and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all questions 
around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, 
and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series 
of subordinate groups.26
The key difference between these similar theorisations is that in Gramsci 
the idea that the subordinate groups are being ‘exploited’ by the hege-
monic group is missing. Instead ‘the general interests of the subordinate 
groups’ hold the dominant power in perpetual states of ‘equilibria’; 
hegemony prevails but ‘only up to a certain point’.27 In Gramsci power 
is always kept in check by the prospect of rebellion, which will necessar-
ily occur if the dominant power exceeds the parameters of acceptability. 
This is an idea that was perhaps inherited from Machiavelli’s insistence 
that ‘the prince should . . . determine to avoid anything which will make 
him hated and despised’, lest he risk the prospect of ‘internal subversion 
from his subjects’.28
Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s ‘ideology’, however, cannot allow for such 
a straightforward model of power and culpability, because they add 
to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and subordinate groups Althusser’s 
theory that ideology has a material existence:
Ideology is not just a set of ideas; it is material practice, woven into the fabric 
of everyday life. At the same time, the dominant ideology is realized specifi -
cally through the institutions of education, the family, the law, religion, jour-
nalism, and culture.29
Thus ‘ideology’ is a more insidious, all-encompassing power than 
Machiavelli’s prince or Gramsci’s ‘modern prince’.
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On top of these two layers, Dollimore and Sinfi eld place yet 
another layer: this time, the idea that dramatists and audiences alike 
in Renaissance England were likely to be interested in and engaged by 
‘ideology . . . under strain’. So while there are no straightforward limits 
to power set by the subordinate groups, as in Gramsci, the functioning 
of ideology is never perfect. Dollimore and Sinfi eld develop this thesis 
by drafting in two ideas from Raymond Williams, ‘contradiction’ and 
‘confl ict’. Contradiction is defi ned as ‘intrinsic to the social process as 
a whole’,30 which closely follows Williams’s own assertion that ‘con-
tradiction [is] intrinsic to any conscious life process’.31 Contradiction is 
thus seen as a normal and fundamental aspect of ideology and culture. 
‘Confl ict’, on the other hand, ‘occurs along the structural faultlines pro-
duced by contradictions’; it is an ‘active struggle’ that can come from 
residual or emergent elements of the culture or from discontent within 
the ruling class.32 The key difference between this and the Gramscian 
conception of resistance is that here there is no direct, causal relation-
ship between the actions of the ruling class and insubordination. The 
relationship is more fractured, the result of structural imperfection – the 
failure of ideology to function correctly – rather than the discontent-
ment of subordinate classes with the prince. In making this materialist 
move against ‘idealism’, paradoxically Dollimore and Sinfi eld divest 
themselves of the Realpolitik of Gramsci and Machiavelli, becoming 
more abstract and functionalist in their thinking. This has two main 
consequences: fi rst, it absolves the ruling class of its accountability to 
its subordinates because the theory cannot account for government or 
sovereign action. Second, and again paradoxically, it robs the subordi-
nate classes of their relative bargaining power and the agency that this 
accountability affords them. Instead, just as in Althusser, and in new his-
toricism, everything becomes a function of ideology. If the subordinate 
classes are passive, then the ideology has ‘worked’, and if they resist, this 
is put down to ideological failure. It is not the case that the subordinate 
classes have fi nally found a voice and the will to rise up in rebellion; 
rather, ideology has fi nally  succumbed to the internal pressures of con-
tradiction and confl ict. Dollimore and Sinfi eld posit a highly nuanced 
and sophisticated theory of ideology, but one that  ultimately  replicates 
the  functionalism of Althusser.
They also display in this essay a disconcerting tendency to present 
their fi ndings about ideology as empirical evidence. In this respect 
at least, Bradshaw’s attack is vindicated. There is a sense in which 
Dollimore and Sinfi eld seem to be presenting their argument and their 
conception of ideology as how things really are: culture is fractured, 
riddled with contradiction and confl ict, and it is the job of ideology to 
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cover those cracks with the façade of unity. It is then the job of cultural 
materialists to peel away that façade in order to expose the ‘truth’. This 
tendency manifests itself most tellingly in their language.
When they fi nally turn to Henry V, for example, we are told that, 
in his soliloquy of 4.1, ‘what really torments Henry is his inability to 
ensure obedience’.33 They support this statement with some apt quota-
tions from the text (4.1.240–1, 256–7).
Henry indicates a paradox of power, only to misrecognize its force by 
 mystifying both kingship and subjection. His problem is structural, since 
the ceremony and role-playing that constitute kingship are the means 
by which real antagonisms can masquerade as obedience – ‘poisoned fl at-
tery’.34
Dollimore and Sinfi eld make a convincing case here, but it is certainly 
not the only way this soliloquy can be read. One might argue that this 
is a moment where, far from ‘mystifying kingship’, Henry laments both 
the emptiness and the necessity of ideology:
O ceremony, show me but thy worth.
What is the soul of adoration?
Art thou aught else but place, degree, and form,
Creating awe and fear in other men?
Wherein thou art less happy, being feared,
Than they in fearing.
 (4.1. 226–31)
Using Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s own defi nition of ideology, one might 
suggest that the ritual of royal ‘ceremony’ that Henry is objecting to 
here is precisely the ‘ideological dimension of authority’ which they 
describe.35 He is decrying the empty symbolism and ‘poisoned fl attery’ 
of Richard II’s style of court:
’Tis not the balm, the sceptre, and the ball,
The sword, the mace, the crown imperial,
The intertissued robe of gold and pearl
The farcèd title running fore the king,
The throne he sits on, nor the tide of pomp
That beats upon the high shore of this world –
 (4.1.242–7)
This can be read as a profound moment of ideological self-awareness for 
Henry, a quality lacking in both his predecessors. It closely echoes the 
uncrowning of Richard II:
With mine own tears I wash away the balm,
With mine own hands I give away the crown,
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With mine own tongue deny my sacred state,
With mine own breath release all duteous oaths.
 (4.1.196–200)
For Richard, the ceremony and the ritual of state defi ne the role of the 
king. It is ultimately this, ‘creating awe in other men’ – in other words, 
ideology – rather than action, warfare or the responsibilities of govern-
ment that is synonymous with kingship.
Richard frequently equates his role as king with its ideological 
markers. When the inevitability of his submission fi nally dawns on him, 
he can only see ‘the name of a King’ (3.3.145) in its ideological repre-
sentations:
I’ll give my jewels for a set of beads,
My gorgeous palace for a hermitage,
My gay apparel for an almsman’s gown,
My fi gured goblets for a dish of wood,
My sceptre for a palmer’s walking staff,
My subjects for a pair of carvèd saints . . .
 (3.3.146–51)
For Richard, there is nothing else to kingship but the ‘structural 
problem’ Dollimore and Sinfi eld describe, but it is not a ‘problem’ for 
him, because he believes utterly in the ideology himself. It should not 
be forgotten that there is, to quote Althusser, a ‘fi nal [ideologically pre-
determined role] for higher management’.36 But Henry V comes from 
a lineage that knows the grittier material reality of sovereignty. His 
father, a calculating pragmatist, spends much of the two parts of Henry 
IV haunted by the fact that he came to power, not through ideological 
ritual or ‘creating awe in other men’, but through cold-blooded murder. 
The fi nal stages of Richard II enact the triumph of materiality, fl esh and 
blood, over ideology.
Towards the end of 2 Henry IV, in complete contrast to Richard 
II, the King posits an idea of kingship based on action and materiality 
rather than ideological function:
Pluck down my offi cers, break my decrees;
For now a time is come to mock at form –
Harry the Fifth is crowned. Up, vanity!
Down, royal state! 
 (4.3.245–8)
Although he is chastising the young prince here, it is signifi cant that 
Henry IV equates his power with ‘offi cers’ and ‘decrees’ rather than his 
‘gay apparel’ or his ‘sceptre’. He speaks of ‘form’ not in its ritualistic, 
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ceremonial sense but in the sense of decorum, the proper behaviour for 
a king, not out of respect for empty ceremony, but for the pragmatic 
reason that the people would not respect a ‘foolish youth’ (4.3.224). 
Henry remembers his own reign in terms of its materiality and its action. 
He speaks of ‘the soil of [his] achievement’ (4.3.317) and ‘quarrel and 
. . . bloodshed’ (4.3.323). Henry V, on the other hand, unlike his father, 
sees the necessity of the king’s ideological function; but, unlike Richard, 
he does not embrace it or indeed mistake it for kingship itself. More 
importantly, he is able to step, momentarily, outside of his ideological 
role and offer a ‘relatively cool analysis’37 of it.
I have thus offered a reading of the soliloquy in 4.1 of Henry V, one 
that takes Richard II and 2 Henry IV into account, using Dollimore and 
Sinfi eld’s own practice of ideology critique. In the light of this reading, it 
is clear that this is an instance where the cultural materialist’s appeal to 
the ‘truth’ of his or her critique produces a rigid, ‘one-eyed’ reading of 
the play under scrutiny. This tendency might be described as the fi xity of 
interpretation, whereby the cultural materialist posits ‘evidence’ – born 
of ideology critique – and then uses this evidence to lock the text into a 
single, defi nitive reading. In this instance, by reading Henry V in the light 
of their ideas of ideological mystifi cation only, Dollimore and Sinfi eld 
neglect to acknowledge that Henry might be equally discontented with 
the burden of being king. In trying to reconcile the contrasting traits 
of Richard II and Henry IV, it is possible that Henry has a moment of 
self-doubt and begins to realise he might have taken on too much too 
soon. As I have shown, Henry demonstrates an impressive, demystifying 
self-awareness of his ideological role, but Dollimore and Sinfi eld appear 
convinced that he ‘mystifi es both kingship and subjection’. After we read 
the entirely mystifi ed version of kingship offered by Richard II, the argu-
ment that the same thing is at play in Henry V is unpersuasive, especially 
when the two monarchs are so different.
In the remainder of this section of the essay, Dollimore and Sinfi eld 
go on to read Henry V entirely in terms of its contemporary ideologi-
cal function. We are told that ‘Henry V was a powerful Elizabethan 
fantasy simply because nothing is allowed to compete with the power 
of the king.’38 This is, of course, in contrast to Elizabeth’s reign, which 
was marked by competing factions that served to undermine her power. 
Dollimore and Sinfi eld thus establish a dichotomy between the (false) 
ideology of Henry V and the (true) actuality of Elizabeth’s reign. For 
example, when they make statements such as ‘thus power, which in 
actuality was distributed unevenly across an unstable faction of the hege-
monic class, is drawn into the person of the monarch’,39 it is not clear 
whether they mean the ‘actuality’ of history according to Holinshed or 
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the ‘actuality’ of Elizabeth’s reign. Again, the partial neglect of the other 
history plays comes to the fore. Richard II, 1 and 2 Henry IV and all 
three parts of Henry VI show much stronger factions and a much more 
unstable nobility. It seems that Shakespeare sought to centralise power 
in the fi gure of the monarch in Henry V to demonstrate not only that 
he was a strong king but also what a strong king might look like, after 
offering us so many weak kings.
Dollimore and Sinfi eld might be right to argue that the play searches 
‘for ideological coherence’ above all else,40 but their tendency to write as 
if their fi ndings were substantive facts can only be reductive in so far as 
it effaces the possibility of further readings. There persists in their work 
the Althusserian notion that Marxism can produce a ‘scientifi c knowl-
edge’,41 one that alludes to reality, as opposed to ideological knowledge, 
which can only ever allude to the representation of imaginary relations. 
Like Althusser, they posit a pseudo-scientifi c materialism against a 
totally ideological idealism, under the assumption that the former can 
expose ‘the truth’ that the latter has attempted to cover up. This Marxist 
commitment seems sharply at odds with their self-avowed ‘subjectivity’. 
On the one hand, they seem to be arguing for an ideology critique that 
can uncover the truth objectively, and on the other, for an overtly sub-
jective criticism in which, as Scott Wilson claims, ‘students are . . . asked 
to read with their genitals, argue with their background, or theorize 
with their skin colour’.42 To draw on Raymond Williams myself, these 
ideas seem in both contradiction and confl ict. Alison Assiter demon-
strated back in 1990 that Althusser and feminism make unhappy bedfel-
lows.43 And if one pushes the argument that Althusser’s functionalism 
is, as E. P. Thompson once put it, ‘on the theoretical production line of 
Stalinist ideology’,44 they might even be fundamentally incompatible. 
Yet Althusser and feminism would appear to fi nd their convergence 
in cultural materialism, one that has persisted beyond Dollimore and 
Sinfi eld and remained, often hidden, in the work of materialist-feminists 
like Catherine Belsey and Kathleen McLuskie.45
This underlying tension is most telling in Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s 
essay when they turn to look at ‘Masculinity’. To use one of their 
favoured terms, this turn reads like a total ‘rupture’ in the essay. It is as if 
the argument they were making – about national unity, the convergence 
of power in the monarch, and the various ways in which the seams do 
not quite hold in Henry V – simply ends, and a new one begins. This 
rupture affords them a chance to switch methodologies; they seem to 
leave Althusser, Williams and ideology critique behind at this juncture 
in order to provide a fairly conventional feminist account of gender 
construction in the plays. They read the play through the dichotomy 
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of masculinity versus femininity, arguing that, though ‘it is often said 
that women have little place in the history plays because the men defi ne 
themselves against other men . . . the men do this through constant refer-
ence to ideas of the feminine and the female’.46 Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s 
argument is less convincing in this section of the essay: ‘Genders and 
sexualities are among the potential disruptions that Henry must incor-
porate or expel in order to appear the undivided leader of an undivided 
kingdom.’47 From here they go on to demonstrate the various reasons 
why this was impossible for Shakespeare in Henry V, because femininity 
is constantly employed to defi ne manliness.
They also explore the various ways in which the representations of 
England and manliness are confl ated and opposed to an effeminised 
France. The argument that all this shows an internal contradiction in 
the dominant ideology – one that posits that ‘the state cannot be secured 
against female infl uence’48 – amounts to saying that because women 
exist they must exert infl uence. This is unconvincing for two reasons: 
fi rst, because it seems oblivious to the fact that women are themselves 
ideological subjects, just like other subordinate groups such as the lower 
classes or the racial Other. Just because a subordinate group exists does 
not automatically mean that it creates a contradiction. Second, it is 
inconsistent with Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s own conception of ideology, 
in which the dominant ideology has ‘a material existence’ that works 
through social institutions and, by extension, human bodies. Dympna 
Callaghan has argued, more convincingly, that materialists should not 
assume that the female body is an automatic site of resistance.49 The 
female body is as subject to ideological construction and appropriation 
as the gallows or the stage. As such, it is diffi cult to reconcile this ‘femi-
nist section’ with their earlier argument about ideological unity and the 
construction of nationhood in Henry V. It is such moments that reveal 
the messy theoretical amalgam that constitutes the rationale of cultural 
materialism. Dollimore and Sinfi eld jump far too readily from a post-
Althusserian ideology critique to feminist materialism without warning. 
There is a strong sense that the feminist section was produced out of 
political obligation rather than to advance the thesis of the essay.
Marginal Politics?
It is this politically motivated dimension of cultural materialism that I 
would like to examine further. I want to ask two questions: fi rst, to what 
extent does this subjective, political aspect of cultural material practice 
distort the texts it appropriates? And second, to what extent can cultural 
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materialism still claim to occupy a marginal position in the twenty-fi rst 
century? Let us return to the humanist polemics of Bradshaw and Levin. 
Their main criticism of cultural materialism, and of Dollimore and Sinfi eld 
in particular, is not its partiality, but the form that partiality takes. Both 
have complained bitterly that their various criticisms have not been 
engaged with due to what Bradshaw calls ‘group think’,50 a hive mental-
ity shared by feminists and materialists alike. The tendency is to make the 
issue political so as to avoid discussing it. As Bradshaw argues, ‘politicized 
issues defl ect or divert us from discussing Shakespeare plays’.51 This can 
clearly be seen at work in the dismissals of Levin as a traditionalist dino-
saur, as when Goldberg caricatures him as ‘the self-appointed protector 
of old plays from new readings’.52 It is not in the interests of this study to 
take sides in these squabbles, but Bradshaw and Levin have a point when 
they complain that feminists and cultural materialists do not engage prop-
erly with criticisms from ‘Dissenters’, especially when they proceed from 
what they perceive to be the humanist Other. In the interests of fairness it 
is worth at least considering what Bradshaw and Levin are actually saying 
rather than demonising them as the acolytes of conservatism.
For Levin, ‘the materialism of [the cultural materialist] doctrine is 
highly selective and that selectivity is determined . . . by politics’.53 The 
suggestion is that cultural materialists bend history and Shakespeare’s 
plays to confi rm the things they oppose to ratify their own politics:
A common tactic is to assert that some aspect (always a bad one) of 
Shakespeare’s world or the world of his play is basically the same in our 
world, often translating it into an abstract problem (like class-division) that 
fl oats free of history and the many material differences between our society 
and his. That does not ‘matter’ so long as their equation of the two worlds 
enables them to derive from the play a Marxist lesson for today.54
If we look at the example of Dollimore and Sinfi eld, this is not an 
entirely fair assessment. Their objective seems to be rather to analyse 
and demystify deeply entrenched critical ideas about the play: the idea 
that Henry V is just state propaganda that establishes national unity, 
and, later, the idea that the men in the play only understand themselves 
in relation to other men. Levin had earlier been guilty of misreading the 
essay as an affi rmation of ‘ideological unity’,55 a point that Dollimore 
and Sinfi eld pick up on rather defensively in the reprinted version found 
in Faultlines.56
However, these critical oversights on Levin’s part should not over-
shadow the wider criticism of cultural materialism as seeking to teach 
us a political lesson. The lesson of the Dollimore and Sinfi eld essay, for 
example, is that a literary text like Henry V will always reveal ideological 
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contradictions in a multitude of different ways, regardless of how much 
it might strive to efface them. In this respect, cultural materialism can 
be seen as criticism as political instruction, which raises the aforemen-
tioned problem that it is the politics rather than the text in question that 
the cultural materialist really wants to discuss. Dollimore and Sinfi eld 
want to show, through the analysis of Henry V, how attempts to forge 
national identity or a masculinity divested of its feminine Other must 
inevitably fail, but one gets the sense that they might have produced a 
similar reading if they had been discussing the Henry VI plays, or indeed 
any play that touches on these issues. Kiernan Ryan has complained 
recently of ‘endless studies bent on shackling Shakespeare to everything 
from maps and money to cooking and cosmetics’,57 but it is diffi cult to 
see how shackling him to a political position is any better. The problem 
here is that the text becomes nothing more than a hook on which to 
hang things and this is due, largely, to the extent to which cultural 
materialism is subjective. If the primary organising principles at work 
are the interests of the critic, then it stands to reason that the text itself 
will be treated in this way. It is important to resist this tendency, because 
it allows the text very little agency. To quote Fredric Jameson, ‘it is the 
past that sees us, and judges us remorselessly, without any sympathy or 
complicity with the scraps of subjectivity we try to think of as our own 
fragmentary and authentic life experience’.58 This was the reason that he 
called upon critics to ‘always historicize’, but how can this happen if our 
reading of the past becomes nothing but those ‘scraps of subjectivity’?
Bradshaw’s argument, on the other hand, is that for cultural materi-
alists ‘any “dissident perspective” is presented as not only superior but 
transhistorically, transculturally true’.59 I have already demonstrated 
this tendency to make ‘truth claims’ above. What I am interested in 
here is just how ‘dissident’ cultural materialism is. Cultural materialism 
claims to write from a radical position; it tends to defi ne ‘the centre’ as 
necessarily ‘(essentialist-) humanist’, and confl ates all that it opposes 
most vehemently under that banner. It might be described as a ‘blanket 
strategy’ that functions according to a circular, quasi-theological logic: 
‘humanists are necessarily wrong and everything we oppose is neces-
sarily humanist, therefore everything we say is true and any attempt to 
ratify a humanist’s argument is not only also humanist but also wrong’. 
By this logic anyone who believes, for example, in the value of maintain-
ing the literary canon must necessarily be a humanist as well as being 
‘wrong’. Yet there is no reason to assume that the establishment and 
conservation of a canon must be a humanist endeavour. It is perfectly 
possible to produce a canon based on cultural importance rather than 
on the text’s intrinsic universal appeal and ability to transcend historical 
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boundaries. Roland Barthes espoused an aesthetic hierarchy in which 
‘writerly’ texts were deemed a superior, more radical form of literature 
than the ‘readerly’ texts typifi ed by genre fi ction; yet he also famously 
announced ‘The Death of the Author’. Is Barthes to be dismissed as a 
‘humanist’ because he prefers Balzac to other writers?
Taking this example of the canon, let us subject it to further scrutiny 
and ask: how ‘dissident’ is it really, in the early twenty-fi rst century, 
to oppose the aesthetic value judgements and hierarchies that go into 
the formation of a literary canon? Leah Marcus made the argument in 
1988 that it was time to overturn the distasteful ‘system of values and 
institutionalised hierarchies’ of humanism.60 In its place cultural materi-
alism (like new historicism) posits a literature without hierarchy, where 
no single text is necessarily more important or valuable than any other. 
Sinfi eld has recently repeated his commitment to this criticism without 
aesthetic discrimination:
Evidently it is true that many of the texts that get to be canonical have a 
complexity of language and cultural implication that makes them available 
for both literary and cultural study. Even so, for new historicists and cultural 
materialists, those texts look more interesting when set along side other 
writing from their period . . . Shakespeare is, simply, the most provocative 
point at which to break in to (or is it out of?) the system.61
So Henry V and Hamlet are just two texts among many that are on an 
equal footing; they exist and are therefore available for analysis. The 
problem here is not necessarily with Sinfi eld’s argument per se but with 
where he positions it, as necessarily ‘marginal’, rebellious, against ‘the 
system’.
As I have already noted, cultural materialism can no longer claim 
to occupy a marginal position in the professionalised space of English 
Literature as taught at universities. Sinfi eld, and indeed cultural materi-
alists in general – possibly because of the Marxist strain in much of their 
thought – sometimes write as if it were the 1950s, when the writing and 
teaching of English criticism were still the luxury of the cultural elite, 
the select few who were admitted into universities. At that time cities in 
Britain were still built around industry, the majority of people still went 
to church and the local high street was populated with small traders. A 
brief visit to any modern city, and indeed to any modern university, will 
demonstrate immediately how times have changed. In short, we have 
gone from being an industrial culture to a corporate one. Traditional 
class labels such as proletarian and bourgeois can no longer be easily 
applied to large portions of the population. When Francis Fukuyama 
declared ‘the End of History’, he was referring not only to the end of the 
Cold War, but also to the fact that capitalism had moved into its fi nal 
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stage of corporate domination.62 The ‘centre’, the dominant ideology, 
is now represented as much by large multinational corporations as it 
is by ‘the state’. There is a degree to which the ideology of ‘unrivalled’ 
consumer choice is now the status quo and institutionalised aesthetic 
hierarchies, for which generations of scholars from I. A. Richards to 
Harold Bloom have stood and fought, are marginalised. And in its level-
ling, anti-canonical, anti-hierarchical philosophy, cultural materialism 
mirrors this ideology of choice exactly. In short, cultural materialism’s 
insistence on its marginal position is based on an outmoded critique 
of British culture – the fact that Tillyard remains a target is reveal-
ing in itself. Cultural materialists would perhaps do well to question 
their assumptions about what qualifi es as ‘radical’ in our own cultural 
moment before declaring its marginality.
To conclude, I have shown that while cultural materialism exempts 
itself from many of the problems associated with the textualised meth-
odology of new historicism, it runs into its own problems in its theory, 
politics and self-confessed subjectivity. The theory runs foul of attempt-
ing to encompass too many competing ideas under the cultural mate-
rialist banner. Although the cultural materialists are far more ready to 
engage with theory than their American counterparts in new historicism, 
they are not quite rigorous enough. Their loose application of Althusser 
to Gramsci, and, in turn, Williams to Althusser, somehow manages 
to lose what is dynamic in all three thinkers: the accountability of the 
ruling class and the signifi cance of action in Gramsci, the prospect of a 
positive but none the less inescapable ideology in Althusser, and the con-
tinually shifting residual and emergent ideological forces in Williams. 
At the same time, they inherit the Marxist habit of positing itself as a 
science that has seen ‘the truth’, things as they really are. Incongruously, 
they attempt to add to this already messy model a feminist practice that 
comes with its own theoretical baggage. The pseudo-scientifi c discourse 
of structural Marxism jars with the necessarily ‘subjective’ criticism of 
feminism. It is politics above all that informs this model, and, following 
Levin and Bradshaw, I hope to have shown how it colours and distorts 
their reading of texts – in this instance, Henry V. This leads to two 
problems: fi rst, it leads to an infl exible form of evidence-based reading 
that necessarily proves its own thesis, which, more often than not, takes 
the form of a political position. Second, it leads to the dangerous habit 
of artifi cially confl ating all opposition into the same ‘liberal human-
ist’ Other. Finally, I have suggested how this polarising, oppositional 
stance can lead to a misdiagnosis of what really counts as marginal or 
conservative. On the issue of consumer choice, for example, the cultural 
materialist view is in line with mass culture and its dominant ideology.
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Chapter 4
An Argument Against Anti-humanism
Nature and Nurture
For all their differences, new historicists and cultural materialists are 
united by their anti-essentialist, anti-humanist stance. It is worth sum-
marising what this stance entails before outlining my main objections to 
it. In short, it is the rejection of any notion of an innate human nature in 
favour of a form of social determinism. Individuals are said to be condi-
tioned by a set of social, cultural and ideological forces; they are entirely 
products of their particular place at a particular historical moment. As 
Clifford Geertz, one of Stephen Greenblatt’s acknowledged main infl u-
ences, states: ‘our ideas, our values, our acts, even our emotions, are, 
like our nervous system itself, cultural products – products manufac-
tured, indeed, out of tendencies, capacities, and dispositions with which 
we were born, but manufactured nonetheless’.1 Jonathan Dollimore 
concurs, rejecting ‘the idea that “man” possesses some given, unalter-
able essence which is what makes “him” human, which is the source and 
essential determinant of “his” culture and its priority over conditions of 
existence’ as an essentialist mystifi cation designed to represent ‘sectional 
interests as universal ones’.2 In 1980, Catherine Belsey, one of the more 
theoretically engaged cultural materialists, even went as far as question-
ing the way that scientists were applying the Theory of Evolution; she 
refused to accept the idea of an ‘essential human nature’ based on what 
she called ‘a quasi-biological theory of instincts’.3 Accordingly, to this 
day cultural historicists, such as Alan Sinfi eld, share an ‘opposition to 
any notion of Shakespeare as universal and timeless’.4 It is worth pausing 
to consider Sinfi eld’s choice of language here; does he really mean ‘any 
notion’? Are we to accept that there is no aspect of Shakespeare’s work 
with which we share common ground at all? This, ultimately, is the 
claim that some cultural historicists make. And it stands to reason: if we 
accept that individuals are nothing but cultural products, then individu-
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als from different cultures or from different periods in history will have 
very little in common. As Marcus Nordlund points out, in adopting this 
stance cultural historicism ‘has effectively closed the door on a fascinat-
ing array of evidence emerging from biology and the other life sciences’.5
However, the idea that individuals are solely produced by culture 
has been discredited outside of English studies. The cognitive scien-
tist Steven Pinker has presented compelling evidence to suggest that a 
large part of what makes human beings who they are is biological and 
genetically inherited. Pinker supports ‘the idea that natural selection has 
endowed humans with a universal complex mind’6 and puts forward an 
almost overwhelming amount of evidence from studies in evolutionary 
and behavioural psychology to support his claims. Among many other 
studies, Pinker draws on the work of the anthropologist Donald E. 
Brown, who claims to have found hundreds of human universals observ-
able in all known cultures.7 These include: broad and general categories, 
such as confl ict and narrative; more specifi c categories, such as the clas-
sifi cation of colours, body parts, kin and sex; emotions, such as envy and 
fear; basic concepts, such as the division of labour and proper names; 
common behaviour, such as baby talk and gossiping; cultural taboos, 
such as those prohibiting incest and rape; and certain seemingly innate 
human abilities, such as language, logic and planning. Pinker’s argument 
is long and complex, and reasonably well disseminated in the public 
sphere; I do not have space here to engage directly with his fi ndings. As 
Pinker says himself, ‘human nature is a scientifi c subject, and as facts 
come in, our conception of it will change’.8 I am not a scientist; for my 
study, all that is important is that there is such a thing as human nature, 
which is inextricably linked with but cannot be reduced to culture, and 
that this fact is reasonably constant across diverse cultures. A signifi cant 
body of new scientifi c evidence is now available, which proves that our 
actions are indeed infl uenced by nature as well as by culture. Whatever 
one makes of Pinker, the clear message from the scientifi c community is 
that the cultural historicist conception of humanity is no longer tenable;9 
consequently, and more importantly for criticism, it is no longer possible 
to claim with an authority bordering on certainty, as cultural historicists 
have for almost three decades, that there are no universal human capaci-
ties or traits.
In Shakespeare’s Humanism, Robin Headlam Wells disparages critics 
who have ignored these recent developments in neuroscience and evolu-
tionary psychology, accusing them of political fundamentalism:
Postmodernism has ignored the rapidly growing body of work in archeoan-
thropology, evolutionary psychology and neurobiology that has transformed 
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modern thinking on social behaviour, the mind, and the mystery of human 
creativity . . . Just as fundamentalist creationists prefer to disregard the sci-
entifi c evidence of the fossil record because it confl icts with their religious 
beliefs, so postmodernists would rather ignore the extensive scientifi c lit-
erature on selfhood, gender, and consciousness because they believe that it’s 
incompatible with their own political ideals.10
Wells argues that we should reject anti-humanism and advocates a 
return to essentialist humanism based on our newfound understanding 
of human universality:
Before they are introduced to Theory, university students of English still 
tend to remark that a particular play has universal themes, or that dilemmas 
experienced by such and such a character are timeless. Irrespective of whether 
they get these ideas from their school teachers or from their own intuitions, 
the fact is that students often seem to feel, not just sympathy for, but an 
empathetic affi nity with, the fi gures they encounter in literature from earlier 
centuries, experiencing the joys and sorrows of those characters and respond-
ing intuitively to their moods. That’s what drew them to literature. It’s as if 
they imagine there’s some kind of human bond linking them to the past, or 
with characters from cultures quite different from their own . . .
. . . Literature can help to teach us the value of tolerance. But deny that 
there is such a thing as common humanity, and one of the most powerful 
arguments for tolerance immediately vanishes. Combine that with postmod-
ernism’s extreme relativism – which logically means that in the absence of 
human universals there can be no rational grounds for preferring one set of 
values to another – and tolerance acquires a quite different meaning: it means 
that we are obliged to tolerate regimes that are in themselves brutal and 
intolerant. It’s time we got over our misplaced embarrassment about human 
nature and recognised anti-humanism for what it really is . . .
. . . Anti-essentialism, and the cultural relativism that is its corollary, are at 
the core of postmodernist thought . . . But we don’t have to take this route.11
Plainly, Wells is in no mood to pull his punches. His argument is as much 
political as it is based on scientifi c research in that he sees a concept of 
human universality as vital to the causes of both tolerance and literature 
as a socially relevant tool.
Although writing from the point of view of Marxism, Gabriel Egan 
comes to similar conclusions. Egan thinks that anti-essentialism is ‘a 
view that has done much harm to radical politics’. He takes issue with 
‘the relativist (that is, anti-essentialist) claim that things we might take 
for granted as unchangeable aspects of being human (emotions, for 
example) are in fact historically and culturally contingent’. Egan claims 
that cultural historicists have relied far too heavily on ‘Althusser’s 
theory [of ideology]’, which ‘attributes so much to the social construc-
tion of the individual (by “interpellation”) of the individual’s sense 
of herself that it is a wonder anyone can think for themselves at all’. 
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He continues: ‘a grave weakness of New Historicism and Cultural 
Materialism has been a misplaced confi dence that Althusser’s theorizing 
of ideology solved the problems of determination, consciousness, and 
base /  superstructure’. ‘Fortunately’, Egan says, Geertz, Althusser and, 
indeed, the cultural  historicists have been proved ‘wrong’ by ‘recent 
anthropological work’. 12
Andy Mousley has also been a strong critic of anti-humanism. He 
accuses critical theory of ‘fl attening the term “humanism”’ by artifi cially 
reifying it.13 In a book that Mousley wrote with Martin Halliwell, he 
states: ‘We are not simply suggesting that critical theory’s version of 
humanism is a pure invention, but that humanism has been tidied up, 
packaged and streamlined by some anti-humanists in such a way as to 
negate its actual diversity.’14 ‘Although mainstream humanism has often 
been regarded as a weapon of (bourgeois) ideology,’ Mousley argues, ‘it 
is possible to locate other expressions of humanism which have acted 
against ideology.’15 Mousley’s work can be seen as an attempt to redeem 
the idea of humanism in literary criticism from ‘the [version of] human-
ism which was attacked on various grounds by anti-humanists in the 
1970s and 1980s’, and which has been ‘routinely invoked as though it 
encompassed the whole of the humanist tradition’.16 For Mousley, the 
anti-humanist approach to both literature and history serves to strip 
them of what he calls ‘existential signifi cance’:
for if history were to be totally deprived of a ‘human interest’ element, then 
why should it matter to us? . . . A form of historicism from which appeals to 
the human had been totally expunged would be in danger of turning history 
into just such an externalised, alienated object, voided of any existential sig-
nifi cance. Dehumanised history, history denied any kind of human face and 
scale, would cease to hold any signifi cance for who we are.17
Like Wells, Mousley views a concept of human universality as being 
fundamental to the reading of literature from the distant past; ‘for 
history to matter’, he argues, ‘it has to resonate with us at some level; 
it has to produce a sense of the past in which we feel we are meaning-
fully engaged’.18 ‘Anti-universalism’, he writes, ‘has discredited the 
language of human feeling and engagement which we might want to use 
to describe the experience of literature.’ In contrast, ‘literary humanism’ 
can reconnect with literature on a human level, by reading it as a ‘practi-
cal ethics’ that helps us answer ‘the question: “how to live”’.19
Wells, Egan and Mousley fi nd another ally in Joseph Carroll,20 who 
has argued for a direct application of Darwinian ideas to critical prac-
tice. In Literary Darwinism, taking his cue from Pinker and others, he 
attempts to develop a critical methodology derived from the cognitive 
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sciences.21 His previous study, Evolution and Literary Theory, which 
provides a thorough critique and rejection of post-structuralism, includ-
ing cultural historicism, ends on an optimistic note:
I predict that within twenty years the Darwinian paradigm will have estab-
lished its dominance in the social sciences. It will have done so in spite of 
all prejudice and all entrenched interests, because of the irresistible force 
of its explanatory power. I imagine that the Darwinian paradigm will take 
rather longer to establish itself in the humanities and in literary theory, partly 
because literary theory is heavily dependent on developments in other disci-
plines, partly because it is far less constrained by empirical fi ndings than the 
social sciences are, and partly because literary theory is the last refuge of mys-
tical indeterminacy . . . But even in literary theory the need for understanding 
must ultimately take precedence over beliefs that depend on obscurantism 
and intellectual obstruction. In any case, whatever happens within the criti-
cal institution as a whole, the pursuit of positive knowledge is available for 
anyone who desires it. Within this pursuit, the opportunities for real and 
substantial development in our scientifi c understanding of culture and of 
literature are now greater than they have ever been before.22
In the ensuing decade, Carroll has been joined in his cause by a range 
of other critics, including Brian Boyd, Jonathan Gottschall and Daniel 
Kruger, who he characterises ‘not as an army, but as a robust guerrilla 
band’. None the less, in his most recent book he complains literary 
Darwinism continues to speak with a marginal voice in the discipline 
and imagines ‘what would a Darwinist contribution to a casebook look 
like?’23
While I am not convinced that Carroll’s direct application of 
Darwinian principles to the study of literature is the wisest course of 
action, there is no denying the strength of the argument he and other 
advocates of evolutionary criticism put forward.
For the past thirty years or so, while the social sciences were going through 
a Darwinian revolution, the humanities have been running in almost exactly 
the opposite direction. While scientists concerned with human behaviour 
have been recognizing that human nature is shaped and constrained by an 
evolved and adapted human nature, the humanities have been proclaiming, 
fl amboyantly but with virtuoso skill in sophistical equivocation, that the 
world is made of words – ‘discourse’, ‘rhetoric’. This too was a revelation – a 
breaking free from nature and reality, a last euphoric fl ing into the varieties 
of the imagination. ‘There is no outside the text!’ So Derrida told us. Humans 
did not exist either as individuals or as a species before we thought of them 
in that way. So Barthes and Foucault told us. Sex is purely a social construct. 
So a whole generation told us. None of it was true. Such things are often 
said, in a tired and routine way, but deep down, nobody has ever thoroughly 
believed them. We all wake up at some point and feel the massive overwhelm-
ing reality of our own biological existence in a physical world.24
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Brian Boyd puts it another way:
For many in the modern humanities and social sciences, there is no human 
nature, only the construction of local culture, and to think otherwise can only 
endanger hopes for changing what we are and do. This position is confused. 
Even to deny a universal human nature and insist only on local cultural dif-
ferences already constitutes a claim about human nature: that the minds 
and behavior of humans, and only humans, depend solely on culture. This 
happens to be false: our minds and behavior are always shaped by the interac-
tion of nature and nurture, or genes and environment, including the cultural 
environment.25
This position, backed as it is with empirical evidence, seems to me to be 
eminently more reasonable, sensible and convincing than the cultural 
historicist anti-humanist view, which is based on little but ‘sterile apri-
orism’.26
Despite writing from four distinct political points of view, Wells, 
Egan, Mousley and Carroll (and associates) are each drawing the same 
conclusion: there remains little reason to hold on to one-dimensional, 
deterministic beliefs about the social construction of the individual when 
there is a more viable alternative available.
Catherine Belsey has been at the forefront of the cultural historicist 
reaction to these arguments. In 1994, she repeated her earlier swipe at 
‘quasi-biological’ theories of instinct by stating baldly: ‘I fi nd socio-
biology . . . deeply distasteful, crude, as well as politically reaction-
ary.’27 Having dismissed an entire branch of the sciences as ‘politically 
reactionary’, more recently Belsey has been more conciliatory in her 
acknowledgement of ‘recent scientifi c advances’. She explains the appar-
ent neglect of these advances by cultural historicists as follows: ‘Cultural 
critics have unduly neglected these advances, because . . . most of the 
new developments have been defi ned and explained from the point of 
view of the scientists.’28 In other words, according to Belsey, ‘cultural 
critics’ do not like the scientifi c method because they fi nd it reductive 
and ‘functionalist’. She then turns her attention to the ideas about 
human universality derived from evolutionary psychology:
This reductive point of view is widely apparent in current popular science, 
and nowhere more so than in evolutionary psychology, which ascribes the 
habits of our own society to an unchanging human nature conjecturally 
shared with the hunter-gatherers who distinguished themselves from our 
hominid ancestors about 100,000 years ago. But evolutionary psychologists 
are not alone in this belief. On the contrary, they share with many biolo-
gists and neurobiologists the belief that human beings display the same basic 
inclinations and tendencies at all times and all places, and this is because, like 
the rest of the animal kingdom, we are ultimately nothing more than survival 
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machines, driven by the imperative to live long enough to disseminate our 
genes . . . It follows from the survival value of all these universal characteris-
tics that individual and cultural distinctions are merely the local manifesta-
tion of organically rooted drives we share with all other human beings.29
However, Belsey does not turn on these ideas as one might expect. 
Instead, she hints suggestively at a middle ground: ‘Without abandoning 
the unquestioned insights of this work, we could now perhaps afford to 
move towards a more nuanced view of culture.’30 I have put that phrase 
in italics because it marks a signifi cant moment. Belsey, an avowed 
and politically motivated anti-humanist thinker, now acknowledges 
the ‘unquestioned insights’ of work that she previously dismissed as 
‘quasi-biological’, ‘deeply distasteful’, ‘crude’ and ‘politically reaction-
ary’ – even if she cannot resist a fi nal dig at evolutionary psychology: 
‘evidently’, she writes, ‘the whole of evolution has led inexorably to 
Walton-on-Thames (or possibly, Westport, CT)’. So Belsey accepts 
that there is something to be learned from Pinker and company, but 
objects to the fact that culture has been reduced to a mere instru-
ment: ‘Now there is a single determinant of social behaviour, and it is 
biology itself’, she complains, ‘culture is no more than the instrument 
of biology.’ Ultimately, Belsey rejects the idea that ‘imagination func-
tions on behalf of biology’. She contends that, although imagination is 
‘rooted in biology in the fi rst instance, the capacity for fantasy takes on 
a degree of autonomy. It develops a material existence to the degree that 
it motivates behaviour.’ All of this leads Belsey to conclude that, through 
language, ‘culture alters those who internalize it’.31
Although Belsey is prepared to concede some ground to the biological 
determinists, she maintains at all costs the relative autonomy of culture: 
‘In my view, the biology that constitutes human beings always interacts 
with the relatively autonomous culture their evolved brains make pos-
sible, and culture too exercises determinations.’32 While this seems a 
plausible dialectical view of the matter, it begs a number of questions: 
to what extent does culture determine human beings? Does the fact that 
biology ‘constitutes human beings’ reopen the door to some notion of 
a universal human nature, or is Belsey advocating a new kind of anti-
humanism beyond anti-essentialism? Even though Belsey has switched 
from the lexicon of institutional state apparatuses and subjects to that 
of ‘human organisms-in-culture’, her argument that the human imagi-
nation develops a material existence which then motivates behaviour 
retains a distinctly Althusserian fl avour. One wonders whether the 
autonomy of the individual disappears under the autonomy of culture. 
That said, Belsey is a cultural historicist who is committed to thinking 
seriously about human agency and about how the fi ndings of Pinker 
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and others complicate the existing theoretical models. I am working in 
a similar vein.
Three Types of Determinism
One feature of this debate between the humanists and the anti-humanists 
strikes me as peculiar: each side accuses the other of crude and reductive 
determinism while attributing categories such as autonomy and dyna-
mism to their own theory. Take, for example, these two passages on the 
human imagination in Belsey’s essay:
The science of human nature credits imagination itself with survival value. It 
permits us to hallucinate specifi c, identifi able satisfactions for our appetites. 
Imagination also enabled our ancestors to conjure up images of creatures and 
situations that could do them harm, as well as to visualize unknown places 
that might be worth the effort of migration. Thanks to imagination we can 
empathize with other people, entering vicariously into their perceptions and 
feelings, and this empathy facilitates the capacity for cooperation that forti-
fi es human groups against predators and natural disasters. We can improvise 
in unforeseen situations, choose between alternative options, and invent new 
social skills and technologies. Imagination creates alternatives to the world 
we know . . .
. . . In the course of history, that amending imagination has produced some 
of the best and worst of human achievements. For one thing, it drives the 
development of knowledge, as science produces hypotheses about what we 
don’t already know, opportunities we could explore, diseases we might 
cure. In addition, it has brought democracies out of dictatorships. But it 
has also generated social experiments that involved exterminating swathes 
of the population. Imagination accounts for both art and pornography; or 
for Shakespeare’s play and Peter Quince’s. The ability to imagine a better 
alternative has fuelled both feminism and the oppression of women . . . the 
civil rights movement, but also apartheid . . . utopian idealists and suicide 
bombers.33
For Belsey, this power – the power to change the course of history, to 
determine the future – is ultimately ascribed to culture, or rather, it is 
culture itself: ‘the capacity for fantasy takes on a degree of autonomy’, 
which then motivates behaviour. The human imagination takes on a life 
of its own which ends up controlling the very people who did the imag-
ining in the fi rst place. But Belsey has also, quite knowingly, reproduced 
the classic humanist argument which maintains that the power to change 
the course of history is in the hands of individuals and their natural abili-
ties, such as imagination. ‘Culture’ is a product of that endeavour; or as 
Pinker puts it, it ‘emerges naturally from that lifestyle [of knowledge-
using and co-operation]’ which comes naturally to humans. For Pinker, 
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‘culture . . . is a pool of technological and social innovations that people 
accumulate to help them live their lives, not a collection of arbitrary 
roles and symbols that happen to befall them’.34
It would appear, then, that the question of where the real autonomy 
lies is a matter of emphasis. According to the humanist, human beings 
use culture as a tool for living and learning; according to the anti-
humanist, on the other hand, culture is autonomous and pushes human 
beings into living and learning in particular ways. The humanist argues 
that primal human needs and desires are the engine room of innovation 
and change, whereas the anti-humanist argues that culture is the chief 
mechanism for instituting change. For the humanist, social determinism 
denies individuals agency; for the anti-humanist, biological determin-
ism denies culture autonomy. I suspect each is guilty of setting up straw 
men who are rather more extreme in their positions than their real-life 
counterparts. The point that Belsey and Pinker are both making is sub-
stantially the same: culture is the accumulated by-product of human 
action and imagination through which humans can achieve their natural 
potential. The relationship between humans and culture is dialecti-
cal. Few evolutionary biologists would deny that culture, along with 
other external factors, plays a major role in human development. For 
example, Boyd states:
That our minds refl ect evolution’s design does not mean that all is nature 
and not nurture, that genes are everything and environment nothing. In any 
sophisticated biological thinking these oppositions have been thoroughly dis-
credited . . . Nature ‘versus’ nurture is not a zero-sum game, in which nature’s 
x percent is 100 minus nurture’s y percent. Rather it is a product, x times y, 
nature activated at each stage according to its impact from nurture.35
Likewise, there is an implicit belief in cultural historicism, albeit vague 
and concealed, in some form of basic human autonomy and subjectivity; 
Mousley calls it ‘covert humanism’.36 When Alan Sinfi eld says, ‘I focus 
on questions of dissident sexuality . . . because they concern me as a gay 
man’,37 does he seriously believe that his sexuality has been culturally 
determined, that he was always already born into a dissident subculture 
of homosexuality? It seems unlikely. In any case, the very existence of 
a subculture of homosexuality would always already depend on there 
being homosexuals (or at least homosexual acts) in the fi rst place – it 
could hardly arise from a group of heterosexual men who had sexual 
contact with women only.
Notwithstanding these subtleties, as I have suggested, we have been 
provided with two deterministic models: biological determinism and 
cultural determinism. Each views the other as fundamentally crude and 
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reductive, and blind to the nuances that make their causal explanation 
of choice superior. In fact, we are faced with two grand meta-narratives, 
of the variety supposedly despised by post-modernists,38 with which we 
can explain the majestic sweep of human history. To these we can add 
a third grand meta-narrative that cannot be reduced to either culture or 
human nature: geographical determinism. The example par excellence 
of this type of determinism is Jared Diamond’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 
study, Germs, Guns and Steel. Diamond attempts to answer the fun-
damental question of inequality in human civilisation: ‘why did wealth 
and power become distributed as they are now, rather than in some 
other way? For instance, why weren’t Native Americans, Africans, and 
Aboriginal Australians the ones who decimated, subjugated, or extermi-
nated Europeans and Asians?’39
Diamond argues that when the Eurasian civilisations came into 
contact with the civilisations from other continents, they ultimately 
conquered them because they had developed guns and steel, and resist-
ance to germs from centuries of breeding domesticated animals, and 
because they rode on horseback. This begs the question of why it 
was the Eurasian nations rather than the nations they conquered that 
developed those things. For Diamond, the answer boils down to the 
‘questions of ultimate causation’:40 luck, geographical location, land 
formation, climate, and available crops and livestock. For him, the alter-
native answers – that it was mainly down to human nature or individual 
cultures – prove both unpalatable and unfeasible. Diamond’s thesis is 
relatively simple: in order for a tribe of people living as hunter-gatherers 
to develop into an agricultural society, certain criteria needed to be met. 
These include the ability to grow sustainable cereal crops that can be 
stored in granaries for reasonably long periods without perishing and 
access to more than one of the so-called ‘Ancient Fourteen Species of Big 
Herbivorous Domestic Animals’.41 With the move from hunter-gather-
ing to farming, not only is there more food for the people to eat (leading 
to population increases), but also time is freed up for the men and the 
women of the tribe to spend on tasks other than picking fruit or hunting 
game. From this point on, barring disasters, the move to the Iron Age 
and beyond is only a matter of time, although contact with other tribes, 
trade, exchanges of knowledge, languages, crops, livestock and confl ict 
are vital to progress. According to Diamond, geography provided a ‘very 
unequal distribution’ of these key ingredients for development ‘among 
the continents’, which, as he puts it, ‘became an important reason why 
Eurasians, rather than peoples of other continents, were the ones to end 
up with guns, germs, and steel’.42
Just as with any well thought out and thoroughly researched 
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 deterministic argument, Diamond’s thesis has an almost irresistible 
explanatory power – at least as irresistible, at any rate, as the ‘explana-
tory power’ Joseph Carroll fi nds so compelling in evolutionary psy-
chology. I bring up Diamond for a reason: geographical determinism 
proves every bit as seductive as the biological and social variants of 
determinism. Robin Headlam Wells writes about cultural materialism 
with typical disdain when he argues that cultural materialists aim to fi nd 
‘something . . .. clear-cut’ in Shakespeare’s plays:
on the one hand a pro-establishment play defending ‘the exercise of state 
violence’; on the other a ‘dissident’ play about heroic workers exploited by 
their ‘upper-class’ rulers . . . If it looks as if the play in question is supporting 
‘the state’, you rewrite it so that it supports the people; if the play is diffi cult 
to pin down you get rid of the ambiguities.43
But it is not diffi cult to imagine critics of Pinker or Diamond drawing 
similar conclusions about the reductive or cruder aspects of their theo-
ries.
Diamond’s theory is only able to answer certain questions.44 For 
example, he is silent on the question of differences between individu-
als. How is it that two people from the same time and place can have 
different personalities, tastes, drives and skills? And, perhaps a more 
ambitious question: why do certain individuals cut such gargantuan 
fi gures in history rather than others? Why Lincoln? Why Gandhi? Why 
Hitler? Why Shakespeare? While evolutionary psychology does not 
have anywhere near all of the answers to such questions, it can certainly 
make a better fi st of it than either social or geographical determinism. 
However, by the same token, it is much harder for evolutionary psy-
chology to account for the huge inequalities of wealth and power that 
Diamond attempts to explain. Likewise, the cultural historicist version 
of social determinism is apt to answer some questions better than others. 
For example, Althusserian ideology critique is, on the whole, far more 
convincing about why the proletarian revolutions that Marx had pre-
dicted would occur in industrialised nations never took place than it is 
on the reasons why the October Revolution did occur; anti-humanists in 
general have a hard time explaining large-scale social changes.
Deterministic models are, by their nature, prone to making aber-
rations and awkward problems fi t their causal explanation of choice 
rather than switching to an alternative. This is a weakness found in all 
three of the deterministic models – social, geographical and biological 
– that I have been discussing. This is an unfortunate tendency, because 
it seems to me that all three models convincingly explain aspects of 
human history. Rather than searching for any single causal explana-
PARVINI PRINT.indd   62 17/02/2012   12:23
An Argument Against Anti-humanism     63
tion for the path human history has taken, we would be better served 
by acknowledging multiple factors. History is not wholly explicable in 
terms of either culture, geography or human biology, but is rather the 
result of their complex interaction, with chance playing a prominent, 
sometimes decisive role in determining when and how those three 
participants combine. Despite some of my earlier misgivings about 
Catherine Belsey’s essay, ‘The Role of Culture’, her reaching for the 
middle ground, for ‘a more nuanced view’, is in the right direction. If we 
wish to answer Kiernan Ryan’s ‘plea for radical critics to bring a wider 
range of expectations to bear on Shakespeare’s plays’ than the assump-
tion that ‘Shakespeare’s drama is steeped in the oppressive ideas and 
attitudes of his day’, then, as Belsey rightly contends, ‘it is the friction 
between’ these  different types of causal explanations ‘that we need to 
think about’.45
Freedom versus Determinism and Human Agency
Lurking under the nature and nurture question is another issue: the scope 
for human agency and the related question of freedom versus determin-
ism. This has long underpinned the struggle between new historicists and 
cultural materialists in the so-called ‘subversion- containment debate’46 
which raged in the 1980s and continued well into the 1990s. In 1985, 
Jonathan Dollimore summarised it as follows:
Perhaps the most signifi cant divergence within cultural analysis is that 
between those who concentrate on culture as th[e] making of history [i.e. 
cultural materialists], and those who concentrate on the unchosen conditions 
which constrain and inform that process of making [i.e. new historicists]. The 
former allows much to human agency, and tends to privilege human experi-
ence; the latter concentrates on the formative power of social and ideological 
structures which are both prior to experience and in some sense determining 
of it, and so opens up the whole question of autonomy.47
This is potentially misleading, because it suggests that cultural material-
ism gives individuals the scope for ‘human agency’, whereas, in fact, they 
are as constrained and informed by the unchosen conditions of culture 
as the individuals in the new historicist model. This is cultural material-
ism at its most dense and diffi cult: how is it possible to have a theory 
of ‘human agency’ when you deny the concept of individual autonomy? 
What Dollimore calls ‘human agency’ might be better described as ‘cul-
tural agency’ because the ‘making of history’ is ultimately ascribed to 
culture rather than to individual human beings.
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In his most recent monograph, Alan Sinfi eld has reiterated Dollimore’s 
sentiments. He opens the book with a fi rm restatement of cultural mate-
rialism’s political objectives:
For Marxism . . . the task is not to transcend material conditions, but to 
change them . . . Cultural materialism may reiterate with some confi dence 
its claim to be a rational and principled endeavour, connecting textuality, 
history and politics, in a world where people have purposes and culture has 
consequences.48
Sinfi eld is motivated partly by Andrew Hadfi eld’s attack on the cultural 
materialist insistence on a ‘dominant-subordinate model’ which ‘tends 
to fi x political positions as “pro” or “anti” the establishment when 
they may not so easily fi t into this model’.49 While Sinfi eld admits that 
this is ‘an awkward tendency’, he argues that his recourse to Raymond 
Williams ensures that ‘we should expect the co-occurrence of subordi-
nate, residual, emergent, alternative, and oppositional cultural forces 
alongside the dominant, in varying relations of incorporation, negotia-
tion, and resistance’. Having said that, Sinfi eld remains ‘convinced that 
it is helpful to speak of a dominant ideology’.50 Sinfi eld goes on to posit 
the crucial question: ‘if it is right to focus on the power of ideology, what 
is the scope for human agency?’51 His answer to this question and, more 
specifi cally, his interpretation of what is meant by ‘agency’ are paradig-
matic of a signifi cant portion of cultural materialist work on Shakespeare. 
‘Agency’ is equated almost exclusively with politically radical action or 
subverting the establishment. Sinfi eld criticises ‘the climate of intellec-
tual timidity’ created by ‘conservative commentators from the 1950s to 
the 1970s’, who maintained ‘a conservative vision, in which disturbance 
of established hierarchy was bad’. Against this, Sinfi eld pits ‘dissidence’, 
the central concept of his earlier book Faultlines. ‘The ultimate issues’, 
he contends, ‘are agency and determination – the extent to which culture 
has to be seen as subject to social and economic conditions.’52 A clear 
dichotomy emerges in Sinfi eld between determination, conservatism and 
‘the establishment’ on one side, and agency, dissidence and subversion 
on the other. Sinfi eld’s answer to Hadfi eld’s criticism ultimately recasts 
the dominant-subordinate model in terms (borrowed from Raymond 
Williams) that allow a looser interpretation of dominance and greater 
scope for insubordination. Hence the business of cultural materialism is 
still a form of ‘political struggle’ against the dominant ideology, which 
is ‘characterised by hierarchy’.53
There are three major problems with Sinfi eld’s model: fi rst, it is 
entirely self-refl exive in that it can only explain changes in culture by 
recourse to elements within culture (which begs the question of where 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   64 17/02/2012   12:23
An Argument Against Anti-humanism     65
those elements came from in the fi rst place); second, it fails to account 
for the potential agency of individuals within culture; third, it assumes 
that agency is always radical in character. All three are problems 
that Sinfi eld has inherited from and failed to resolve in his theoretical 
infl uences; they stem from his attempt to overcome the limitations of 
Althusser’s theory of ideology with Williams’s ideas about residual and 
emergent culture (see Chapter 3). This is an example of how the rigid 
and almost dogmatic insistence on working within the constraints of 
the anti-humanist theoretical framework can lead to an apparent dead 
end. Louis Montrose, who is one of the more interesting new historicist 
thinkers on the issue of agency, articulates the central tenet with which 
neither he nor Sinfi eld can dispense: ‘the possibility of social and politi-
cal agency cannot be based upon the illusion that consciousness is a 
condition somehow beyond ideology’.54 This leads us into a theoretical 
black hole, which I will address further in Chapters 5 and 6.
But Althusser’s totalising theory of ideology proves much less prob-
lematic if, following evolutionary psychology, one returns to the 
notion of universal human capacities and traits (a move, of course, 
that Althusser himself would have staunchly opposed) and views it for 
what it is: a convincing explanation of how states are able to maintain 
order over their populations and why rebellions and revolutions do not 
occur more frequently. Althusser’s theory simply provides us with an 
analysis of one facet of the historical picture; there is no need to make 
it do more work than that, especially when it is so plainly inadequate 
in its account of other aspects of human society. The same can be said 
for Foucault, Williams and any other variety of the social determin-
ism to which so many English departments have been in thrall since 
the advent of new historicism. The antidote to the ‘dominant ideology’ 
that Sinfi eld is looking for cannot be yet more ideology or culture; there 
are other determinants available, including human nature. Cultural 
historicism’s search for agency is destined to be frustrated as long as it 
remains  committed to structural models that under-theorise the human 
subject.55
In a recent essay, Ewan Fernie also broaches this topic:
Even for moderate modern commentators personal agency is thoroughly con-
ditioned by forces beyond the self. And the ‘masters of suspicion’ themselves 
unfold a much more extreme and frightening vision: the human agent turns 
into a puppet or conduit of larger forces – of the unconscious for Sigmund 
Freud; of ideology for Louis Althusser; of power for Michel Foucault; of 
différance for Jacques Derrida. Manifold human agencies explode into a 
ghastly, pervasive ‘agentless’ agency that possesses and acts through a mere 
fi gment of individuality.56
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The problem here is not with the ‘forces beyond the self’ but with the 
one-dimensionality of the theories of each of the ‘masters of suspicion’ 
that Fernie names: Freud explains things primarily in terms of the 
unconscious, Althusser primarily in terms of ideology and so on. That 
human beings are shaped – biologically, culturally and geographically 
– is not in question. There is no escape from the situation of determina-
tion and I think it is a mistake to look for freedom ‘outside’ of this situ-
ation. An individual’s choice to act one way or the other is informed by 
a huge variety of determinants which may well be in confl ict – including 
factors such as the individual’s upbringing and social standing, his or 
her natural inclinations determined by their genes and hormones, and 
such seemingly arbitrary factors as the weather and type of food avail-
able. The simple fact that there are determinants does not dictate the 
individual’s fi nal choice.
Shakespeare, more than any other writer of the Renaissance, palpably 
struggled with the issue of human agency. The relationship between 
individuals and the various forces that shape and constrain them is 
central to many of his plays. Self and circumstance are regularly in 
confl ict; characters wrestle with the constraints placed on them by the 
structures in which they fi nd themselves. In many ways, Shakespeare’s 
own theorising of the nature versus nurture debate is as complicated 
as the position articulated by Catherine Belsey. Take, for example, 
Enobarbus’s enigmatic aside in Antony and Cleopatra: ‘I see men’s 
judgements are / A parcel of their fortunes, and things outward / Do 
draw the inward quality after them / To suffer all alike’ (3.13.30–3). 
For Enobarbus, people’s views of things are shaped by their circum-
stances. However, his statement also presupposes the existence of an 
‘inward quality’, which suffers ‘all alike’ with the ‘judgements’ that 
were formed by ‘things outward’. This might seem like another version 
of social determinism, but Enobarbus collapses the binary opposition 
between human beings and their environment by making their relation-
ship dialectical; the fate of ‘men’s judgements’ depends as much on their 
‘inward quality’ as on ‘their fortunes’ (‘things outward’), even though 
the latter seems to be predominant. Celia and Rosalind’s exchange in 
As You Like It elaborates on the diffi culty of pinpointing which aspects 
of humanity to attribute to fortune and to nature (1.2.25–46). When 
Celia claims that fortune governs the physical features of women and 
thus, indirectly, their character, Rosalind tells her that she has confused 
fortune with nature: ‘Fortune reigns in the gifts of the world, not in the 
lineaments of nature’ (1.2.35–6). Celia counters this claim with a more 
complicated formulation as Touchstone the clown enters: ‘When Nature 
hath made a fair creature, may she not by Fortune fall into the fi re? 
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Though Nature hath given us wit to fl out at Fortune, hath not Fortune 
sent us this fool to cut off the argument?’ (1.2.37–40). For Rosalind, 
it is clear that, although nature may bestow intrinsic qualities upon an 
individual, they are subject to being changed by fortune. Elsewhere in 
Shakespeare, we fi nd positions that emphasise the autonomy of nature, 
such as Dogberry’s topsy-turvy maxim in Much Ado About Nothing: 
‘to be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune, but to write and read 
comes by nature’ (3.3.13–14). Ironically, this is a similar stance to that 
taken by modern evolutionary psychology: the capacity for language is 
one that comes naturally to humans. Fortune and nature remain as com-
peting but inextricably linked forces throughout Shakespeare’s work. 
In his later career, he shifted his attention from the struggle between 
fortune and nature to the products of human endeavour, the ‘potent art’ 
of Prospero (The Tempest, 5.1.50). In Polixenes and Perdita’s discussion 
about art and nature in The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare arrives at the 
following position: suppose there is, says Polixenes, an art that comes 
close to matching the beauty of nature,
Yet nature is made better by no mean 
But nature makes that mean. So over that art
Which you say adds to nature is an art
That nature makes . . .
                          . . . This is an art
Which does mend nature – change it rather; but
The art itself is nature.
 (The Winter’s Tale, 4.4.89–92, 95–7)
The cultural endeavours of human beings are seen not only as the 
product of nature but also as a part of it. We can observe similarities 
between this formulation and Catherine Belsey’s ideas about the imagi-
nation. Shakespeare was grappling with similar issues to those that are 
currently central to cultural historicist theory.
Although Shakespeare, like other early modern playwrights, draws on 
archetypes, his characters are always recognisably human. Their actions 
are motivated; they have internal struggles; they laugh and joke with 
each other; they bicker; they compete for supremacy; they contemplate; 
and, although it is not always in their best interests, they act. English 
literature affords us no better opportunity than Shakespeare’s plays to 
explore the question of human agency in history. And, as I hope to show 
in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, nowhere is this question more pertinent or more 
powerfully dramatised than in the history plays, where Shakespeare, 
relatively free of the generic conventions of tragedy and comedy, could 
grapple with some of the enduring questions of history on a human 
scale.
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Solutions
The problems with which I have been dealing in the preceding chapters 
are bound up with the question of history. Reading Shakespeare in 
itself is an inextricably historical experience, since the plays come to us 
from the remote past. But they also exist in the present. They occupy 
a strange dual space: they are simultaneously products of the distant 
past and objects within the present time that have a history of their 
own. New historicists and cultural materialists have stressed the need 
to read historically: to study, above all else, the historical moment from 
which the plays came. They have argued that history is fundamental to 
understanding what these plays are about. While agreeing on certain 
issues, I fi nd the assumptions and methods of both new historicists and 
cultural materialists problematic. In the chapters that follow, I hope to 
resolve some of the problems that I have found in new historicism and 
cultural materialism by turning to Shakespeare’s two great tetralogies 
about English kings: 1, 2 and 3 Henry VI and Richard III, and Richard 
II, 1 and 2 Henry IV and Henry V. These eight plays not only deal 
directly with historical subject matter but also meditate on the nature 
of history and, in the process, arguably constitute a unique form of 
historiography. I wish to advance a method of reading historically that 
presents a serious alternative to new historicism and cultural material-
ism. I also wish to come to a better understanding of Shakespeare’s 
own  explorations of history and politics as they are manifest in these 
plays.
Before turning to the history plays, however, in this brief chapter I will 
summarise the problems I have found in new historicism and cultural 
materialism and then suggest possible solutions. My critique of new 
historicism emphasises the following points:
1. New historicist practice is a type of ‘hidden formalism’ that textual-
ises culture and reads it as a formalist might read a poem.
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2. This covertly formalist treatment of culture results in an ahistorical 
fl attening of diachronic history.
3. Accordingly, following Clifford Geertz and Michel Foucault, new 
historicists tend to study the synchronic fi eld or ‘episteme’ in histori-
cal isolation.
4. Because of this, new historicists seldom seek to make links with pre-
vious or subsequent epistemes.
5. When reading these synchronic fi elds, new historicists have a habit 
of making arbitrary connections, often by elevating the importance 
of an incidental anecdote, which then reveals some aspect of early 
modern thought. As Kiernan Ryan succinctly puts it: ‘in the end the 
eccentric anecdote repeatedly turns out to be a synecdoche, an exem-
plary illustration of a pervasive cultural logic, which even the wildest 
imaginations of the age are powerless to escape’.1
6. By using anecdotes as synecdoches and making arbitrary connec-
tions, new historicists imply that there is a latent unity in the culture 
in question, whereby all its apparently disparate elements work to 
the same end; in this way they inadvertently reproduce the function-
alism of Talcott Parsons.
7. Stephen Greenblatt’s notion of ‘social energy’ also reveals a kind of 
culturalism or ‘cultural essentialism’ in new historicist thought which 
assumes that there are ‘generic structures’ in cultures that can be 
uncovered through analysis. One consequence of this is that it leads 
to a parochial, localised analysis, which seems incapable of taking 
wider contexts and infl uences into account.
Recent critiques of new historicism by other writers have praised it 
for its creativity and playfulness, especially in its use of the anecdote. 
For example, Steven Connor argues that new historicism’s emphasis 
on the arbitrariness of the past draws attention to ‘the bittiness of 
things’.2 Sonja Laden argues that ‘new historicism is a mode of “liter-
ary history” whose “literariness” lies in bringing imaginative operations 
closer to the surface of non-literary texts’.3 For Laden, new historicists 
employ anecdotes to re-imagine history ‘as it might have been’ and to 
demonstrate ‘that the primacy of historical evidence over narrative is 
by no means conclusive’.4 I am not convinced by these arguments. As I 
have shown in Chapter 2, new historicists explicitly employ anecdotes 
to reveal the hidden structures of early modern culture. How can the 
‘paradigmatic instance’ reveal the ‘bittiness of things’? The logic of 
the synecdoche surely relies on homogeneity. And if, as Laden claims, 
new historicism is simply an elaborate rhetorical game that continually 
reveals the constructedness of history, then is Shakespeare criticism 
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really the  appropriate arena in which to play it? The primary function 
of Shakespeare criticism must surely be to illuminate the plays it reads.
To this end, in my own reading of Shakespeare’s history plays I will 
not employ anecdotes or make arbitrary connections, not least because 
they are not always immediately pertinent to the plays in question. I will 
also resist the tendency to treat the Renaissance period in isolation. The 
history plays explicitly refer back to medieval England and, since the 
time of their writing, have been the subject of over 400 years of critical 
and cultural reception. Shakespeare’s history plays are as inextricably 
linked to their diachronic contexts as they are to their immediate culture; 
as Phyllis Rackin has argued, they resist a synchronic understanding of 
history.5 I also see no reason to follow the new historicists in their com-
mitment to ‘local knowledge’, as advocated by Geertz; Shakespeare’s 
England absorbed a range of infl uences from Renaissance Europe. 
Furthermore, the country’s foreign relations, not least with France, 
inform the history plays on many levels. Finally, it would be equally 
ill advised to make any assumptions about the unity of early modern 
English thought. My analysis will be sensitive to the nuances and frac-
tures that existed in England in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries without feeling the need to assert its ultimate heterogeneity – it 
is entirely possible that the populace were largely united on some issues 
while being divided or even undecided on others.
My critique of cultural materialism fi nds fewer problems on the level 
of methodology. My salient criticisms are as follows:
1. Cultural materialism draws on a diverse range of thinkers such as 
Althusser, Foucault, Gramsci and Williams, but appears to ignore 
their obvious differences.
2. Cultural materialists implicitly reproduce the orthodox Marxist 
habit of claiming their writing to be ‘the truth’.
3. They incongruously mix this pseudo-scientifi c aspect of Marxism 
with self-consciously ‘subjective’ feminism.
4. Cultural materialism’s avowedly radical political position can distort 
both its treatment of history and its readings of Shakespeare’s plays.
5. It also leads cultural materialists to tar their various opponents with 
the same ‘liberal humanist’ brush, which allows them to avoid engag-
ing with any objection to their approach that is raised.
6. Cultural materialism lays claim to a marginal position without suf-
fi ciently demonstrating how it remains marginal in the twenty-fi rst 
century.
The political dimension of cultural materialism has traditionally been 
the one thing for which it has been consistently praised. For Walter 
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Cohen, Jean E. Howard, Don E. Wayne and the other contributors 
to Shakespeare Reproduced, British cultural materialism represented 
a refreshing, politically animated antidote to the perceived quietism 
of American new historicists. My problem is that cultural material-
ism appears to put the proverbial cart before the horse; the politics are 
largely driven by the critic and then either substantiated or contradicted 
by Shakespeare’s plays. If critics already know the political point that 
they want to drive home, and if their conclusions are already drawn, 
then why go to the trouble of reading the plays at all? If literature 
cannot challenge our preconceptions and is reduced to the role of sup-
porting political arguments, then it is stripped of any independent power 
it might have otherwise had. However, even with these reservations 
made, no one could deny that cultural materialism has been successful 
in its most vital tasks: the tasks of debunking the myth of universalism 
that has been built around Shakespeare’s plays and exposing the ways 
in which the status quo has exploited that myth in the classroom to 
further its own ends. However, I remain sceptical of the need to attack 
‘the centre’ continuously, not least because it is no longer obvious what 
constitutes that centre. Governments, corporations, media outlets, 
celebrities and, increasingly, internet sites vie for people’s attention and 
money; it would take a study in itself to determine which of those fi elds, 
if any, has hegemony. One thing is particularly clear, though: E. M. W. 
Tillyard and his brand of patriarchal British imperialism no longer rep-
resent the centre. This is not to suggest that the work of feminists and 
post-colonialists is done, but rather that they should fi nd new targets in 
our increasingly fragmented post-modern society.
My chief aim in making these critiques of new historicism and cultural 
materialism has been to suggest ways in which readers of Shakespeare 
might move beyond the problems these anti-humanist approaches have 
encountered. There is a fundamental belief at the core of all histori-
cist thought, regardless of its type or theoretical origin: the belief that 
individuals are shaped, often intractably, by the social organisations in 
which they fi nd themselves in their particular world and time, and by the 
dominant ideas and attitudes of that world and time. At its most basic, 
historicism in the fi eld of literary studies is founded on a fairly simple 
logic: societies produce individuals who write texts; therefore, in order 
to understand a text we need to understand the society from which its 
author came in all its cultural and ideology complexity. And in order to 
understand the society from which an author comes we need to under-
stand the history of that society. A fuller understanding of the society 
and its history will facilitate a clearer understanding of the author and 
his or her text.
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However, over the past three decades ‘the author’ has disappeared 
from this model since Roland Barthes declared his ‘death’. Instead of 
texts as the products of socially conditioned authors, we have had texts 
as social products. As I have stressed, both new historicism and cultural 
materialism are anti-humanist approaches to literature from which the 
notion of ‘the author’ as an autonomous individual has been virtually 
erased. Indeed, in the work of some of these critics, it is diffi cult to 
discern any notion of individuality – a charge that feminists and human-
ists have levelled at them repeatedly over the years. Alan Sinfi eld has 
answered this charge directly:
But thinking of ourselves as essentially individual tends to efface processes of 
cultural production and, in the same movement, leads us to imagine ourselves 
as autonomous, self-determining. It is not individuals but power structures 
that produce the system within which we live and think, and focusing on 
the individual makes it hard to discern those structures . . . I believe feminist 
anxiety about derogation of the individual in cultural materialism is mis-
placed, since personal subjectivity and agency are, anyway, unlikely sources 
of dissident identity and action. Political awareness does not arise out of 
an essential, individual self-consciousness of class, race, nation, gender, or 
sexual orientation; but from involvement in a milieu, a subculture.6
In essence, this is a rehash of a version of Althusser: individuals are 
ideological or cultural effects. The concept of individuality is itself an 
ideology, designed to give us the illusion of being free and autonomous 
in order to fulfi l our social functions. To this, Sinfi eld adds the notion 
of political resistance. When he turns to Shakespeare, what is seen as 
important is how the plays in question represent and relate to state 
power – the same state power that ultimately produced the very condi-
tions in which they were written. As a cultural materialist, Sinfi eld’s 
avowed aim is to fi nd in Shakespeare’s plays ‘faultlines’, which are 
contradictions in ideological formations produced by ‘sub-cultures’ that 
allow individuals to dissent from or subvert state power. As we have 
seen, new historicists tend to make arguments for the state’s ultimate 
containment of such subversive efforts, but their focus has been on the 
same basic issue none the less.
My problem with this anti-humanist strain in new historicism and 
cultural materialism is two-fold. First, it has given rise to a kind of 
‘post-theory’ empiricism in modern Shakespeare scholarship that has 
nothing to do with either new historicism or cultural materialism. Take, 
for example, James Siemon’s essay ‘“The power of hope?” An Early 
Modern Reader of Richard III’, which appears in a major collection of 
essays about Shakespeare’s histories. The focus of Siemon’s study is on a 
copy of Richard III that was annotated by an unknown mid- seventeenth-
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century reader. The question he seeks to answer is ‘to what degree did 
the mid-seventeenth-century reader fi nd the play familiar or alien?’ 
Siemon argues that ‘the annotations deserve consideration as pieces in 
an empirical puzzle that remains far from solution’.7 Which begs the 
question: should literary critics be in the business of solving ‘empirical 
puzzles’? While Siemon’s essay is undoubtedly interesting (because the 
annotations are historical curiosities in themselves), it does not go on to 
interpret the play. Richard III provides the backdrop to the object that is 
being studied: the early modern reader who annotated it. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, the essay tells us quite a lot about that early modern reader 
but not very much about Richard III – the mid- seventeenth century is 
not even the contemporary historical context for a play written in the 
1590s. This is not cultural materialism or new historicism (or even ‘old’ 
historicism) but a plain form of historicism that studies context for its 
own sake. However, although there are no discussions of Foucault, 
Althusser, state power, ideology or discursive formations here, whether 
consciously or not the same anti-humanist principles that underpin new 
historicism and cultural materialism underpin Siemon’s essay, because 
he assumes that his seventeenth-century reader broadly represents the 
thought and values of his time. It might be argued that new historicism 
and cultural materialism have provided the appropriate intellectual and 
institutional contexts for Siemon to tackle his ‘empirical puzzle’. Brian 
Boyd, Joseph Carroll and Jonathan Gottschall are correct to point out 
that:
Many scholars working under the infl uence of ‘New Historicism’ or ‘cultural 
studies’ now claim they are ‘post-theory’ because they focus not on theories 
but on ‘empirical’ historical data gleaned from archives. In reality, the archi-
vists have not left poststructuralist theory behind but have only internalized 
it.8
Siemon’s essay is by no means atypical; it is exactly the type of essay 
one would expect to fi nd in major collections of modern Shakespeare 
scholarship. Where once formalists focused on the text in isolation, now 
historicists are focusing on history alone.
My second objection is theoretical. Gramsci, Althusser, Williams, 
Foucault and Bourdieu all offer us perfectly plausible explanations 
for the ways in which we live and think. I am convinced, for example, 
by Althusser’s argument that Marxist revolutions did not occur in the 
West because capitalist ideologies have been so successful in interpel-
lating individuals. Similarly, I am convinced by Foucault’s argument 
that ‘universally widespread panopticism enables [power] to operate, 
on the underside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and 
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minute’.9 But neither of these thinkers can explain why it was Einstein 
and not someone else who discovered the theory of relativity or why it 
was Shakespeare and not someone else who wrote his plays. Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus offers us the structural possibility of agency,10 but it 
does not explain how, for example, two brothers – say Edward IV and 
Richard III – might have completely different moral values and abilities. 
We might all be caught in a web of ideology, culture and power struc-
tures which conditions and constrains us, but that does not account for 
the traits of individuals. Sinfi eld’s concept of ‘faultlines’, or Williams’s 
theory of contradiction on which it is based, does not answer these 
questions. Are all of the many differences between individuals produced 
by ‘sub-cultures’? ‘In that bit of the world where the sub-culture runs’, 
Sinfi eld tells us, ‘you can feel confi dent, as we used to say, that Black is 
beautiful, gay is good.’11 But what of the black or gay person who wants 
to say something else? And what of the rest of us who might not belong 
to such a sub-culture? Are we doomed to become capitalist automa-
tons? I cannot help but feel that there is something missing here, some-
thing individual and unaccountably human. According to Sinfi eld: ‘the 
essentialist-humanist approach to literature and sexual politics depends 
upon the belief that the individual is the probable, indeed necessary, 
source of truth and meaning’.12 But what of a humanist approach that 
is not essentialist? To maintain that individuals are fundamentally dif-
ferent from each other for reasons that are not reducible to ideology or 
power is not to assert a universal truth; it is merely to suggest that there 
is something more to people than structural effects.
There have been several signifi cant recent publications, beyond those 
outlined in Chapter 4, that posit a form of ‘non-essentialist’ humanism: 
Phillip Davis’s Shakespeare Thinking, A. D. Nuttall’s Shakespeare: The 
Thinker,13 and, remarkably, Stephen Greenblatt’s Will in the World – 
indeed, some readers might be forgiven for gasping at the sight of the 
father of new historicism admitting that ‘Shakespeare was, after all, 
human’.14 These studies use a mixture of historical or scientifi c research, 
guesswork and imagination to produce strongly suggestive new readings 
of Shakespeare’s plays.
The most radical of these studies is Davis’s ‘minigraph’. Davis draws 
on the essays of William Hazlitt and modern brain-scanning technol-
ogy to suggest why ‘Shakespearean thinking . . . somehow feels like no 
other’.15 He pays particular attention to Shakespeare’s peculiar and dis-
tinctive use of words and their physical effects on the reader’s brain. For 
my purposes, however, Davis’s most useful suggestions are not about 
neurological research or ‘noun-verb shifts’ but about why Shakespeare 
is a dynamic and original thinker. For Davis, Shakespeare’s plays ‘are 
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experiments which call forth a world that comes into being as if for the 
fi rst time . . . things have to adapt to the places available to them. As 
characters face each other, the very space between them itself becomes a 
third presence.’ Davis (like Hazlitt before him) thinks of Shakespeare’s 
plays as ‘experiments’. Put simply, they are simulations of life in which 
individuals think and act freely to the extent that they become ‘more 
than he or anyone can control’.16 Davis thinks of Shakespeare as an 
alchemical genius playing with elements without quite knowing what 
the results will be:
Shakespeare’s experiments are deeply morphological. Everything is thrown 
into the melting pot to take its chance, and whatever comes out again, under 
the pressure of contingency, does so anew without explicit intent, lost and 
found in an improvised replication of life’s creative process – a fi nite full of 
what is near infi nite and almost too much for it.17
This is an interesting way of thinking about Shakespeare: as a dramatist 
who is concerned above all else with process – with action and reaction 
rather than static substance, or in Davis’s words, ‘a fast-released verb 
rather than an ever-fi xed name’.18 Andy Mousley echoes these senti-
ments in Re-Humanising Shakespeare, incidentally written the same year 
as Davis’s Shakespeare Thinking. He praises ‘Shakespeare’s inordinate 
ability to intensify the “existential signifi cance” of otherwise abstract 
ideas and precepts through human embodiment’, which ‘presents us 
with vividly “realised” . . . forms of life, ways of living’.19 I will return 
to these ideas later, because I believe they are crucial for understanding 
Shakespeare’s history plays. For now, suffi ce it to say that, although 
Davis does not explicitly reject the assumptions of new historicists or 
cultural materialists (as Mousley does), his view of Shakespeare is a long 
way away from the ideological state apparatus of Tudor England and its 
containment strategies.
Nuttall argues that historicism as we know it ignores the cognitive 
potential of writers:
I am suggesting that as soon as you allow the poet cognitive or referential 
power, we enter into a world of analogy in which the social conditions or 
composition or, for that matter, the psychological genesis remain palpably dis-
tinct from the achieved work. The root is not the fl ower . . . New Historicism 
now holds sway in universities in Britain and North America (though there 
are signs that its grip is weakening). Where ‘Historicism’ means expending all 
one’s attention on the immediate historical circumstances of composition and 
seeking to explicate the work in terms of those circumstances, I am opposed. 
The argument of this book is that, although knowledge of the historical 
genesis can on occasion illumine a given work, the greater part of the artistic 
achievement of our best playwright is internally generated. It is the product, 
not of his time, but of his own, unresting, creative intelligence.20
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For Nuttall, it is clear that ‘creative intelligence’ is not reducible to ideol-
ogy. There is something more at work in Shakespeare’s plays than the 
process of ideology being refl ected back on itself.21
As one might expect, Greenblatt’s book, unlike Nuttall’s, does not 
position itself against historicism. Instead, it is a playful and imaginative 
biography of the Bard, or ‘Will’, as he is called throughout Will in the 
World. Greenblatt’s method is fairly straightforward: he tells stories of 
episodes in Shakespeare’s life and then projects the events and people of 
those episodes on to his plays. For example, at one point he tells us that:
at some moment in the late 1580s, Shakespeare walked into a room – most 
likely, in an inn in Shoreditch, Southwark, or the Bankside – and quite 
possibly found many of the leading writers drinking and eating together: 
Christopher Marlowe, Thomas Watson, Thomas Lodge, George Peele, 
Thomas Nashe, and Robert Greene.22
Greenblatt goes on to suggest that this group of bohemian university 
wits formed the basic materials out of which Shakespeare fashioned 
Falstaff and his crew. ‘The deeper we plunge into the tavern world 
of Falstaff,’ he tells us, ‘the closer we come to the world of Greene.’23 
The hypothesis is clear: Shakespeare wrote about the people he had 
met, which is a simple, conventional form of historicism. What is 
striking about Greenblatt’s study is the extent to which he humanises 
Shakespeare as a remarkable individual in a broadly humanist fashion. 
Greenblatt speaks of ‘Will’s own primal sense of theatricality’ and tells 
us that he was ‘intelligent, quick, and sensitive’.24 Twenty-four years 
previously, Greenblatt had likewise written that Shakespeare ‘possessed 
a limitless talent for entering into the consciousness of another’.25 Again, 
none of these personal traits can be reduced to ideology or power.
While I would hesitate to follow the approaches of either Nuttall or 
the Greenblatt of Will in the World, which at times wander dangerously 
close to intuiting the author’s intention, I do think that they are right to 
perceive in his writing human qualities that are beyond explanation in 
terms of ideology, discursive fi elds, culture and the social milieu. And to 
assume on the strength of his plays that Shakespeare was an exception-
ally intelligent and imaginatively gifted individual is to expect them to 
be engaged in more than merely upholding or exposing Tudor or Stuart 
state propaganda. Accordingly, my aim is to attempt to read the history 
plays on their own terms in order to determine what they have to say 
about history and politics, and whether they are still of relevance today. 
What do I mean by ‘on their own terms’? I mean that I will assume that, 
although he was undoubtedly conditioned by the prevalent ideas of his 
time, Shakespeare had the capacity to write about his subjects in ways 
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that had no precedent in those ideas. That is not to suggest that his views 
of these subjects are transculturally, transhistorically true, but to stress 
the fact that they had their origins in the creative genius of an extraor-
dinary individual who had engaged with and thought deeply about such 
pertinent issues as the relationship between society and the individual, 
the forces that motivate individuals to make decisions and take action, 
and the forces that determine the shape of history.
Despite the diversity of the readings of Shakespeare’s plays that new 
historicists and cultural materialists offer, both sets of critics are united 
by their basic assumption that the plays are primarily functions of 
history or, more specifi cally, the ideological moment of the turn of the 
seventeenth century. I would like to start my analysis by making the 
opposite assumption, which is that the plays are primarily the products 
of Shakespeare’s particular thought processes and expressive power. 
While those thought processes were undoubtedly shaped and medi-
ated by Shakespeare’s world – both directly by his immediate location 
in London and the theatre, and indirectly through his wider social, 
cultural, philosophical and political mileux – that world still afforded 
him suffi cient room for the free play of his ‘creative intelligence’. I will 
assume, in other words, to quote Wilbur Sanders, that Shakespeare 
wrote with ‘a mind which could read Holinshed and think otherwise’.26
The history plays provide perhaps the best means of comparing the 
playwright’s thinking to that of his time, because the chronicle sources 
on which he based them provide a concrete basis for comparison. The 
chronicles of Hall and Holinshed, Samuel Daniels’s historical poem, 
The Civil Wars, and the popular historical poem, A Myrroure for 
Magistrates, are texts that Shakespeare certainly or almost certainly 
read. They are all more politically didactic and ideologically transpar-
ent than Shakespeare in their treatment of the period between 1399 and 
1485. These contemporary historical texts are both the most immediate 
and the most appropriate context in which to consider Shakespeare’s 
history plays. Furthermore, the broader context of late sixteenth-century 
historiography – including European texts that Shakespeare may not 
have read himself – showcases the wide range of approaches to, and 
ways of thinking about, history that existed in the early modern period; 
it demonstrates, moreover, that Shakespeare was not alone in his capac-
ity to ‘think differently’. The history plays are not simply a complacent 
refl ection of Tudor ideas and ideals; they reveal a brilliant young play-
wright thinking critically about the fundamental issues of history and 
politics: what are the mainsprings of actions and events? How much 
can be attributed to the personalities and motives of individuals and 
how much to forces beyond their control? What is the scope of  personal 
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and political agency? Is power bestowed on individuals by God, or is 
it gained by those with the desire, willpower and ruthlessness to take 
it? And if it is the latter, which attributes and tactics are needed to 
succeed, and which ones lead to failure? Why do the majority of people 
in society accept a situation in which they are being exploited, and what 
might motivate them to rebel? Indeed, in writing the two tetralogies, 
Shakespeare was thinking through for himself and palpably struggling 
with the issues raised by history, ideology and power – the very issues 
that have preoccupied new historicists and cultural materialists, who 
ironically seem intent on subordinating Shakespeare’s insights into those 
issues to the history, ideology and power of his time. Rather than using 
the plays to prove the theories of various political philosophers, I would 
prefer to read them as engaging in a dialogue with them: as a vital con-
tribution to a philosophical debate that has raged in Western Europe 
from Thomas Aquinas to Niccolò Machiavelli and Michel de Montaigne 
to Karl Marx and beyond.
In the following chapters, I will fi rst attempt to gain a fi rm under-
standing of late sixteenth-century English historiography as the key 
context in which to appreciate Shakespeare’s dramatisations of history. 
By identifying how Shakespeare’s contemporaries thought and wrote 
about history it will be possible to make some broad claims about 
Shakespeare’s own treatment of history and the respects in which it is 
different from this. I will then undertake readings of the two tetralogies, 
paying particular attention to 2 Henry VI, 3 Henry VI, Richard II and 
the two parts of Henry IV, in order to draw out Shakespeare’s distinc-
tive insights into the fundamental questions posed by history, ideology, 
politics and the individual.
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Chapter 6
Shakespeare’s Historical and 
Political Thought in Context
The Bishop’s Prophecy
The Bishop of Carlisle’s prophecy, spoken shortly before Richard’s 
deposition in Richard II, has long served as the skeleton key to unlock 
Shakespeare’s tetralogies.
My lord of Hereford here, whom you call king,
Is a foul traitor to proud Hereford’s king;
And, if you crown him, let me prophesy
The blood of English shall manure the ground
And future ages groan for this foul act.
Peace shall go sleep with Turks and infi dels,
And in this seat of peace tumultuous wars
Shall kin with kin and kind with kind confound.
Disorder, horror, fear, and mutiny
Shall here inhabit, and this land be called
The fi eld of Golgotha and dead men’s skulls.
O, if you rear this house against this house
It will the woefullest division prove
That ever fell upon this cursèd earth!
Prevent, resist it; let it not be so,
Lest child, child’s children, cry against you woe.
 (Richard II, 4.1.125–40)
As Nicholas Grene summarises,
for those who see the eight history plays as a single cycle, this provides a 
master plan for the whole, looking forward from the moment of the usurpa-
tion of Richard’s throne by Henry IV in 1399 to the dynastic wars that tore 
England apart in the century following.1
In E. M. W. Tillyard’s providential view of Tudor history, the Bishop’s 
prophecy is taken at face value. For Tillyard, Shakespeare’s history plays 
perpetuate ‘the Tudor myth’, which viewed the Wars of the Roses as a 
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punishment from God for the murder of a divinely ordained monarch.2 
The historian Nigel Saul puts forward a recent version of this argument:
To Shakespeare and his contemporaries the history of fi fteenth-century 
England was a commentary on the bishop’s prophetic utterance. All the ills 
that were to affl ict the realm . . . fl owed from Hereford’s (Bolingbroke’s) rebel-
lion against Richard . . . [Henry Tudor] providentially healed the divisions by 
marrying Elizabeth of York . . . Underlying Shakespeare’s preoccupation with 
civil strife was a deeper concern for social order. In the Elizabethan’s world 
view civil discord imperilled the very existence of society. This was essentially 
the medieval view of the world. Everyone and everything was held to have its 
allotted place. From the bottom of society to the top, people were linked in a 
‘great chain of being’, which duplicated the order of heaven.3
Like Tillyard, Saul assumes that Tudor England shared a monolithic 
‘world view’ to which Shakespeare wholly subscribed.
New historicists and cultural materialists have, quite rightly, opposed 
this argument. In theory at least, ‘new historicists are determinedly suspi-
cious of unifi ed, monolithic descriptions of cultures or historical periods, 
insisting that there were countless Elizabethan world views but not a 
monolithic world picture’.4 And, as we have seen, cultural materialists 
often exhume Tillyard as the archetypal bastion of ‘idealist philosophy’.5 
They chiefl y lament his political conservatism rather than his historicist 
method. Sinfi eld, for example, disdains the old historicist ‘conservative 
vision, in which disturbance of established hierarchy was bad’.6 However 
– discussions of Tillyard aside – generally speaking, for new historicists 
and cultural materialists, the second tetralogy becomes another stage on 
which to rehearse their arguments about containment and subversion.
Greenblatt’s ‘Invisible Bullets’, which is about the Henriad, is the 
example par excellence of the new historicist case for ‘the produc-
tion and containment of subversion and disorder . . . in . . . plays that 
meditate on the consolidation of state power’.7 Naturally, Greenblatt’s 
essay has produced a range of cultural materialist responses that give 
the plays greater scope for resistance. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and 
Margaret Iversen’s introduction to Belsey’s essay on the second tetral-
ogy, ‘Making Histories Then and Now: Shakespeare from Richard II to 
Henry V’, might serve equally to summarise the responses of Dollimore 
and Sinfi eld:
Greenblatt’s model of subversion and containment is seen as inadequate to the 
complexities of the plays and ungrounded in what we know of Elizabethan 
history. In its place Belsey offers a reading that gives more credence to resist-
ances within Shakespearean texts, resistances that are inseparable from the 
‘poetics of Elizabethan power’ of which Greenblatt speaks, but which are not 
always ‘contained’ by the reaffi rmation of that power.8
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In these new historicist and cultural materialist readings of the second 
tetralogy questions of history are subordinated to questions of power. 
This is refl ected in Phyllis Rackin’s summary of the main differences 
between the new historicist and cultural materialist objections to 
Tillyard:
For many new historicists [Tudor discourse] was fi nally univocal, a discourse 
of the elite, shaped by the interests of the dominant classes, whose defi nitive 
speaker and audience and ultimate source of authority was always the sover-
eign. Cultural materialists, on the other hand, have discovered a polyphonic 
discourse, where even the voices of the illiterate can never be fully silenced. 
They have emphasised the role of popular transgression and subversion, 
while new historicists have tended to construe subversion as always already 
contained – by the dominant discourse.9
Rackin wrote this summary in 1990. Since then both schools have 
developed their thought. As I have shown in previous chapters, new 
historicists now have a greater interest in multivocality and in produc-
ing counter-histories that give voice to the ‘forgotten dead’.10 Cultural 
materialism, on the other hand, has tended to place more stress on 
Shakespeare’s canonicity, his role in education and the scope for reading 
plays ‘against the grain’ in order to subvert long-established conserva-
tive readings that have helped to marginalise certain groups such as 
women and homosexuals. Neither of these developments does much to 
alter the fact that the history plays are generally read through the prism 
of containment and subversion.11
Let us return briefl y to the Bishop’s prophecy in Richard II, which, 
for Tillyard and others, is the paradigmatic instance of Shakespeare’s 
advocacy of the providential view of history. Michael Hattaway makes 
the simple point that ‘when the Bishop of Carlisle prophesies in 4.1 
of Richard II he is giving an account of history that is his own – not 
one endorsed by Shakespeare – and he is promptly arrested for capital 
treason’.12 In this instance, Richard II seems to struggle between alterna-
tive views of history: the play gives the Bishop’s prophecy a voice only 
to censor it almost immediately – just as, earlier, John of Gaunt eulo-
gised England, ‘this royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle’ (2.1 40), 
before his death, the ultimate censor. There is a neat parallel between 
these oft-quoted speeches. As Graham Holderness reminds us, Gaunt’s 
eulogy ‘functions as a diatribe of criticism against the ruling monarch’.13 
Gaunt speaks of a lost England that ‘hath made a shameful conquest of 
itself’ (2.1.66); he speaks of a country that has been ruined and abused 
by Richard. By contrast, the Bishop’s prophecy looks forward to a 
future England ravaged by ‘disorder, horror, fear, and mutiny’ (4.1.133) 
because of Bolingbroke’s imminent usurpation of Richard’s crown. 
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Despite their differences, both speakers are essentially conservative 
voices speaking out against the unreasonable actions or planned actions 
of their current rulers.14 Furthermore, in their immediate contexts, both 
speakers are largely ignored and then rebuked – Gaunt by Richard and 
the Bishop by Northumberland and Bolingbroke – before they are fi nally 
silenced. The play briefl y considers each point of view before moving 
swiftly on, leaving the audience in two or even several minds about the 
issues of history, kingship and providence.
In this chapter, I will argue that this apparent uncertainty about history 
more accurately refl ects early modern historiography and Shakespeare’s 
own thoughts about history than the providential view advocated by 
Tillyard or Saul. In addition, I will suggest that the complexity of Tudor 
historiography complicates the new historicist and cultural materialist 
readings of Shakespeare’s second tetralogy that treat the plays primarily 
as exercises in nation-building. Finally, I hope to situate Shakespeare’s 
dramatic practice in relation to late sixteenth-century historiography in 
order to build a platform for my own readings of the history plays in the 
following chapters.
Sixteenth-century Historiography
The fi rst thing to note when considering sixteenth-century historiogra-
phy is that ‘history’ did not exist as an academic discipline as it does 
now. As Ivo Kamps explains, ‘“History” could in fact refer to an impres-
sive variety of texts. Poems, plays, memorials, biographies, narratives, 
annals, chronicles, surveys, antiquarian accounts – all could bear the 
name “history” in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.’15 
To complicate matters further, the term ‘history’ did not necessarily 
pertain to actual events and made no distinction between historical 
and mythical fi gures. Histories of the sixteenth century often, though 
not exclusively, prioritised moral instruction over historical veracity. 
According to Paul Budra, ‘history throughout the period [1550 to the 
early 1600s] was seen as a form of instruction . . . History was regarded 
as second only to scripture for teaching morality, and it was therefore 
very popular with the middle class and educators’.16 Budra overstates 
the case because he ignores the ways of thinking about history that were 
changing English historiography in the late sixteenth century, but it is 
true that many – probably most – readers of the period viewed history in 
terms of moral instruction.
Another peculiar feature of early modern historiography is the 
notion that, although it is ostensibly linear, history is also cyclical. 
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According to Dominique Goy-Blanquet, ‘there is no Elizabethan theory 
of progress’.17 Both providential and humanist historians believed in 
the idea that history repeats itself. In Kamps’s words, the ‘shape of 
time [in Elizabethan England] was that of a spiral endlessly repeating 
the drama of rise and fall’.18 It is not diffi cult to see how such a view of 
history might lend itself easily to the teaching of moral lessons. As Goy-
Blanquet asserts, ‘the past could be used as a mirror to project critical 
refl ections on present realities’.19 The cyclical view of history was not 
restricted to providential historians. Machiavelli, for example, rejects 
the idea that history is driven by God’s will, but The Prince repeatedly 
draws political lessons from past rulers, which is to say that the cyclical 
view of history does not necessarily rely on notions of providence.
Finally, the ‘history’ produced in the sixteenth century sometimes 
made little distinction between national and local concerns – the latter 
often taking the form of anecdotes about local crimes and murders, 
gossip and bizarre events.20 As Barrett L. Beer tells us, the ‘reading 
public’ of Tudor chronicles ‘was predominantly lay and secular in 
outlook and as much interested in court politics, economics, and bizarre 
natural occurrences as in the progress of the Reformation’.21 In many 
ways, chronicles combined the roles of history books and modern news-
papers – which goes some way towards explaining their sharp decline in 
popularity in the seventeenth century. Indeed, D. R. Woolf argues that
the most obvious consequence of the advent of print was to rob the chronicle 
. . . of its function as the recorder and communicator of recent events, that is, 
as a medium of what would soon become news . . . it is . . . no accident at all 
that the virtual end of chronicle publication in England . . . coincided with the 
fi rst wave of corantos and newsbooks.22
There was nothing intrinsic to Tudor historiography that made the 
chronicle its dominant genre.
This rather muddled picture of the status of history in Tudor England 
refl ects what Arthur B. Ferguson has called ‘the special ambivalence 
discernible in much Renaissance thinking about history’.23 Despite 
this ambivalence, a few things about history in late sixteenth-century 
England are clear. First, although history had no dominant form in 
the sixteenth century, the chronicle was plainly the most popular and 
widely distributed. Written by and for ‘literate individuals spanning a 
fairly wide cross section of socio-economic groups’ that mainly com-
prised the middle classes,24 chronicles ‘contained, reasonably handily, 
the latest historical research’.25 The important thing to note here is that 
the writers of chronicles were not in the business of producing state 
propaganda. While it is true that some chroniclers were the benefi ciaries 
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of royal patrons, they also faced censorship.26 The chroniclers were not 
establishment fi gures or wealthy aristocrats but enthusiastic amateurs. 
According to Geoffrey Bullough, the most prolifi c chronicle writer of all, 
John Stow, ‘lived for many years on the charity of friends, and even got 
permission to beg for alms’.27 The aims and attitudes of these writers 
were evidently not those of the crown. As Patterson convincingly argues, 
the belief propagated by Tillyard and others that chroniclers ‘were 
engaged in legitimation of the house of Tudor simply will not stand’.28 
To a certain extent, it is possible to speak of ‘Tudor historiography’s 
ideological independence’.29
The second thing that is clear about history in the late sixteenth 
century is that the period saw some of the most radical changes in 
English historiography to date, which further complicates the descrip-
tion of the history written in the period that I have provided thus far. 
The emergence of new historiographical methods and ideas from Italian 
humanists and antiquarian classicists did not immediately displace 
‘time-honoured medieval practices’.30 It was a moment of transition for 
English historiography. Disagreement is still widespread among histo-
rians about the extent of the changes that took place, about when the 
changes took place and about which assumptions and practices best rep-
resent the status quo. As Kamps puts it, Renaissance historiography has 
an ‘almost schizophrenic character’.31 For the purposes of the present 
study, I will outline the broad currents of historiographical thought that 
existed in the period. I will also note the major differences of opinion 
among literary historians where necessary and test their claims against 
original sixteenth-century texts.
By the 1590s, when Shakespeare staged his history plays, there were 
three main strains of historiography: providential, humanist and anti-
quarian – to which I will return later. To complicate matters further, 
there were differing views about the function and nature of history that 
were debated within and across the different types of historiography. 
Probably the most important of these debates was about whether history 
should be morally instructive above all else or simply an objective and 
accurate record of events. The key thing to note here is that this was 
truly a debate as opposed to a stable, unifi ed position. Compare, for 
example, William Camden’s strong antiquarian manifesto, Annales 
(written between 1615 and 1617), with the note found in A Myrroure 
for Magistrates (1559) about the discrepancies between its sources. 
Camden writes:
For the study of TRVTH, as it hath been the only spur to prick me forward 
to this Worke; so hath it beene mine only Scope. To detract from Historie, 
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is nothing else than to pluck out the eies of a beautifull creature, and for a 
medicinable potion, to offer poison to the Readers vnderstanding.32
For Camden, moralising only distracts the reader from the chief issue 
at hand: ‘WHY, HOW, TO WHAT END, and WHAT IS DONE’.33 
Camden’s Annales still starts with a dedication to God, but he insists 
that he is writing a history rather than a sermon. In stark contrast, A 
Myrroure for Magistrates contains the following note about its depic-
tion of the quarrel between Henry Bolingbroke and Thomas Mowbray 
during the reign of Richard II:
This tragicall example was of all the cumpany well liked, how be it a doubte 
was founde therin, and that by meanes of the diuersity of the Chronicles 
for where as maister Hall whom in this storye we chiefely folowed, maketh 
Mowbray accuser, and Boleynbroke appellant, mayster Fabian reporteth 
the matter quite contrary, & that by the reporte of good authours, makyng 
Bokynbroke the accuser, and Mowbray the appeliant, Which matter sith it 
is more harde to desise, than nedefull to our purpose, which minde onely to 
diswade from vices and exalte virtue . . .34
The poet acknowledges that a number of his source materials do 
not agree on whether it was Mowbray who started the argument or 
Bolingbroke, but then goes on to argue that it does not really matter. His 
‘purpose’ is ‘onely to diswade from vices and exalte vertue’, so historical 
veracity is not at all a priority.
There are also many cases in which historians laid claim to objectivity 
only to produce politically biased accounts of events; Kamps even goes 
as far as to suggest that it was a ‘commonplace’.35 Samuel Daniel, for 
example, opened The Civil Wars with this claim in 1595:
I haue carefully followed that truth which is in the Historie; without adding 
to, or subtracting from, the general receiu’d opinion of things as we fi nde 
them in our common Annalles: holding it an impietie, to violate that publike 
Testimonie we haue, without more euident proofe; or to introduce fi ctions of 
[our] owne imagination, in things of this nature. Famae rerum standum est. 
Though I knowe, in these publike actions, there are euer popular bruites, and 
opinions, which run according to the time & the biass of mens affections: and 
it is the part of an Historian, to recite them, not to rule the[m].36
Yet, as any reader of The Civil Wars will attest, Daniel is far from 
impartial, not least in the signifi cance he gives to the Tudors’ role in 
reuniting the country.
Yet now what reason haue we to complaine? 
Since hereby came the calme we did inioy; 
The blisse of thee Eliza; happie gaine 
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For all our losse: when-as no other way 
The Heauens could fi nde, but to vnite againe 
The sev’red Families, that they 
Might bring foorth thee: that in thy peace might growe 
That glorie, which few Times could euer showe.37
It is worth noting that Daniel succeeded Edmund Spenser as Poet Laureate 
in 1599, and became Master of the Queen’s Revels in 1603, and later, 
groom of the chamber to the Queen Consort, Anne of Denmark.38 He 
plainly had his own personal interests at stake. Although James Knowles 
has argued persuasively to the contrary, the most obvious reading of 
The Civil Wars suggests that it is an attempt to rewrite history from a 
Tudor perspective.39 Daniel’s poem is neither as committed to historical 
veracity as Camden nor as didactic in its moralising as A Myrroure for 
Magistrates but, like many histories of the period, it occupies an indis-
tinct middle ground. As Rackin neatly summarises the matter, many 
Tudor chronicles ‘confl ated providential moralizing with pragmatic 
skepticism’.40 It was not uncommon in Renaissance historiography to 
fi nd blatant theoretical and historical inconsistencies and contradictions 
with no attempt made to reconcile them.
The Case of Bolingbroke and Mowbray
Such inconsistencies are not diffi cult to demonstrate. For example, 
Shakespeare’s sources, like those of the author of A Myrroure for 
Magistrates, cannot agree on even the most rudimentary details of a 
seemingly straightforward event such as the quarrel between Mowbray 
and Bolingbroke (dramatised in 1.1. and 1.3 of Richard II). Sixteenth-
century chroniclers such as Hall and the contributors to Holinshed’s 
Chronicle often repeated their fi fteenth-century sources verbatim 
without sensitivity to the original author’s prejudices. In 1399, Henry 
IV’s usurpation of Richard II’s throne was an event that divided the 
population. Contemporary accounts of Richard’s reign, which were 
often written by eyewitnesses, were thus coloured indelibly by the per-
sonal dispositions of individual writers towards Richard. This was clear 
to John Capgrave in 1399:
Forasmuch as different writers have given different accounts of the deposi-
tion of King Richard and the elevation of King Henry to the throne – and no 
wonder, since, in so great a struggle, one took one side and one the other . . .41
It is useful to note the biases of the major contemporary sources 
that were used by sixteenth-century historians. Broadly speaking, the 
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account of Thomas Walsingham of St Albans, the chief source used by 
Holinshed, is pro-Lancastrian and the trio of French accounts used by 
Edward Hall, Samuel Daniel and others – those by Jean Creton, Jean 
Froissart and the author of Traïson de Mort – are pro-Richard. Each of 
these contemporary accounts can only be understood in terms of their 
singularity. Creton, for example, according to G. K. Martin, ‘wrote with 
a propagandist’s fervour in Richard’s cause’.42 And Froissart’s chroni-
cles ‘provide useful information and insight on people and events . . . 
[but] on some points [they are] wildly and unaccountably inaccurate’.43 
Some sixteenth-century chroniclers lacked the necessary resources and 
methodological principles to question their sources, so fourteenth- and 
fi fteenth-century prejudices and inaccuracies invariably fi ltered down to 
their work.
Edward Hall’s account of the quarrel between Mowbray and 
Bolingbroke presents Bolingbroke as ‘a prudente and politike persone, 
but not more politike then welbeloued, and yet not so welbeloued of 
all, as of some highly disdayned’.44 Hall is generally sympathetic to 
Bolingbroke and critical of Mowbray. In Hall’s account it is Bolingbroke 
who tells Mowbray of his heartfelt sadness about how Richard had 
treated the nobles:
[Bolingbroke] beganne to breake his mynde to [Mowbray] more for dolour 
and lamentacion, then for malice or displeasure, rehersyng howe that kyng 
Richarde litle estemed and lesse regarded the nobles and Princes of his realme, 
and as muche as laie in hym soughte occasions, inuented causes and practised 
priuely howe to destroye the more part of theim.
Hall goes on to present Mowbray as a self-seeking tell-tale and oppor-
tunist, who
was very glad (as tell tales and scicophantes bee, when thei haue any thyng 
to instill in to the eares and heddes of Princes) to declare to the kyng what he 
had heard, and to agrauate and make the offence the greater, he muche more 
added but nothyng diminished.45
It is important to note here that Hall places great emphasis on 
Mowbray’s role as the accuser, using it to underline his sympathy for 
Bolingbroke. Later, Hall’s preference for Bolingbroke makes itself even 
more explicit after his banishment to France:
Wondreful it is to write, and more straunge to here, what nombre of people 
ranne in euery towne & strete, lamenting and bewailyng his departure: As 
who woulde say that whe[n] he departed, the onely shelde, defe[n]ce & 
comfort of the co[m]me[n] people was vadid & gone, as though [the] so[n]
ne had falle[n] out of the spere, or [the] moone had lapsed fro[m] her proper 
epicicle.46
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There can be little doubt as to where Hall’s sympathies lie: fi rmly with 
the future Lancastrian king, Henry IV. It is worth remembering here 
that Henry VII had ‘claimed to represent the line of Lancaster [because] 
his mother Margaret was the last of the Beauforts, John of Gaunt’s 
illegitimate descendants who had been legitimated by the pope and 
Richard II’.47 In other words, it was natural for Tudor writers to prefer 
the Lancastrian kings, not only because Henry VII had defeated the last 
Yorkist king, Richard III, but also because the current monarch’s claim 
to the throne was linked directly to John of Gaunt.
Holinshed’s account, which is much more detailed and adds direct 
quotation, contradicts Hall by making Bolingbroke the accuser: ‘Henrie 
duke of Hereford accused Thomas Mowbraie duke of Norfolke, of 
certeine words which he should vtter in talke had betwixt them.’48 
Holinshed’s handling of the dispute between Bolingbroke and 
Mowbray is generally much more measured and diligent than Hall’s. 
At one point, for example, Holinshed notes: ‘writers disagrée about 
the daie that was appointed [for Mowbray and Bolingbroke’s duel 
at Coventry]: for some saie, it was vpon a mondaie in August; other 
vpon saint Lamberts daie, being the seuenteenth of September, other 
on the eleuenth of September’.49 Hall simply states that Richard 
‘assigned the place to be at the citee of Couentree in the moneth of 
August’.50 However, this diligence does not stop the chroniclers repeat-
ing Hall’s account of Bolingbroke’s  departure from Britain almost 
 verbatim: 
A woonder it was to sée what number of people ran after him in euerie towne 
and stréet where he came, before he tooke the sea, lamenting and bewailing 
his departure, as who would saie, that when he departed, the onelie shield, 
defense and comfort of the commonwealth was vaded and gone.51
The wording of this passage is too similar to Hall’s for it to be a coinci-
dence. Holinshed’s account repeats Hall’s not only in its details but also 
in the author’s subjective ‘wonder’, which is typical of the way sixteenth-
century chroniclers interpolated passages from their sources into their 
texts. Thus, the sympathetic treatment of Bolingbroke found in Hall 
fi nds its way into Holinshed – despite the fact that Holinshed makes 
Bolingbroke the accuser and that much of Hall’s immediate reason for 
preferring Bolingbroke is based on the sycophantic opportunism of 
Mowbray. The compilers of Holinshed compromise their own fairly 
rigorous historical methods by including scarcely edited material from 
an ideologically motivated author like Hall, who treats Bolingbroke as 
Mowbray’s ‘victim’ to suit his preference for the latter.
Modern historians tend to accept Bolingbroke as the accuser and 
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Mowbray as the defendant following an account found in the  semi-offi cial 
‘Roles of Parliament’, which states:
Henry duke of Hereford came before our lord the king in parliament carrying 
in his hand a schedule, and said to the king . . . that the duke of Norfolk had 
made a number of incriminating remarks to the slander of our lord the king’s 
person.52
There is an almost unanimous consensus that this is the correct version 
of events.53 The confusion in sixteenth-century histories may have arisen 
from Froissart, who had written:
The Earl Marshal [i.e. Mowbray] took particular notice of a remark made 
with the best of intentions by the Earl of Derby [i.e. Bolingbroke], who meant 
it as a confi dential opinion and never thought it would be repeated.54
Indeed, there are enough similarities between Froissart’s version of 
events and Hall’s to suggest that Froissart was one of Hall’s main 
sources. However, Froissart does not share Hall’s preference for 
Bolingbroke. Froissart’s chronicle also provides a detailed account of 
the King in private council and offers a unique insight into Richard’s 
thought processes. For example, at one point in Froissart, Richard’s 
advisors tell him:
Sire, you should not intervene too openly in this business. Say nothing and let 
them get on with it; they will manage all right. The Earl of Derby is extraor-
dinarily popular in this country . . . and if they saw you taking sides with the 
Earl Marshal against him, you would lose their favour entirely.55
Such details are entirely missing in Hall, where Richard makes his deci-
sion almost immediately with no consultation. Hall appears to have 
handpicked from Froissart and other sources the details that presented 
Bolingbroke in the best possible light.
It is interesting to trace the other sixteenth-century histories that 
make Mowbray the accuser – the accounts read like Chinese whispers. 
Predictably, A Myrroure for Magistrates follows Hall, sometimes repeat-
ing his peculiar phrasing. For example, just as in Hall, Bolingbroke ‘fully 
brake[s] his mynde’ to Mowbray.56 A Myrroure makes Mowbray the 
speaker and is fl atly moralising in its tone:
Marke with what meede vile vyces are rewarded.
Through pryde and envy I lose both kyth and kynne,
And for my fl attring playnte so well regarded,
Exyle and slaunder are iustly me awarded.57
There is no question here about Mowbray’s role as a sycophantic 
opportunist. Likewise, in the fi rst edition of The Civil Wars (which 
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Shakespeare almost certainly read), Daniel tells us of ‘the faithless Duke 
[Mowbray] that presentlie takes hold / Of such advantage to insinuate 
/ Hastes to the king, perverting what is told, / And what comes of good 
minde he makes it hate’.58 Daniel even insinuates that Mowbray was 
lying about Bolingbroke’s complaint. It is not possible to state defi ni-
tively that the sixteenth-century historians who made Mowbray the 
accuser deliberately altered the facts – Polydore Vergil, for example, an 
ostensibly honest historian, also follows Froissart. However, it is pos-
sible to suggest that writers with Lancastrian sympathies made the most 
of the situation to vilify Mowbray as a lackey of Richard II and to make 
a hero of Bolingbroke. This is in stark contrast to less politically moti-
vated historians like John Stow, the compilers of Holinshed, and indeed 
Shakespeare, who make Bolingbroke the accuser and take a generally 
more even-handed approach.59 Thus, even a seemingly incidental detail 
– such as the question of who started the dispute between Mowbray and 
Bolingbroke – can reveal in microcosm the complexities of sixteenth-
century historiography.
In short, historiography was fragmented and heterogeneous in 
Shakespeare’s time. There was no consensus on the issue of histori-
cal accuracy or on the question of whether or not history should be 
morally instructive. This has led a number of prominent literary histori-
ans – wrongly, I think – to give greater weight to one side or the other. 
Graham Holderness, for example, claims that
sixteenth-century historians were preoccupied with the problems of truth, in 
senses still considered proper to modern historiography: truth in historical 
record and historical recollection; the avoidance of false or forged versions, 
or what we would now call ideological appropriations of the past.60
But, as we have seen, while these claims might hold fi rm for the histories 
of William Camden or Thomas Blundeville, they would scarcely apply 
to A Myrroure for Magistrates or the history of Walter Raleigh. Ivo 
Kamps makes the opposite claim:
it is wrong to say that early modern men and women had no conception of 
truth and falsehood, but it is obvious that the differences between them – 
especially if the problem was couched in terms of ‘fact’ and ‘fi ction’ – was 
not of paramount importance when it came to the production of historical 
texts.61
If it is ‘obvious’ that the difference between truth and falsehood was not 
important to sixteenth-century historians, then what leads Holderness 
to draw the opposite conclusion? Annabel Patterson puts a third theory 
on the table by making the claim that the compilers of Holinshed’s 
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Chronicles were at the cutting edge of late sixteenth-century historiog-
raphy because of their ‘determination to register diversity of opinion’.62 
Patterson argues that Raphael Holinshed, John Stow, Abraham Fleming, 
John Foxe and others deliberately contrasted contradictory source mate-
rial, because they were ‘dedicated to the task of showing what it might 
mean to be “all Englishmen” in full consciousness of the fundamental 
differences of opinion that drove Englishmen apart’.63 For Patterson, 
then, it is not so much a question of ‘fact’ or ‘fi ction’, but rather of 
respecting the reader’s ability to listen to myriad voices in order to reach 
his or her own conclusions. Holderness, Kamps and Patterson – all expe-
rienced readers of Tudor historiography – each come to different conclu-
sions about its commitment to historical veracity. I would suggest that it 
is not possible to make defi nitive claims for late sixteenth-century histo-
riography, because it was simply too diverse and fragmented to have a 
general character. Instead, I would prefer to come to an understanding 
of the period’s three main strains of historiography.
Three Strains of Historiography
The fi rst and most prominent of these strains was the providential view 
of history inherited from the medieval period, which, as we shall see, 
endured well into the seventeenth century. As Budra explains, this sort 
of history ‘emphasised the fi rst causes of events, the intervention of God 
into history’.64 As late as 1614, Sir Walter Raleigh’s The History of the 
World, banned by James I in that year, found ‘examples of diuine proui-
dence, euery where’.65 Raleigh’s preface to the volume puts forward a 
sustained argument for providence, insisting that God is ‘for euer a suf-
fi cient and effectuall cause of the world’.66 In his supplement to Thomas 
Beard’s The Theatre of Gods, published in 1642, Thomas Taylor uses 
divine providence as the chief justifi cation for apparent contradictions 
between contemporary Christian doctrines and the actions of Biblical 
prophets and other sainted fi gures. On the issue of why Abraham and 
others had multiple wives, Taylor argues:
Abraham was before either the Law or the Gospell, and in his time Big[om]y 
was not forbidden. Now the punishment of a fault grew from the time of the 
Law, for it was not a crime before it was inhibited and forbid; so [Abraham] 
had four wives, which whilest it was a custom was no crime, who as they 
married not meerly for concupiscence, and to fulfi ll the lust full desires of 
the fl esh, but rather instigated by providence to the propagation of issue; 
therefore let no man fl atter himselfe by making them their president, for all 
adultery is damnable, &c.67
PARVINI PRINT.indd   96 17/02/2012   12:23
Shakespeare’s Historical and Political Thought     97
The message is clear enough: multiple marriages were only customary in 
Abraham’s day because God permitted them and demanded ‘the propa-
gation of issue’, whereas now God absolutely prohibits them. For our 
purposes, the examples of Raleigh and Taylor plainly demonstrate that 
ideas of providence were still fairly widely disseminated by Protestants 
in the seventeenth century well after Shakespeare’s death. This shows 
that neither the infl ux of humanist and classicist thought from Italy 
during the Renaissance, nor the religious upheavals during the reigns of 
Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth served to dislodge provi-
dential thought completely from the public consciousness.
The second major type of historiography in Elizabethan England 
was the Italian humanist approach inherited from Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Francesco Patrizi, Francesco Guicciardini and Polydore Vergil.68 Rackin 
identifi es ‘three great innovations, all originating in Italy, [that] were 
changing English historiography during the second half of the sixteenth 
century’. She goes on to defi ne these innovations as ‘a new interest in 
causation, a recognition of anachronism, and a questioning of textual 
authority’.69 Of these innovations, the most conspicuous was the shift of 
focus from ‘fi rst causes’ (i.e. God’s will) to the ‘second causes’ of human 
action. Even if history was still framed by the theological framework of 
divine providence, humans were still afforded a degree of autonomy. 
After all, free will was always a central tenet of Christian doctrine, what-
ever the denomination (even in the most extreme versions of Calvinism, 
individuals have the free will to commit acts of evil70). None the less, 
the shift in emphasis lent history an increasingly secular character; the 
lessons change from moral sermons to political analyses.71
The fi rst historian to import Italian humanist ideas and practices 
to Britain was Polydore Vergil, who questioned the validity of long-
established claims that the Trojan leader Brutus founded Britain, which 
dated back to ‘Brut, the overwhelmingly popular version of Geoffrey of 
Monmouth’s Historie Regum Britannie’.72 This legend was still widely 
believed in the early sixteenth century, not least because of the success 
of William Caxton’s The Chronicles of England, a translation of the old 
Brut chronicle, which was published in 1482 and was one of Britain’s 
fi rst printed books. The Chronicles of England tell of how Brutus ‘con-
querd Albyon / that after he named Brytayn after his owne name / that 
now is called Englond after the name of Engyst of Saxon’.73 Vergil could 
not corroborate these claims with his own knowledge of Roman history. 
Goy-Blanquet claims that ‘Vergil was a genuine historian, probably the 
best of the century, the fi rst to use critical judgement, compare sources, 
and check the veracity of facts.’74 Kamps, however, argues that Vergil’s 
‘advance [in the procedures of history writing] went unheeded’.75 It 
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is also important to remember that there is still a strong providential 
slant in much of Vergil’s work. For example, he still recounts the story 
of Genesis at the start of his histories, maintaining that man ‘should 
be subiect in obedience bycause he was fashioned after [God’s] owne 
lykenes’.76 Furthermore, there remains a distinct moral dimension to 
Vergil’s work. For example, he fi nds:
HYSTORIES of all other writynges be mooste commendable, because it 
infourmeth all sortes of people with notable examples of liuyng, and doth 
excite noble men to ensue suche actiuite in enterprises as they reade to haue 
bene doone by their auncestours, and also discorageth & dehorteth wicked 
persons from attemptyng of any haynouse deede or cryme, knowyng that 
suche actes shalbe regestred in perpetual memory to the praise or reproche of 
the doers, accordyng to the deserte of their endeuoures.77
For Vergil, then, history is as much a deterrent with which to discourage 
‘wicked persons’ as it is a source of information and interest. Vergil’s 
chief contribution to the development of English historiography restricts 
itself to his refusal to accept sources at face value.
Notwithstanding the general impact of Machiavelli’s political thought 
– in which ‘worldly politics were shaped not by the City of God but 
by the will, desire, cunning, virtue, and energy of man’78 – probably 
the most important text for the transmission of Italian humanist ideas 
in English historiography was Thomas Blundeville’s The True Order 
and Methode of Wryting and Reading Histories, published in 1574. In 
this work, as Kamps explains, Blundeville ‘yokes together an abridged 
translation of Francesco Patrizi’s distinctly humanist political text Della 
Historia Diece Dialogue (1560) and Giancomo Concio’s much more 
traditional, and medieval treatise’ with no apparent attempt to recon-
cile their obvious differences.79 Kamps has a point: Concio’s section of 
Blundeville text starts by stating that we should ‘acknowledge the proui-
dence of God’ and ‘be stirred by example of good to followe the good, 
and by example of the euill to fl ee the euill’. The extent of Concio’s 
medievalism demonstrates just how progressive Patrizi’s humanism was. 
Patrizi commits himself ‘to tell things as they were done, without either 
augmenting or diminishing them, or swaruing one iote from the truth’. 
Patrizi appears to break with the fundamental notion of providence:
Hystories bee made of deedes done by a publique weale, and such deedes, be 
eyther deedes of wayre, of peace, or else of seduction and conpiracie. Agayne, 
every deede, be it priuate, or publique must needs be done by some person, 
for some occasion, in sometyme, and place, with means & order, and with 
instruments, all which are not to be forgotten of the writer, and specially 
those that haue accompanied and brought deede to effect.80
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This might seem like common sense to modern minds, but to sixteenth-
century readers, God would have been conspicuous by His divine 
absence. To underline his point, Patrizi goes on to make a still stronger 
humanist statement of what he takes to be the case from the historian’s 
point of view: ‘power consisteth chiefl ye in three things, that is, in 
riches, in publique authoritie, and in pryuate estimacion’. Such senti-
ments were not only blasphemous in sixteenth-century England; after 
the Reformation they would have also constituted treason, because the 
monarch’s power was seen as second only to God’s – even more so in 
the early seventeenth century, when James I invoked the divine right of 
kings. Patrizi’s history makes no mention of providence and omits God 
from the network of power structures it considers. Patrizi is also surpris-
ingly interested in bibliographical and cultural contexts. ‘In wr[i]ting 
the lyfe of anye man’, he says, ‘you ought fi rst to shew his proper name, 
the name of his familie, and of what country he is, and then to declare 
his actes and deedes.’81 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Patrizi 
considers the political and psychological motives of the key players in 
history: ‘sith in every action there must needs be a dooer, a worker, the 
hystorie must fi rst make mention of hym, and then shewe the cause that 
mooued him to doe, to what intent and ende, in what place, and with 
what means and instruments’.82 It is diffi cult to fi nd a direct inheritor 
of Patrizi in the mainstream sixteenth-century chronicles, which – as 
Patterson points out so convincingly – mix so many confl icting attitudes 
and materials that it is impossible to ascribe their practice to any single 
type of historiography.
At this juncture, I would like to suggest that Shakespeare is the true 
inheritor of Patrizi’s form of historiography. The history plays most 
closely resemble the humanism of Patrizi in three ways. First, in their 
commitment to context; second, in the way they show that the true 
nature of power resides ‘in riches, in publique authoritie, and in pryuate 
estimacion’; and fi nally, in their exploration of the psychological and 
political motivations of their characters. Although humanist ideas 
would later merge with antiquarian practices to form the basis of the 
modern discipline of history in Britain, in the 1590s (with the possible 
exception of Marlowe), Shakespeare was alone in tapping into the dis-
tinctly human course of history by showing the kings of England as what 
they were: fl awed men who made politically and emotionally motivated 
decisions.
Late sixteenth-century England also saw the rise of a third type of 
historiography called antiquarianism. As Kamps says, the antiquarians 
‘desired to reconstruct, through study of both textual and physical rem-
nants of the past, an “exact memory” of the objects of antiquity’.83 This 
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is what Holderness has in mind when he argues that the Elizabethans 
were concerned above all else with historical veracity: ‘the emphasis’, he 
acknowledges, ‘of course goes back to antiquity’.84 As we have seen, the 
pioneer who led the fi rst antiquarians in Britain was William Camden. 
Camden was committed to the pursuit of truth for its own sake; knowl-
edge and understanding, rather than moral lessons or the reiteration 
of divine providence, become history’s ultimate aims. For Camden, 
‘they, whose mindes doe comprehend no knowledge of former times, 
deserued not to be called men, in regard they exceeded not children in 
vnderstanding’.85 He is consistently scathing about ‘IGNORANCE & 
FALSHOOD’, which are frequently equated in his writings, and about 
‘PREIVDICE’, which is seen ‘as an abuser of the Iudgement’. The 
preface to the Annales has a distinctly defensive tone; Camden seems 
at pains to show his impartiality, that he is not in receipt of any bribes 
and that he leaves no place for the ‘SVSPICION OF FAVOVR OR 
PRIVATE GRVDGES’.86 Camden seems acutely aware that he is fl ying 
in the face of convention and has few scruples about denigrating those 
who do not share his passion for knowledge of the past. For example, 
Camden prefaces another book of his, Britannia, by pre-empting his 
critics:
For I see judgements, prejudices, censures, reprehensions, obtrectations, 
detractions, affronts, and confronts, as it were, in battaile array to environ 
me on every side: some there are which wholly contemne and avile this study 
of Antiquitie as a back-looking curiositie; whose authority as I do not utterly 
vilefi e, so I do not overprize or admire their judgement. Neither am I destitute 
of reasons whereby I might approve this my purpose to well bred and well 
meaning men which tender the glory of their native Country: and moreo-
ver could give them to understand that in the studie of Antiquity, (which 
is alwaies accompanied with dignity, and hath a certaine resemblance with 
eternity) there is a sweet food of the mind well befi tting such as are of honest 
and noble disposition. If any there be which are desirous to be strangers in 
their owne soile, and forrainers in their owne City, they may so continue and 
therin fl atter themselves.87
The important thing to consider here is not that Camden dismisses the 
opinions of his critics, but that he addresses his study to similar-minded 
people, ‘well bred and well meaning men which tender to the glory of 
their Native country’. Crucially, Camden equates the knowledge of 
history with patriotism and the construction of nationhood.
This has been the context in which new historicists and cultural mate-
rialists (including Holderness, Dollimore and Sinfi eld, and, to a lesser 
degree, Greenblatt) have preferred to understand late Tudor and early 
Stuart historiography: the attempt to foster a stable notion of English 
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national identity after almost a century of civil strife. According to 
Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin, for example, ‘the interest of the 
sixteenth-century English in the history of their own country can be 
seen as one aspect of the complex process by which England was slowly 
emerging as a modern nation state’.88 Howard and Rackin go on to read 
Shakespeare’s history plays through this lens of nation-building. They 
tell us: ‘like their historical sources, the plays performed the necessary 
function of creating and disseminating myths of origin to authorize a 
new national identity and to deal with the anxieties and contradictions 
that threatened to undermine the nation-building project’.89 This posi-
tion has become almost commonplace when reading the history plays. 
Derek Cohen, for example, tells us that ‘the Elizabethan preoccupation 
with history was . . . a matter of urgent national interest’.90 England 
unquestionably needed such redefi nition at this time, but it remains 
unclear whether or not the works of history provided it.
The conclusions of Howard and Rackin, Cohen and others about six-
teenth-century historiography, and indeed, Shakespeare’s history plays, 
are by no means conclusive. Earlier, Rackin herself came to a quite dif-
ferent conclusion in stating that Renaissance historiography was ‘driven 
by nostalgia’.91 In perhaps the most convincing case to date, D. R. Woolf 
argues that the production of history was driven by economic factors. 
‘The Tudor chronicle’, Woolf explains, ‘was at the whim of a market 
that was to prove both soft and short-lived.’92 There is certainly enough 
evidence to substantiate Woolf’s claims. The chronicles were large, 
unwieldy and expensive texts that ultimately proved too costly for the 
general public. According to Elizabeth Story Donno, the 1587 edition 
of Holinshed’s chronicles consisted of ‘roughly 3½ million words’, 
while the fi rst edition ‘required a stock of £10,000 at least’ to print.93 
Barrett L. Beer shows us that John Stow’s chronicles ‘reached a larger 
contemporary readership because of their lower cost and smaller size, 
and they also speak with the voice of a single scholar rather than as an 
editorial committee’.94 Woolf produces an impressive number of tables 
that show the popularity and prices of individual chronicles from the 
1470s to the 1640s.95 The tables throw up a few interesting facts: fi rst, 
that shorter and cheaper texts were more popular than longer, more 
expensive ones. For example, a copy of the 1577 edition of Holinshed’s 
Chronicles would cost 26s bound and 20s unbound at retail compared 
with only 3s for Stow’s Abridgement. Stow’s various historical works, 
mostly summaries and abridgements, were reissued twenty-fi ve times 
between 1565 and 1631, whereas Holinshed was reissued only three 
times between 1577 and 1587. It is hardly surprising to fi nd that price 
was such an overriding factor in determining the public’s buying habits 
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during the late sixteenth century because, as Patterson notes, it ‘was a 
period of dramatic infl ation’.96 Much more interesting is Woolf’s discov-
ery of how sharply the production and sales of chronicles declined in the 
1600s. He states:
whatever the intrinsic merits of [Holinshed’s] Chronicles and its clear appeal 
to contemporaries (Shakespeare among them), it was nevertheless part of a 
genre that was already on its last legs . . . peaking at mid-century, the market 
[for chronicles] had largely been glutted by 1600.97
Woolf suggests that the downfall of the chronicle was caused by a 
combination of factors: market saturation, the emergence of a number 
of ‘parasite genres’ (including Shakespeare’s history plays), economic 
viability and the rise of antiquarianism.
The practice of history writing became fragmented and lost its domi-
nant genre at the very moment when England was supposed to have 
been urgently reconstructing its own national myth. It seems to me 
altogether more accurate to describe the process in terms of transition. 
The late sixteenth century fi nds England caught in a moment of uncer-
tainty, on the cusp of modernity, and unsure whether or not to cling on 
to its medieval, providential past. Rather than leading England’s efforts 
at nation-building, Shakespeare’s history plays feed off this climate of 
uncertainty. Medieval throwbacks like John of Gaunt, Joan of Arc and 
the Bishop of Carlisle share the stage with proto-modern Machiavellian 
pragmatists like Hotspur, Henry IV and Henry V. By showing the mach-
inations of court politics – its self-serving relationships of convenience 
and its backstabbings – Shakespeare’s historical drama demystifi es the 
nation-state as much as it defi nes it. Shakespeare’s sensitivity to human 
motives implicitly follows Italian humanist historiography in focusing 
on the ‘second causes’ of history, but at the same time the history plays 
give voice to popularly held beliefs about divine providence. The history 
plays see Shakespeare tapping into the uncertainty that surrounded him 
and mining it for drama. As a playwright, rather than a chronicler or 
polemicist, he was under no obligation to fi nd stable conclusions or to 
resolve the many complexities of late-sixteenth-century historiography.
We should not forget either that these were uncertain times not only 
for historiographers, but also for the clergy and theologians. The issues 
at stake in the religious debates during Elizabeth’s reign, especially 
those of free will and predestination, feed directly into Shakespeare’s 
history plays. At this time the Church of England was still very much 
in its nascent state, and actively forging a doctrinal identity. Thomas 
Cranmer’s attempts to establish a more Lutheran form of Protestantism 
for England were brought to a sudden and brutal halt under the reign 
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of Elizabeth’s sister, Mary. Questions about the fundamental beliefs of 
the Church of England were still at stake. The period saw the rise of 
both Puritanism and the infl uence of John Calvin, chiefl y in the form of 
Presbyterianism under Elizabeth’s successor, James I. Calvin’s student, 
John Knox, who had been banned in England under Elizabeth, pro-
foundly infl uenced James during his time in Scotland. However, even 
during Elizabeth’s reign we can see Calvin’s infl uence. Two of the key 
ideas that gained prominence were sola fi de (or justifi cation by faith 
alone) common to most forms of Protestantism and Calvin’s more 
extreme theory of predestination derived from the idea of sola gratia (or 
‘grace alone’).
it will be beyond dispute, that free will does not enable any man to perform 
good works, unless he is assisted by grace; indeed, the special grace which 
the elect alone receive through regeneration. For I stay not to consider the 
extravagance of those who say that grace is offered equally and promiscu-
ously to all.98
We can see traces of Calvin in the wording of certain items in the Thirty-
Nine Articles written by Protestant reformers in 1563 under Elizabeth:
X. Of Free-Will.
THE condition of Man after the fall of Adam is ſuch, that he cannot turn and 
prepare himſelf, by his own natural ſtrength and good works, to faith, and 
calling upon God: Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleaſant 
and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Chriſt preventing us, that 
we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.
XI. Of the Juſtifi cation of Man.
WE are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord 
and Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, by faith, and not of our own works or deſervings. 
Wherefore, that we are juſtifi ed by faith only, is a moſt wholſome Doctrine, 
and very full of comfort, as more largely is expreſſed in the Homily of 
Juſtifi cation.99
Calvin’s theory has serious implications for human free will and accord-
ingly for the idea of personal agency. For Calvin, humans do not have 
the capacity to perform ‘good works’ by their own free will and since 
our ultimate fate in heaven or hell is predestined by the will of God. 
Individuals play no part in steering the course of their own destiny.
However, England under Elizabeth stopped short of adopting these 
ideas wholesale. Alongside the rise of Calvinism, the period in which 
Shakespeare wrote the history plays also saw the rise of Anglicanism, 
a position much closer to Catholicism, most prominently in the work 
of Richard Hooker, especially Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie 
(1594).100 Anglicanism is characterised by the idea of via media or 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   103 17/02/2012   12:23
 104    Shakespeare’s History Plays
‘middle way’, and it is possible to see this in the very next item of the 
Thirty-Nine Articles:
XII. Of Good Works.
ALBEIT that Good Works, which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after 
Juſtifi cation, cannot put away our ſins, and endure the ſeverity of God’s judg-
ment; yet are they pleaſing and acceptable to God in Chriſt, and do ſpring out 
neceſſarily of a true and lively Faith; inſomuch that by them a lively Faith may 
be as evidently known as a tree diſcerned by the fruit.101
Although the authors of the Thirty-Nine Articles broadly followed 
Calvin in their stance on free will and the individual’s capacity to 
perform ‘good works’, here they appear to suggest that although good 
works will not help us in the Final Judgement, they are at least ‘pleasing 
and acceptable to God’ and, implicitly, we are able to perform them by 
our own free will. This would appear to contradict, or at least compli-
cate, article X but it is a good example of via media because it is a con-
cession to vestiges of the Catholic belief still popular at the time.
For the present study, there are two important items of note here: fi rst, 
the fact that issues of free will and predestination were being debated 
actively in Shakespeare’s own time; and second, that Calvin’s ideas of 
predestination are in many ways a return to beliefs found in the medi-
eval period. To borrow a phrase from Raymond Williams, Calvinism 
was ‘residual’ in Elizabethan culture – ‘effectively formed in the past, 
but . . . still active in the cultural process . . . as an effective element of 
the present’.102 This is because, as Anthony N. S. Lane tells us, ‘Calvin 
clearly believed that, on a wide range of issues, he was simply restoring 
the teaching of Augustine.’103 Augustine believed strongly in the idea of 
predestination. This idea, principally through the teachings of Thomas 
Aquinas, gained some prominence during the medieval period and 
Middle Ages.104 In the argument that follows, I consistently contrast the 
residual ideology of divine providence with the emergent humanist view 
of history. I argue that Shakespeare explicitly rejects divine providence; 
it goes without saying that this also implies a rejection of the Calvinist 
view of free will and predestination.
Shakespeare’s Humanist Historiography
In a thousand parts divide one man,
And make imaginary puissance.
Think, when we talk of horses, that you see them,
Printing their proud hoofs i’th’ receiving earth;
For ’tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings,
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Carry them here and there, jumping o’er times,
Turning th’accomplishment of many years
Into an hour glass – for which supply,
Admit me Chorus to this history.
 (Henry V, Prologue.24–32)
Shakespeare’s history plays deal with people. This might sound like 
an obvious statement (who else could populate a play but people?), 
but the point is worth stressing – not least because, as Andy Mousley 
writes, ‘one effect of [cultural historicism’s anti-humanism] has been 
to dehumanise history, to empty history of its human interest, scope 
and scale’.105 We have seen that Tudor historiography was not a dis-
cretely defi ned practice. Controversial new foreign ideas about politics 
and statecraft vied with received medieval superstitions about divine 
providence, often within the covers of a single text. At the same time, 
cutting-edge antiquarian methods of scholarship competed with moral 
didacticism for the territory marked ‘truth’. England had cut its ties 
with Catholicism, provoked war with Spain and faced French intrigue 
in Scotland, which was a constant source of instability for the English 
throne; the country was moving into uncertain and isolated waters. No 
doubt, the need for a fi rm sense of national identity was strongly felt – 
especially by its government. History is the bedrock on which national 
identity is built. Thus, the process of national self-identifi cation hinged 
ultimately on the writers of history.
However, England did not experience the defi nitive period of self-
identifi cation that its authorities sought in the late sixteenth century. 
History written during this time was heterogeneous. It was disseminated 
through a wide variety of forms and came to no stable conclusions about 
how best to understand England’s bloody past. As I have argued, the 
1580s and 1590s are best understood as a period of transition in English 
historiography. To borrow a term from Michel Foucault, it was a pro-
found moment of ‘discontinuity’.106 Epistemological breaks are rarely 
clean, however. It is perhaps more useful, therefore, to think of the his-
torical texts produced in the 1590s in terms of self-refl ection rather than 
as marking a period of self-identifi cation. Whether implicitly or explic-
itly, writers and historians were asking fundamental questions about 
their nation and about themselves: What does it mean to be English? 
How have we come to the present state of affairs? Who are the people 
that have shaped this country? What were their successes and mistakes? 
What can we learn from the past today?
Shakespeare’s history plays pose these questions as strongly as any 
contemporary chronicle and they do so in a uniquely humanist fashion, 
because they reduce the broad sweep of history to the microcosm of 
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the stage and ‘reduce the political process down to a human scale’.107 
Shakespeare’s history is truncated, stripped to its most essential ele-
ments: people and their actions. Shakespeare exercises poetic licence 
with the details of historical events. Whole decades are reduced to a 
few minutes on stage; history is triturated and poured into ‘an hour-
glass’ (Henry V, Prologue.31), making the signifi cance of human action 
available for all to see. As Jan Kott notes, Shakespeare’s history is 
‘cleared . . . of all descriptive elements, of anecdotes, almost of story. It 
is history distilled of irrelevances’.108 As individual characters negotiate 
their way around the poisoned chalice of kingship – scheming, praying, 
wooing, betraying, squabbling, kissing and killing their way through 
history – audiences are left to fi ll in the blanks. We remind ourselves 
how each action has the potential to affect thousands of people: ‘In a 
thousand parts divide one man’ (Henry V, Prologue.24). Shakespeare’s 
treatment of history draws our attention to just how much has been 
determined by the actions and choices of a few men and women, and 
reminds us of how precarious their privileged positions can be. To 
quote Annabel Patterson: ‘it mattered to Shakespeare . . . who works 
and who speaks’.109 But it also draws us into the interpretative process 
of history: ‘’tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings’ (Henry 
V, Prologue.28). This line may be read as a superfi cial appeal to the 
audience to imagine the magnifi cent robes and gold crowns of bygone 
kings, but it can also be read another way: the chorus of Henry V calls 
on the members of its audience to awaken from their passivity in order 
to judge for themselves the key fi gures of fi fteenth-century England. 
We are invited not only to ‘deck our kings’ in the fi nest silks, but 
also to assess critically their performances in the ongoing pageant of 
history. In short, Shakespeare’s historical gaze puts the kings, queens 
and statesmen of England on trial and asks his audience to act as 
both judge and jury. When viewed in this way, Shakespeare’s history 
plays  constitute nothing less than a radical, humanist form of histori-
cism.110
Shakespeare’s history is a genuinely human affair in which actions 
have consequences and personalities matter; it has winners and losers, 
good ideas and bad ideas, triumphs and blunders, selfi sh tyrants and 
innocent victims, ambitious nobles and escapist kings. As Moody E. 
Prior noted elegantly in 1973, Shakespeare’s historical insights ‘come to 
us clothed in their full human signifi cance’.111 To conclude this chapter 
and in Chapter 7, I want to take the opportunity offered by the Chorus 
of Henry V to pay particular attention to the actions and decisions of 
the characters found in 2 Henry VI and 3 Henry VI. By so doing, I hope 
to engage in the process of interpreting history at its most fundamental 
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level: analysing the key choices and actions of characters in order to 
discern what has contributed to their accomplishments or downfalls. 
This is historicism as envisioned by Shakespeare: the very stuff of history 
brought to life, as if for the fi rst time, in front of our eyes and held up to 
be considered and judged. Ronald Knowles makes a similar argument:
Shakespeare not only recreated the empirical conditions of historian as 
witness, but also freed the past from the fi xity of the page. The resurrected 
personages of history now spoke for themselves and the audience, free from 
the directives of a didactic narrator, could bear witness to the meaning of 
experience, rather than accept the truism of precept, by hearing and seeing 
arguments and actions, words and deeds.112
To adapt Stephen Greenblatt’s famous phrase, here is a real chance ‘to 
speak with the dead’,113 because the fi gures of history are being reani-
mated quite literally on the stage – albeit in an anachronistic and cultur-
ally mediated form.
The anti-humanist bent of much new historicist and cultural materi-
alist work has led recent critics to discredit the notion of character as 
a category for analysis and to focus attention on the extent of anach-
ronism and cultural mediation in Shakespeare’s plays. In other words, 
their emphasis has been on the degree to which social and ideological 
pressures impinge upon and make themselves felt within Shakespeare’s 
plays. I am much more interested in the degree to which those plays 
intervene in early modern debates about history and politics in a unique 
and dynamic way, and in their capacity to challenge audiences to think 
critically about the historical process. In taking this approach, I would 
also like put forward the idea that anti-humanist modes of enquiry are ill 
equipped to deal adequately with Shakespeare’s history plays, precisely 
because they are opposed to the very categories on which his historical 
enquiry is predicated – a matter to which I will return presently.
In centring history on individuals, Shakespeare was, at least in part, 
opposing long-held beliefs inherited from the medieval period about 
the primacy of God’s will in historical events. Although Phyllis Rackin 
rightly argues that ‘it is impossible to derive a single, coherent theory of 
history from the plays’,114 it is equally impossible to deny that the plays, 
as David Scott Kastan points out, ‘all too clearly . . . deal with the fallen 
world of politics’.115 The plays cannot be made to uphold the received 
ideas of divine providence and retribution without the gross oversimpli-
fi cation found in Tillyard,116 not least because Shakespeare’s characters 
repeatedly make claims that dispute providence. In 2 Henry VI, for 
example, time and again York cites Henry’s personality as the cause of 
England’s failings and vows to take matters into his own hands:
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Nor shall proud Lancaster usurp my right,
Nor hold the sceptre in his childish fi st,
Nor wear the diadem upon his head,
Whose church-like humours fi ts not for a crown . . .
And force perforce I’ll make him yield the crown,
Whose bookish rule hath pulled fair England down.
 (2 Henry VI, 1.1.241–4, 255–6)
The suggestion implicit in York’s resolve to make a challenge for the 
crown is that if Henry VI had been of a different ‘humour’, if his rule 
had been less ‘bookish’ and ‘church-like’, he would not have been forced 
into action. York cites, as Prior argues, ‘the human causes of Henry’s 
failure’.117
In the very next scene, the ambitious Eleanor of Gloucester attempts 
to goad her husband, Duke Humphrey, into action to make a claim on 
the crown himself:
Follow I must: I cannot go before
While Gloucester bears this base and humble mind.
Were I a man, a duke, and next of blood,
I would remove these tedious stumbling-blocks
And smooth my way upon their headless necks.
And, being a woman, I will not slack
To play my part in fortune’s pageant. 
 (2 Henry VI, 1.2.62–7)
Eleanor bemoans her husband’s lack of ambition and the social restric-
tions placed upon her sphere of action because of her gender, but she 
is not content to entrust her future to providence (‘fortune’s pageant’). 
One is reminded of Karl Marx’s celebrated observation that ‘men make 
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circum-
stances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past’.118 
Eleanor, no doubt, wishes she could choose her own circumstances, 
but she is still going to try to play the best hand with the cards that she 
has been dealt. Like York, she resolves to take her destiny into her own 
hands in order to try to achieve her aims. In the event, by electing to 
dabble in witchcraft, she chooses the ‘wrong’ option and plays a sig-
nifi cant part in her own downfall, but her concerns about Humphrey’s 
rivals prove to be well founded none the less. Again, the implication 
is that, had Humphrey been of a less ‘humble mind’, he might have 
survived the play; indeed, the very course of history might have been 
signifi cantly altered.
Queen Margaret also takes matters into her own hands because of her 
dissatisfaction with Henry’s character:
PARVINI PRINT.indd   108 17/02/2012   12:23
Shakespeare’s Historical and Political Thought     109
I tell thee Pole . . .
I thought King Henry had resembled thee
In courage, courtship, and proportion.
But his mind is bent to holiness . . .
I would the College of the Cardinals
Would choose him Pope, and carry him to Rome
And set the triple crown upon his head:
That were a state fi t for his holiness.
 (2 Henry VI, 1.3.45, 48–50, 56–9)
When she agreed to marry Henry, Margaret fell for William de la Pole, 
the Earl of Suffolk – she fell for his personal qualities – his ‘courage, 
courtship, and proportion’. Henry, who lacks these qualities, has plainly 
disappointed her. To underline the point, Shakespeare, quite unhistori-
cally, develops an explicit affair between Margaret and Suffolk. Margaret 
is unwilling to let circumstances get in the way of her goals and desires. If 
Henry is unwilling to do what is required of him, she will either do it in his 
place or fi nd a suitable substitute. This becomes a keynote of Margaret’s 
character. She fi nds herself a proxy lover in Suffolk and becomes both 
the proxy head of state and the commander-in-chief of the royal army. 
All the while, she chastises and humiliates the King for his lack of gump-
tion, brazenly kissing Suffolk in front of him and calling him names such 
as ‘wretched man’ and ‘timorous wretch’ (3 Henry VI, 1.1.218, 233). 
The sheer dominance of Margaret over her timid husband maintains the 
power to shock and surprise in the twenty-fi rst century. She brings to 
mind the ruthless, individualist ideology of Thatcherite Britain as much 
as the Elizabethan construct of feminine monstrosity. Whether or not it 
was Shakespeare’s intention to vilify her, as feminists argue, as a ‘sus-
tained example of the danger which ambitious and sexual women pose 
to English manhood and to English monarchy’,119 the fact remains that 
she pursues her endeavours through force of personality alone. Despite 
her often spiteful nature, throughout the Henry VI plays she consistently 
makes the best of a bad situation: the daughter of a powerless king, who 
not only negotiates marriage above her political pulling power, but also, 
upon fi nding the King of England a weak and ineffectual man, cuckolds 
him to satisfy her own needs, leads his armies, successfully subdues her 
political rivals, and produces a legitimate heir. Without Margaret, the 
Lancastrian house would undoubtedly have capitulated to the House of 
York far sooner and more readily – indeed, she is responsible for killing 
the leader of the opposition, Richard of York. Again, Shakespeare is at 
pains to show how much depends upon the actions and characteristics of 
individuals – even those like Eleanor and Margaret who are, in theory, 
denied agency by the patriarchal status quo.
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These women also serve, especially in Margaret’s case, as the antidote 
to the insipidly passive Henry VI, who, more than any other character, 
throws himself on the mercy of divine providence. If Richard III repre-
sents a thoroughgoing critique of Machiavellianism, then the Henry VI 
plays surely subject the providential theory of history to equal scrutiny. 
As Ronald Knowles has suggested:
[Henry’s] Christian faith accepts that what has taken place must be part of 
God’s just providential ordering of the world, however inscrutable that might 
appear to mere human understanding . . . The chaos which ensues when the 
monarch puts his complete faith and trust in the effi cacy of God in human 
affairs [serves] ultimately [to] subvert the commonplaces of Tudor Christian 
ideology . . . An audience is surely left aghast at such single-minded piety 
which has rendered the king politically blind and lame.120
In a world that is plainly governed by human action rather than provi-
dence, Henry’s court is quickly overrun with ambitious individuals who, 
as the makers of history, are not content to sit back and wait for things 
to happen. Henry’s placid inaction serves both to focus our attention 
sharply on the actions of others and to highlight how different things 
might have been if Henry had taken the decisions he needed to at vital 
moments. I will return to this theme later. For now it is enough to say 
that Shakespeare himself was keenly aware of the fact that the War of the 
Roses could have been averted had it not been for the King’s incompe-
tence. However much Margaret is demonised in the plays, at least she is 
in the business of steering the wheel of history rather than letting it spin 
out of control or letting someone else steer it. After all, what is history 
but an account of people’s actions? Margaret’s attempts to steer history 
are, at their most basic level, attempts to exercise infl uence and control 
over other people, the practice we most commonly call politics. It almost 
goes without saying that the politics of the history plays are intensely 
personal, and each major player in the political game is brought under 
scrutiny – for examination and cross-examination – before the galler-
ies of jurors who make up Shakespeare’s audience. Kings, queens and 
nobles are put on perpetual trial, much like modern politicians under 
the spotlight of the media. The collective gaze is brought to bear upon 
each action, decision and utterance; the audience apportions blame to 
the individuals responsible for failure and heaps praise on those who 
achieve success – but only after the event.
This intense focus on individual players in ‘fortune’s pageant’ also 
lends Shakespeare’s treatment of history a sense of contingency and 
immediacy that cannot be found in studies of prescribed history. We 
are reminded constantly of how things might have been were it not for 
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certain people. There is an uncertainty as to how events may unfurl, 
despite the fact that history has already written the outcome. In 2 Henry 
IV, Shakespeare underlines this sense of contingency by introducing 
the device of Rumour, who, from the start of the play, blurs events and 
raises doubts in the audience about what actually happened in the pre-
vious play by spreading the lie ‘that Harry Monmouth fell / Under the 
wrath of noble Hotspur’s sword’ (2 Henry IV, Induction.29–30). We 
know this did not happen, but in the world of the play it remains a dis-
tinct possibility; in the same circumstances, Hotspur might have killed 
Prince Hal. This sense of contingency changes the dynamic of history. 
Blair Worden is right to assert that ‘Shakespeare’s instincts are always 
descriptive, never prescriptive’, but wrong to claim that ‘he provides 
maps of political conduct, not tests of political theory’.121 The image of 
a ‘map’ suggests a static landscape with fi xed positions, but the history 
plays are populated by characters who change their allegiances, who 
adopt different political stances depending on fl uctuating fortunes, and 
whose personalities develop as events unfold and body-counts rise. If 
anything, abstract political theories are put to the test in ‘real’ situations 
in which almost anything could happen. Without doubt, Shakespeare 
privileges praxis over theory. Shakespeare’s history plays are not simply 
an account of what happened, but dynamic and probing analyses of 
historical causality which place the responsibility for the outcomes of 
events squarely on the shoulders of men and women.
New historicists and cultural materialists would surely baulk at 
such conclusions, because they run the risk of affording individuals 
the agency to control (within boundaries) their own destinies and the 
course of history. After all, the ‘declared objective’ of anti-humanism 
is the ‘decentring of man’.122 The principal objection such critics would 
doubtless raise is that, by centring history on individuals, Shakespeare 
ignores the historical and social processes that produce those individu-
als in the fi rst place. How can individuals truly effect change if they are 
caught up in the ideological thought-patterns of their particular place 
and moment? But Shakespeare also provides part of the answer to these 
questions: individuals have different personalities. There is only so much 
that ideology critique can account for. How can one explain the wildly 
dissimilar dispositions of Henry VI and his father, Henry V, or of Duke 
Humphrey and his wife, Eleanor? Why was it Clarence and not Richard 
of Gloucester who betrayed Edward IV? We may point to any number 
of reasons, but they will undoubtedly be specifi c and personal rather 
than general and ideological. It seems too tempting and easy to answer, 
as Graham Holderness does, that these differences of personality are 
merely refl ections of ‘residual and emergent ideologies in a changing 
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society’.123 I am not suggesting that the personalities of individuals are 
inherent or ‘essential’, because it is clear that most human behaviour is 
learned; but rather that the external impetuses which regulate human 
behaviour over time and which constitute ‘personality’ are far too varied 
and innumerable to be explained away by general principles. As readers 
of Pierre Bourdieu will attest,124 the will to abstraction can lead only to 
further abstraction: a kind of Russian-doll model in which structural 
fi elds merely beget and explain further structural fi elds. The continental 
model of advancing theoretical arguments a priori has a habit of pro-
viding anti-humanists with useful catch-all phrases that can be used to 
defeat almost any argument. So Jonathan Dollimore, for example, is 
able to dismiss the medieval theory of providentialism, Tillyard’s adop-
tion of it in reading Shakespeare’s history plays, the liberal-humanist 
counter-arguments to Tillyard of the 1960s that centre history on indi-
viduals, and Jan Kott’s brand of secular existentialist despair, on the 
grounds that they are ideological.125 All of which begs the question: 
what is not ideological in quasi-Althusserian materialism?
A strong argument can be made in support of the view that 
Shakespeare’s history plays demonstrate that it is individuals and not 
God who drive history. Yet new historicists and cultural materialists, by 
recourse to the anti-humanism of Althusser, Foucault and others, would 
deny individuals their place in history altogether. This is hardly surpris-
ing, given that both Althusser’s and Foucault’s theoretical projects rest 
on static, closed, discontinuous, synchronic and essentially deterministic 
models of history, whereas Shakespeare’s humanist historical model, 
which is opposed to determinism, is dynamic, diachronic, contingent 
and, as Kastan argues, ‘open-ended’.126 In other words, cultural histori-
cism is fundamentally opposed to Shakespeare’s own project of human-
ising history, so it follows that the majority of its practitioners tend to 
produce readings of the history plays that emphasise their supposed 
advocacy of the Elizabethan ideological state apparatus while neglecting 
Shakespeare’s close attention to individual characters.
Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfi eld take successive generations of 
twentieth-century Shakespeare critics to task for making a ‘fundamental 
error’ in considering the roles of individuals in the process of history:
Perhaps the most fundamental error in all these accounts of the role of 
ideology is falsely to unify history and / or the individual human subject. 
In one, history is unifi ed by a teleological principle conferring meaningful 
order (Tillyard), in another by the inverse of this – Kott’s ‘implacable roller’. 
And Sanders’s emphasis on moral or subjective integrity implies a different, 
though related, notion of unity: an experience of subjective autonomy, of an 
essential self uncontaminated by the corruption of worldly process; ‘indi-
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vidual integrity’ implies in the etymology of both worlds an ideal unity: the 
undivided, the integral.127
When I asked the question ‘what is history but an account of people’s 
actions?’ above, I did so with this passage from Dollimore and Sinfi eld in 
mind, because they assume that history is something else and in doing so 
beg further questions. Why is the so-called unifi cation of history and the 
individual necessarily ‘false’? Was it not Margaret who brought York 
to his knees? Was it not Richard III who killed Margaret’s son, Prince 
Edward, and who arranged for the death of his own brother Clarence? 
What would it mean exactly to separate these historical actions from the 
individuals who perpetrated them? Dollimore and Sinfi eld provide their 
own answer, which is:
not to become fi xated on [the] negation [of the concept of unifying history 
and human subjects] – chaos and subjective fragmentation – but rather to 
understand history and the human subject in terms of social and political 
process. Ideology is composed of those beliefs, practices, and institutions that 
work to legitimate the social order – especially by the process of representing 
sectional or class interests as universal ones.128
From this perspective it was social and political process, rather than 
Margaret or Richard III or any other person, that was ultimately respon-
sible for the historical events I described above. I have deliberately 
emphasised the word ‘work’ here; it is a verb, an action that assumes, 
one would think, a doer. But the concept of ‘individual human subjects’ 
has just been discredited; there is no single person or even group of 
people responsible for this process; the ‘beliefs, practices, and institu-
tions’ just work ‘by themselves’,129 in the abstract. Since we are dealing 
with Marxist ideas, let us return briefl y to Marx’s famous aphorism: 
men make history, but not under conditions of their own choosing. 
What would become of this in the hands of Dollimore and Sinfi eld? 
Their version might read: ‘social and political processes make history, 
under conditions of their own creation’. I would suggest that, by falsely 
unifying the historical process – what people say and do – and confl ating 
it with the social and ideological processes by which individuals function 
in society, it is Dollimore and Sinfi eld who have made the ‘fundamental 
error’.
As Annabel Patterson argues, the cultural historicist thraldom to 
‘certain fashionable forms of anti-humanism [has] seriously inhibited 
our capacity to talk sensibly about literature’.130 Patterson is particularly 
concerned that these anti-humanist ideas efface individuals from the 
process of history. She locates the problem in the continued infl uences 
of Lacan, Foucault and Althusser: ‘Lacan’s neo-Freudian “qui parle” 
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denies to the subject the oldest humanist privilege – speech as a sign of 
rational self-determination – and Foucault’s quotation of it extends that 
denial to history.’ And the problem is compounded, Patterson adds, by 
Althusser’s belief ‘that economies (and economic theories) can exist in 
abstraction from the human beings that produced them’.131 Patterson 
notes a tendency in these theorists to raise all questions to the level 
of abstraction; their theses advance from general principles to general 
principles – a move, as we have seen, repeated by cultural historicists. 
In the twenty-fi rst century – an era in which politicians and national 
governments increasingly absolve themselves of personal responsibility 
by citing economic forces that are beyond their control – the issue of 
individual agency remains vital. In my readings of the history plays in 
the next two chapters of this book, I hope to show that similar issues 
were at stake in the 1590s and that Shakespeare was deeply aware of 
them. I also wish to demonstrate how, in subjecting the major players of 
recent English history to such concentrated scrutiny, the fi rst and second 
tetralogies insist upon a political world of personal culpability that deals 
harshly with those who would hide behind abstractions.
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Chapter 7
Personal Action and Agency in 
Henry VI
The Human Causes of History
A throne is only a bench covered in velvet.
Napoleon Bonaparte
Wolfgang Iser states that ‘any present day study [of Shakespeare’s history 
plays] . . . will be confronted not only with the plays themselves, but also 
with the manifold readings of them. These cannot be dismissed from 
mind, but will inevitably affect our attitude to the plays’.1 Although my 
reading of 2 and 3 Henry VI is primarily textual, past readings cannot 
be ignored. These plays have long been regarded by most critics as crude 
and didactic early attempts at drama by a playwright who was still trying 
to fi nd his own voice in the Elizabethan public theatre. Accordingly, in 
sharp contrast to the fi nal play in the fi rst tetralogy, Richard III, the 
Henry VI plays were afforded relatively scant attention during the 
twentieth century compared to the considerable body of work that was 
produced about the second tetralogy.2 Aside from tackling the ques-
tions of authorship and chronology,3 as Alan C. Dessen pointed out in 
1993, scholars and directors alike have shown only ‘intermittent inter-
est in [the Henry VI] trilogy other than as a context for Richard III’.4 
At best these plays have been seen as promising precursors of better 
things to come: ‘the rich ore out of which the later plays are refi ned’.5 
The advent of cultural historicism has done little to reverse this trend. 
Stephen Greenblatt, Leonard Tennenhouse, Alan Sinfi eld, Jonathan 
Dollimore and Graham Holderness each pay much greater attention to 
the second tetralogy in their respective studies.6 The same is true of the 
essays collected in the broadly cultural historicist volume, Shakespeare’s 
Histories and Counter-Histories.7 Phyllis Rackin’s seminal book, Stages 
of History, and Jean E. Howard’s equally penetrating The State and 
Social Struggle in Early Modern History – as well as their collaboration, 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   122 17/02/2012   12:23
Personal Action and Agency in Henry VI     123
the feminist study, Engendering A Nation – represent the only sustained, 
major re-evaluations of all three parts of the Henry VI trilogy from a 
cultural historicist perspective.8
In general, new historicists and cultural materialists have approached 
the plays of the fi rst tetralogy by locating them fi rmly within the spe-
cifi c historical and political contexts of the 1590s and by focusing on 
particular sequences or characters. They reject both the Tillyardian 
view that the plays posit a providential grand narrative, and the liberal 
humanist tendency, typifi ed in the 1960s and 1970s by Moody E. Prior 
and Wilbur Sanders,9 to read them for abstract, transcultural political 
lessons in the manner of Machiavelli. While cultural historicists disagree 
with Tillyard’s assumptions about the extent of Tudor hegemony and 
his conclusions about the plays, they have few major reservations about 
his basic methodology – they are, after all, united with Tillyard at the 
most general level by ‘historicism’. Therefore, although Tillyard remains 
a perennial target, the cultural historicists reserve their strongest criti-
cisms for the liberal humanists, because they divorce the plays, whether 
deliberately or not, from their particular historical contexts. According 
to the new historicist Leonard Tennenhouse:
For over fi fty years these plays have generally been read in one of three ways: 
as overtly political texts which one can interpret by reference to the histori-
cal source material; as dramatic entertainments to be classed as an aesthetic 
genre comparable with comedy, tragedy or romance; or as part of a process 
of Shakespeare’s personal development which accompanied his youthful 
comedies and preceded the grand metaphysical tragedies and mature vision 
of his lyrical romances.10
For Tennenhouse, each of these positions imposes modern (bourgeois, 
essentialist-humanist) distinctions between literature and politics on the 
past. He argues that notions of genre lead us to read plays in certain 
prescribed, ideologically fi xed ways. He objects in particular to the 
notion that ‘a work’s transcendence or referentality made it successful’, 
preferring to concentrate on the ways ‘Renaissance drama displayed 
its politics in its manner of idealizing or demystifying specifi c forms of 
power’.11 The cultural materialist Graham Holderness offers a similar 
account, arguing that: 
the history plays have often been discussed in terms of an extremely abstract 
defi nition of ‘politics’, conceived not as the specifi c discourses and practices 
of power in a particular historical moment, but as a Machiavellian system 
located in the universal shabbiness of political practices throughout the 
ages.12
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Like Tennenhouse, Holderness is fundamentally opposed to any notion 
of the plays transmitting non-specifi c, transhistorical ideas. He laments 
what he calls ‘the counter-orthodoxy which constitutes the plays as 
humanistic treatises teaching the secular lessons of history to rulers and 
peoples’.13
In contrast to their theoretical work, in practice the cultural his-
toricists insist upon specifi city over generality. This often leads to 
highly specifi c, localised readings of the plays.14 It has also led cultural 
historicists to prefer reading selected scenes or passages from individual 
plays rather than reading them together as a tetralogy. Accordingly, 
they have paid signifi cant attention to the gender politics of 1 Henry VI, 
particularly the confl ict between Talbot and Joan La Pucelle, and to the 
depiction of Cade’s rebellion found in Act 4 of 2 Henry VI. More often 
than not in these readings, Shakespeare is assumed to be the supporter 
of the offi cial Tudor state ideology, playing on contemporary anxieties 
about class and gender. For example, in his reading of Cade’s rebellion, 
Richard Wilson accuses Shakespeare of being a sneering, politically par-
tisan apologist for the rich, who gives voice to contemporary fears about 
workers’ revolts; while, in their reading of 3 Henry VI, Howard and 
Rackin depict him as a staunchly chauvinist playwright exploiting the 
‘cultural fantasy of the monstrous Amazonian woman’.15 The cultural 
historicist tendency to allow modern political motives to colour their 
criticism is plainly evident. I would suggest that such readings, which 
falsely dichotomise the plays and force Shakespeare to choose sides, 
overlook the complexity of the fi rst tetralogy (there are rarely only two 
sides to consider) and ignore its internal logic – Shakespeare’s dialecti-
cally enquiring mind is not prone to partisanship. To quote Moody E. 
Prior, Shakespeare’s modus operandi throughout the history plays is 
‘exploratory rather than doctrinaire’.16
Despite this, as Graham Holderness explains, ‘it is customary to 
regard the plays of the so-called “First Tetralogy” – the Henry VI 
plays and Richard III – as more direct and straightforward expressions 
of the “Tudor Myth” than the later plays of the second “cycle”’.17 
The keynote, once again, is providence. I have been suggesting that 
Shakespeare’s treatment of history is avowedly humanist and centred on 
individuals, but this view has been unpopular in the past. According to 
Irving Ribner, for example, ‘there is little in Shakespeare of Marlowe’s 
humanistic philosophy of history. Richard [of York’s] personal abilities 
avail him nothing in the face of hostile fortune which destroys him in 
retribution for his sins’.18 But Ribner neglects to mention the participa-
tion of other humans in York’s fate: Henry VI’s passivity before and 
during the emergence of this ‘hostile’ environment and Margaret’s not 
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inconsiderable hand in his downfall. Such factors do not matter to 
Ribner because, for him, ‘the political doctrine of the Henry VI plays is 
simple and obvious’.19 For Ribner, as for Tillyard before him, the fi rst 
tetralogy constitutes a fl at dramatic update of Edward Hall’s chronicle, 
The Union of the Two Noble and Illustrious Families of Lancaster and 
York. Similarly, for M. M. Reese:
[The] sequence is essentially didactic[:] . . . a straight-forward moralising 
of the Tudor pattern of history, with only an occasional glimpse of real 
people and recognisable human predicaments . . . In its extreme earnestness 
it is perhaps the standard example of a poet-historian using drama to teach 
lessons appropriate to his own times.20
Thus, for Reese, the fi rst tetralogy is no different from the providential 
chronicles of Edward Hall, the didactic poem A Mirror for Magistrates 
or Samuel Daniels’s moralising mini-epic The Civil Wars. Jan Kott pro-
vides a more nuanced, secular version of this argument, which empha-
sises the relentless march of time in what he calls ‘the Grand Mechanism’ 
or the ‘great staircase’ of history.21 Kott accepts that Shakespeare has ‘an 
awareness of the extent to which people are involved in history’, but 
insists that, amid the continuous bloodshed and power struggles, ‘the 
faces of kings and usurpers become blurred, one after the other’.22 To 
use an old sports aphorism: ‘the game stays the same, only the players 
change’. Kott replaces the cold judgement of divine providence with 
the nihilistic nightmare of existentialism, which merely updates the 
Tillyardian tendency to deny the signifi cance of human actions; endless 
cycles do not permit agency.
As we have seen, new historicists and cultural materialists have not 
overturned these commonplaces, preferring to focus on class and gender 
politics, power relations and early modern anachronisms. Indeed, it 
would be wrong to expect a group of anti-humanists to disregard read-
ings that serve predominantly to deny individuals their place in history. 
For many critics, these plays ‘express the plight of individuals caught 
up in a cataclysmic movement of events for which responsibility is 
communal and historical, not personal and immediate’,23 and thus the 
traditional view holds that these plays do not lend themselves easily to 
studies in character. But for all the talk of providence, chaos and face-
less individuals, when one actually turns to the plays, one cannot fail to 
be struck by the variety and contrasting political styles of the characters 
found in the three parts of Henry VI and Richard III. It seems nonsensi-
cal to discount as irrelevant (to history) the obvious differences between, 
for example, Henry VI and Richard III, Margaret of Anjou and the Duke 
of York, or the Duke of Gloucester and the Earl of Suffolk. According 
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to Nicholas Grene, ‘Shakespeare characterises more than the chroniclers 
do, but only so far as he needs to characterise for the purposes of his nar-
rative’.24 But Grene does not account for the numerous moments when 
Shakespeare simply invents, which seems to serve no other purpose than 
to humanise his characters. As A. D. Nuttall reminds us, even at the very 
start of his career, ‘Shakespeare excels at characterization’.25
As noted in Chapter 6, the most explicit example of Shakespeare 
‘humanising’ historical characters is the development of the adulterous 
relationship between Margaret and Suffolk, which has no concrete basis 
in the chronicles.26 As Rackin points out, ‘Margaret’s adultery has no 
real impact on the action of Henry VI plays’;27 but her love for Suffolk 
provides personal motivation for her subsequent actions and accounts 
in part for her increasingly driven, ruthless and eventually demented 
character in 3 Henry VI and Richard III. There is no reason to doubt 
Margaret’s genuine grief as she nurses the severed head of her lover 
in 2 Henry VI: ‘Think therefore on revenge and cease to weep . . . my 
hope is gone, now Suffolk is deceased’ (4.4.3, 56). From a few histori-
cal details provided by the chronicles – of the ‘soft, pitiful, gentle, and 
easily infl uenced’ Henry VI and his unusually determined, ‘forceful and 
domineering’28 wife – Shakespeare has very carefully thought through 
the possible reasons why Margaret behaved in the manner she did. 
After Suffolk’s death, Margaret’s frustration with her placid husband is 
palpable: ‘What are you made of? You’ll nor fi ght nor fl y’ (2 Henry VI, 
5.2.74). Viewed in this way, Shakespeare’s development of the relation-
ship between Margaret and Henry is strikingly modern. The Queen’s 
emotional motivation for much of the fi rst tetralogy seems to be to 
take command of her relationship with both the King and the country 
in order to fulfi l the expectations of the King’s role, to take his place. 
This she continues to do until the murder of her son at the end of 3 
Henry VI, whereupon, after begging for her own death (5.5.69–80), she 
metaphorically dies, becoming the ghostly harbinger of revenge found in 
Richard III. Far from being made faceless or irrelevant by the relentless 
advance of history, Margaret is unique in the Shakespeare canon in that 
her character is developed over four plays.29
Besides the affair between Margaret and Suffolk, there are other 
moments in the fi rst tetralogy that serve no real narrative purpose. One 
such moment occurs in Richard III: George, the Duke of Clarence – a 
man who, in 3 Henry VI, was twice traitor to the throne and involved 
in two usurpations – is imprisoned and it is almost certain that he will 
be executed on the orders of his own older brother, Edward IV, through 
the machinations of his younger brother, Richard. Before his imminent 
death, he meditates on his past ‘misdeeds’ and prays for God to ‘spare 
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[his] guiltless wife and . . . poor children’ (Richard III, 1.4.70–2). It is 
an unusually tender human moment in a play that is marked by bru-
tality. Another such moment occurs in 2 Henry VI when Eleanor, the 
Duchess of Gloucester, forced to walk the streets of London barefoot 
and wrapped only in a sheet, prepares to leave her husband after being 
sentenced to exile for life on the Isle of Man for ‘dealing with witches 
and with conjurers’ (2.1.170). Duke Humphrey, who had earlier stub-
bornly opposed Eleanor’s ambitious plans for social advancement and 
condemned her dabblings in witchcraft, now displays compassion for 
his wife, imagining her shame and humiliation:
Sweet Nell, ill can thy noble mind abrook
The abject people gazing on thy face,
With envious looks, laughing at thy shame, . . .
But soft, I think she comes; and I’ll prepare
My tear-stained eyes to see her miseries.
 (2 Henry VI, 2.4.9–12, 16–17)
If these plays were straightforwardly didactic, why would Shakespeare 
devise a scene (2 Henry VI, 1.2) in which to establish the close and 
loving but ultimately strained relationship between Humphrey and 
Eleanor and then treat his audience to a tearful ‘farewell’ scene an act 
later? Human touches, such as Humphrey’s affectionate pet name for his 
‘sweet Nell’ or Eleanor’s lines expressing genuine ‘shame’ (2 Henry VI, 
2.4.19, 24, 31, 48, 101, 107), serve to complicate the glib moral lessons 
which critics have assumed to be inherent in Eleanor’s descent from 
naked ambition to witchcraft to exile. Given that Shakespeare invests 
the relationship with emotional interest, the characters of Humphrey 
and Eleanor might be read more fruitfully in other ways.
Personal Politics: 2 Henry VI
In the following analysis of 2 Henry VI, I hope to show that, contrary 
to the received critical wisdom, the plays of the fi rst tetralogy do reward 
readings that pay close attention to character. I also wish to show that 
the analysis of character in Shakespeare’s historical drama is insepa-
rable from the analysis of politics. Political decisions and actions are 
tightly bound up with the personalities of individual characters. Despite 
the objections of Holderness and other cultural historicists, this con-
ception of politics resists abstraction, because it takes as its starting 
point a group of particular individuals in a specifi c place and time. As 
Prior argues, their differing ambitions and approaches to the political 
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situation ‘taken together . . . constitute a spectrum . . . an exhaustive 
separating out of the principal aspects of the central idea of kingship’.30 
Rather than merely refl ecting the commonplaces of Tudor political 
discourse, this spectrum is internally generated; its political fi ndings are 
Shakespeare’s own, because his approach to history is empirical, a cease-
less testing of alternative types of politics.31 Wilbur Sanders perhaps put 
this argument best:
In choosing to treat this turbulent stretch of English history, Shakespeare has 
plunged into the very waters where the concept of kingship was fraught with 
the profoundest complexities. If he was planning to exemplify the simplifi ed 
monarchic theory of Tudor propaganda, it was a singularly unhappy choice 
of subject.32
It seems to me that Shakespeare’s aim in writing the fi rst tetralogy is 
two-fold. The fi rst aim – like that of an historian – is to come to an 
understanding of the attitudes, decisions and actions of the individuals 
who produced these ‘complexities’. And the second aim is to question 
the effectiveness of their political strategies, both in terms of personal 
survival and the sustenance of the body politic, which are two ends that 
increasingly come into confl ict.
As the commonly assumed moral centre of 2 Henry VI, Gloucester 
is the logical character with whom to start. Most critics agree that the 
‘good’ Duke Humphrey maintains a genuine commitment to the com-
monwealth in the face of an increasingly self-interested and personal 
brand of politics. For his characterisation of Humphrey, Shakespeare 
seems to have taken his cue from John Foxe’s description of the Duke 
found in Acts and Monuments:
Of manners he seemed meeke and gentle, louing the common wealth, a 
supporter of the poore commons, of wit & wisdome discreet and studious, 
well affected to religion, and a frend to veritie, & no les enemy to pride 
& ambitio[n], especially in hauty prelates, which was his vndoing in this 
prese[n]t euil world.33
For the fi rst half of 2 Henry VI, the various factions of Henry VI’s court 
– Margaret and Suffolk; the loyalist Lancastrians, Buckingham and 
Somerset; the Cardinal of Winchester, Humphrey’s old arch-nemesis 
from 1 Henry VI; and the Yorkists, whose ranks at this stage comprise 
the Duke of York and the Nevilles (Salisbury and Warwick) – are united 
in their desire to remove Humphrey’s infl uence over the weak King for 
their own selfi sh motives. Traditionally, Eleanor’s actions have been 
read as catalysts of her husband’s eventual downfall, and her motives 
for turning to witchcraft are seldom read sympathetically. Sen Gupta, 
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for example, points out that ‘Eleanor’s ambition provides Margaret and 
her accomplices with an excuse for their campaign against Gloucester’.34 
Jean E. Howard goes a step further by arguing that ‘indirectly, the ambi-
tion of an aspiring and ungovernable woman seems a chief cause of the 
crumbling of the crowned king’s rule’.35
Although there is some truth to these claims about Eleanor, there are 
also grounds for suggesting that Duke Humphrey’s stubborn adherence 
to public service is neither in the interests of self-preservation nor, from 
his point of view, the nation. Although the avuncular Duke stands as a 
‘pillar of public order’ against the chaos of factionalism,36 his refusal to 
compromise his principles by entering the murky world of Realpolitik 
is both idealistic and hopelessly naïve. He is no dupe; Humphrey knows 
full well that ‘these days are dangerous’ and that Suffolk’s, Winchester’s, 
York’s and Margaret’s ‘complot is to have [his] life’ (2 Henry VI, 
3.1.142, 147). But his unswerving faith in justice and moral integrity 
prevents him from acting:
I must offend before I be attained,
And had I twenty times their power,
All these could not procure me any scathe
So long as I am loyal, true, and crimeless.
 (2 Henry VI, 2.4.60–4)
And it ultimately proves his downfall. In the long run, Humphrey’s refusal 
to act against his political rivals leads to the violent chaos of Cade’s rebel-
lion and 3 Henry VI, and, indirectly, to the tyranny of Richard III. The 
Duke of Gloucester may seem like a long-sighted thinker, but he proves to 
be a rigid political strategist, who is defeated by his rivals precisely because 
of his inability to think ahead; he has no contingency plan. Eleanor’s 
proposed alternative to his inaction, to ‘remove these tedious stumbling 
blocks’ (2 Henry VI, 1.2.64), may have incurred bloodshed and resentment 
of the couple in the short term, as Gloucester feared, but in the long term 
it would have given Humphrey an almost free rein to run England accord-
ing to his high ideals. Shakespeare shows that politics demands a degree 
of moral compromise and pragmatic fl exibility, in the process bearing out 
one of Machiavelli’s tenets: ‘The fact is that a man who wants to act virtu-
ously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not 
virtuous.’37 Humphrey’s sense of public duty is at odds with the political 
moment in which he fi nds himself; his wife, Eleanor, understands all too 
clearly what needs to be done, but he does not heed her advice. The Duke’s 
refusal to bloody his hands on moral grounds is akin to a modern politi-
cian who thinks he can win an election without using spin-doctors simply 
by virtue of the fact that he is honest; in short, he is delusional.
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As Michael Hattaway observes, ‘the political centre of [2 Henry VI] 
is the bond between Henry and Gloucester’;38 it is the fulcrum around 
which the other major players revolve during the fi rst half of the play. 
Shakespeare consistently depicts Henry as incapable of ruling the 
country alone, which is something the King himself realises, leading 
him to insist on a proxy leader to make decisions and resolve disputes 
on his behalf. This does not so much create a power vacuum, as is com-
monly thought, as produce a situation in which the position of Lord 
Protector becomes the top job in England – the role of king in all but 
title, rank and hereditary right. When Humphrey scolds Eleanor for her 
‘ill-nurtured’ (1.2.42) ambition, he alludes to the fact that, as a couple, 
they have already advanced as far as any in England can:
Art thou not second woman in the realm
And the Protector’s wife, beloved of him?
Hast thou not worldly pleasure at command
Above the reach or compass of thy thought?
 (1.2.43–6)
There is no doubt that Gloucester harbours no ambitions to usurp the 
crown, but this may also be because he is happy in the role of Lord 
Protector, a fact to which the Cardinal of Winchester points repeatedly 
in 1 Henry VI. Humphrey’s critical mistake is his refusal to act against 
his rivals, not his refusal to attempt usurpation; he is already, in practi-
cal terms, more powerful than the King.
Aside from highlighting his moral delusions, Shakespeare portrays 
Gloucester as a committed and serious-minded statesman, who seems 
harassed by factional quibbling and keen to ‘talk of commonwealth 
affairs’ and get straight ‘to the matter at hand’ (2 Henry VI, 1.3.149, 
153). In 2.1, he is immediately sceptical when the charlatan Simpcox 
claims to have been cured of blindness by a miracle and quickly exposes 
the lie through deductive logic (2.1.11–19). Among other things, the 
scene shows how important Gloucester is to Henry. Unlike his uncle, 
the King believes in the miracle from the outset: ‘Now God be praised, 
that to believing souls / Gives light in darkness, and comfort in despair’ 
(2.1.65–6). Henry’s default position is to trust the man, whereas 
Gloucester’s is to be more cautious and, ultimately, more cynical. 
Gloucester is a skilled and able political administrator who, unfortu-
nately yet crucially, does not or will not accept that he is operating in a 
new political era. Henry, on the other hand, lacks all the necessary skills 
for public offi ce, and (at this stage) seems oblivious to – or rather, in 
denial of – the culture of backbiting and one-upmanship that dominates 
his court; he believes so devoutly in the doctrine of providence that 
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he does not even question the credibility of a man who claims to have 
experienced a miracle. The Simpcox scene serves to demonstrate how 
loose Henry’s grip on reality is – had Gloucester not intervened, one can 
only imagine how the King might have rewarded Simpcox. Shakespeare 
shows that, as long as Henry remains king, the role of Lord Protector is 
structurally necessary for England to function.
However, Humphrey is depicted not only as the Lord Protector, but 
also as Henry’s surrogate father, his emotional bedrock as well as his 
political proxy. In 1 Henry VI, when a skirmish breaks out between a 
group of serving men in court, a young Henry, not fully confi dent of 
his own authority (as he will never be), immediately turns to Gloucester 
to resolve the confl ict: ‘Pray, Uncle Gloucester, mitigate this strife’ (1 
Henry VI, 3.1.116). Henry addresses Humphrey in affectionate, familial 
terms: ‘O loving uncle, kind Duke of Gloucester’ (1 Henry VI, 3.1.142). 
In 2 Henry VI, even as an older man in his mid-twenties, he twice 
repeats the phrase ‘Uncle, how now’ (1.1.51), ‘Why how now, / Uncle 
Gloucester?’ (2.1.48–9); the familiar, informal tone of this question sug-
gests both his emotional and his political dependence on Humphrey. 
When Eleanor’s dalliances with witchcraft leave Henry no option but to 
remove Gloucester from offi ce, he is anxious to reassure his uncle that 
his affection for him remains undiminished: ‘go in peace, Humphrey, no 
less beloved / Than when thou wert Protector to thy king’ (2.3.48–9). 
Henry claims that he will now take up the reins of government himself 
with only God to turn to for guidance: ‘God shall be my hope, / My 
stay, my guide, and lantern to my feet’ (2.3.24–5). There is at least the 
suggestion that until now Humphrey fulfi lled the functions that Henry 
now ascribes to God. Although Humphrey has been removed from 
offi ce, in 3.1 Henry will not commence Parliament because ‘my Lord of 
Gloucester is not come’; he thinks fi rst of the latter’s welfare: ‘’Tis not 
his wont to be the hindermost man, / Whate’er the occasion keeps him 
from us now’ (2 Henry VI, 3.1.1–3). Gloucester’s many rivals seize the 
opportunity to sow seeds of doubt about the former Lord Protector in 
Henry’s mind, but the special bond stands fi rm:
I shall speak my conscience,
Our kinsman Gloucester is as innocent
From meaning treason to our royal person
As is the suckling lamb or harmless dove:
The duke is virtuous, mild, and too well given
 To dream on evil or work my downfall.
 (3.1.68–73)
Despite his resolute belief in Gloucester, Henry feels powerless to 
prevent his arrest and places his faith, as ever, in divine providence: ‘My 
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Lord of Gloucester, ’tis my special hope / That you will clear yourself 
from all suspense: / My conscience tells me you are innocent’ (3.1.139–
41). As Gloucester leaves, he already knows that he will soon be dead 
and the bond is fi nally broken:
Ah, thus King Henry throws away his crutch
Before his legs be fi rm to bear his body.
Thus is the shepherd beaten from thy side
And wolves are gnarling who shall gnaw thee fi rst.
 (3.1.189–92)
These words hit Henry hard. He leaves Parliament saying that his ‘heart 
is drowned with grief’ (3.1.198), not only because he realises that he has 
almost certainly lost his mentor and closest (possibly only) ally at court, 
but also because he feels a deep sense of personal culpability for having 
failed his surrogate father:
Even so myself bewails good Gloucester’s case
With sad unhelpful tears and, with dimmed eyes,
Look after him and cannot do him good;
So mighty are his vowèd enemies 
 (3.1.217–20)
Despite his unshakable and blind belief in providence, Henry can see 
that his lone support alone could not save Gloucester at this late hour 
and he realises immediately that Humphrey’s downfall leaves him 
weak and isolated on the throne – loyalist lackeys such as Somerset 
and Buckingham offer him scant solace. In the very next scene, after it 
is revealed that Gloucester has been murdered, the news is too much 
for the King to bear. After fainting, he is beside himself with grief: ‘O 
heavenly God!’ (3.2.37). For possibly the only time in the fi rst tetralogy, 
Henry loses his temper and rebukes Suffolk: ‘Thou baleful messenger, 
out of my sight!’ (3.2.48). As Gloucester correctly predicts, Henry has 
been left to the ‘wolves’.
At fi rst glance, it is not diffi cult to see why Gloucester’s removal from 
offi ce and eventual death are so desirable for his rivals; as the King’s 
current proxy ruler, he stands between them and power. However, the 
situation is more complicated than that. Each of the other players in 
the political game has a personal or strategic motive for his elimina-
tion. As Queen, Margaret feels that it is her right to hold the keys to 
power (with Suffolk by her side). The Duke of Suffolk himself, per-
sonal ambitions aside, is one of the few English aristocrats who wanted 
reconciliation with France during the Hundred Years War. Although 
Suffolk’s brokering of the marriage between Henry and Margaret is 
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undoubtedly designed to further his own selfi sh and lustful motives, 
he does also provide political reasons: ‘[t]his alliance will confi rm our 
peace, / And keep the Frenchmen in allegiance’ (1 Henry VI, 5.5.42–3). 
Gloucester represents one of the last of the older generation of chivalric 
ideologues embodied by Talbot and symbolised by Henry V’s military 
victories. Suffolk, who prefers the high rhetoric and ceremony of the 
court to the undignifi ed violence of the battlefi eld, opposes everything 
for which they stood. Suffolk wants to complete what John D. Cox 
describes as ‘the transfer of power from successful and heroic warrior 
aristocrats . . . to mere opportunists and educated courtiers who sap 
the nation’s strength while selfi shly and sophistically pursuing their 
own interests’.39 The Duke of York, like Gloucester, is outraged by the 
loss of England’s French lands because of the marriage between Henry 
and Margaret: ‘Cold news for me: for I had hope of France’ (3.1.87). 
York is also driven, ultimately, by his superior claim to the throne and 
wants what is rightfully his; he views Gloucester’s removal simply as a 
necessary by-product of his overall goal. The Cardinal of Winchester’s 
issue with Humphrey is more personal; it is a matter of pride for him. 
In 1 Henry VI, Winchester resented Gloucester’s high position as Lord 
Protector and accused him of sitting ‘imperious in another’s throne’ 
(3.1.44). Gloucester’s constant jibes at Winchester’s expense (‘bastard 
of my grandfather’, ‘saucy priest’ (3.1.42, 45)) do not help matters. 
The Earl of Warwick’s position is more complicated, and his opposi-
tion to Gloucester is merely political. In the famous rose-plucking scene 
of 1 Henry VI, he claims to ‘love no colours’ (2.4.34) and, presum-
ably, sides with York only because – on balance, after considering the 
relative strengths of his claim to the throne and his personality – the 
latter is a more attractive and more prudent prospect for leadership 
than the King. In the dispute between Gloucester and Winchester, 
Warwick is measured with his comments and edges himself closer to 
Gloucester, arguing that ‘it fi tteth not a prelate [i.e. the Cardinal] to 
plead’ and deferring to Humphrey’s superior rank: ‘Is not his grace 
Protector to the king?’ (1 Henry VI, 3.1.57, 60). Shakespeare presents 
Warwick as a man in a similar mould to Gloucester: as a statesman 
fi rst and  foremost. His father, Salisbury, explicitly likens Warwick to 
Gloucester:
Warwick, my son, the comfort of my age,
Thy deeds, thy plainness, and thy housekeeping
Hath won the greatest favour of the commons,
Excepting none but good Duke Humphrey.
 (2 Henry VI, 1.1.187–90)
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Like Gloucester, Warwick claims to ‘love the land / And common profi t 
of his country’ (2 Henry VI, 1.1.202–3). Warwick is naturally cautious 
in his political intrigues. He promises to ‘one day make the Duke of 
York a king’ (2 Henry VI, 2.2.29) only after being fully satisfi ed of the 
validity of York’s claim and only after it is obvious that Gloucester’s 
days in offi ce are numbered.
From this brief survey of Humphrey’s rivals and their reasons for 
opposing him, an interesting set of political dichotomies emerge along 
three axes:
1. Public versus personal politics.
2. Pragmatic versus idealistic approaches to politics.
3. Cautious versus impulsive decision-making.
Those involved in public politics are interested in the ‘commonweal’, the 
‘public good’ (2 Henry VI, 1.1.186, 196), whereas those engaged in per-
sonal politics are interested only in their own advancement. Pragmatists 
are willing to make alliances and compromise their beliefs in the short 
term for their long-term goals, whereas idealists tend to stick rigidly to a 
set of prescribed principles.40 Cautious characters weigh up their options 
before making big decisions, whereas impulsive decision-makers are 
more likely either to rush into things headfi rst or to make snap decisions 
with very little consideration of the possible consequences. Shakespeare 
offers us characters of every combination; as Hattaway says, ‘no politi-
cal value is left untested’.41
Accordingly, there are characters who epitomise the extremes of these 
polarised positions. Duke Humphrey of Gloucester, as we have seen, is 
an idealistic yet cautious politician who insists on dealing with public 
affairs only. The Nevilles, Salisbury and Warwick also consistently claim 
to be working for the public good and operate cautiously but, unlike 
Gloucester, are fl exible enough to switch allegiances or to oppose people 
whom they admire (such as Gloucester himself) as circumstances dictate. 
Shakespeare contrasts with these state-orientated characters more selfi sh, 
vindictive players of the political game, who each seem to have a per-
sonal axe to grind. The most obvious examples of these are Winchester, 
who, out of jealousy and pride alone, seeks his nephew’s downfall, and 
Suffolk, who arranges the marriage between Henry and Margaret on dis-
advantageous terms for England, mainly because he sees an opportunity 
for personal power: ‘Margaret shall now be queen, and rule the king: / 
But I will rule both her, the king and realm’ (1 Henry VI, 5.5.107–8). 
Winchester’s only goal throughout the fi rst two parts of Henry VI seems 
to be to antagonise Gloucester by making derogatory comments about 
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him; at different times he calls him a ‘usurping proditor’, ‘a foe to citi-
zens’, ‘abominable’ (1 Henry VI, 1.3.31, 61, 85), ‘too hot’ and ‘danger-
ous’ (2 Henry VI, 1.1.134, 161). Shakespeare makes Winchester the 
personifi cation of personal vengeance. He seems to have no objective but 
to bring about the destruction of Gloucester – which is perhaps why he 
is treated to a guilt-ridden, demented death scene shortly after his aim is 
achieved (2 Henry VI, 3.3), there being nothing left for him to live for.
Suffolk, who rabidly pursues power from the outset, reveals himself as 
a rigid idealist shortly before his death at the hands of pirates; he appeals 
to the ideology of nobility. Even when faced with imminent death, he 
refuses to accept the reality of his situation:
Suffolk’s imperial tongue is stern and rough,
Used to command, untaught to plead for favour . . .
. . . True nobility is exempt from fear.
More can I bear than you dare execute.
 (2 Henry VI, 4.1.121–2, 129–30)
Neither Suffolk nor Winchester can really be called a ‘pragmatic’ politi-
cian. However, it should be noted that Winchester cuts, on the whole, 
a more cautious fi gure than Suffolk; in 1 Henry VI he is willing to bide 
his time and make temporary peace with Gloucester in order to appease 
the King (see 3.1.134–5). Suffolk, on the other hand, seldom hesitates 
to speak his mind, even when the odds seem stacked against him – he is 
more impulsive than cautious.
Both Margaret and Eleanor are also characters who make matters 
personal, as the third scene of 2 Henry VI makes clear:
     [Margaret drops her fan]
[MARGARET:] Give me my fan; what, minion, can ye not?
     She gives the DUCHESS a box on the ear
 I cry you mercy, madam; was it you?
ELEANOR: Was’t I? Yea, I it was, proud Frenchwoman;
 Could I come near your beauty with my nails
 I’d set my ten commandments in your face.
KING HENRY: Sweet aunt, be quiet – ’twas against her will.
DUCHESS: Against her will? Good King, look to’t in time!
 She’ll pamper thee, and dandle thee like a baby.
 Though in this place most master wear no breeches,
 She shall not strike Dame Eleanor unrevenged!
                                         Exit
 (2 Henry VI, 1.3.133–46)
It is not diffi cult to see, as Paul Dean does, that this ‘fi ght is not national 
. . . but personal . . . [the characters’] motives are selfi sh and petty’.42 
It is this sort of pettiness that shows personal politics at its worst. 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   135 17/02/2012   12:23
 136    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Shakespeare demonstrates that when private grievances drive action 
in the political arena, characters become prone to making mistakes. 
Thus, it is immediately after this scene that, probably with her ear still 
sore from the Queen’s blow, Eleanor visits Hume and the conjurer, 
Bolingbroke (1.4).
Margaret’s personal and emotional investment in her dealings with 
Henry’s court also leads her to make poor political decisions. For 
example, in the run-up to Gloucester’s murder, she prematurely shows 
her hand to York by openly lending support to the joint plan of 
Winchester and Suffolk to have Humphrey killed: 
SUFFOLK:  Here is my hand, the deed [of murdering Gloucester] 
is worthy doing.
MARGARET: And so say I.
 (3.1.78–9)
It may not seem so at the time, but this is a slip which gives York all the 
ammunition he needs to set his plans for usurpation in motion and to 
hoist Suffolk and Margaret by their own petards. The situation is almost 
perfect for York; it conveniently removes both the heir presumptive and 
the most senior offi cial of Henry’s court, Gloucester (thereby making 
York both the rightful heir to the throne, assuming that Henry produces 
no children, and the King’s most seasoned military campaigner), and at 
the same time gives him an excellent excuse to condemn Winchester and 
Suffolk for their part in Gloucester’s murder. York must have known 
that the death of Humphrey would push Henry to the verge of despair; 
as Suffolk issues the assassination order, York promptly leaks the infor-
mation to his co-conspirators, Salisbury and Warwick, who in turn 
promptly tell the King. As we have seen, Henry is naturally devastated 
and in a rare moment of resolve and self-assertion banishes Suffolk from 
England ‘on pain of death’. He also stands up to his wife for the fi rst 
time: ‘Ungentle queen . . . no more I say’ (3.2.288, 298–9). Margaret’s 
selfi sh, impulsive support for Suffolk against Gloucester both alienates 
her from the King and strengthens the Yorkist position, because Henry 
immediately turns to Warwick for advice: ‘Come, Warwick, come 
good Warwick, go with me; / I have great matters to impart to thee’ 
(3.2.298–9). Margaret’s faux pas in front of York also has more indirect 
consequences: with four words, she has eradicated any lingering doubts 
among the Yorkists about whether the King and Queen are united. York 
and Warwick obliquely exploit the weakness in Henry and Margaret’s 
marriage at the start of 3 Henry VI when they broker a deal with the 
King in which Henry names York his successor ‘to cease this civil war’ 
(1.1.99). In so doing, Henry disinherits his and Margaret’s son and heir, 
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Edward, for what he sees as the public good. For this Margaret, perhaps 
understandably, lambasts him: ‘[I] would I had died a maid / And never 
seen thee, never borne thee a son, / Seeing thou hast proved so unnatural 
a father!’ (1.1.218–20). From her point of view, Henry has failed in the 
one and only area in which he might have proved useful to her: as the 
father to the future King of England, her son. But, from Henry’s posi-
tion, Margaret is no more trustworthy than York or Warwick. After all, 
she has been an unfaithful wife and openly had a hand in murdering 
his closest ally and relative. Had she been a little more discreet and a 
lot less impulsive, Margaret might have been able to manipulate Henry 
more closely. By this stage, Henry is quite aware that his marriage has 
been a sham, so it is not diffi cult to imagine that he associates his son 
with Margaret and therefore does not feel close to him. The murder 
of Gloucester and the subsequent exile (and murder) of Suffolk show 
Margaret utterly outmanœuvred by the more circumspect York.
York himself is an interesting case, because he presents himself, like 
Gloucester, Warwick and Salisbury, as a champion of the common-
wealth, but he is also driven by personal ambition; he sees the crown 
as rightfully his and wants to ‘claim his own’ (2 Henry VI, 1.1.234). 
However, even in soliloquy, he seldom puts forward his claim for the 
throne without couching it in terms that suggest he wants a better future 
for his nation by installing himself as its king. Put simply, he sees himself 
as a better candidate for the crown than Henry:
I am far better born than is the king,
More like a king, more kingly in my thoughts.
But I must make fair weather yet awhile
Till Henry be more weak, and I more strong.
 (2 Henry VI, 5.1.28–31)
York is increasingly frustrated with Henry’s timid character and his 
total mismanagement of the country and the court. He is doubly frus-
trated because, objectively speaking, he does have a better claim to the 
throne than Henry, as Henry himself admits: ‘[Aside] I know not what 
to say, my title’s weak’ (3 Henry VI, 1.1.134). This sense of frustration 
is at odds with his cautious, pragmatic nature; in 5.1 of 2 Henry VI, 
he knows that he has to bide his time ‘awhile’ because the situation is 
not yet ripe for him to strike. His master-plan has many goals: to elimi-
nate Gloucester; to eliminate Suffolk by framing him for Gloucester’s 
murder; to muster an army (which he achieves by being given troops to 
subdue ‘th’uncivil kerns of Ireland’ (2 Henry VI, 3.1.310)); to destabilise 
London through Cade’s rebellion; and, fi nally, to give himself a viable 
and legitimate motive to turn against the King.
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King did I call thee? No, thou art no king,
Not fi t to govern and rule multitudes,
Which dar’st not, no, nor canst not rule a traitor.
That head of thine doth not become a crown;
Thy hand is made to grasp a palmer’s staff
And not to grace an awful princely sceptre.
 (2 Henry VI, 5.1.93–8)
Thus, York genuinely combines public and personal politics in a manner 
almost unique in the fi rst tetralogy (though later his son, Clarence, 
shows a more confl icted combination of personal and public interests). 
His ultimate defeat at the hands of Margaret and the barbaric Clifford 
is not tactical but more a case of ruthless power politics overcoming 
long-term strategy. After Clifford heartlessly kills York’s youngest son, 
Rutland, York struggles to comprehend the lengths to which Margaret 
and Clifford have gone in pursuit of their goal: the restoration of 
Prince Edward as heir to Henry’s throne. He attempts to rationalise 
it by dehumanising Margaret; he describes her face as ‘vizard-like, 
unchanging’, calls her ‘inhuman’ and, in the trilogy’s most famous line, 
‘O tiger’s heart wrapped in a woman’s hide’, decries her remorseless 
cruelty (3 Henry VI, 1.4.116, 156, 137). Margaret’s victory over York 
is the triumph of a merciless form of Machtpolitik over York’s brand of 
 vigilant pragmatism.
Transitions
Margaret’s victory over York also moves the politics of the tetralogy 
into new territory. The confl icts of the fi rst two parts of Henry VI are 
played out within certain boundaries – as we have seen, they centre on 
clashes of personality or ideology – but the ruthless killing of Rutland 
by Clifford at the start of 3 Henry VI throws out the rulebook. Clifford, 
who is ‘a curious portrait of radical providentialism in action’,43 has no 
personal relationship with Rutland; it is doubtful that they have even 
met before their encounter:
RUTLAND: Ah, let me live in prison all my days
 And when I give occasion of offence
 Then let me die, for now thou hast no cause.
CLIFFORD: No cause?
 Thy father slew my father: therefore die. [Stabs him]
RUTLAND: Di faciant laudis summa sit ista tuae! [Dies]
 (3 Henry VI, 1.3.43–8)
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Although Clifford’s motivation is undoubtedly personal here, the 
murder of Rutland is also a calculated political act. Clifford is cold and 
emotionless in his line of reasoning (‘thy father slew my father: therefore 
die’), which momentarily detaches the act from its immediate human 
signifi cance; this is not the straightforward revenge killing that Clifford 
claims. It is worth bearing in mind that the author of these lines wrote 
Hamlet less than a decade later. There is something a little too business-
like about Clifford’s ruthlessness for it to be dismissed as the result of 
shoddy characterisation. Clifford wants the Lancastrians to defeat the 
Yorkists and, like Margaret, will stop at nothing to achieve that aim. 
The hot-headed personal confl icts found in the political world of 2 
Henry VI now serve a harsher climate of Machiavellian power politics 
in which the means, however cruel, justifi es the ends – Rackin calls it ‘a 
Machiavellian jungle’ in which ‘power becomes an end in itself’.44 This 
transition fi nds its completion in the death of York. Northumberland, a 
sworn Lancastrian, cannot help but feel compassion for the humiliated 
Duke: ‘I should not for my life but weep with him / To see how inly 
sorrow gripes his soul’ (3 Henry VI, 1.4.169–70). But Margaret icily 
puts paid to the sentiment: ‘Think upon the wrong he did us all / And 
that will quickly dry thy melting tears’ (1.4.173–4). Again, the appeal 
is personal, but Margaret seems devoid of genuine passion of the sort 
that drove her to give Eleanor a box on the ear or to kiss and, later, 
weep for Suffolk; these are cool, calculated actions made for political 
gain. Margaret has replaced the binary of ‘public versus personal poli-
tics’ with a new political category: ruthlessness. This is not to say that 
there are not ruthless moments in the fi rst two parts of Henry VI (there 
are many), or to say that the characters who populate those plays are 
comparatively merciful, but rather that this is the fi rst time ruthlessness 
has been taken seriously as a political doctrine in itself. At some point 
between 2 Henry VI and 3 Henry VI, possibly triggered by Suffolk’s 
death, Margaret must have realised the limitations of the impulsive, per-
sonally invested approach to politics which had failed her thus far and 
cost her lover his life.
After looking in detail at each of the major players of 2 Henry VI, it 
is clear that the play does not present abstract political theories but a 
complex spectrum of political practice, which identifi es three areas that 
have been crucial in the development of the historical events depicted in 
the play. I have collated my fi ndings in Table 7.1.
From this it is possible to draw a number of conclusions. In the 
politics of the fi rst tetralogy, there are two objectives that Shakespeare 
keeps in focus throughout: political survival and the welfare of the 
state. Shakespeare is fi rst and foremost a realist; he understands that 
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these two objectives – which remain fundamental constants in the 
politics of nations, regardless of ideologies, forms of government, and 
the cultural or historical moment – are not mutually exclusive. For an 
individual to tend to the welfare of the state, they must fi rst survive 
and then get themselves into a position from which they can implement 
their policies. Therefore, Shakespeare does not, as is often claimed, 
fl atly condemn the personally driven characters, because they have 
understood at least one of these principles: you cannot begin to think 
about public service if you are dead! If the plays are critical of selfi sh 
characters, such as Suffolk, they are equally critical of well-meaning 
characters, such as Gloucester or Henry, who do not anticipate moves 
made against them for power. There is a complicated hierarchical struc-
ture of political survival in 2 Henry VI; personally driven characters 
defeat publicly motivated characters, pragmatists defeat idealists, and 
cautious decision-makers defeat impulsive ones. However, for England 
(and for Shakespeare), it is obvious that politics pursued in the public 
interest is more  desirable than  politics driven primarily by personal 
ambitions.
Thus, in theory, Shakespeare’s ‘perfect politician’ is someone who 
cares about the state but who is also built for survival, or as Irving 
Ribner concluded in 1957, ‘strong, crafty, and unselfi shly devoted to 
his people’.45 The character who comes closest to that description is 
Warwick (public, pragmatic, cautious), but this is perhaps to miss the 
point. Shakespeare is not looking for the ideal king or leader, but provid-
ing a critique of Henry’s reign, undoubtedly one of the most disastrous in 
English history, and accounting for its failings. To an extent, Cox is right 
to argue that ‘the implicit thesis of the Henry VI plays [is] that strong 
central leadership is essential to prevent an inevitable decline into politi-
cal and social chaos’.46 Henry’s passivity and Gloucester’s moral rigidity 
Table 7.1
Character Type of Politics Approach Decision-making
Henry VI Public Idealistic Impulsive
Gloucester Public Idealistic Cautious
Winchester Personal Idealistic Cautious
Suffolk Personal Idealistic Impulsive
Margaret Personal → Ruthless Pragmatic Impulsive
Eleanor Personal Idealistic Impulsive
York Public and Personal Pragmatic Cautious
Warwick Public Pragmatic Cautious
Clifford Ruthless Idealist Impulsive
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are certainly held accountable for Suffolk’s limited personal successes. 
However, York and Warwick are strong leaders but they do not resolve 
the matter. Their attempt to put York on the throne fails in 3 Henry 
VI, because they are blindsided by the rise of a new, ruthless power 
politics, by means of which even a selfi sh and impulsive character such 
as Margaret can take down a tactical mastermind such as York. There 
is no doubt that Henry VI, as Andrew Hadfi eld argues, is ‘ill-equipped 
. . . to deal with the harsh realities of political leadership’.47 But could 
the same be said of York? It seems unlikely. It is too easy to suggest, 
as Hadfi eld goes on to, that ‘all fail [in the fi rst tetralogy] because they 
are incapable of governing with wider horizons in mind than their own 
dynastic ambitions and factional confl ict’.48 This is simply untrue of 
Gloucester or York, or indeed of Salisbury or Warwick (whose eventual 
downfall we encounter later in 3 Henry VI), because, as we have seen, 
these characters seem genuinely committed to the ‘commonweal’. Even 
the people with the appropriate attitudes and skills cannot get on with 
the job of governing the country, because it is too diffi cult to get into 
power. Shakespeare’s ‘perfect politician’ ultimately fails. This opens up 
the radical possibility that Shakespeare  questions the basis and  structure 
of monarchy itself in 2 Henry VI.
To conclude, each ideology of the status quo is brought into question 
by the play: Gloucester’s policy of blind loyalty to the throne costs him 
his life, Henry’s belief in divine providence is exposed as absurd, and 
the principle of hereditary succession is responsible for putting on the 
throne a man who is plainly inadequate for the task of leading a nation, 
while at the same time keeping more able men from fulfi lling that 
task. In this respect, 2 Henry VI anticipates Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
 eighteenth-century rejection of monarchy as a fundamentally fl awed 
form of government:
An essential and inevitable defeat, which will always rank monarchical below 
republican government, is that in a republic the public voice hardly ever raises 
to the highest positions men who are not enlightened and capable . . . while in 
monarchies those who rise to the top are often merely petty blunderers, petty 
swindlers, and petty intriguers, whose petty talents cause them to get into the 
highest positions at Court but, as soon as they have got there, serve only to 
make their ineptitude clear to the public.49
Rousseau highlights the inadequacy of monarchy to the task of fi nding 
the right man for the demanding role of king. This is compounded by 
the rule of hereditary succession, which, for Rousseau, is one of the 
chief disadvantages of monarchy, because it risks ‘having children, mon-
strosities, or imbeciles as rulers’. T his fosters a ‘lack of coherence’ and 
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‘inconsistency’, because each new, quite different king ‘creates a revolu-
tion in the State’.50 While it would be inaccurate to paint Shakespeare 
as a fully-fl edged democrat, in 2 Henry VI he seems implicitly to yearn 
for a more meritocratic system of government, one that might allow 
people with the right mix of skills – such as Gloucester, Warwick or 
York – to govern without controversy; one that would, through a rigor-
ous process of rational selection, prevent characters such as Suffolk or 
Winchester exerting national infl uence; and one that would not put the 
nation at risk by electing a person of Henry VI’s plainly inappropriate 
character and disposition to its highest offi ce. Thus, 2 Henry VI outlines 
the structural problems inherent in monarchical feudalism, which serve 
to create inconsistency and to exacerbate crises when they occur – a fact 
underlined by Cade’s rebellion.
Class Politics: Cade’s Rebellion
There’s room at the top they are telling you still, 
But fi rst you must learn how to smile as you kill,
If you want to be like the folks on the hill,
A working class hero is something to be.51
Although kings and aristocrats dominate the action of the fi rst tetral-
ogy, Shakespeare is careful to gauge popular opinion at key intervals. 
The ‘commons’ act as a kind of built-in approval rating for the current 
government, a general indicator of the relative popularity of particular 
actions or characters at a particular moment, which for the most part is 
kept in the background. For example, in 1 Henry VI, during the skirmish 
between Gloucester’s and Winchester’s serving men, one of Gloucester’s 
serving men pledges his allegiance to Humphrey in terms that suggest 
he is doing a good job as Lord Protector. He says that Gloucester has 
been ‘so kind a father of the commonweal’ that ‘We and our wives and 
children all will fi ght / And have our bodies slaughtered by thy foes’ 
(3.1.98, 100–1). No such endorsement is given to Winchester. Later, 
in 2 Henry VI, Suffolk intercepts a petition that was intended for sub-
mission to Gloucester, which reads ‘Against the Duke of Suffolk, for 
enclosing the commons of Melford’, the ‘poor petitioner’ claiming to 
be acting on behalf of his ‘whole township’ (1.3.19–20, 22). It is clear 
that Gloucester is popular and trusted by the commons, whereas Suffolk 
is despised. Accordingly, Henry enjoys popularity early in his reign by 
virtue of his gentle character, because of his association with Gloucester, 
and, most importantly of all, because he is the king and son of Henry 
V. But he makes an error at the end of 1 Henry VI, which proves 
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costly: he rewards Suffolk for arranging his marriage with Margaret 
by giving him a sizable portion of tax revenues: ‘For your expenses and 
suffi cient charge, / Among your people gather up a tenth’ (1 Henry VI, 
5.5.92–3). This not only adds insult to injury, but also foolishly aligns 
the crown with Suffolk’s imprudent action. York senses that he could 
use the situation to turn the tide of public opinion against the King, 
while at the same time increasing his own popularity: ‘I shall perceive 
the commons’ mind, / How they affect the house and claim of York’ (2 
Henry VI, 3.1.374–5). York guesses correctly, because in the next scene 
Henry faces potential disorder when the commons discover that Suffolk 
arranged for Gloucester’s murder: ‘The commons again cry, “Down 
with Suffolk! Down with Suffolk! . . . An answer from the king, or we 
will all break in”’ (2 Henry VI, 3.2.242, 278). Even before Cade appears 
in the play, public discontent is at boiling point and ready to spill over 
into the King’s court. Shortly before Suffolk’s death, the pirates respon-
sible for his murder reveal full-blown public support for the Yorkist 
cause: ‘And now the house of York, thrust from the crown / By shame-
ful murder of a guiltless king’ (2 Henry VI, 4.1.94–5). It is a reminder 
that even seemingly insignifi cant actions, such as Henry’s rewarding of 
Suffolk at the end of 1 Henry VI, have tumultuous ramifi cations in the 
public sphere. Shakespeare makes the commons a force that cannot and 
will not be ignored; as Theodor Meron states, ‘Shakespeare’s general 
message is that rebellion is a serious matter’.52 Just as in Machiavelli, 
it is important ‘to satisfy the people and keep them content’ or else, if 
pushed too far, they will rebel.53 This is exactly what happens to Henry 
VI.
Given the cultural historicist preoccupation with power, subversion 
and its containment, it is perhaps unsurprising to fi nd that the atten-
tion of new historicists and cultural materialists has been drawn to the 
sequence dramatising Cade’s rebellion in 2 Henry VI. This contains 
some of the most violent and disturbing scenes in Shakespeare, includ-
ing one particularly morbid moment in which the severed heads of 
Lord Say and Sir James Cromer are made to kiss (2 Henry VI, 4.7.138). 
As a moment of genuine insubordination by a group of commoners 
against the state, it represents a unique opportunity for critics to pin 
Shakespeare down and brand him with the appropriate stamp: ‘conserv-
ative’ or ‘radical’. Most critics – including cultural historicists – have, 
quite  overwhelmingly, viewed the sequence as evidence of Shakespeare’s 
adherence to Tudor state ideology, designed to be interpreted as ‘the 
standard Tudor warning against rebellion’.54 In his new historicist 
reading, Stephen Greenblatt follows the orthodox line and insists that 
Shakespeare depicts Cade and his followers as ‘buffoons’ who, for 
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all their bravura, ultimately succumb to state power: ‘A few rousing 
speeches from the aristocrats, with the invocation of the name Henry V 
and the threat of a French invasion, suffi ce; the state triumphs, and Cade 
fl ees.’55 Thus, for Greenblatt, Shakespeare’s play contains the threat of 
rebellion internally, draining it of whatever subversive appeal it might 
have held for its audience.
In his reading of the sequence, Richard Wilson looks at the scenes of 
Cade’s rebellion and ties them closely to contemporary events:
In 1592 the London clothing workers were fi ghting a rearguard action 
against long-term structural changes in their industry . . . Shakespeare is not 
anticipating Orwell, as critics like to believe, but sniping satirically at the 
cloth workers’ dream of extending the jurisdiction of the Livery Companies 
to the unarticulated labour in London’s extra-mural parishes.56
Working on the assumption that he ‘wrote 2, 3 Henry VI between 
March and August 1592’,57 Wilson goes on to accuse Shakespeare of 
conservative ‘partisanship’ in his account of the rebellion.58 He argues 
that
in this very early work, [Shakespeare] laid bare the cultural prejudices he 
brought to writing . . . [he] used his professional debut to signal scorn for 
popular culture and identifi cation with an urban elite in whose eyes authority 
would henceforth belong exclusively to writers.59
Wilson suggests that ‘Shakespeare’s Cade is a projection of the atavistic 
terrors of the Renaissance rich . . . a juvenile nightmare of worker revo-
lution’.60 Wilson’s argument is rich both in terms of historical research 
and rhetorical force, but such highly specifi c attempts to historicise 
Shakespeare’s plays are prone to twist the material to fi t the evidence. 
Wilson’s neglect of the episode’s immediate dramatic context – the rest 
of 2 Henry VI and the fi rst tetralogy – leads him to forget temporarily 
that Cade is not really a hero of the working class but an agent employed 
by the aristocratic Duke of York – he is a red herring, a minor ploy in a 
wider stratagem.
Few critics have challenged the orthodox reading of Cade’s rebellion 
as a conservative Tudor warning against the dangers of popular protest. 
Michael D. Bristol hints at the radical potential of the scene by sug-
gesting that ‘the expression of popular resentment nevertheless escapes 
being totally repressed’, but stops short of saying more.61 Similarly, 
Derek Cohen argues that ‘the sheer want expressed in the enthusiasm 
for the idea of enough to eat and drink’ is itself an acknowledgement of 
the fact that there is a problem with Henry VI’s government of England, 
but ultimately assents to the view that ‘the poor in Shakespeare’s history 
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plays receive short shrift . . . the working people are seen as so many 
fools and dolts, easily misled by a villain who promises them anarchy, 
wealth, and revenge against their enemies, the rich’.62 Jean E. Howard 
offers perhaps the most sympathetic cultural historicist reading, align-
ing the rebels with a long tradition of Christian egalitarianism. Howard 
argues that ‘Cade . . . offers the most radical critique of social inequality 
[in 2 Henry VI], [but] is personally vilifi ed and discredited within the 
play [because] he probably had to be for the drama to be [passed by the 
censors] and staged’.63
Although it cannot be denied that Shakespeare embellishes the sever-
ity of the historical Cade’s rebellion ‘to include as much violence as 
possible’ by drawing on accounts of numerous peasant revolts, includ-
ing, most famously, the Peasants’ Rebellion of 1381 during the reign 
of Richard II,64 the question of whether or not he depicts Cade and 
his rebels as ‘buffoons’ or ‘so many fools and dolts’ is open to debate. 
Neither is the episode as straightforwardly conservative as Richard 
Wilson and others present it. The fi rst scene concerning the rebellion, 
4.2, does not begin with a rabble-rousing speech from Cade but with 
a brief exchange between two rebels, who complain that ‘it was never 
merry world in England since gentlemen came up’ and that it is a ‘miser-
able age [because] Virtue is not regarded in handicraftsmen’ (4.2.8–9). 
This exchange is important, because it establishes the fact that, despite 
Cade’s personal duplicity as an agent of the Duke of York, there are at 
least some rebels with legitimate grievances who are prepared to fi ght 
for a better life. The rebels see themselves as battling against ‘sin’ and 
‘inequity’ (4.2.21) and therefore see their aristocratic enemies as wrong-
doers. What is most signifi cant about this exchange is that Shakespeare 
depicts normal, working men as voting with their feet. These two men 
have joined the rebellion out of choice, after coming to their own con-
clusions about the ‘miserable’ state of nation. They do not seem like 
fools or dolts.
When Cade fi nally appears to stir the troops, he begins by making the 
wrong appeal in the wrong idiom: ‘We John Cade, so termed of our sup-
posed father –’ (4.2.29). He appeals to a (bogus) aristocratic heritage in 
order to lend himself legitimacy and speaks using the royal ‘we’, partly 
in mock bombast, but also in a bid to lift himself symbolically above 
the crowd. Shakespeare employs two characters, Dick the butcher and 
Smith the weaver, to undercut and provide commentary upon Cade’s 
opening address. The passage warrants closer scrutiny:
CADE: We John Cade, so termed of our supposed father –
DICK: [Aside] Or rather of stealing a cade of herrings.
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CADE:  For our enemies shall fail before us, inspired with the spirit of 
putting down kings and princes – Command silence.
DICK: Silence!
CADE: My father was a Mortimer –
DICK: [Aside] He was an honest man, and a good bricklayer.
CADE: My mother was a Plantagenet –
DICK: [Aside] I knew her well; she was a midwife.
CADE: My wife descended of the Lacies –
DICK:  [Aside] She was indeed a pedlar’s daughter, and sold many laces.
SMITH:  [Aside] But now of late, not able to travel with her furred pack, 
she washes bucks here at home.
CADE: Therefore am I of an honourable house.
DICK:  [Aside] Ay, by my fait, the fi eld is honourable; and there was he 
born under a hedge, for his father had never a house but the cage.
CADE: Valiant I am.
SMITH: [Aside] ’A must needs, for beggary is valiant.
CADE: I can endure much.
DICK:  [Aside] No question of that: for I have seen him whipped three 
market-days together.
CADE: I fear neither sword nor fi re.
SMITH: [Aside] He need not fear the sword, for his coat is of proof.
DICK:  [Aside] But methinks he should stand in fear of fi re, being burnt 
i’th’hand for stealing sheep.
CADE:  Be brave then, for your captain is brave, and vows reformation. 
There shall be in England seven halfpenny loaves sold for a 
penny; the three-hooped pot shall have ten hoops, and I will 
make it a felony to drink small beer; all the realm shall be in 
common; and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass; and 
when I am king, as king I will be –
ALL: God save your majesty!
(4.2.26–59)
At fi rst glance, the asides of Dick and Smith (which are addressed to 
their fellow rebels rather than directly to the audience) seem to under-
mine Cade’s authority in a crude didactic attempt by Shakespeare to 
let his audience know that they are dealing with a charlatan. However, 
York has already prefaced the scene at the start of Act 3; he likens Cade 
to ‘a shag-haired crafty kern’ and describes him as a ‘devil’ (3.1.367, 
371), so the audience already knows what to expect when it fi nally 
encounters him. It is possible that in pointing out each of Cade’s lies, 
Shakespeare simply ensures that there is no doubt about his lack of 
moral fi bre. It is also possible that the passage provides a much-needed 
window of light relief before the scenes of brutality that follow. But both 
of these readings overlook the fact that Dick, who speaks most of the 
asides, is fully complicit with Cade – after Cade tells him to ‘Command 
silence’, he does so at once. Upon closer inspection, rather than under-
mining Cade, the asides are actually designed to foster support for him. 
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As I have noted, Cade begins his speech in the ‘wrong’ register – by 
making an aristocratically fl avoured appeal to his followers. Dick’s 
interjections let the crowd of rebels know that Cade is probably being 
sarcastic and at the same time underline the fact that he, like them, is 
a plain-spoken working man from a poor background. When Cade is 
fi nally cheered at line 59, it is not because he may or may not be the son 
of John Mortimer, but because he seems to represent the rebels’ interests 
in a way that no aristocrat could. Phyllis Rackin offers a superb account 
of just what these interests may have been in the sixteenth century (for 
she reads the play anachronistically): the wish for ‘abundant food, low 
prices, and the abolition of enclosures’ because of ‘actual hunger among 
the poor . . . [that was created by] infl ation in an era of rising popula-
tion, which produced an oversupply of labor and a scarcity of food’.65
However, Rackin ultimately concludes that, despite giving brief voice 
to such interests, Shakespeare forecloses the possibility of genuine, 
radical political action: ‘Despite the vividness of Cade’s characterization 
and the real social ills his rebellion addresses, Cade is fi nally reduced to a 
mechanism for ideological containment.’66 For supporting evidence, she 
points to Shakespeare’s ‘fl attering’ portrait of Alexander Iden, ‘the vir-
tuous country gentlemen’ who is responsible for Cade’s eventual death. 
Rackin’s argument hinges on early modern ‘ethical distinctions between 
the “noble” and the “ignoble” and the generic distinctions between 
comedy and tragedy . . . that separated “gentlemen” of high birth and 
character from “clowns” and “villains”’. For Rackin, Cade’s rebellion is 
‘tainted by comedy’, and therefore succumbs utterly to the Tudor ideol-
ogy of class.67 However, this is to overlook the fact that Shakespeare has 
already subjected that very ideology to close scrutiny when the pirates 
apprehend Suffolk in the scene that immediately precedes the rebellion. 
Suffolk appeals precisely to the notions of ‘high birth and character’ that 
Rackin ascribes to Iden:
Look on my George: I am a gentleman.
Rate me at what thou wilt, thou shalt be paid.
 (2 Henry VI, 4.1.29–30, emphasis mine)
The pirates make it clear to Suffolk that they do not care a jot for his 
rank, and insist instead on judging him by his actions. The lieutenant 
lists many reasons why the people of England hate Suffolk, including 
his role in arranging the terms of Margaret and Henry’s marriage, his 
subsequent affair with the Queen and the loss of Anjou and Maine to 
France (4.1.70–103). Shakespeare does not seem to be making ‘ethical’ 
or ‘generic’ distinctions between a ‘gentlemen’ and the lower orders 
here, despite the fact that Suffolk, who is roundly condemned, insists 
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on maintaining such distinctions until his death. He laments the ‘paltry, 
servile, abject drudges’ (4.1.105) who seem intent on cutting through 
his aristocratic hot air with the cold steel of justice. The attitudes and 
motivations of the pirates seem to be almost identical to those of the two 
rebels whose exchange prefaces Cade’s rebellion.68
If Shakespeare was working, as Rackin thinks, in ‘the interests of 
the elite’,69 why would he insert a scene in which the very assumptions 
of class and nobility are shown to be vacuous immediately before the 
rebellion? It is hard to imagine why, only moments later, Shakespeare 
would about-turn and uphold the same distinctions as Suffolk in his 
depiction of the rebellion and of Cade’s subsequent downfall. Rackin 
does provide an answer for this by way of reference to 1.3, the scene in 
which Suffolk intercepts the poor petitioners, which, she argues, serves 
to ‘raise the audience’s antipathy toward Suffolk and Margaret . . . [in 
order to] absolve the older aristocracy, represented by the good Duke 
of Gloucester . . . of blame for the unpopular enclosures and to fi x it on 
parvenu courtiers like Suffolk’.70 Rackin thus distinguishes between two 
types of elite, which appears to resolve the apparent contradiction in her 
argument – but to what end? As we have already seen, the play shows 
the rigidly principled ‘older aristocracy’ of Gloucester to be outmoded 
and fatally inadequate to the needs of the political moment. It is simply 
not the case that Shakespeare ‘absolves’ Gloucester of responsibility: 
he might not get the blame for enclosure, but he is certainly to blame 
for his own death and, to a lesser but signifi cant degree, for giving 
York the opportunity to put his plan into action. With 2 Henry VI, the 
play cannot be made to identify itself closely with any one character 
or ideology, because it delves too deeply into the inner workings of 
Realpolitik and asks too many questions of ‘virtuous’ characters such 
as Gloucester. Rackin discerns a didactic dimension in the play that it 
plainly lacks.
Cultural historicists have been keen to limit the radical potential-
ity of Cade’s rebellion, arguing that, even if the rebels have legitimate 
concerns, Shakespeare makes their proposals so absurd that their cause 
is emptied of meaning. To stay with the example of Rackin: ‘[Cade] 
proposes a revolution so radical and so ludicrous that it discredits 
the just grievances it addresses’.71 This assessment is perhaps guilty of 
underestimating the rebels. I would like to take seriously, for a moment, 
A. D. Nuttall’s claim that Cade’s rebellion is ‘proto-communist’.72 
Shakespeare was, of course, writing centuries before Marx, but that 
does not mean he did not have insights into class confl ict.
When the rebellion fi nally gets under way, the ire of the mob does 
not focus on the aristocratic elite but on the emergent literate and edu-
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cated middle classes. Their fi rst victim is the clerk of Chartham, who is 
attacked because ‘he can read and write’ (2 Henry VI, 4.2.70). It is sig-
nifi cant that the rebels direct their anger towards such middle-class petty 
offi cials rather than towards the King. This is something that would not 
have surprised Antonio Gramsci, who noted in his Prison Notebooks:
The ‘people’ is aware that it has enemies, but only identifi es them empirically 
as so-called signori [i.e. ‘gentlemen’] . . . There is [a] dislike of offi cialdom – 
the only form in which the State is perceived. The peasant, and even the small 
farmer, hates the civil servant; he does not hate the State, for he does not 
understand it. He sees the civil servant as a ‘signore’ . . . This ‘generic’ hatred 
is still ‘semi-feudal’ rather than modern in character, and cannot be taken as 
class consciousness – merely the fi rst glimmer of such consciousness.73
This is how Shakespeare presents Cade and his rebels: on the cusp of 
realising that they are being oppressed, yet unable to direct their aggres-
sive energy meaningfully; they resolve merely to attack civil servants and 
their means of administration. Cade is specifi cally concerned with the 
clerk’s literacy:
CADE:   Dost thou use to write thy name? Or hast thou a mark to thyself, 
like an honest plain-dealing man?
CLERK:  Sir, I thank God, I have been so well brought up that I can write 
my name.
ALL: He hath confessed: away with him! He’s a villain and a traitor.
CADE:  Away with him, I say! Hang him with his pen and inkhorn about 
his neck.
(2 Henry VI, 4.2.84–90)
Shakespeare explicitly associates writing with education. The clerk is 
privy to knowledge and skills to which the rebels have no access; Dick 
points out that the clerk can ‘write court-hand’ (4.2.77). Evidently, 
the rebels are resentful of the fact that the written word is used to 
administer their lives, when they do not and cannot have the means to 
read and write themselves. Moments earlier, Dick declares war on the 
law itself, the discourse in which writing and authority converge most 
visibly: ‘the fi rst thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers’ (4.2.63). This is 
Foucault’s Power-Knowledge in action: ‘it is in discourse that power and 
knowledge are joined together’.74 The rebels themselves make the con-
nection between written discourse and their own disempowerment. The 
clerk is a ‘villain and a traitor’ because he is embedded in, and making 
a living out of, the exploitative system that is keeping the rebels poor. 
The rebels’ solution is a crude one: simply to eradicate discourse and 
its  practitioners, to ‘burn all the records of the realm’ and ‘not leave 
one lord, [or] one gentleman [alive]’ (4.2.10, 159). Even so, we can 
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hardly dismiss the thought process behind that solution as ‘so radical 
and so ludicrous that it discredits the just grievances it addresses’, 
especially considering how neatly it maps on to Foucault. As Thomas 
Cartelli argues, the rebels exhibit ‘a politically astute reckoning with a 
long list of social grievances whose inarticulate and violent expression 
does not invalidate their demand for resolution’.75 In Cade’s rebellion, 
Shakespeare shows the limits of class consciousness within the confi nes 
of the feudal system.
The rebels do not stop at the level of discourse; they are actually 
seeking, however unconsciously, to take down an entire ideological 
system: that of a nascent bourgeoisie. It is not only writing but also 
education itself, or rather the clerk’s particular type of education, to 
which they object. Later, Cade rants vehemently at Lord Say – the play’s 
embodiment of nascent petty-bourgeois notions of progressive educa-
tion – for his role in both the education system and the proliferation of 
writing and reading materials:
Thou has most traitorously corrupted the youth of the realm in erecting a 
grammar school: and whereas before our forefathers had no other books but 
the score and the tally, thou has caused printing to be used, and, contrary 
to the king, his crown, and dignity, thou has built a paper-mill. It will be 
proved to thy face that thou hast men about thee that usually talk of a noun 
and a verb, and such abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to 
hear. Thou hast appointed justices of the peace, to call poor men before them 
about matters they were not able to answer. Moreover, thou hast put them 
in prison; and, because they could not read, thou hast hanged them; when 
indeed, only for that cause, they have been most worthy to live.
(2 Henry VI, 4.7.25–37)
The idea that time spent at grammar school would ‘corrupt the youth’ 
may horrify English lecturers, but it will be familiar to readers of 
Althusser, who argues that ‘the bourgeois has installed [the educational 
apparatus] as its number-one, i.e. as its dominant ideological State appa-
ratus’.76 Cade is attacking Lord Say for propagating a bourgeois ideol-
ogy of social mobility, disseminated through the discourse of education 
(‘a noun and a verb’), which subjugates and even condemns the ‘poor 
men’ who are not fortunate enough to have been interpellated by it. Say 
can only react by iterating that same ideology, stating that ‘ignorance is 
the curse of God’ and ‘Knowledge the wing wherewith we fl y to heaven’ 
(4.7.22–3). Shakespeare depicts the two men as classes apart, trapped in 
their respective ideological spheres; both fi guratively and literally, they 
are not speaking the same language (‘He speaks Latin’ (4.7.47)). This 
bears out Gramsci’s observation; we are dealing with a feudal (or semi-
feudal) state in which true class-consciousness is not yet possible. The 
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rebels are unable to rationalise their actions beyond a base animosity 
towards individual civil servants, and Lord Say is unable to understand 
why they are rebelling in the fi rst place.
It is not long after Say’s murder and decapitation that Buckingham 
and Old Clifford (not to be confused with his son, who appears in 3 
Henry VI) arrive to re-establish order. It is at this moment that the 
rebels fail to connect their assaults against the petty offi cials with wider 
action against the state. As in Gramsci’s reading of the Italian working 
class, they do not understand the state. The rebellion is satiating class 
resentment at a lower level, so it is unsurprising that the rebels succumb 
so quickly to the glib appeal of ‘Who loves the king and will embrace 
his pardon . . . Who hateth him and honours not his father, / Henry 
the Fifth[?]’ (4.8.13, 15–16), for, in their own minds, the rebellion 
was never truly against the King. Despite the fact that he is himself in 
the employ of York, Cade is the only character who demonstrates any 
degree of class-consciousness; he realises that the population is in thrall 
to an ideological system that denies individuals freedom and knowledge. 
Thus, when the King’s men fi rst attempt to apprehend the rebels, he 
calls Stafford and his soldiers ‘silken-coated slaves’ (4.2.106). Cade can 
see that the soldiers are as trapped within the system as the commoners. 
Accordingly, he claims to fi ght for ‘liberty’ (4.2.158). When his follow-
ers desert him, Cade again appeals to liberty and lambasts them for their 
cowardice and servility:
I thought ye would never have given out these arms till you had recovered 
your ancient freedom: but you are all recreants and dastards, and delight to 
live in slavery to the nobility. Let them break your backs with burdens, take 
your houses over your heads, ravish your wives and daughters before your 
faces.
(4.8.23–7)
It is a withering assessment of how the commoners condemn themselves 
to a life of poverty and exploitation. The rebellion might have failed, 
but the words of Cade’s parting shot surely constitute some of the 
most openly subversive sentiments in Shakespeare. One can imagine a 
sixteenth-century cloth-worker sitting stunned at hearing such things 
being spoken. One can equally imagine the same cloth-worker going 
home from the theatre that night and thinking to himself that Cade may 
have a point.
It does not matter that Cade is forced to fl ee to his death at the hands 
of the strange petty-bourgeois fi gure, Alexander Iden, because his point 
has already been made – his class struggle is lost. Critics have rightly 
seen Iden as the embodiment of emergent middle-class values of private 
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ownership; his garden, as Greenblatt points out, is ‘enclosed private 
property’,77 and he is ‘ambivalent’ towards the royal court (4.10.14–
21).78 Iden’s estate is oddly removed from the hurly-burly of London 
and from the machinations of the King’s court, an island of calm amid 
a sea of chaos; the scene is set away from the main action of the play. 
This serves to distil the action and heighten the contrast between the 
two men. Cade has not eaten for fi ve days and steals into Iden’s garden 
to forage for vegetation, having just led a radical, hell-raising rebellion 
in which he called for the abolition of money (‘there shall be no money’ 
(4.2.60)). In complete contrast, Iden is well fed and content with his lot 
in life; he is happy to live off the ‘small inheritance’ his father left him 
and to take ‘quiet walks’ in his garden (4.10.15–16). When they fi ght, 
Cade quickly capitulates, blaming his chronic hunger for the defeat: 
‘Famine and no other hath slain me’ (4.10.54). As Greenblatt states, the 
contrast between ‘a well-fed owner of property and a “poor famished 
man”’ is marked.79 Rackin notes numerous ways in which Shakespeare 
supposedly sides with Iden, but the fact that he invokes, for example, 
‘emblems of an older world’80 cannot dim the symbolic power of watch-
ing a starving man being killed by a sword on stage, especially as Cade’s 
strong indictment of class inequality in the previous scene is still ringing 
in the audience’s ears.
However, Shakespeare’s depiction of Cade’s rebellion is not best 
understood through the binary, cultural historicist terms of contain-
ment and subversion, because 2 Henry VI painstakingly deconstructs 
government. When the leadership of the country is seen as mutable and 
contingent, subject to the personalities and ambitions of individuals, 
and constituted at the highest level not by ideology but by action, it is 
hardly relevant to discuss whether or not it is possible to subvert power, 
because it has no stable form. The function of the Cade sequence is not 
to make an abstract moral point about the perils of civil disorder but to 
underline the fact that the ruling class can ill afford to neglect their civic 
duty, especially if, as is the case here, the majority of the populace are 
subject to abject poverty and gross exploitation. The action of the fi rst 
three acts of 2 Henry VI emphasises the primacy of pragmatism over ide-
alism and the disadvantages of impulsive decision-making in politics; the 
fi nal two acts, which deal with Cade’s rebellion and its aftermath, show 
that although personal politics (as practised by Suffolk and Margaret) is 
effective for short-term survival, it is not viable as a long-term strategy, 
because it fosters widespread public resentment and risks aggravat-
ing class confl ict. In the process, Shakespeare offers us a powerful and 
penetrating account of feudal class confl ict in which the commoners are 
justifi ably aggrieved but lack the necessary understanding of the state to 
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direct their rebellion meaningfully. If the play does conclude that plebe-
ian uprisings are destined to fail, it is not because Cade is morally dis-
credited or shown to be a ‘buffoon’, but rather because the system does 
not provide the rebels with the adequate faculties of reasoning needed to 
organise a serious revolution.
Historians such as Blair Worden may raise the objection that mon-
archy was so entrenched in Renaissance life that alternative forms of 
 government were almost unthinkable.81 But, as we have seen, this does 
not mean that an alert individual such as Shakespeare could not see its 
inherent problems. The end of 2 Henry VI fi nds Shakespeare seriously 
questioning the adequacy of monarchy for the task of governing a nation; 
he fi nds a system which is utterly at the mercy of individuals (who may or 
may not have the prerequisite characteristics for leadership), and which 
is undermined internally by latent class confl ict. 2 Henry VI is thus both 
analytical and demonstrative – akin to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The 
Social Contract or the fi rst half of The Communist Manifesto – but it 
offers few solutions. This is not because solutions are beyond the remit 
of drama, but rather because it is the middle act of a trilogy in which the 
realist playwright contents himself simply and powerfully with posing 
problems. For Shakespeare, as for Rousseau after him, ‘we know for 
ourselves that we must put up with bad government; the question is how 
to fi nd a good one’.82
Power Politics: 3 Henry VI
Priests pray for enemies, but princes kill.
(2 Henry VI, 5.2.71)
Whereas 2 Henry VI concerns itself with the minutiae of monarchical 
politics and closely analyses the defi ciencies of the feudal class structure, 
3 Henry VI is a study in extremes. As we have seen, the brutal murders 
of Rutland and York with which 3 Henry VI starts mark a shift in the 
political dynamic of the fi rst tetralogy: cautious pragmatism, which was 
shown as a remarkably effective tactic for dealing with idealists (whether 
personally or publicly motivated) in 2 Henry VI, must now make way 
for ruthless power politics. The political lessons of 2 Henry VI no longer 
hold water. The death of York represents the third change of political 
climate in the fi rst tetralogy. The fi rst occurs between 1 Henry VI and 
2 Henry VI, when the old aristocratic values of Talbot and Gloucester 
are replaced with the selfi sh, personal politics of Suffolk, Winchester, 
Eleanor and Margaret; the second occurs shortly after Gloucester’s 
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death, when three cautious and pragmatic characters, York, Warwick 
and Salisbury, outmanœuvre the four selfi shly motivated characters; 
and the third occurs at the start of 3 Henry VI when a newly ruthless 
Margaret humiliates and kills York, thereby replacing the pragmatism 
of Realpolitik with hardnosed Machtpolitik. As Nicholas Grene puts it, 
‘as the war goes into its second phase, the war-hardened sons of mur-
dered fathers will abandon whatever Geneva conventions previously 
obtained to indulge themselves in violence without limits’.83 In other 
words, 3 Henry VI replaces the logic of individual political survival with 
that of outright war: kill or be killed.
Thus, in the fi rst tetralogy, the question of whether certain politi-
cal strategies fi nd success or failure depends largely on circumstance. 
What worked brilliantly for York during 2 Henry VI now fails him in 3 
Henry VI, because the circumstances are different; there are no universal 
codes of correct conduct. This principle bears a strong resemblance to a 
passage in Machiavelli:
It can be observed that men use various methods in pursuing their own per-
sonal objectives, that is glory and riches. One man proceeds with circumspec-
tion, another impetuously; one uses violence, another stratagem; one man 
goes about things patiently, another does the opposite; and yet everyone, for 
all this diversity of method, can reach his objective. It can also be observed 
that with two circumspect men, one will achieve his end, the other not; and 
likewise two men succeed equally well with different methods, one of them 
being circumspect and the other impetuous. This results from nothing else 
except the nature of the times . . . This . . . explains why prosperity is ephem-
eral; because if a man behaves with patience and circumspection and the time 
and circumstances are such that his method is called for, he will prosper; 
but if time and circumstances change he will be ruined because he does not 
change his policy. Nor do we fi nd any man shrewd enough to know how to 
adapt his policy in this way; either because he cannot do otherwise than what 
is in his character or because, having always prospered by proceeding one 
way, he cannot persuade himself to change. Thus a man who is circumspect, 
when circumstances demand impetuous behaviour, is unequal to the task, 
and so he comes to grief. If he changed his character according to the time 
and circumstances, then his fortune would not change.84
Here it is possible to spot many of the trends that I have traced in 
2 Henry VI. Machiavelli has favoured the terms ‘circumspect’ and 
‘impetuous’, where I have used ‘cautious’ and ‘impulsive’, but they refer 
essentially to the same traits. However, there are notable differences. For 
example, unlike Shakespeare, Machiavelli does not entertain the pos-
sibility of there being individuals who are genuinely motivated by civic 
duty. He assumes personal motives for all political players; characters 
such as Gloucester and Henry do not exist in Machiavelli’s political 
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reality. Also, Machiavelli seems to preclude the possibility of individuals 
adapting their personalities and political approaches to changing for-
tunes, whereas Shakespeare’s Margaret, for example, to modify G. K. 
Hunter’s phrase, seems like a ‘different Margaret’ from one play to the 
next, because she adapts her policies.85 Most crucially, Machiavelli takes 
the prospect of changing fortunes as a virtually guaranteed (abstract) 
political given and therefore fails to account for what brings about such 
changes. Shakespeare, on the other hand, who also demonstrates an 
understanding of changing fortunes, explains such changes by pointing 
to the human causes of specifi c events (e.g. Suffolk’s brokering of the 
marriage between Henry and Margaret, York’s strategic victory over 
Margaret, the murder of Rutland and so on). Machiavelli compares 
fortune ‘to one of those violent rivers which, when they are enraged, 
fl ood the plains, tear down trees and buildings, wash soil from one place 
to deposit it in another’. He argues that people are powerless to stop 
such fl oods occurring once such rivers are in full stream, but ‘it does not 
follow that when they are fl owing quietly one cannot take precautions, 
constructing dykes and embankments’.86 Thus, for Machiavelli, humans 
cannot control fortune but, with the correct contingency plans in place, 
they can dampen the impact of sudden and drastic changes. As we have 
seen, Shakespeare prefers the image of ‘fortune’s pageant’ (2 Henry 
VI, 1.2.67), in which individual human action has the power to alter 
the course and confi guration of the procession. Hence, York scoffs at 
Somerset’s claim that ‘fortune’ was responsible for his failure as Regent 
over France, suggesting that had he been in charge, he would have made 
his own luck (2 Henry VI, 3.1.305). Shakespeare leaves less to chance 
than Machiavelli.
In 3 Henry VI, Shakespeare freshly interrogates the political positions 
he outlined in 2 Henry VI in the new context of civil war. Circumstances 
have changed. Most of the major players of the fi rst two parts of Henry 
VI are dead; by 2.1 of 3 Henry VI, of the ten characters who make up 
Henry’s court at the start of 2 Henry VI, only Henry, Margaret and 
Warwick survive. The War of the Roses is now in full swing. Unlike 2 
Henry VI, which contains several factions, in 3 Henry VI, the characters 
can be neatly divided between the royal houses of Lancaster and York 
– the stage is set for a bloodbath. Shakespeare shows the extreme con-
ditions that may give rise to a tyrant such as Richard III. After York’s 
death, a new set of characters come to the fore to try their chances in 
this new, violent political climate – namely, York’s three surviving sons: 
Edward (IV), George (of Clarence) and Richard (of Gloucester, later 
Richard III). Interestingly, of these, only Richard can be ranked along-
side Margaret and Clifford as ‘ruthless’. Edward is selfi sh,  personally 
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driven and impulsive in the mould of Suffolk, and, like his father, 
Clarence is cautious and pragmatic and fi nds himself torn between 
public and private impetuses. Therefore, in 3 Henry VI, we can see 
Shakespeare revisiting character types that we have already encountered 
in the previous plays in order to subject them to sterner tests in more 
volatile waters. This is typical of his exhaustive, empirical approach to 
politics in the Henry VI trilogy; if Machtpolitik is to become the new 
modus operandi, Shakespeare must fi rst show us if and why it super-
sedes the available alternatives before outlining whether or not it is itself 
a sound and sustainable political strategy. That said, 3 Henry VI is less 
about the success or failure of particular strategies for individuals than 
it is about their desirability at the ‘macro’ level of the state; as the scale 
and viciousness of the violence escalate, wider ethical questions can no 
longer be ignored.
Of all the characters Shakespeare tests in 3 Henry VI, perhaps 
the most closely scrutinised is the King himself. After Gloucester’s 
death and his attempt to disinherit his son in Act 1, Henry fi nds 
himself completely isolated and increasingly powerless on the throne. 
Paradoxically, as he becomes ever more marginalised in political terms, 
Shakespeare gives him a more prominent dramatic role on stage as 
the play’s self-appointed moral centre in the absence of Humphrey. 
Shakespeare juxtaposes Henry’s simple, unyielding faith with the 
brutal form of Machtpolitik that has come to characterise the poli-
tics of the War of the Roses. After York’s death, Shakespeare under-
lines the fact that Henry rules England in title only; his new proxy is 
Margaret. In 2.2, fresh from her victory over York, Margaret gloats to 
her husband:
Welcome, my lord, to this brave town of York.
Yonder’s the head of that arch-enemy
That sought to be encompassed with your crown.
Doth not the object cheer your heart, my lord?
 (3 Henry VI, 2.2.1–4)
Predictably, Henry is anything but cheered by the news (‘this sight irks 
my soul’ (2.2.6)) and worries that the murder has invoked the wrath of 
God, presumably because it invalidates the sacred oath of disinherit-
ance he made in the opening scene (1.1.196–201). Clifford responds 
by putting forward perhaps the strongest argument for power politics 
found in the play:
My gracious liege, this too much lenity
And harmful pity must be laid aside.
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To whom do lions cast their gentle looks?
Not to the beast that would usurp their den.
Whose hand is that the forest bear doth lick?
Not his that spoils her young before her face.
Who scapes the lurking serpent’s mortal sting?
Not he that sets his foot upon her back.
The smallest worm will turn, being trodden on,
And doves will peck in safeguard of their brood.
 (2.2.9–18)
Clifford plainly appeals to the dog-eat-dog logic of natural selection. 
He sees pity as ‘harmful’ and, in evoking lions and beasts, echoes 
Machiavelli’s famous contention that a prince is forced to know how 
to act like a beast, that he must learn to be the fox and the lion. In that 
contention, Machiavelli reasons that ‘one must be a fox in order to 
recognize traps, and a lion to frighten off wolves. Those who simply 
act like lions are stupid.’87 Signifi cantly, Clifford neglects to mention 
the fox, which, as we have seen, is represented in the tetralogy by cau-
tious and pragmatic characters such as York and Warwick. However, 
at this moment in the tetralogy, lions are in the ascendancy while foxes 
are down in numbers; Clifford is refl ecting the Zeitgeist of the political 
status quo.
Henry’s reaction represents an interesting turn in the development of 
his character and approach to politics:
Full well hath Clifford played the orator,
Inferring arguments of mighty force:
But Clifford, tell me, didst thou never hear
That things ill got had ever bad success?
And happy was it for that son
Whose father, for his hoarding, went to hell?
I’ll leave my son my virtuous deeds behind:
And would my father had left me no more!
For all the rest is held at such a rate
As brings a thousandfold more care to keep
Than in possession any jot of pleasure.
Ah, cousin York, would thy best friends did know
How it doth grieve me that thy head is here!
 (2.2.43–55)
Henry is unique in the tetralogy because – in stark contrast to virtu-
ally all the other leading characters (including the likes of Talbot and 
Gloucester) – he does not view power as the ultimate goal; instead, his 
goal is to live virtuously in personal contentment. This passage marks 
the beginning of Henry’s fi nal withdrawal from the political sphere. His 
wish that his ‘father had left [him] no more’ than ‘virtuous deeds’ is not 
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only a rejection of Clifford’s brutality but also a rejection of politics 
and, indeed, of the role of king itself. When the Yorkists arrive and 
Edward makes a bold claim to the crown, Henry leaves it to Margaret 
and Clifford to raise objections. There are some thirty-six lines of dia-
logue before Henry can muster an utterance: ‘Have done with words, 
my lords, and hear me speak / . . . I prithee give no limits to my tongue: / 
I am a king and privileged to speak’ (2.2.117, 119–20). This brief, half-
hearted attempt to assert whatever semblance of authority he has left 
falls on deaf ears. The other characters all but ignore Henry’s request 
to speak. It is clear to the Yorkists that Margaret and Clifford are the 
true leaders of the Lancastrian house and that Henry has become at best 
a ceremonial mascot and at worst an irrelevance. Richard’s quip that 
‘Clifford’s manhood lies upon his tongue’ (2.2.125) proves true, because 
Henry does not speak again in 2.2.88 By the end of the scene, over fi fty 
lines after the King’s request for an audience, Edward draws attention to 
the King’s continued silence and resorts to violence: ‘Since thou deniest 
the gentle king to speak. – / Sound, trumpets! Let our bloody colours 
wave’ (2.2.172–3). It is a strange moment in the play; the King requests 
permission to speak and then says nothing, as if paralysed.
As Michael Manheim says, Henry’s ‘mental state, revealed more by 
what he does not say than by what he does say . . . must be considered 
carefully’.89 The historical Henry VI famously suffered from mental 
breakdowns, a fact which Henry’s paralysis in 2.2, a critically important 
scene, perhaps refl ects. From this moment on, Henry seems palpably 
altered. His next appearance is in the famous ‘molehill scene’ in which 
he dreams of living the simple life of a shepherd, while the fi erce civil 
war rages on elsewhere; for Edward Berry, it is ‘the most important 
scene in the series [i.e. the fi rst tetralogy]’.90 It is worth considering at 
length. Henry’s mood at the start of his soliloquy is one of despair:
Here on this molehill will I sit me down.
To whom God will, there be the victory!
For Margaret my queen and Clifford too, 
Have chid me from the battle, swearing both 
They prosper best of all when I am thence. 
Would I were dead, if God’s good will were so:
For what is in this world but grief and woe? 
 (3 Henry VI, 2.5. 14–20)
This is not only a declamation against civil war by a pious king, but also 
a depiction of a desperate and isolated man in mental freefall. It is often 
claimed of Henry that he lacks awareness, that he is a ‘holy fool, or just 
a fool’,91 who ‘is always slow to recognise the true motives of both his 
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enemies and allies’.92 But, as I have suggested, since Suffolk’s death Henry 
has been keenly aware that Margaret is ‘his’ queen in name only. It is sig-
nifi cant that Henry is only sitting on the molehill in the fi rst place because 
Margaret has ‘chid’ him ‘from the battle’, apparently because she views 
him as a hindrance. She has given up all pretence of a happily married 
life. Immediately after pointing this out, Henry wishes he were dead. 
Since his sudden silence in 2.2, a plethora of things must have dawned on 
Henry: the nation is at brutal civil war and it is largely his fault; his wife 
has all but disowned him after he attempted to disinherit his only son; his 
power has been directly challenged by Edward and, at the same time, he 
has been marginalised within his own House; fi nally, on the most human 
level, he has lacked any form of companionship or friendship since 
Gloucester’s death. It hardly comes as a shock that he yearns for escape:
O God, methinks it were a happy life
To be no better than a homely swain;
To sit upon a hill, as I do now, 
To carve out dials quaintly, point by point,
Thereby to see the minutes how they run: 
How many make the hour full complete,
How many hours bring about the day,
How many days will fi nish up the year, 
How many years a mortal man may live. 
When this is known, then to divide the times: 
So many hours must I tend my fl ock; 
So many hours must I take my rest; 
So many hours must I contemplate; 
So many hours must I sport myself; 
So many days my ewes have been with young; 
So many weeks ere the poor fools will ean;
So many years ere I shall shear the fl eece: 
So minutes, hours, days, months, and years, 
Past over to the end they were created, 
Would bring white hairs unto a quiet grave. 
Ah, what a life were this! How sweet, how lovely!
 (3 Henry VI, 2.5.21–40)
Henry’s incessant listing betrays a mind deeply troubled by realities that 
are too immense for one man to face. On the surface, the speech is about 
the benefi ts of a pastoral, contemplative life, but this is merely a tactic by 
which Henry attempts to put his true situation out of mind. The repeti-
tion of ‘how many’ and ‘so many’ and the numbing metric regularity of 
the lines create a kind of rocking motion: Henry attempts to lull or nurse 
himself into a daydream. But there is no place for him to hide.
Shakespeare punctures Henry’s self-induced trance with one of the 
tetralogy’s most poignant set pieces: the sight of ‘a son that hath killed 
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his father [with the dead man in his arms]’ and ‘[a] father [that hath 
killed his son] . . . bearing of [the body]’ (2.5.54, 79). Henry looks on 
grief-stricken and wonders about his legacy: 
How will the country, for these woeful chances,
Misthink the king and not be satisfi ed! . . .
Sad-hearted men, much overgone with care,
Here sits a king more woeful than you are.
 (2.5.107–8, 123–4)
Clearly, it is inaccurate to paint Henry as the innocent dupe.93 He is all 
too aware of his own situation: that history will judge his turbulent reign 
harshly and that, ultimately, the current climate of violent power politics 
is the result of his own passivity. Henry’s reaction is painfully, almost 
endearingly, human; he buckles under the intense pressure and seeks to 
escape into idealised fantasy. Fortune can be unkind to men born out 
of time. The most explicit effect of the ‘molehill scene’ is to draw atten-
tion to the horrors of civil war, which tragically set fathers and sons at 
each other’s throats. However, more covertly, it is a damning critique 
of Henry’s morally aloof, laissez-faire approach to politics. Shakespeare 
builds on the thesis implicit in Gloucester’s death in 2 Henry VI: the idea 
that the refusal to compromise moral principles in the short term for fear 
of committing evil deeds oneself can lead to much greater evil in the long 
term. Henry wishes for a life without responsibility, but, paradoxically, he 
has already absolved himself of his responsibilities as king through the use 
of myriad proxies and through his failure to intervene at crucial moments 
(for example, before Gloucester’s murder in 2 Henry VI (3.1), before 
York’s attempt at usurpation in the same play (5.1) or when confronted 
by Edward in 3 Henry VI (2.2)). The cruel irony of Henry’s dream of 
becoming a shepherd is that one suspects he would struggle with the tasks 
of herding and shearing. By showing the paradoxes and failures inherent 
in the King’s approach to politics, Shakespeare rejects both moral abso-
lutism and the recourse to idealism in the face of material dangers.
In 3 Henry VI we are shown that pacifi sm is not a means of defeat-
ing violence; a leader such as Henry will almost always come to grief 
against enemies who do not share the same moral scruples. In an 
essay written during the Second World War, Mattie Swayne obliquely 
compares Henry VI’s attitude during the War of the Roses to Neville 
Chamberlain’s conciliatory dealings with Adolf Hitler before the out-
break of the war:
Like Henry VI, our liberal rulers have believed so heartily in the civilizing 
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infl uences of our age and in the capacity of human nature to be regenerated 
that they have neglected to maintain strong guards against the enemies of civ-
ilization. Selfi sh forces have, nevertheless, been on the alert to take advantage 
of this very faith in the ideal and to bewilder humanity with its own honest 
doubts and inarticulate hopes. The resulting confusion of loyalties is equal 
to that which drove Henry VI to condemn himself with other rulers for their 
lack of responsibility to the people.94
High ideals are misplaced when dealing with ‘selfi sh forces’, if they are 
not backed up by affi rmative action. Henry VI and Neville Chamberlain 
may have been good men individually, but their legacies do not make 
for happy reading. The primacy of interventionism over appeasement is 
a key feature of Shakespeare’s thought. Shakespeare insists on a world 
in which individuals are defi ned by their actions rather than by their 
ideals. His version of history, as told by the Henry VI plays, remembers 
a king who did almost nothing when he should have been proactive and 
then weeps when he fi nds the nation tearing itself apart. Thus Henry VI, 
despite his apparent saintliness, is for Shakespeare a morally question-
able king, who neglects his public duty.
However, it would be inaccurate to suggest that 3 Henry VI condemns 
Henry completely, because it juxtaposes his piety with the reckless licen-
tiousness of Edward IV. In his portrayal of the two Kings, Shakespeare 
presents his audience with a serious moral dilemma: given the choice 
between a king who neglects his power and a king who abuses it, which 
is preferable? After Henry is captured in 3.1, Shakespeare immediately 
shifts the action to Edward’s court to analyse the alternative monarch. 
After seizing the throne, Edward wastes no time in abusing his newly 
acquired power. In a shocking scene, he attempts to coerce the widow 
Lady Elizabeth Grey (Woodville) to sleep with him:
KING EDWARD: To tell thee plain I aim to lie with thee.
LADY GREY: To tell you plain I had rather lie in prison.
KING EDWARD: Why then, thou shalt not have thy husband’s lands.
 (3.2.69–71)
When Lady Grey remains undeterred by the material threats, Edward, 
‘the bluntest wooer in christendom’ (3.2.83), apparently driven by lust, 
proposes marriage. This scene mirrors Suffolk’s equally lustful wooing 
of Margaret in 1 Henry VI (5.3). Like Suffolk, Edward puts his own 
immediate gratifi cation ahead of the affairs of state and in both cases the 
impolitic marriage proves to be monumentally disastrous for the King. 
However, there are crucial differences between the two marriage pro-
posals. Edward does not even attempt to reproduce the fancy  rhetorical 
tricks with which Suffolk had beguiled Margaret; instead, he relies 
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entirely on his position as king and issues commands (‘my request’, ‘my 
demand’ (3.2.79–80)). The entire scene hinges on the basic power rela-
tion between king and subject: the notions of ‘service’ (3.2.43, 44) and 
‘command’ (3.2.45, 49). Edward makes no secret of his ultimate goal:
One way – or other – she is for a king
And she shall be my love, or else my queen. –
Say that King Edward take thee for his queen? . . .
I speak no more than what my soul intends
And that is to enjoy thee for my love.
 (3 Henry VI, 3.2.87–9, 94–5)
It is almost as if Edward wishes to prove a point: he is now king and 
therefore, by right, should be able to ‘enjoy’ literally the fi rst woman he 
sets eyes on. It is one of the most fl agrant abuses of power in the entire 
tetralogy.
Edward’s exploits set off a chain of events that effectively extends 
the War of the Roses for another year. In the immediate wake of the 
proposal, Richard hatches his master-plan to become king by whatever 
means possible. Of course, it is possible that Richard would have made 
a bid for the crown under any circumstances, but Edward’s lust seems 
to trigger the speech:
Ay, Edward will use women honourably –
Would he were wasted, marrow, bones, and all,
That from his loins no hopeful branch may spring
To cross me from the golden time I look for!
And yet, between my soul’s desire and me –
The lustful Edward’s title burièd –
Is Clarence, Henry, and his son, young Edward . . .
 (3.2.124–30, emphasis mine)
Before this scene, Richard shows few signs of personal ambition. He 
is consistently depicted as a die-hard Yorkist who is a little overeager 
for bloodshed (see 1.2.28–34) and who seems genuinely to admire his 
‘warlike father’ (2.1.19), the Duke of York. During the wooing scene 
Richard seems content to look on and indulge in laddish banter with 
his brother, Clarence. It is only when he is left alone and after he has 
witnessed Edward’s display of sexual power politics that he begins 
to lament the deformity that renders the prospect of his own sexual 
exploits with women a ‘miserable thought’ (3.2.151). Edward’s wooing 
of Lady Grey seems to tease out a latent bitterness in Richard, which sets 
him on course ‘to dream upon the crown’ (3.2.168).
However, the marriage creates a much more urgent situation for 
Edward, which produces both domestic and diplomatic crises and 
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unwittingly rehabilitates the defeated Lancastrians. The following scene 
takes place at the court of the French King, Louis XI, where we fi nd 
Margaret pleading for aid against the Yorkists, and Warwick on a 
diplomatic mission to marry Edward IV to Louis’s daughter, Lady 
Bona. Obviously, Margaret’s and Warwick’s aims are directly at odds. 
Interestingly, Louis does not care about England’s internal politics or 
about whose claim to the throne is better; he wishes only to deal with 
Warwick, the representative of the current King, Edward (3 Henry VI, 
3.3.144–50). Louis maintains a clear distinction between politics and his 
private life; although he remains a ‘friend’ of Henry and Margaret, this 
is business – he will do only what is best for France. In sharp contrast 
to Edward, whose shameless abuse of power we have just witnessed, 
Shakespeare makes the French King a paragon of public duty. Louis 
is ready to marry his daughter to Edward to make peace between the 
nations of England and France, even at the expense of leaving his per-
sonal ‘friends’ in the cold. Then a bundle of letters arrives, bearing news 
of Edward’s proposal to Lady Grey. What follows is a brilliant exposé 
of the transient and fragile nature of political alliances, which are as 
easily broken as they are made. The news transforms the scene; it angers 
Louis (‘Dare he presume to scorn us in this manner?’ (3.3.178)) and 
leads an enraged Warwick to ‘renounce [Edward] and return to Henry’ 
(3.3.194). Margaret immediately moves to seal the new alliance:
Warwick, these words have turned my hate to love
And I forgive and quite forget old faults
And joy that thou becom’st King Henry’s friend.
 (3.3. 199–201)
Louis, in turn, signals his intent to ‘aid’ the Lancastrians against the 
Yorkists with ‘fi ve thousand men’ (3.3.220, 234). And Warwick 
cements his commitment to the Lancastrian cause by marrying his 
daughter, Anne Neville, to Margaret’s son (and Henry’s heir), Prince 
Edward. This is quickly followed by the defection to the Lancastrians of 
Clarence, who is also outraged by the impolitic marriage. With his fi rst 
act as king, Edward has lost a powerful ally in Warwick, made an enemy 
of Louis, and has even lost his own brother.
In the face of all this, Edward remains imperious, seemingly oblivi-
ous to the collateral damage that his marriage has caused: ‘They are 
but Lewis and Warwick: I am Edward, / Your king and Warwick’s, 
and must have my will’ (4.1.15–16). He does not or will not see the 
responsibilities that defi ne the role of king, preferring to view England 
as his personal fi efdom: ‘It is my will and grant, / And for this once my 
will shall stand for law’ (4.1.49–50). Thus it is evident that, if Henry VI 
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is morally responsible for the civil war because of his neglect of power, 
Edward IV is equally culpable for exacerbating the situation through 
such needless abuses of power – if not more so because, unlike Henry, 
he does not acknowledge his own responsibility. The fi nal two acts of 3 
Henry VI oscillate between the two Kings, as if to underscore the moral 
dilemma. Henry is temporarily restored to the throne and promptly 
appoints Warwick and Clarence as his proxies:
Warwick, although my head still wear the crown,
I here resign my government to thee . . . 
I make you both [Warwick and Clarence] Protectors of this land
While I myself will lead a private life
 (4.6.23–4, 41–2)
This reads almost as a parody of Henry’s shirking of responsibility; as 
soon is he back in power, he begins the process of weakening his posi-
tion again. However, at least Henry has come to terms with his own 
failures and is ready to leave administration to more capable hands (and 
none more capable than Warwick). But the new government proves 
short-lived; Henry is soon recaptured, Warwick is killed in battle and 
Clarence (pragmatically) switches his allegiance back to the winning 
side. The murders of Henry and Prince Edward follow, and Margaret, 
defeated and broken, is exiled to France. Edward wins the war, but at 
what cost? Edward, typically, is in triumphant mood: ‘Sound, drums 
and trumpets! Farewell, sour annoy! / For here, I hope, begins our 
lasting joy’ (5.7.45–6). But as Susan Bennett argues:
Edward’s short-sightedness is treated ironically; any possibility of lasting joy 
has already been destroyed during the course of the play. His alienation of 
the French king through the rejection of the Lady Bona in favour of Elizabeth 
Woodville and the casual manner in which he ships off the deposed Margaret 
. . . has ensured him enemies overseas. At home, his preferment of his new 
wife’s relatives has alienated many, including his own brothers.95
It is obvious that he cannot look forward to ‘lasting joy’, not with 
characters such as Margaret, Clarence and Richard to contend with. 
His impulsive marriage to Lady Grey, born of an arrogant abuse of 
power, remains a bone of contention that will perpetually undermine 
his tenure as king, as Clarence’s ominous aside near the end of the play 
attests (5.7.21–5). Furthermore, Edward’s bullish belief in the superior-
ity of his own sovereign will over other considerations means that he is 
liable to make more political mistakes in the future and is potentially 
blind to cannier political operators, not least his brothers. However, 
at least for the time being, the civil war is over and the Yorkists’ rule 
 unopposed.
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It is worth pausing here to consider the ethical and political implica-
tions of the contrast between Henry VI and Edward IV found in 3 Henry 
VI. The two Kings pose interesting questions for the audience: without 
doubt, Henry is an incompetent king whose misrule leads the nation to 
a bloody civil war, but does it follow that the man who removes him 
from power is morally justifi ed in doing so? Henry neglects his power, 
but on a personal level he lives virtuously and always wishes the best 
for his nation: does this make him morally good, or does the fact that 
he costs thousands of people their lives morally condemn him? Edward 
makes mistakes and abuses his power, but he successfully brings an end 
to the War of the Roses (most of Richard III takes place in peacetime) 
and ultimately defeats all of his enemies against considerable odds. Does 
this success and the potential stability it brings the nation outweigh his 
earlier, morally questionable actions? It is clear that Shakespeare is not 
a straightforward moral absolutist, but neither is he an amoralist or, 
judging from his implicit advocacy of interventionism, a moral relativist.
Again, the most useful comparison to make is with Machiavelli. In 
Machiavelli, the key criterion for the moral worth of any action is its 
outcome. For a prince, the desired outcome of any action must be the 
welfare of the nation. Thus, Machiavelli distinguishes between two 
types of cruelty:
I believe that here it is a question of cruelty used well or badly. We can say 
that cruelty is used well . . . when it is employed once and for all, and one’s 
safety depends on it, and then it is not persisted in but as far as possible turned 
to the good of one’s subjects. Cruelty badly used is that which, although 
infrequent to start with, as time goes on, rather than disappearing, grows in 
intensity. Those who use the fi rst method can, with God and men, somewhat 
enhance their position . . . the others cannot possibly stay in power.96
In this way Machiavelli challenges conventional notions of virtue, 
because individual actions are not seen as inherently good or evil but 
judged in terms of their end result as effective or ineffective. Thus, 
Machiavelli is an early advocate of consequentialism, which would later 
be developed by utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill. Would it be valid to place Shakespeare in that philosophical 
tradition? Certainly, what we fi nd in the fi rst tetralogy aligns him more 
closely with Machiavelli than with those Elizabethans who believed in 
the Great Chain of Being. But there is also a marked difference between 
the political thought of Shakespeare and that of Machiavelli. To begin 
with, Machiavelli would not devote his attention to a monarch such as 
Henry VI, because his cynical view of the world does not recognise the 
existence of such fi gures. Second, Machiavelli is concerned with outlin-
ing a coherent doctrine for the acquisition and maintenance of power, 
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whereas Shakespeare seems more concerned with the paradoxes  inherent 
in monarchy and with testing divergent positions. Henry’s disastrous 
reign would presumably lead a consequentialist such as Machiavelli 
to dismiss him out of hand as morally culpable and a failure, but 
Shakespeare does not do that and instead gives Henry ample time to 
outline his own moral position. However, the Henry VI plays plainly do 
not align themselves with that moral position, but quite explicitly draw 
attention to Henry’s failures as a king. The two ideas – Henry’s moral-
ity and the good qualities required for effective rule – are incommensu-
rate. What we fi nd, then, is something approaching ‘value pluralism’, a 
concept derived from Machiavelli by Isaiah Berlin. As Berlin explains, 
value pluralism is the idea that:
The world we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced 
with choices between ends equally absolute, the realization of some of which 
must inevitably involve the sacrifi ce of others . . . If, as I believe, the ends 
of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each 
other, then the possibility of confl ict – and of tragedy – can never wholly 
be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of 
choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the 
human condition.97
Even if Henry’s message to live by ‘virtuous deeds’ (3 Henry VI, 
2.2.49) is desirable, the realities of nation states and their governance 
ensure that it is almost impossible for a king to choose that path without, 
as Berlin puts it, ‘confl ict’ or ‘tragedy’. As we have seen, for Shakespeare, 
in order to be successful, a king must fulfi l wide-ranging and disparate 
criteria which are not necessarily compatible. For example, it is not pos-
sible to survive without being to some degree personally driven, but if 
you are personally driven it follows that you cannot be fully committed 
to the welfare of the state because your ultimate investment is in your 
own life and career rather than in the public good. Therefore, rulers who 
fi nd themselves preoccupied with their own survival cannot hope to live 
up to the ideal of caring only for the commonwealth; the two crucial 
factors for a good and successful king – personal survival and civic duty 
– are at odds. In the Henry VI plays, the characters driven by public duty 
(Gloucester, Henry, York and Warwick) do not survive, whereas those 
who are driven by personal ambition (Edward, Margaret, Richard) 
achieve their ends, at least for a limited time. The choice between sur-
vival and civic duty, then, does not represent a choice between good and 
evil, but a choice between two ‘goods’. The choice between Henry VI 
and Edward IV is a choice in the truest sense of the word: for his selfl ess-
ness and care for the commonwealth, Henry necessarily sacrifi ces his 
own survival and fails to intervene when he should, whereas by winning 
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the War of the Roses and securing his own survival, Edward acts self-
ishly and provokes both internal and external confl ict.
In his reading of The Merchant of Venice, Robin Headlam Wells, 
who also believes that Shakespeare has a pluralist view of ethics, argues 
that the play ‘is about understanding ourselves as moral and political 
beings, and the irresolvable paradoxes that result from the peculiarities 
of our humanity’.98 The same can be said of the Henry VI trilogy. This 
is where the humanism of Shakespeare’s historiography is most marked; 
the political struggles of the past demand moral judgement and these 
plays put kings and would-be kings on stage to be judged, but, after an 
exhaustive survey of their characters, political approaches, decisions and 
actions, they ultimately resist judgement because they are involved – as 
we are – in the perpetual puzzle of humanity. There are a vast number of 
options available to us, but it is unclear which way to proceed, because 
every option taken involves inevitable sacrifi ce, every door opened closes 
another. In 3 Henry VI there is, fi nally, no ultimate solution to the 
complex problems that are presented to the human condition by history 
and politics.
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Chapter 8
Ideology in Richard II and Henry IV
The Making and Breaking of Ideology: Long Live the 
King, ‘Amen’
The three parts of Henry VI reveal a playwright who seems to be 
obsessed with personalities, the individual traits of rulers and would-
be rulers, and their impact upon the course of history. In Chapter 7, I 
argued that Shakespeare’s exhaustive survey of the political spectrum in 
Henry VI suggests which characteristics are needed for an individual to 
become, and then reign as, a successful king and which characteristics 
lead to defeat, civil war and ultimate failure in death. I concluded that, 
although the fi rst tetralogy in general encourages its audience to make 
political and moral judgements of the people it dramatises, 3 Henry VI 
turns away from conventional ethics by recognising that real human 
beings often fi nd themselves faced with irresolvable dilemmas. A. P. 
Rossiter calls this ‘the constant Doubleness of Shakespeare’s vision in 
the Histories’.1 The individual may be faced with a true choice between 
‘two goods’ or ‘two bads’ – Henry VI’s way or Edward IV’s way – both 
of which are at once valid and invalid. Such a choice necessarily entails 
moral, political or personal sacrifi ce, regardless of which option is fi nally 
taken. The Henry VI plays are violent, intense, competitive and, above 
all, personal affairs in which there are no hiding places for the partici-
pants in the political game; even passive inaction is a choice with real 
consequences. As Norman Rabkin says, ‘Shakespeare’s politics is tragic 
precisely because it will not allow us the luxury of evading action’.2
I also suggested that, in the scenes of Cade’s rebellion, 2 Henry VI con-
stitutes an implicit critique of the semi-feudal structure of monarchy by 
highlighting its inadequacies: the arbitrariness of hereditary right (which 
concentrates power in an individual who may have all, some or none of 
the relevant personal qualifi cations for kingship) and the latent yet ever-
looming confl ict between segregated classes who do not understand each 
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other. These scenes in which class tensions serve to highlight ideological 
imperfections foreshadow Shakespeare’s increased interest in the role of 
ideology in maintaining the structure of power in Richard III and the 
second tetralogy. In the Henry VI plays, Shakespeare had explored the 
intricacies of personal and political action in history primarily from the 
point of view of individuals. He had already, as it were, written his own 
dramatic ‘ABC of power’,3 which developed a comprehensive practical 
understanding of political strategy to rival Machiavelli’s The Prince. 
In the second tetralogy, there is a widening of the lens, a zooming out 
which captures not only individuals caught in systems of power, but also 
the systems of power themselves.
This is immediately evident in Richard III, where the political lessons 
that were demonstrated so comprehensively in the Henry VI plays are, 
for the fi rst time, taken for granted as basic political principles. After 
reading the Henry VI plays, it comes as no surprise when Richard begins 
the play by declaring openly that he is ‘determinèd to prove a villain’ 
(Richard III, 1.1.30) by using underhand means to unseat his brother, 
Edward IV. In fact, such things are almost to be expected; Richard is 
only perfecting the formula that brought his father, York, so close to 
the throne. As Jan Kott puts it, ‘Richard III is a king who has read The 
Prince’.4 We have already seen that Edward is an impulsive and tactless 
king. Thus, in the brutal and warped political world of the fi rst tetral-
ogy, Richard’s plot to dispose of his brothers as he ‘marr[ies] Warwick’s 
youngest daughter’ (1.1.154) seems entirely justifi ed, commendable even 
– a point underlined by the fact that the audience becomes complicit 
with Richard’s plans as he divulges them in soliloquy. The play is less 
concerned with the practical question of how an individual can become 
king (because we already know), and more interested in the philosophi-
cal or structural question of what kingship entails both personally and 
nationally.
The key scene in this respect is 3.7: Richard’s wonderfully stage-
managed ascension to the throne, which Andrew Hadfi eld describes as 
a ‘grotesquely comic process’.5 The scene starts with a private exchange 
between Richard and his chief ally, Buckingham. Buckingham has been 
trying to win popular support for Richard’s bid for the crown. Richard 
asks Buckingham if the crowd cried ‘God save Richard, England’s 
royal king!’, to which Buckingham replies: ‘No, so God help me, they 
spake not a word’ (3.7.24). Richard is irritated and complains about 
the ‘tongueless blocks’ who would ‘not speak’ (3.7.42). The famous 
set-piece in which Richard appears before the Mayor of London and 
a crowd of citizens ‘between two Bishops’ (3.7.94) as ‘a kind of latter-
day Henry VI’6 follows. Buckingham outlines the case for young Prince 
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Edward’s illegitimacy before requesting that Richard, as the next 
legitimate heir to the throne, step into the breach to alleviate the crisis. 
Richard feigns both modesty and piety and answers as Henry VI might:
Alas, why would you heap this care on me?
I am unfi t for state and majesty.
I do beseech you, take it not amiss:
I cannot nor I will not yield to you. 
 (3.7.203–6)
With their new understanding of the situation, the crowd is taken aback 
at the refusal. As Wilbur Sanders notes, no one is prepared to admit that 
such devout behaviour is alien to court life and Richard plays on the 
crowd’s hypocrisy. These ‘sham moralists’7 now want Richard as their 
king – and he does not refuse a second invitation.
The scene reaches its climax when Buckingham and Richard fi nally 
achieve the desired outcome of their ruse:
BUCKINGHAM: Long live King Richard, England’s worthy king.
ALL: Amen.
 (3.7.238–9)
Richard now has everything he needs for effective power: military 
might and popular support or – in Althusser’s terms – the Repressive 
State Apparatus (RSA) and the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). I 
mention Althusser here with good reason; the fi nal stage of his so-called 
‘quadruple system of [ideological] interpellation’ depends upon both 
individuals’ recognition of themselves ‘in ideology’ and their subsequent 
vocalisation of it. This is a complex but none the less straightforward 
idea. It is worth quoting Althusser verbatim:
We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as 
subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is speculary, i.e. a 
mirror-structure, and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive 
of ideology and ensures its functioning . . . The duplicate mirror-structure of 
ideology ensures simultaneously:
•  the interpellation of ‘individuals’ as subjects;
•  their subjection to the Subject;
•  the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects’ recognition of 
each other, and fi nally, the subject’s recognition of himself;
•  the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition 
that subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything 
will be all right: Amen – ‘So be it.’8
The key difference between Richard III and his two immediate pred-
ecessors, Henry VI and Edward IV, is that he seems to understand that 
power, and his ultimate position as king, depend not only upon mili-
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tary strength but also upon this ‘double-mirror’ structure. Even though 
Richard consciously ‘play[s] the maid’s part’ (3.7.50) by initially refus-
ing the crown, his eventual acceptance is as important to the process as 
the crowd’s recognition of Richard as their new king, which they must 
then register in public discourse (by chanting the slogan ‘God Save King 
Richard’). This last point is crucial: not only does power rest on the 
mutual ideological recognition of the Subject (the King) and his subjects 
(the crowd), but it must also be vocalised. It is not enough for ideology 
simply to exist; to serve the purposes of power, it must be manifested in 
speech and language (or, in Foucault’s terms, ‘discourse’). This explains 
why Richard is so insistent that the crowd cheer his name; as long as 
they remain ‘tongueless blocks’, he has no power over them. His transi-
tion from ambitious duke to all-powerful monarch can be completed 
only once his subjects recognise him as their king and he recognises them 
as his subjects and only once those subjects have accepted that situation 
as the new status quo: ‘Amen’.
This ‘double-mirror’ of ideology on which power depends comes to 
preoccupy Shakespeare in the second tetralogy. Where the fi rst tetral-
ogy explores the minutiae of politics, the second tetralogy asks more 
penetrating questions: what is the role of a king? What is it that sets 
kings apart from those they rule? What force compels people to take to 
the battlefi eld and kill each other in war? And, perhaps most searching 
of all, why do people accept the situation in which they are ruled by 
another individual, even though it might be to their own disadvantage? 
There is an increased awareness of the power of ideology throughout 
the second tetralogy. As Hadfi eld says, ‘the notion of the king as actor 
assumes centre stage throughout the [second] tetralogy’.9 But this is 
not simply to show that kingship requires a certain degree of ceremo-
nial theatricality; it also exposes the fact that the role of king, far from 
being sacred or divinely ordained, is an artifi cial, ideological construct 
– a part played, like any other, by mortal human beings. As Richard II 
concedes, ‘I live with bread, like you’ (Richard II, 3.2.171) and Henry 
V tells his soldiers while in disguise, ‘the King is but a man, as I am . . . 
All his senses have but human conditions’ (Henry V, 4.1.99). However, 
kingship is also a role unlike any other in that it is both subject to the 
demands of power and the sole source of that power’s legitimacy. If the 
fi rst tetralogy reads like an ‘ABC of power’, an attempt to show the par-
ticulars of political reality in action, then the second tetralogy reads like 
an attempt to understand the workings of the entire system. In linguistic 
terms, we might say that Shakespeare shifts his attention from instances 
of parole to langue – that is, from the particular acts of individuals to the 
systematic principles of power. This is not to suggest that Shakespeare 
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suddenly becomes abstract in his thought, because he still very much 
privileges praxis over theory. Rather, by reading the plays of the second 
tetralogy closely, I hope to show not only that Shakespeare understands 
the inner workings of power, but also that he is fi nely attuned to the 
factors upon which different types of power are contingent and to the 
means by which they are undermined.
Cultural Historicism and the Second Tetralogy
Since the plays of the second tetralogy are explicitly concerned with 
the issues of power and ideology, it is not surprising that they have 
been central in the development of cultural historicism. In many ways, 
they provided the main site of the major debates between new his-
toricists and cultural materialists throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Stephen Greenblatt’s seminal essay on the Henriad, ‘Invisible Bullets’, 
is still read by many as the paradigmatic new historicist statement. 
Greenblatt’s careful and subtle analysis of the ‘relation between ortho-
doxy and subversion’10 in the two parts of Henry IV and Henry V set 
the agenda for discussion of the history plays for the succeeding two 
decades. Greenblatt’s contention that ‘the subversiveness that is genuine 
and radical . . . is at the same time contained by the power it would 
appear to threaten . . . the subversiveness is the very product of that 
power and furthers its end’11 has been almost as infl uential as E. M. W. 
Tillyard’s grand conclusions about Shakespeare’s advocacy of the Great 
Chain of Being in the 1940s.12 Just as readers in the 1950s and 1960s 
were obliged to accept, adapt or contest Tillyard’s thesis, so readers in 
the 1990s and 2000s could ill afford to ignore Greenblatt’s powerful 
argument. Accordingly, the cultural materialist responses to ‘Invisible 
Bullets’ – which include a much-discussed essay on Henry V by Jonathan 
Dollimore and Alan Sinfi eld (see Chapter 3), an impressive mono-
graph by Phyllis Rackin and several studies by Graham Holderness13 
– undoubtedly represent some of the best work produced on the second 
tetralogy in the past quarter-century. For all their theoretical shortcom-
ings, collectively the cultural historicists have made an invaluable and 
lasting contribution to our understanding of the history plays. First, and 
most obviously, there is an increased awareness of historical context, of 
how these plays might have been received in the 1590s and early 1600s. 
Second, there is an increased awareness that the history plays deal at 
some level with the issue of state power and its containment of potential 
resistance through covert ideological or discursive methods.
However, these gains have also come at a cost, which I have dis-
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cussed in some detail in Chapters 2 and 3. The primary theoretical 
problem with cultural historicism is the assumption – inherited from 
anti-humanists such as Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault and Clifford 
Geertz – that individual human beings are structural effects, born ‘with 
very few useful instincts’14 and virtually devoid of autonomous thought, 
and the consequent assumption that texts are little more than the sum of 
their cultural contexts. In practice, this has had two main consequences 
for the criticism of Shakespeare’s plays: fi rst, there is the tendency to 
read them either as products of the status quo that serve to underpin the 
dominant ideology or as products of ‘sub-cultures’ that seek to under-
mine the dominant ideology; and second, there is the near-total neglect 
of their formal and linguistic features. These consequences inevitably 
compromise even the most lucid and engaging cultural historicist read-
ings of the history plays. Richard Levin views the overwhelming concern 
of such readings with ‘certain ideological issues’ as a narrowing of focus. 
‘Typically’, he says, they ‘frame an argument, then turn selectively to 
passages in one or more texts’ to support it – a tendency which limits 
stylistic analyses and what Levin calls ‘a kind of alertness’ to the details 
and nuances of each play.15 Kiernan Ryan makes a similar argument; he 
speaks of ‘the tunnel vision to which so much radical criticism seems to 
be congenitally predisposed’ and complains about ‘the neglect of formal 
techniques, structural implications and dramatic parentheses, whose 
import changes the meaning of the narrative they articulate’.16
One unfortunate by-product of cultural historicism’s preoccupation 
with power has been the emergence of a false dichotomy in readings of 
Shakespeare’s plays. Critics oscillate between the ‘containment’ thesis of 
new historicism and its ‘subversive’ alternative found in cultural mate-
rialism, which, to draw on Ryan once more, ‘simply reverses the poles 
of the orthodox view’.17 Annabel Patterson voices similar sentiments: 
‘[recent readings of the histories] fall simply, even crudely, on either side 
of the line that divides belief from scepticism, idealism from cynicism, 
or, in contemporary parlance, legitimation from subversion’.18 It seems 
to me that such polarised readings fail to grasp what earlier generations 
of critics readily accepted as an essential feature of Shakespeare’s dra-
matic practice: namely, the consideration of two contrasting alternatives 
held in dialectical tension.19 In forcing the playwright to take sides in 
the dramas he is depicting, cultural historicists fail to acknowledge what 
Norman Rabkin calls ‘Shakespeare’s habitual recognition of the irreduc-
ible complexity of things’.20 The argument that this sort of polarity is 
the result of a solid understanding of Shakespeare’s historical context 
does not hold water, because it is perfectly possible for a professional 
historian of early modern England, such as Blair Worden, to accept 
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the ambivalence inherent in Shakespeare’s work.21 In other words, the 
dichotomous, polarised view of Shakespeare’s historical drama is not a 
necessary consequence of historicism, but simply the peculiar way it has 
manifested itself in Shakespeare studies of late.
Notwithstanding these criticisms of cultural historicism, the problem 
is not so much with the focus on ‘certain ideological issues’, but rather 
with how these issues are dealt with. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how 
Dollimore and Sinfi eld’s selective reading of Henry V misappropriates 
key passages to further its own political ends. This is not to suggest that 
such readings are discussing the ‘wrong’ issues, but rather that they are 
discussing the right issues in the wrong way. The emphasis on histori-
cal context can distort texts as much as it can illuminate them, when 
the context is given priority and the text is reduced to the ideas and 
values of its historical period. This way of reading does not allow for 
the exceptional: for the possibility of a playwright who might have ideas 
at odds with, or even ahead of, his time.22 Even Terry Eagleton, one of 
the foremost Marxist critics of his generation, quips that Shakespeare 
seems to have been ‘almost certainly familiar with the writings of Hegel, 
Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Wittgenstein and Derrida’.23 When dealing 
with plays as complex and sophisticated as the histories, it strikes me as 
more appropriate to study the distinctive features of the texts themselves 
than to bind and subordinate them to other texts of the period, because 
Shakespeare’s precise understanding and articulation of the issues and 
ideas that he dramatises are not like any other. There may be innumer-
able points of overlap between the history plays and, for example, 
Holinshed’s Chronicles – such as the fact that both sets of texts recount 
roughly the same narratives – but they are manifestly not the same thing. 
They are distinguished by genre, form, language, characterisation and, 
perhaps most of all, by the fact that they were written by different indi-
viduals, who clearly had quite different views of the matters they had in 
common. Thanks to cultural historicism we have an increased critical 
awareness of historical context and a renewed alertness to the machina-
tions of power, but neither of these developments should preclude critics 
from paying close attention to the way Shakespeare wrote and organised 
his plays. For example, we can take from Greenblatt the idea that power 
can maintain ‘the constant production of its own radical subversion 
and the powerful containment of that subversion’,24 but within a frame-
work that assumes as a basic principle that creative individuals such 
as Shakespeare are intelligent and endowed with a certain, if limited, 
degree of intellectual and imaginative autonomy.
It does a great disservice to these plays to read them as partisan 
statements that champion or challenge the establishment. This way of 
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understanding the history plays reduces them, as Ryan writes, ‘to the 
ideology they are intent on unravelling’.25 Rather than seeing them as 
working to uphold or undermine the dominant ideology, I prefer to view 
the history plays as a serious attempt (or a series of serious attempts) by 
Shakespeare to make sense of the past: a unique effort to understand 
through drama certain aspects of the human condition which cannot be 
reduced to Tudor ideology or other sets of received ideas. Harold Bloom 
puts a version of the argument that Shakespeare is the source, not a mere 
mirror, of meaning much more forcefully: 
Standard scholarly views of literary history, and all Marxist reductions of 
literature and history alike, have the curious allied trait of working very well, 
for, say, Thomas Dekker, but being absurdly irrelevant for Shakespeare. 
Falstaff and the Tudor theory of kingship? Falstaff and surplus value? . . . 
With Falstaff as with Hamlet . . . Shakespearean representation is so self-
begotten and so infl uential that we can apprehend it only by seeing that it 
originates us. We cannot judge a mode of representation that has overdeter-
mined our ideas of representation . . . Falstaff is not how meaning is renewed, 
but rather how meaning gets started.26
Characteristically, Bloom pushes the point too far, but he touches on 
something of great importance: the fact that Shakespeare and Dekker 
are distinct, individual playwrights, whose plays are equally distinct 
because – despite working during the same period – they were different 
people with different ideas and different dramatic and poetic gifts. They 
cannot be confl ated as if they were both avatars of the same monolithic 
culture, no matter how insidious its processes of containment. As Bloom 
goes on to say, Shakespeare’s plays are ‘the product of [his] will over 
language, a will that changes characters through and by what they 
say’.27 In short, Shakespeare had a mind of his own, a mind which is best 
understood by textual rather than contextual analysis.
Richard II: ‘Such is the breath of kings’ (1.3.208)
In Shakespeare from the Margins, Patricia Parker picks key words or 
phrases and uses them to unlock the plays from which they are taken.28 
If we were to use a similar method to read Richard II, our key word 
might be ‘tongue’ or ‘speak’. From the very start of the play, when 
Bolingbroke and Mowbray confront each other before the King at 
Windsor Castle, we are made to think of confl ict primarily in linguistic 
terms or, more specifi cally, in terms of speech itself. Shakespeare does 
not present the quarrel between Bolingbroke and Mowbray as a fi st-fi ght 
but as a verbal duel, ‘the bitter clamour of two eager tongues’ (1.1.49). 
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As Bolingbroke frames his accusations against Mowbray, he is careful 
to express the wish that ‘heaven be the record of his speech’ (1.1.30). 
We are reminded of the ideological ‘Amen’ so crucial to Richard III’s 
enthronement in the earlier play. Bolingbroke wishes to ‘record’ his 
‘speech’ in the correct ideological register. However, Bolingbroke is 
also keen to associate his speech with action. Twice during his opening 
gambit he affi rms that, for him, language is only a temporary substitute 
for concrete action: ‘for what I speak / My body shall make good upon 
this earth . . . What my tongue speaks my right-hand sword may prove’ 
(1.1.36–7, 46). Even though he has couched his objection to Mowbray 
in the correct discourse, he is eager to move matters from the linguistic 
into the physical realm, where duelling tongues can be replaced by ‘arm 
to arm’ (1.1.74) combat.
By the time he reaches the end of his charge, Bolingbroke has shifted 
completely from the realm of speech to a wholly physical world in which 
the ‘blood’ of the murdered Duke of Gloucester ‘cries / Even from the 
tongueless caverns of the earth’ (1.1.104–5). In such a ‘tongueless’ world, 
Bolingbroke relies upon his body to avenge Gloucester’s death: ‘This 
arm shall do it or this life be spent’ (1.1.108). Richard and Mowbray 
respond by immediately shifting back to the verbal register as the King 
transmutes Bolingbroke’s domain of ‘tongueless caverns’ and ‘arms’ into 
sound: ‘How high a pitch his resolution soars’ (1.1.109). And Mowbray 
urges the King to ‘bid his ears a little while be deaf’ (1.111–12). From 
the start of the scene, Richard refers to the confl ict exclusively in terms 
of speech and sound. He asks John of Gaunt whether or not he has 
‘sounded’ (1.1.8) out his son about his accusations against Mowbray 
before stating that he ‘will hear / The accuser and accusèd freely speak’ 
(1.1.16–17). Plainly, ‘speech’ is the domain in which Richard feels he 
has the most authority.
When it is Mowbray’s turn to respond to Bolingbroke’s charge, 
Richard again emphasises his call for ‘free speech’ (1.1.123). Of 
course, Mowbray’s speech is anything but ‘free’; it is subject entirely to 
Richard’s power. Shakespeare suggests this poetically. Towards the end 
of Mowbray’s answer to Bolingbroke, during which he throws down 
his gage, his verse breaks out into rhyming couplets: ‘In haste whereof 
most heartily I pray / Your highness to assign our trial day’ (1.1.150–1). 
Richard’s next line is designed both to reassert his power and to steer 
the confl ict away from the physical: ‘Wrath-kindled gentlemen, be ruled 
by me. / Let’s purge this choler without letting blood’ (1.1.152–3). 
Richard not only drains the confl ict of physical violence, but also 
symbolically rejects Mowbray’s rhymes, as ‘me’ and ‘blood’ disrupt 
the sequence of couplets. In the very next line, Richard begins his own 
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sequence of rhymes starting with ‘physician’ and ‘incision’ (1.1.154–5). 
When John of Gaunt replies four lines later, he confi rms the couplets 
with ‘age’, ‘gage’, ‘when’ and ‘again’ (1.1.160–3). Then Richard com-
mands Mowbray to kneel before him: ‘Norfolk throw down! We bid, 
there is no boot’ (1.1.164). Mowbray obeys while submitting to the 
rhyme: ‘Myself I throw, dread sovereign, at thy foot’ (1.1.165). Now 
that Mowbray has accommodated himself to Richard’s rhyme-scheme 
(as opposed to his own), Richard is happy to pick up, at least partly, his 
rhyme ‘blood’ (1.1.172) with the off-rhyme ‘withstood’ (1.1.173). When 
Richard issues the same command to Bolingbroke – ‘Cousin, throw 
down your gage. Do begin’ (1.1.186) – Bolingbroke has no option but 
to play by Richard’s rules; he submits to the rhyme with ‘sin’ (1.1.187). 
Bolingbroke speaks all his remaining lines in the scene in strict heroic 
couplets featuring mostly full, masculine rhymes. Bolingbroke makes 
one fi nal effort to render the confl ict in grotesquely physical terms:
                          Ere my tongue
Shall wound my honour with such feeble wrong,
Or sound so base a parle, my teeth shall tear
The slavish motive of recanting fear,
And spit it bleeding in his high disgrace
Where shame doth harbour, even in Mowbray’s face.
 (1.1.190–5)
This graphic image of Bolingbroke ripping out his own tongue with his 
teeth in order to spit it in Mowbray’s face (literally rendering himself 
‘tongueless’ and so the complete man of action) is stripped of any sym-
bolic power it might have because he is forced to speak it in the straight-
jacket of Richard’s poetic form.
In contrast, at the end of the scene, Richard asserts his linguistic 
supremacy by showing that he is at liberty to break the rhyme scheme 
at any time he chooses. Just as he does when he disrupts Mowbray’s 
sequence at 1.1.152–3, after Bolingbroke fi nishes his speech Richard 
immediately shifts back into blank verse for four lines before restarting 
the sequence on his own terms at 1.1.200–1 (‘arbitrate’ / ‘hate’). In this 
scene, Richard is the only person who is truly at liberty to demonstrate 
‘free speech’, because he is the only character who is free to stop and 
start rhyme schemes as he pleases. He twice halts another character’s 
run of couplets as if tacitly scolding them for starting one in the fi rst 
place. But no character dares to decline one of Richard’s rhymes. In this 
fi rst scene of Richard II, Shakespeare shows how Richard regulates his 
power almost exclusively through language and its chief instrument, the 
tongue. He wins the symbolic struggle between ‘speech’ (or sound) and 
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Bolingbroke’s ‘tongueless’ world of ‘arms’ not only by carefully control-
ling the sorts of images used, but also by asserting his power by dictat-
ing the poetic form of the dialogue. Despite this display of linguistic 
authority, Phyllis Rackin is critical of Richard’s handling of the quarrel 
between Bolingbroke and Mowbray because he is unable to stop it and 
‘capitulates’ by arranging the trial by combat.29 However, Rackin over-
looks the possibility that the trail by combat was the outcome Richard 
intended. The spectacle of the trial would not only appeal to Richard’s 
sense of theatricality, but also explicitly highlight his authority – a 
timely reminder to all those in attendance that the King’s word is law. 
That Richard wishes to prevent the action turning from the linguistic to 
the physical is not in doubt. He not only succeeds in this aim but also 
does so in the manner that most visibly draws attention to his authority: 
by throwing down his warder just before the chivalric duel is about to 
begin. There is everything to suggest that Richard planned this sequence 
of events from the start, because – in the short term, at least – it serves 
to augment his authority.
Richard’s penchant for ruling by language partly accounts for what 
Tillyard calls the ‘extreme formality’ of the play.30 When Richard issues 
a command – ‘be ruled by me’ – it is the formal impetus of his language 
alone that compels both Mowbray and Bolingbroke to act. As M. M. 
Mahood says, this poet-king has ‘faith in words’.31 Richard makes 
spoken discourse his dominion and as long as his subjects are caught 
– or ‘interpellated’32 – in it, he will continue to have power over them. 
Gaunt, who fi nds his own ‘tongue . . . party’ (1.3.227) to this discursive 
power, fi nds himself saying things that lead to his own ruin: ‘you gave 
leave to my unwilling tongue / Against my will to do myself this wrong’ 
(1.3.234–5). Elsewhere, York asks Richard, ‘how long / Shall tender 
duty make me suffer wrong?’ (2.1.164–5). This is the power of ideology: 
the power to compel people, without apparent coercion, to say and do 
things that are not necessarily in their own best interests but in the inter-
ests of the sovereign. Foucault is very clear on this point when describing 
Bentham’s Panopticon:
the major effect of the Panopticon [is] to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power . . . [T]he perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise 
unnecessary . . . He who is subjected to the fi eld of [the Panopticon’s] visibil-
ity, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power . . . 
he becomes the principle of his own subjection. By this very fact, the external 
power may throw off its physical weight . . .33
Formal language is Richard’s discursive equivalent of the Panopticon, 
because as long as it is spoken in England during his reign the king’s 
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presence is felt and his subjects regulated; the very act of speaking makes 
Richard ‘everywhere present and visible’.34 As Harry Berger argues, ‘this 
is political, not merely poetic, mastery’.35
It is not surprising, then, that the ‘duel’ scene at Coventry (1.3) which 
follows shortly should be so anti-climactic and so thoroughly devoid 
of action. Syntactically, the scene plays out like a series of sub-clauses 
waiting for the main verb. There is an extended preamble during which 
there is much fanfare, standing and sitting, and many introductory 
remarks, but not very much action. Bolingbroke and Mowbray repeat 
their respective grievances before the King, only to have them repeated 
again by their heralds. By the time Richard makes his famous interven-
tion by throwing down his warder at 1.3.118, the audience has heard 
the arguments of both sides a total of three times (once from 1.1). 
Rackin, again, views Richard’s handling of the trial in terms of failure: 
‘when Richard stops the trial by combat he interferes with a symbolic 
embodiment of his own authority . . . In preventing the symbolic ritual 
of chivalry, Richard attacks the source of the only authority that makes 
him king.’36 But this contradicts the point Rackin herself acknowledges 
earlier: it was never Richard’s intention for Bolingbroke and Mowbray 
to come to blows. The entire play thus far has built up to this point 
only for the promise of action between Bolingbroke and Mowbray to 
be broken at the last minute by a series of decrees spoken by Richard. 
Physical battles, of the sort that Bolingbroke had been looking forward 
to, have no place in Richard’s poetic scheme. Accordingly, he describes 
the proposed duel in terms of its jarring sounds, as being ‘roused up 
with boist’rous untuned drums, / With harsh-resounding trumpets’ 
dreadful bray, / And grating shock of wrathful iron arms’ (1.3.128–30). 
Military instruments do not keep time with the beat of Richard’s metre. 
Richard’s motives for stopping the duel and exiling both Bolingbroke 
and Mowbray are well known. First, Richard himself issued the order 
to kill the Duke of Gloucester. If Bolingbroke were to win the duel, 
Richard would be in the uncomfortable position of condemning a 
man who had carried out his orders. However, if Mowbray were to 
win, Richard would be implicitly admitting that he had sanctioned 
Gloucester’s murder. Second, both Mowbray and Bolingbroke were part 
of the group of rebels, known as the Lords Appellant, who had risen in 
arms and defeated Richard in 1387. So ridding England of both men 
effectively buries the question of Gloucester’s murder and secures the 
throne from powerful lords who have a history of rebellion. But Richard 
also has more immediate motives. He no doubt fears that allowing the 
physical confl ict to take place would not only give the eventual victor 
too much power, but also draw attention to their prowess in physical 
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action, a fi eld in which Richard is weak. The King cannot afford to let 
action dictate the course of events, because he knows his power depends 
exclusively on form and language.
The banishments of Bolingbroke and Mowbray show Richard at the 
peak of his power. His ideological strategy rests entirely on the fact 
that when he speaks – ‘Breathe I against thee’ (1.3) – his subjects listen. 
To return to our linguistic motif: Richard makes England his langue, 
a kingdom in which all utterances spoken in a certain idiom (verse) 
ultimately signify his power. This is perhaps why Richard II contains 
no prose. Until his death, even the gardeners and common citizens are 
caught in his ideological web of formal language and therefore speak 
in blank verse (see 3.4). Thus, even explicit criticism of the King is con-
tained – in Greenblatt’s sense of the word – by the fact that it must be 
articulated in Richard’s idiom. Of course, in the presence of the King 
himself, criticism is simply not permitted. When the dying Gaunt objects 
to Richard’s seizure of Bolingbroke’s inheritance, Richard chastises him 
for speaking out of turn: ‘this tongue that speaks so freely in thy head 
/ Should run thy head from thy unreverent shoulders’ (2.1.123–4). In 
any case, the full force of Gaunt’s criticism (1.2.93–103) is contained by 
the fact that he has to speak it in Richard’s linguistic prison. Ronald R. 
Macdonald sums it up nicely: ‘in the very act of denouncing fl atterers, 
Gaunt is constrained to use the language of sacred kingship . . . It is not 
that Gaunt wishes to fl atter Richard (quite the opposite), but that the 
only language available to him contains and supports . . . the system of 
sacred kingship.’37 Shortly after Gaunt’s death, Northumberland tells 
Richard he should visit Gaunt. Richard’s response is, ‘What says he?’ 
(2.1.149). Northumberland’s answer – which is to tell Richard that 
Gaunt has died – is framed in terms of its impact upon speech: ‘Nay, 
nothing: all is said. / His tongue is now a stringless instrument. / Words, 
life, and all, old Lancaster hath spent’ (2.1.149–51). Notice that the 
image of the ‘tongue’ as a ‘stringless instrument’ bereft of ‘words’ pre-
cedes any mention of the loss of ‘life’. Language and speech appear to 
matter more to the King than trifl ing physical matters such as the life or 
death of an uncle. Richard rules England as a sort of linguistic dictator-
ship. Thus, when Mowbray learns of his banishment, his immediate 
thoughts are not about his imminent dislocation and separation from 
his family and loved ones, but about language. He makes a series of 
statements bemoaning the impotence or imprisonment of his tongue: 
‘Now my tongue’s use is to me no more’ (1.3.155), ‘Within my mouth 
you have enjailed my tongue, / Doubly portcullised with my teeth and 
lips’ (1.3.160–1). Mowbray views the exile as a symbolic death: ‘What 
is thy sentence then but speechless death, / Which robs my tongue from 
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breathing native breath?’ (1.3.166–7). Richard has not only banished 
Mowbray, he has linguistically and ideologically castrated him. The 
inmates of Richard’s poetic prison are thus doubly bound: fi rst, by the 
fact that the realm of speech itself asserts Richard’s absolute authority 
through form, and second, by the fact that the prospect of being ban-
ished from that realm neutralises any ideological power a subject might 
possess. On his home turf of language and speech, Richard is almost 
impregnable.
If Bolingbroke is to stand any chance against the King, he has to 
wage an asymmetrical war, which marginalises the symbolic power 
of Richard’s poetry as much as possible, while emphasising his weak-
ness in action. By 1.3, whether consciously or not, Bolingbroke has 
already done much of the groundwork for starting such a war. As I 
have shown, he persistently attempts to draw attention to the mate-
rial dimension of his plight. Bolingbroke’s immediate reaction to his 
banishment is marked by the fact that he thinks of the physical con-
sequences of moving to another country: ‘now our fl esh is banished 
from this land’ (1.3.190). Bolingbroke does not share Mowbray’s fear 
of his tongue being ‘enjailed’, not least because he promised to rip out 
his own tongue in 1.1 if his accusations against Mowbray proved false. 
It is safe to say that Bolingbroke sets much less stock by tongues than 
either Mowbray or Richard, because he is nowhere near the master of 
words that Richard is. As he prepares to leave his father and the country, 
words escape him. When Gaunt asks him, ‘to what purpose dost thou 
hoard thy words[?]’ (1.3.242), he answers: ‘I have too few to take my 
leave of you, / When the tongue’s offi ce should be prodigal / To breathe 
the abundant dolour of the heart’ (1.3.244–6). Bolingbroke seems inca-
pable of articulating his pain; he cannot, as Richard does with aplomb 
later in the play, ‘write sorrow’ (3.2.143). Richard alludes a number of 
times to Bolingbroke’s comparative inadequacy when it comes to speak-
ing. For example, during the deposition scene he calls him ‘silent king’ 
(4.1.280) and mocks his clumsy usage of the word ‘convey’ (4.1.307). 
Nicholas Grene points out that Bolingbroke ‘never speaks in soliloquy, 
never delivers a single line aside . . . we never see him in private, never 
hear him off the record’, which leads him to the conclusion that ‘there 
is an asymmetry of representation’ in Richard II.38 In fact, contrary 
to Grene’s claims, Bolingbroke does have a private moment with his 
father, Gaunt, shortly before he leaves England, as we have seen. It is 
not so much that Bolingbroke is not given a soliloquy that is of note, 
but rather that he would not know what to say if he was given one. The 
disparity between the number of lines given to Richard and Bolingbroke 
refl ects a fundamental difference in their characters: Richard is a master 
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of  language whose modus operandi as a king is to rule ideologically 
through speech, whereas Bolingbroke achieves his ends ‘with hard 
bright steel’ (3.2.107). I am not convinced by Grene’s argument that 
Bolingbroke ‘wears a poker-face throughout’ the play as if he were a 
master strategist,39 because it seems to me that he has no other option. 
Bolingbroke cannot hope to beat Richard at his own game, so he must 
force the king to play his.
Richard’s unusual reliance on language to govern England is seen in 
the play as a break with the practice of the previous King, Edward III.40 
After Richard callously strips the Lancasters of their estates and related 
revenues, the rebels Willoughby, Ross and Northumberland discuss 
Richard’s reign. Amid the talk of forced loans and grievous taxes, 
Willoughby wonders where all the money has gone; Northumberland 
has this to say:
Wars hath not wasted it; for warred he hath not,
But basely yielded upon compromise
That which his ancestors achieved with blows.
More hath he spent in peace than they in wars.
 (2.1.253–6)
It is safe to say that Richard’s purely ideological style of government is 
not popular because the King is perceived as being inactive. The gardener 
of 3.4 repeats these criticisms. He calls Richard ‘wasteful King’ (3.4.56) 
and laments his ‘waste of idle hours’. Thus, Richard’s main strength (his 
mastery of language) leads to his biggest weakness (his failure to act), 
because he relies so heavily on language and speech to rule. Shakespeare 
shows that ideology is ineffective if it is not supported by physical action 
(which, for those in power seeking to maintain order, tends to take the 
form of violence), because there is nothing to deter subjects from simply 
breaking rank. Foucault’s ‘perpetual victory that avoids any physical con-
frontation’41 is thwarted if the subjects are able to assert themselves physi-
cally. From Bolingbroke’s illegal return to England in 2.3 and his decision 
to challenge the King’s word explicitly (‘I am a subject, / And I challenge 
the law’ (2.3.132–3)) it is not long before Richard surrenders his grip on 
the country. Shakespeare shows us the limits of ideological power.
At fi rst Richard thinks he can defeat Bolingbroke using his ideologi-
cal powers alone; as Catherine Belsey puts it, he ‘clings to the imaginary 
sovereignty of the signifi er’.42 His reaction to news of Bolingbroke’s 
growing military strength is revealing:
So when this thief, this traitor, Bolingbroke . . .
Shall see us rising in our throne, the east,
His treasons will sit blushing in his face,
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Not able to endure the sight of day,
But, self-affrighted, tremble at his sin.
Not all the water in the rough rude sea
Can wash the balm from an anointed king.
The breath of worldly men cannot depose
The deputy elected by the Lord.
For every man that Bolingbroke hath pressed
To lift shrewd steel against our golden crown,
God for his Richard hath in heavenly pay
A glorious angel.
 (3.2.43, 46–57)
Richard does not entertain, or perhaps does not wish to entertain, the 
prospect of Bolingbroke simply ignoring the ideological implications of 
facing an anointed king. Richard quietly attempts to shift the confl ict 
back into the realm of speech. Notice that he says ‘the breath of worldly 
men cannot depose’ him, but he surely knows that, should Bolingbroke 
‘lift shrewd steel’ against him, no angels will come to his aid.
This is confi rmed when Richard goes ‘pale’ (3.2.71) after hearing 
Salisbury’s report that his Welsh army of 20,000 has deserted him. The 
news comes as a stark reality-check for Richard and, for a moment, he 
realises the grave danger he is in. However, after a brief prompt from 
Aumerle, he recovers and returns to the relative safety of ideological 
rhetoric: ‘I had forgot myself. Am I not King? / . . . Is not the King’s 
name forty thousand names? / Arm, arm, my name! A puny subject 
strikes / At thy great glory’ (3.2.79, 81–3). Richard invokes the point of 
legitimation on which his entire ideological system rests: the fact that the 
king, by the divine right conferred on him by his royal birth, has power 
over his ‘puny subject[s]’. However, Scrope soon brings Richard back 
down to material reality with news of Bolingbroke’s growing numbers 
and the deaths of the Earl of Wiltshire, Bushy, Bagot and Green. It fi nally 
dawns on Richard that his power is contingent not on the symbolic 
power of words, but on material things and, ultimately, on his ability to 
threaten and employ physical violence to secure his sovereignty. In one 
of the play’s most memorable speeches, Richard comes to terms, for the 
fi rst time, with the fact that without these things his crown is rendered 
‘hollow’ and there is little to differentiate him from his subjects:
      For within the hollow crown
That rounds the mortal temples of a king
Keeps Death his court; and there the antic sits,
Scoffi ng his state and grinning at his pomp,
Allowing him a breath, a little scene,
To monarchize, be feared, and kill with looks.
Infusing him with self and vain conceit,
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As if this fl esh which walls about our life
Were brass impregnable; and humoured thus,
Comes at the last, and with a little pin
Bores through his castle wall; and farewell, king.
Cover your heads, and mock not fl esh and blood
With solemn reverence. Throw away respect,
Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty,
For you have but mistook me all this while.
I live with bread, like you; feel want,
Taste grief, need friends. Subjected thus,
How can you say to me I am a king?
 (3.2.156–73)
This is the situation stripped of all ideological superfl uities. Richard 
seems to lament the fact that, as a king, he must fulfi l a symbolic role 
dictated by ‘respect / Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty’ while 
being ‘subjected’ by the mortal trappings of humanity to hunger, desire, 
sorrow and the need for companionship. Despite Richard’s previous 
excesses, Shakespeare elicits sympathy for him here. If nothing else, we 
are reminded of the incredible strain that the concentration of so much 
power in the hands of a single individual must exert. However, it is also 
worth remembering that Richard’s desperate situation is brought about 
mainly because of his narrow policy of ruling exclusively by ideological 
means, through language, while neglecting raw, physical power.43
For most of the rest of the play, Richard fi nds himself in the humiliat-
ing position of not only being physically overpowered but also transfer-
ring to Bolingbroke the symbolic and linguistic powers that he most 
cherishes. The threat of physical force is enough for Richard to pardon 
Bolingbroke and offi cially ratify his return to England. This marks 
Richard’s fi rst real defeat on his home terrain of language. He does not 
take it well: ‘O God, O God, that e’er this tongue of mine, / That laid 
the sentence of dread banishment / On yon proud man, should take it off 
again / With words of sooth!’ (3.3.132–5). Such backtracking was unim-
aginable in Act 1. It is almost too much for Richard to bear. He sees in 
this, his fi rst defeat in a purely linguistic confrontation, the destruction 
of the entire ideological system on which his identity and authority rest:
What must the King do now? Must he submit?
The King shall do it. Must he be deposed?
The King shall be contented. Must he lose
The name of King? A God’s name, let it go.
 (3.3.142–5)
An extended conceit follows in which Richard promises to exchange the 
symbolic markers of his royalty for plainer alternatives:
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I’ll give my jewels for a set of beads,
My gorgeous palace for a hermitage,
My gay apparel for an almsman’s gown,
My fi gured goblets for a dish of wood,
My sceptre for a palmer’s walking staff,
My subjects for a pair of carvèd saints,
And my large kingdom for a little grave,
A little, little grave, an obscure grave;
Or I’ll be buried in the King’s highway . . .
 (3.3.146–54)
And what brings on this tantrum? Very little but the news that 
Northumberland has returned with a message from Bolingbroke. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the functioning of Richard’s royal ide-
ology is contingent upon two factors: fi rst, that no subject shall resort 
to or threaten physical violence against him; and second, that the ideol-
ogy is never transgressed. In other words, it is an ideology that relies on 
all its parts to work as expected at all times. Bolingbroke has already 
threatened physical violence and now he has made the King reverse a 
decision, thereby creating a ‘contradiction’ (3.3.123) in Richard’s ideol-
ogy. From this moment, Richard’s defeat is almost inevitable.
Cornered and broken, Richard names Bolingbroke his heir and resigns 
the throne. All that is left, in Richard’s eyes, is the fi nal transference of 
ideological power by way of ritual.
Now mark me how I will undo myself.
I give this heavy weight from off my head,
      [BOLINGBROKE accepts the crown]
And this unwieldy sceptre from my hand,
      [BOLINGBROKE accepts the sceptre]
The pride of kingly sway from out my heart.
With mine own tears I wash away my balm,
With mine own hands I give away my crown,
With mine own tongue deny my sacred state,
With mine own breath release all duteous oaths.
 (4.1.194–200)
The ‘breath’ that could once ‘enjail’ tongues in seconds is now relieved 
of its power with equal speed. The double-mirror of ideology is fi nally 
smashed, ‘cracked in an hundred shivers’ (4.1.279), moments later. 
Bolingbroke’s bland, business-like language in this scene contrasts 
starkly with Richard’s elaborate metaphors; it marks the dawning 
of a new era of leadership driven by physical action rather than by 
words. Of course, soon afterwards, Bolingbroke has Richard mur-
dered – the  symbolic transference of power is not enough for the king 
of action.
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Richard’s fi nal soliloquy fi nds him musing upon both the malleability 
and the constricted nature of social roles:
I have been studying how I may compare
This prison where I live unto the world . . .
Thus play I in one person many people,
And none contented. Sometimes am I king;
Then treason makes me wish myself a beggar,
And so I am. Then crushing penury
Persuades me I was better when a king.
Then am I kinged again . . .
 (5.5.1–2, 32–6)
In the prison, with its scant contents and ‘populace’ (5.5.3) of one, 
Richard can see how, in the absence of material corroboration, thoughts 
alone can authorise identity – a king can transform himself into a beggar 
and back again in a matter of seconds. Gaunt understands this principle 
at the start of the play, when he tries to persuade Bolingbroke that the 
severity of his sentence of six years in exile depends entirely on how one 
looks at it:
Think not the King did banish thee,
But thou the King. Woe doth the heavier sit
Where it perceives it is but faintly borne.
Go, say I sent thee forth to purchase honour,
And not the King exiled thee . . .
 (1.3.256.12–16)
By the end of the play Richard realises, like Gaunt, that ‘bare imagination’ 
(1.3.260) can overturn the constructs of ideology, because ideology itself 
is the stuff of imagination. The only reason that Richard is not defeated 
by ‘bare imagination’ himself is because, as a master of language, he is the 
play’s canniest ideological operator and tries to foreclose that possibility 
at every turn by controlling the terms and poetic form of spoken discourse. 
In Richard II, Shakespeare exposes the fragile nature of ideologies: no 
matter how effectively they contain their subjects, they depend ultimately 
upon individuals to do as they are told and the threat of physical violence. 
Ideology alone cannot safeguard power from being overthrown.
Henry IV: ‘God save the King! Will no man say 
“Amen”?’ (Richard II, 4.1.163) 
The formal contrast between Richard II and the two parts of Henry IV 
could not be more marked. Richard II is a play which contains no prose 
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and in which even gardeners and common citizens speak in blank verse. 
I have suggested that the formality of the language in Richard II refl ects 
Richard’s ideological absolutism; every character in the play speaks in 
the King’s chosen idiom as if they were caught in a monolithic Orwellian 
state that closely regulates language. In complete contrast, Henry IV 
features scenes of sustained prose in which the King’s own son, Hal, 
indulges in the discourse of tavern banter. Henry IV cannot boast the 
same poetic mastery as Richard II; as he says in the opening lines of 1 
Henry IV, he is more prone to ‘breathe short-winded accents’ (1.1.3) 
than to construct exquisite extended metaphors. The discursive hetero-
geneity of Henry IV refl ects the King’s ideological weakness – he cannot 
even control his son’s behaviour, let alone the rest of his subjects. It is 
worth remembering that Henry’s ideological weakness is exacerbated 
by the fact that he is a usurper. The offi cial ideology of Richard’s reign 
was not only maintained by the mastery of language but also buttressed 
by its legitimacy. As Leonard Tennenhouse notes, ‘few if any monarchs 
in the entire sequence of history plays are represented at the outset of 
their dramas with a more secure claim to the throne [than Richard]’.44 
Rackin makes a similar point: ‘Richard is the only king in the two 
tetralogies with an unambiguous hereditary claim to the throne rooted 
in an uncontrolled genealogy and ratifi ed by divine right’.45 By contrast, 
Henry IV, in Catherine Belsey’s words, ‘is not morally or legally enti-
tled to the throne he holds’.46 In 1399, when Richard was deposed, the 
House of Plantagenet had ruled England uninterrupted for 246 years, 
during which they had established a strong feudal ideology; this legacy 
was broken by Henry’s usurpation. In effect, Henry has to start again: 
to build a new ideology that ratifi es his authority almost from scratch. If 
Richard II exposes the limits of the ideology of monarchy when it is not 
supported by physical action or violence, Henry IV demonstrates how 
important ideology can be for those in power. Here is the ‘constant dou-
bleness’ Rossiter speaks of in action: Richard and Henry are two sides 
of a classic Shakespearean dialectic. The situation in Henry IV is the 
inverse of that of Richard II; where Richard was a king who maintained 
his power exclusively by asserting his ideological authority, Henry relies 
on his military might to subdue those who would oppose him. James L. 
Calderwood makes the astute observation that after Richard’s usurpa-
tion ‘rhetoric, lacking the automatic sovereignty of poetry, earns its keep 
in action, substituting for inherent validity an achieved validity’.47 When 
Bolingbroke becomes Henry IV, language is drained of its ideological 
signifi cance, because it is no longer in the service of power.
In his fi rst scene as king, near the end of Richard II, Henry IV elects 
simply to eliminate the remainder of Richard’s supporters; as one might 
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expect, he promises to visit ‘destruction’ (5.4.137) upon them. However, 
the way he deals with his fi rst real decision as king just prior to this is 
interesting. York reveals that his son, Aumerle, had been part of a con-
spiracy to assassinate Henry at Oxford and provides the letter he took 
from him in 5.2 as evidence (5.3.48). Henry’s immediate reaction is to 
resort to type as the man of action; he draws his sword and threatens 
to kill Aumerle. Aumerle’s mother, the Duchess of York, soon arrives 
begging for her son’s life. When Henry asks, ‘What shrill-voiced suppli-
ant makes this eager cry?’, the Duchess replies by taking a gamble and 
rhyming with the King’s line: ‘A woman, and thy aunt, great King: ’tis 
I.’ She then rhymes her next two lines. In a reversal of Richard’s con-
sistent refusal to comply with the rhymes of his mere subjects, Henry 
immediately accepts the rhyme scheme offered him (5.3.77–80), which 
continues for the rest of the scene. In his fi rst scene as king, Henry allows 
one of his subjects to dictate the form of the proceedings – something 
unimaginable under Richard. The other point of note here is how few 
lines Henry has in comparison with York and his wife. He has several 
curtailed lines of only two feet, all of which are repetitions of the 
same command: ‘Rise up, good aunt’ (5.3.89), ‘Good aunt, stand up’ 
(5.3.109, 127). The intended effect is perhaps comic (as is suggested by 
the couplet ‘Our scene is altered from a serious thing / And now changed 
to “The Beggar and the King”’ (5.3.77–8)), but it is not insignifi cant that 
the Duchess not only dictates what the scene has changed into, but also 
actually disobeys the King three times by staying on her knees, despite 
his repeated command for her to rise. In fact, she only rises once she 
has obtained and made absolutely certain of her objective. Henry fi rst 
pardons Aumerle at 5.3.129, which prompts both York and Aumerle to 
rise, but the Duchess stays on her knees and insists that the King ‘speak 
it again’ (5.3.131), which he does: ‘I pardon him / With all my heart’ 
(5.3.134). Only now does the Duchess rise to her feet. On the face of 
it, Henry looks in supreme command here. He has three people begging 
at his feet, one of them more loyal to him than his own son and the 
other two begging for that son’s life. This is enough for Tennenhouse to 
declare it a display of supreme political mastery: ‘in one scene . . . [Henry 
IV] shows both sides of the coin of power: he vows to exercise unlimited 
force in the interest of the state, and he displays generosity in the interest 
of the blood’.48 However, this overlooks the Duchess’s subtle poetic and 
psychological control of the scene; she demonstrates that Henry’s power 
is malleable. Henry has good strategic reasons for pardoning Aumerle: 
as Tennenhouse notes in his appraisal, it is an act of mercy to show that 
he is not a tyrant and it potentially gains him a dependable subject who 
now owes his life to him. Nevertheless, in allowing the Duchess to speak 
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some forty-four lines of dialogue – during which she interpellates him 
into her rhyme scheme, disobeys him three times and then manages to 
get him to repeat a decree – Henry allows himself to be manipulated. 
In his fi rst ideological test, then, Henry fi nds himself outmanœuvred, 
just as he was outmanœuvred by Richard during the fi rst three acts of 
the play. The contrast between this moment of careless leadership and 
Richard’s masterful poetic command over his subjects (and over his 
imagination in the remaining scenes of the play) cannot be overstated. If 
Henry is to have success on the throne, he needs to fi nd both an ideology 
and an appropriate discourse in which to administer his power.
By the start of 1 Henry IV, Henry has come to realise more fully the 
importance of ideology to the task of containing and regulating the 
disparate competing elements of a nation.49 As Graham Holderness 
has convincingly argued, even in 1.1, Henry IV ‘demonstrates what 
we would call in twentieth-century terms a clear understanding of the 
importance of ideology in ruling a state full of internal disharmony 
and civil confl ict’.50 We fi nd him weary of civil war and yearning for 
some degree of national harmony. Throughout his opening speech, he 
emphasises unity and conformity, arguing that his subjects are ‘all of one 
nature, of one substance bred’ (1.1.11) and therefore should ‘march all 
one way, and be no more opposed’ (1.1.15). Ostensibly, Henry might 
be wishing for peace for the good of the commonwealth here, but he 
makes no secret of his true motive for wishing to end the civil confl ict: 
‘The edge of war, like an ill-sheathèd knife, / No more shall cut his 
master’ (1.1.17–18). The ‘master’ is not England but Henry. As long as 
his subjects are embroiled in confl ict he cannot hope to recreate the per-
vasive ideological discourse that helped maintain Richard’s power while 
he was king. Henry knows that, unlike his militarily weak predecessor, 
he can put down rebellions by force if necessary, but he would much 
prefer to preclude that possibility by the use of soft power. In fact, unless 
he can bring the rebels to heel by ideological means (so that they do not 
wish to rebel in the fi rst place), his reign is destined to be a miserable 
series of trouble-shooting battles, putting down one rebellion here just 
as another breaks out elsewhere. The need for some measure of ideologi-
cal support is paramount. However, Henry faces an interesting problem: 
ideologies are only truly effective at regulating subjects once they are 
up and running, so having just succeeded in dismantling the old ideol-
ogy, how does one go about instituting a new one? After defeating such 
an ideologically profi cient king, Henry faces the daunting prospect of 
coming up with an ideology that has to rival what Richard had to offer.
His plan, concocted at the end of Richard II (5.5.45–52), is to play 
to his strengths and make a virtue out of action – the sphere in which 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   195 17/02/2012   12:23
 196    Shakespeare’s History Plays
he most excels. He proposes to lead a crusade to Jerusalem, thereby 
uniting the warring factions of his nation against a common, foreign and 
heathen enemy. Again, Henry’s true motives for this proposed crusade 
are transparent; they are, as Ronald Knowles notes, ‘as far removed 
from authentic piety as the Jerusalem chamber in which he dies is from 
Jerusalem itself’.51 Even though the idea fi rst comes to him as a means of 
absolving himself of guilt (at the end of Richard II), by 1.1 of 1 Henry 
IV the only motivate is political. To underline the point, Henry reveals 
his true intentions to Hal before his death near the end of 2 Henry IV. 
He tells his son
To lead out many to the Holy Land,
Lest rest and lying still make them look
Too near unto my state.
Therefore, my Harry,
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels . . .
 (4.3.338–42)
The strategy is clear: distract the subjects at home with the promise of 
conquest abroad. Whereas Richard based his ideological strategy on 
formal and ritualistic language, Henry’s ideology is based mainly on the 
spectacle of action and its potential to distract. It is a sort of medieval 
‘shock and awe’ policy: to cause enough carnage abroad for the people 
eventually to forget the initial causes of the war or cease to worry about 
such academic matters as how Henry ‘came by the crown’ (2 Henry 
IV, 4.3.346). The sophistication of Henry’s ideological understanding 
is remarkable. We might even say that Henry’s plan anticipates the 
perpetual war of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.52 Just as in Orwell’s 
novel, where it does not matter if the war is with Oceania or Eurasia, in 
the Henriad it does not matter if the war is with Jerusalem or France (as 
it is in Henry V). The important factor is that there is a foreign enemy far 
from home; and, just as in Orwell, Henry’s strategy relies on his subjects 
to ‘double-think’ themselves not only into wanting to win such a war 
but also into forgetting that he obtained the crown by usurpation.
However, political understanding is not the same thing as political 
execution. At the start of 1 Henry IV, the King has been contemplating 
his crusade for ‘twelve month[s]’ (1.1.28). Immediately after outlining 
his plan, Henry receives news that one of his supporters, Mortimer, 
has been ‘taken’ (1.1.41) by ‘the irregular and wild [Owain] Glyndŵr’ 
(1.1.40) with ‘a thousand of his people butchered’ (1 Henry IV, 1.1.42), 
which forces him to delay its implementation even longer. Henry, with a 
hint of irritation, puts his plans for the crusade back on the shelf: ‘And 
for this cause awhile we must neglect / Our holy purpose to Jerusalem’ 
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(1.1.100–1). With his long-term master-strategy on hold, Henry must 
come up with a plan B for the short term. He is forced to rely on the 
physical power of his supporters to quell further rebellions militarily 
while invoking the much weaker ideology of ‘honour’ to prevent further 
disharmony. To this end, he praises Harry ‘Hotspur’ Percy (who at this 
point is still fi ghting for him, under the command of Sir Walter Blunt, 
against Scottish rebel forces) for being ‘the theme of honour’s tongue’ 
(1.1.80). It is worth pausing here to consider what Henry means by 
‘honour’. Henry appears to see virtue in Hotspur’s exploits in action, on 
the fi eld of battle. But Percy is honourable chiefl y because he is fi ghting 
for the King against ‘riot and dishonour’ (1.1.84). Thus, Henry attempts 
to create a new ideology of ‘honour’ of which he is the sole legitimat-
ing source. ‘Honour’ implies engaging in combat – the King’s preferred 
mode of power – on behalf of the King and taking action in arms against 
the King constitutes ‘dishonour’. This is a much cruder form of ideology 
than Richard II’s sophisticated and insidious web of regulatory poetics 
or Henry’s own much-delayed master-plan. But, lacking both time and 
his predecessor’s subtle command of language, Henry has few other 
options.
The extent of Henry’s ideological weakness is demonstrated in the 
next scene, where we fi rst meet Hal and Falstaff, who are engaged in 
banter. In this fi rst exchange, Falstaff and the Prince claim to be, not the 
King’s men, but ‘the moon’s men’ (1.2.28) stealing through the night to 
snatch ‘a purse of gold’ (1.2.30) with which to buy sack or the services 
of the local tavern wench. This is as far from the ideology of combat and 
‘honour’, which we have just seen the King trying to institute, as it is 
possible to get. They go on to mock the changeability of the law. Falstaff 
jokes about how, once Hal becomes king, he shall be responsible for 
hanging thieves, to which Hal answers, ‘No, thou shalt’ (1.2.55). In the 
imagined realm of Hal’s future, the law is as mutable as the imaginary 
fi gures of Richard II’s cell. As in 5.5 of Richard II, where a king can 
become a beggar in a breath, here a known thief can become a hangman 
(the law’s executioner) or, if we are to believe that Hal has engaged in 
thieving as well,53 even a future king (the maker of law) in an instant. 
We glimpse here an instance of the power of ‘bare imagination’ (Richard 
II, 1.3.260), of which Gaunt failed to persuade his thoroughly materi-
alist son, the present King, in the previous play. By not taking the law 
seriously, Falstaff and Hal expose how fragile it can be and how easily 
it comes undone when it is challenged by those of a criminal mindset.
Neither the trick that Hal and Poins plan to play on Falstaff after 
his exit (1.2.142–71), nor Hal’s cold soliloquy in which he promises 
to ‘throw off’ (1.2.186) his current companions once he becomes king, 
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serves to undermine the fact that Falstaff has just planned a robbery 
in front of the Prince of Wales. Even if Hal’s talk of ‘imitat[ing] the 
sun’ (1.2.175) to break through the ‘foul and ugly mists’ (1.2.180) of 
his alehouse cronies distances him from Falstaff, it does not bring him 
any closer to his father. It is, in fact, an oblique allusion to a similar 
speech by Richard II in which he compares himself to the sun ‘rising on 
our throne, the east’, the ‘searching eye of heaven’ that ‘darts his light 
through every guilty hole’ to seek out the ‘thieves and robbers’ who 
lurk in them (Richard II, 3.2.46, 33–9). By comparing himself to the 
sun while speaking in blank verse, Hal not only echoes the imagery and 
formal language of Richard II, but also evokes his style of ideological 
leadership. As if to underscore the point, Hal ends the speech by dem-
onstrating a fl ash of poetic mastery: he ends it with a heroic couplet, 
rhyming ‘skill’ with ‘will’. Hal’s linguistic play in this scene begins to 
rival Richard’s. He slips from the laddish prose of tavern banter to quasi-
symbolic poetry in a matter of moments. The important thing to note in 
this scene is that it creates an undertone for the rest of the play (and its 
sequel); whatever Hal’s true motives, his actions and, more importantly, 
the two discourses in which he has chosen to operate (Falstaff’s lawless 
irony and Richard II’s image-laden poetry) are sharply at odds with the 
ideology of honour in action that his father is so desperately trying to 
establish. Hal has already displayed at least as much ideological insight 
as Henry and, undoubtedly, a greater degree of verbal dexterity; all of 
which suggests that, up to this point, Hal is playing a selfi sh game. He 
has his own future image in mind, not the King’s. In fact, if either of 
the discourses that Hal emulates in this scene were to take hold of the 
popular consciousness at large, Henry would face certain usurpation – 
which, at this time, does not seem to have occurred to the self-seeking, 
hedonistic Prince.
With these ideas in mind, the next scene jolts us back into the King’s 
court. Henry is in a foul mood. Still lacking a fully functional ideology, 
he resolves to be ‘mighty and to be feared’ (1.3.6). He realises that his 
mild temperament, ‘which hath been smooth as oil’ (1.3.7), will not 
grant him the ‘title of respect’ (1.3.9) in the climate of honour and action 
that he has been trying to foster. Henry has chosen this moment to reas-
sert himself as the fi gurehead of this new ideology of honour, but frus-
tration and anger get the better of him. He suddenly snaps at Worcester, 
interrupting Northumberland at 1.3.14 to dismiss him in no uncertain 
terms. Hotspur’s refusal to release prisoners, taken at the recent battle 
in Holmedon, until the King pays Glyndŵr for the ransom of Mortimer, 
the Earl of March (who had been named as Richard II’s heir), causes the 
King to lose his temper altogether (1.3.76–91). Henry not only demands 
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the release of the prisoners, but also accuses Mortimer of being a rebel 
and refuses to believe that he fought with Glyndŵr. Before leaving, he 
issues a direct order and a veiled threat to Percy: ‘Send us your prison-
ers, or you’ll hear of it’ (1.3.122). He exits before Hotspur can answer. 
Here we see the collapse of an incomplete ideology; Henry issues an 
order and Hotspur not only fl atly disobeys it, but also ends the scene 
resolved to combat the King in order to get his own way. Henry’s action-
packed defeat of Richard II has created a momentary tear in the ideo-
logical fabric of the nation in which power, being maintained by ‘might’ 
alone, can be disputed by physical action at almost any time. Hotspur 
levels a torrent of abuse at the King; he repeatedly attacks his honour, 
calling Henry ‘unthankful’ (1.3.134), ‘ingrate and cankered’ (1.3.135), 
‘murderous’ (1.3.161) and a ‘vile politician’ (1.3.239). When ideol-
ogy works it moves silently and out of sight, on an unconscious level. 
If the subjects notice its subtle manœuvrings (before the fi nal moment 
of ‘Amen’), much of its power is undone. Not only is Henry’s problem 
that he is endeavouring to carry out the extraordinarily diffi cult task of 
establishing a new ideological dispensation, it is also that, in choosing 
‘honour’ as his model, he has chosen what Raymond Williams would 
call a ‘residual culture’,54 which has an easily identifi able precedent 
in the not too distant past. Holderness has argued that Bolingbroke / 
Henry IV himself represents this residual culture, the ‘older order’, from 
the start of Richard II,55 but I would argue that Henry only co-opts this 
ideology of honour in action as a last-minute necessity. This explains 
why Hotspur feels so at ease in challenging the King on his own 
ideological turf. He attacks Henry by dismissing his claims to honour – 
which, earlier, in 1.1, served as the authority that legitimised Hotspur’s 
honour – and supplanting it with his own brand of honour. If the King 
plans to march ‘from the east unto the west’ to attack Glyndŵr, Percy 
promises that his ‘honour [will] cross [Henry] from the north to south’ 
(1.3.193–4). He casts himself as the saviour of honour, vowing to ‘pluck 
up drownèd honour by the locks’ in order to ‘redeem her’ (1.3.203–4). 
This is a doubly crushing blow for Henry, because ‘gallant Hotspur’ 
(1.1.52) was supposed to be his prototype, the exemplary soldier of the 
king of action, the ‘theme of honour’s tongue’ (1.180). The one man 
on whom Henry had pinned his hopes has cruelly rebuffed him, further 
weakening his position. Plainly, Henry’s ideological strategy to date has 
been a resounding failure.
When Hal visits his father in 3.2, the King is still in a fragile state of 
mind. Hal’s dalliances with ‘rude society’ (3.2.14), the ‘vulgar company’ 
(3.2.41) of Falstaff and his followers, draws attention to the fact that 
he has failed to bring ideological unity to England during his reign. It 
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is interesting to see how Henry views his usurpation of Richard. He 
argues that he ‘won’ the crown by the ‘rareness’ of his appearances and 
the ‘solemnity’ (3.2.59) of his demeanour and he derides Richard as a 
‘skipping King’ (3.2.60) who ‘enfeoffed himself to popularity’ (3.2.69) 
and left himself open to be swayed by fl attery. Even in retrospect, Henry 
is unwilling to recognise Richard’s ideological achievements. He plays 
down Richard’s control over his subjects:
He was but as the cuckoo is in June,
Heard, not regarded, seen but with such eyes
As, sick and blunted with community,
Afford no extraordinary gaze
Such as is bent on sun-like majesty 
When it shines seldom in admiring eyes,
But rather drowsed and hung their eyelids down,
Slept in his face, and rendered such aspect
As cloudy men use to their adversaries,
Being with his presence glutted, gorged, and full.
 (3.2.75–84)
Henry’s analysis of Richard’s reign does not tally with what we saw in 
Richard II. Henry seems to forget Richard’s impressive display of ideo-
logical power at Coventry (to which he was banished) and how easily 
he contained his father’s (Gaunt’s) political objections. Henry seems 
incapable of distinguishing between conscious personal relations and 
the unconsciously coercive power of ideology. Richard’s subjects may 
not have been aware of his poetic power, but their spoken discourse 
had to obey the strictures of its form. Henry glosses over the fact that 
he defeated the King by using the threat of physical violence and, ulti-
mately, by murdering him.
Even though Henry understands the importance of ideology, his 
instincts still tend toward action. Henry compares Hal to Richard: ‘in 
that very line, Harry, standest thou’ (3.2.85); ‘For all the world, / As 
thou art to this hour was Richard then’ (3.2.93–4). As we have seen, 
the King has a point: when Hal shifts from the prose of the alehouse 
to the poetry of the royal court, he refl ects Richard’s image rather than 
Henry’s. The thought is enough to make the King weep. Henry tells Hal 
that, on current form, Hotspur is a better candidate than him to inherit 
the throne, because he has acquitted himself in action on the battlefi eld. 
Henry emphasises military might as the key ingredient of kingship: the 
ability to lead men ‘to bloody battles, and to bruising arms’ (3.2.105). 
Of course, this is a rearticulation of his short-term ideological strategy 
of honour in action. It is a simple message: to beget ‘never-dying honour’ 
(3.2.106) one must perform ‘high deeds . . . in arms’ (3.2.107–8) in the 
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name of the king. After the loss of his favourite general, Hotspur, Henry 
needs Hal both on side and fully subscribed to his ideology in order to 
maintain his supremacy in action. He tells Hal bluntly that if he con-
tinues to ape Richard II, and to waste time with Falstaff, he might as 
well ‘fi ght against [him] under Percy’s pay’ (3.2.126). This goads Hal 
into action and he promises to kill Hotspur. Henry wastes no time in 
giving him an army and, after Walter Blunt arrives, gets straight to the 
business of military tactics. As soon as Hal is on side, Henry is happy to 
busy himself in action, which is clearly the area in which he feels most 
empowered. We are even treated to a poetic fl ourish from him at the 
end of the scene as he ends his military speech with a rhyme: ‘Our hands 
are full of business; let’s away. / Advantage feeds him fat while men 
delay’ (3.2.179–80). With the prospect of battle ahead, the King is in his 
element, momentarily distracted from the ideological concerns that have 
long dogged his reign.
However, the play’s discursive composition highlights the fact that 
different ideologies are competing for hegemony and, however much 
Henry seeks refuge in action, that situation will not change until the 
King fi nds an ideological solution. A king is revealed in 1 Henry IV 
who has a fairly secure grip on the throne in material and military terms 
but who is, none the less, ideologically weak. In contrast to the relative 
hegemony of Richard’s formal discourse, we have already encountered 
three subversive discourses that threaten to undo the King’s makeshift 
ideology of honour in action: fi rst, there is Falstaff’s cynical, insubordi-
nate wit, which is heedless of the law and can never be pinned down to 
a stable point of view; second, there is the residual echo of Richard II’s 
linguistic absolutism sounded in Hal’s soliloquy, which is diametrically 
opposed to Henry’s ideological mode; and, third, there is Hotspur’s rival 
brand of honour, which inverts Henry’s. To these we can add a fourth: 
the pseudo-mystical accents found in Owain Glyndŵr’s Welsh castle – 
‘a land of miracles and music’, as Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin 
put it, ‘an outlandish world of idleness and illicit pleasure’56 – accents 
which we hear in one of the strangest scenes in all the history plays. 
Here, Glyndŵr claims that the earth shook when he was born (3.1.22), 
while Mortimer’s wife sings in Welsh and Hotspur lays his head on Lady 
Percy’s lap. During this scene, the rebels draw up plans to divide British 
lands between themselves amid incidental talk of commanding ‘the devil’ 
(3.1.54). Clearly, there is a culture clash taking place in this scene. In a 
quick private exchange with Mortimer, Hotspur reveals that he is in two 
minds about working with Glyndŵr: ‘Sometimes he angers me / With 
telling me of the moldwarp and the ant, / Of the dreamer Merlin and his 
prophecies’ (3.1.144–5). Hotspur is uncomfortable at this  mingling of 
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two distinct discourses, because it shakes his own ideological certainty, 
it ‘puts [him] from [his] faith’ (3.1.151). The slow seduction of the 
Welsh lady’s song lulls the English contingent into a passive slumber. 
It is almost as if Glyndŵr is trying to interpellate his allies into his own 
ideological fi efdom. The attempt seems to have some effect on Hotspur, 
because he repeatedly asks his wife to follow suit: ‘Come, Kate, I’ll have 
your song too’ (3.1.241). After she refuses, Hotspur is insistent, speak-
ing eleven lines in an attempt to rouse Lady Percy into song. Again, she 
fl atly denies him: ‘I will not sing’ (3.1.254). Lady Percy’s obstinacy para-
doxically intensifi es our sense of how quickly and hopelessly Mortimer 
and Hotspur fi nd themselves succumbing to – or rather being seduced by 
– Glyndŵr’s subversive Welsh ideology. In a single brief scene, Glyndŵr 
almost succeeds in doing something that Henry IV has failed to do thus 
far in the play: to convert others to his own ideological system. The sug-
gestion is that – with the right poetic mastery, that is, the verbal control 
of form, here induced by the Welsh lady’s song – it can be done.
I have argued that King Henry’s chief problem in the two parts of 
Henry IV is ideological. Lacking both the necessary linguistic skills to 
rule through discourse and the stability to embark on a crusade, he is 
forced to make do with an ideology of honour that relies on action to 
be effective. The differences between this conception of honour and 
Richard II’s web of formal language as instruments of hegemony are 
clear to see. During Richard’s reign, the King ruled by decree alone. 
He was his own source of legitimation, which is to say that he ruled 
simply by virtue of being king; Richard was intrinsically powerful. By 
contrast, the ideology of honour requires constant action from the king 
or his representatives to legitimate itself. It is an ideology in which the 
king is not intrinsically superior to his subjects but sits on the throne 
by virtue of his ‘deeds’ (1 Henry IV, 3.2.107). As an ideological strat-
egy it relies on a constant supply of battles in which the king and his 
men can replenish their stock of honour. Therefore, Henry’s mode of 
power can only function in wartime. This is why Henry, despite being 
embroiled in a civil war for his entire reign and slowly disfi gured by 
leprosy, still hankers after his foreign crusade in 2 Henry IV: ‘And were 
these inward wars once out of hand, / We would, dear lords, unto the 
Holy Land’ (3.1.102–3). However, Shakespeare shows that an ideology 
that relies on constant action can be easily outmanœuvred by one that 
relies on discourse. At the start of 2 Henry IV, the King faces a new 
enemy: Rumour. Before the action of the play even begins, Shakespeare 
inserts the personifi cation of Rumour, who relates a spurious version 
of the events dramatised in the previous play in which Hotspur defeats 
Hal. Interestingly, the allegorical fi gure wears a robe that is ‘painted 
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full of tongues’ (1.1.1), an image that ties him closely to the rhetoric of 
Richard II’s reign. By introducing the fi gure of Rumour, Shakespeare 
not only fosters a sense of contingency in these plays (as I suggested in 
Chapter 6), but also draws attention to the constructedness and ideo-
logical nature of history. Actions and events have no signifi cance until 
they are recorded by history – the issue of paramount importance is not 
what happened, but what the ‘wav’ring multitude’ (2 Henry IV, 1.1.19) 
believes to have happened. What matters is not the ability to kill people 
but, as Falstaff can attest, the ability to make people believe that you 
have. This is a central tenet of effective ideology, which seems to elude 
Henry until his death: the ability to control discourses. Henry is made to 
pay for his neglect of language as a tool of ideological power; his victo-
ries in the heat of battle mean little without a corresponding victory in 
the discourse of domination.
Falstaff
Of all the ideological strategies on offer in the fractured and ‘poor 
kingdom’ (2 Henry IV, 4.2.261) of Henry IV, Falstaff’s is by far the 
most interesting. As we have seen, in general the dominant ideology 
works insidiously to ensure that its subjects are constrained in such a 
way that most of their thoughts and utterances reinforce the power that 
it serves. When ideology is effective, even conscious dissidents, such as 
Gaunt in Richard II, struggle to articulate their grievances in a way that 
would have a discernible ideological impact, because they are forced to 
voice them using the offi cial discourses of power. The only means of 
defeating ideology that we have seen to date (when Bolingbroke usurped 
Richard II) is by the threat of action or, more specifi cally, physical 
violence. Despite all this, Falstaff seems to see through all ideological 
illusions. He is unique in the second tetralogy because he appears to do 
what he wants, when he wants, in the manner of his own choosing. In 
other words, he seems to occupy a place outside of ideology; as he says 
himself, ‘I live out of all order, out of all compass’ (3.3.16–17). This 
is, potentially, radically subversive. Falstaff could be taken, as he is by 
Wyndham Lewis, as a ‘psychological liberator’;57 if he were to put his 
energies toward a social purpose greater than lining his own pockets 
to purchase sack, he might even incite a rebellion. But, unlike someone 
such as Jack Cade (who, in a previous play, sought the complete ideo-
logical destruction of Henry VI’s England), Falstaff relies on exploiting 
the system he understands so well almost exclusively for his own profi t, 
pleasure and social advancement. Falstaff has all the tools an individual 
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might need to challenge the dominant ideology, but lacks the utopian 
vision – and the inclination – to do anything with them. Falstaff’s unique 
mode of being is not so much an ideology as it is a self-sustaining sur-
vival strategy that permits him to do as he pleases.
This survival strategy rests on two points of understanding: fi rst, that 
ideology is a man-made construct to which there is nothing physically 
binding him; and second, that ideology relies entirely on what Althusser 
calls ‘the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real existence’.58 
Barbara Hodgdon has argued that Falstaff, ‘more than any other, is well 
aware that the counterfeit – the reproduced image of the authentic – has 
no value until it is put into circulation and exchanged’.59 He certainly 
understands that the value of an object depends entirely on what people 
think it is worth; hence his ability to ‘turn diseases to commodity’ (2 
Henry IV, 1.2.227). But the depth of Falstaff’s understanding goes much 
further than the nature of value; he realises that the law, the aristocracy, 
the crown, the nation and any other such ideological constructs are fun-
damentally imaginary – they exist inside people’s minds. This is perhaps 
why he routinely transgresses the law and also why he tells so many lies: 
perception is all that truly matters. The best articulation of this realisa-
tion is found in Falstaff’s famous critique of honour:
Well, ’tis no matter; honour pricks me on. Yea, but how if honour prick 
me off when I come on? How then? Can honour set-to a leg? No. Or an 
arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in 
surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word. What is in that word ‘honour’? 
What is that ‘honour’? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? He that died 
o’Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. ’Tis insensible then? 
Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction 
will not suffer it. Therefore I’ll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon. And 
so ends my catechism.
(1 Henry IV, 5.1.129–39)
Falstaff sees through Henry’s ideological strategy and grasps immedi-
ately the fact that it is not designed with his best interests in mind but 
the King’s. By deciding that he will have ‘none of it’, Falstaff actualises 
in practice the theory of ‘bare imagination’ fi rst suggested by Gaunt 
(Richard II, 1.3.260) and developed by Richard II (Richard II, 5.5.1–
41).
Falstaff’s realisation shows how easily ideology can come unstuck. As 
Catherine Belsey says, he ‘consistently represents the refusal of monar-
chic order’.60 Throughout 1 Henry IV, Falstaff mercilessly exploits 
the King’s ideological system, ‘misuses the King’s press’ (1 Henry IV, 
4.2.12), for his own profi t. He avoids a fi ght with Douglas by playing 
dead and then claims credit for killing Hotspur by relying on his friend-
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ship with Hal. Falstaff shows that, in Henry’s system of honour, a 
combination of clever individual choices and persuasion can achieve the 
same results as actually doing an ‘honourable’ deed: ‘the better part of 
valour is discretion’ (1 Henry IV, 5.4.117–18). Falstaff shows how an 
individual can slip through the many loopholes in ideology right under 
the noses of those in power. In 2 Henry IV, the King has to rely on the 
physical intervention of the Lord Chief Justice to keep an eye on Falstaff 
– we are a long way from Foucault’s Panopticon here. And while the 
Lord Chief Justice does cause Falstaff a new problem in 2 Henry IV, the 
latter is still able to claim credit for the capture of Sir John Colville (2 
Henry IV, 4.2) to swindle Robert Shallow out of ‘a thousand pound[s]’ 
(2 Henry IV, 5.5.70). It is debatable whether he would get away with 
such schemes under a more ideologically driven king such as Richard II.
Undoubtedly, Falstaff passes on his subtle understanding of ideol-
ogy to Hal, albeit through osmosis rather than direct teaching. This 
is evidenced throughout Henry V, where Harry not only successfully 
synthesises the contrasting strategies of his two predecessors – resurrect-
ing the formal control of Richard II while fi nally executing his father’s 
master-plan of the foreign crusade – but also puts the skills he learned 
in the alehouse to good use when dealing with the likes of Pistol and 
Captain Fluellen. More specifi cally, he inherits from Falstaff the insight 
that the perception of his subjects is all that truly matters. He is a king 
who will stop at nothing to ‘feel other men’s minds’ (Henry V, 4.1.119). 
The best example of this is the masterful scene from which that quota-
tion is taken. In it he disguises himself in Sir Thomas Erpingham’s cloak 
in order to gauge the opinion of his soldiers. Harry slips into prose, and 
probes Bates and Williams about their reaction to the prospect of dying 
in the forthcoming battle with the French. Shortly afterwards, in the 
blank verse of soliloquy, we fi nd him echoing Falstaff’s attitude when 
he wonders about the shallow ideological function of royal ceremony:
And what art thou, thou idol ceremony? . . . 
O ceremony, show me but thy worth.
What is thy soul of adoration?
Art thou aught else but place, degree, and form,
Creating awe and fear in other men?
 (Henry V, 4.1.222, 226–9)
Just as Falstaff can see ‘honour’ for what it is – an illusory tool used to 
compel men to go willingly to their deaths – Harry is able to demystify 
the ceremony of kingship. As if to underline the point, Shakespeare links 
the two speeches grammatically by rephrasing Falstaff’s question and 
answer ‘Can honour set-to a leg? No’ (1 Henry IV, 5.1.130) as ‘Canst 
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thou [ceremony], when thou command’st the beggar’s knee, / Command 
the health of it? No’ (Henry V, 4.1.238–9). The key difference between 
Falstaff and King Harry is that the former exposes the ideology of 
honour and elects to have ‘none of it’ (1 Henry IV, 5.1.139), whereas the 
latter, despite realising the true nature of ceremony, can understand that 
it is necessary ‘to maintain the peace’ (Henry V, 4.1265) and accepts it 
as his royal duty.
The question of Hal’s rejection of Falstaff at the end of 2 Henry 
IV – as well as the question of where the play ultimately intends the 
audience’s sympathies to lie – has long been seen as vital to understand-
ing the second tetralogy. Indeed, as Empson remarks, ‘the question of 
whether Falstaff is a coward may be said to have started the whole 
snowball of modern Shakespearean criticism’.61 Stephen Greenblatt’s 
famous argument that the Henriad works to contain its subversive ele-
ments hinges on it:
The subversive voices are produced by and within the affi rmations of order; 
they are powerfully registered, but they do not undermine that order . . . 
Shakespeare refuses to endorse so baldly cynical a conception of the social 
order [as Falstaff’s]; instead actions that should have the effect of radically 
undermining authority turn out to be the props of that authority . . . We are 
invited to take measure of [Henry IV’s] suffering, to understand . . . the costs 
of power. And we are invited to understand those costs in order to ratify the 
power, to accept the grotesque and cruelly unequal distribution of posses-
sions: everything to the few, nothing to the many . . . The play appears to 
ratify the established order, with the new-crowned Henry V merging his body 
into ‘the great body of our state’, with Falstaff despised and rejected.62
There are a number of points of contention here. First, Greenblatt writes 
as if Henry IV’s fl edgling ideological order – which, as I have argued, 
is consistently portrayed as being so fragile that the King has to resort 
to physical violence to maintain control, and consistently exploited 
by Falstaff – deliberately creates the disorderly and subversive forces 
that keep Henry awake at night. It seems much more likely to me that 
Falstaff and others are able to exploit a situation that has arisen because 
of the King’s weak ideological position and his inability to control his 
subjects without resorting to repressive apparatuses such as the Lord 
Chief Justice. To say that Henry IV’s state ‘produces’ its own subversive 
elements is akin to saying that a bank that has failed to secure its vaults 
‘produces’ its own robberies. Greenblatt’s assessment vastly overesti-
mates the level of Henry’s ideological control over the state. Second, 
while we are undoubtedly invited to understand the costs of power, it 
does not follow that therefore we are invited to accept that power. We 
were also invited in previous plays to ‘take measure’ of the suffering of 
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Jack Cade, Henry VI, the Duke of York, John of Gaunt and Richard 
II, so, by Greenblatt’s logic, are we to ‘ratify’ each of these character’s 
positions despite their being in most cases politically and ideologically 
opposed? Finally, it is diffi cult to see how Falstaff’s subversive actions 
have become ‘the props of authority’ at the end of 2 Henry IV and 
debatable whether he is indeed ‘despised’.
My view is that Hal rejects Falstaff not because he dislikes him or 
because he wishes to reject his lifestyle, but for one strategic reason born 
of the deep ideological understanding he has inherited from his former 
friend and for one more personal reason. The fi rst is that he could not 
hope to cultivate the image of ideal monarchy with Falstaff at his court. 
Hal knows that Falstaff’s entire survival strategy is built upon the exploi-
tation of ideology; were he to trust him to enter his circle of power, it 
would only be a matter of time before Falstaff would exploit and seek 
to profi t from that trust. Hal knows that, however successful he may 
become in uniting the nation under a single ideological vision, Falstaff 
will see through it and learn its rules, only to disobey them for his own 
advantage. It is not so much a rejection as a tacit acknowledgement of 
the fact that Falstaff is too wily a character to have at close quarters – or 
even within a ‘ten mile’ (2 Henry IV, 5.5.63) radius – when one is trying 
to establish ideological hegemony. The second, more personal reason 
for the rejection is that, as well as thinking for the good of the nation 
himself, Hal actually has Falstaff’s own interests in mind. While Falstaff 
would spell trouble for Hal at court, he would be relatively harmless if 
left to the taverns and alehouses where his subversive survival strategy 
could remain self-contained. By leaving Falstaff at the side of the road 
and banished from his sight, the new King covertly licenses him to carry 
on living the life to which he has been accustomed.63
Greenblatt is correct, therefore, to say that Falstaff is contained at 
the end of 2 Henry IV, but only to the extent that he was ‘contained’ 
by the terms of his own self-interest at the start of 1 Henry IV. Falstaff 
only subverts the ideological order for his own profi t and plainly har-
bours no revolutionary ambitions. However, read within the context of 
Shakespeare’s history plays, Falstaff can be read as ‘revolutionary’ in 
a different sense. He explicitly highlights an idea that Shakespeare has 
been developing throughout the history plays: that ideology is, fi rst, vital 
for those in power to control and maintain order among their subjects, 
and, second, only as strong as the degree to which people are willing, 
consciously or not, to subject themselves to it. This may seem obvious, 
but it is easier said than achieved; the hardest part of resisting ideology 
is realising that it is there at all. Thus in Richard II, when characters fi nd 
themselves ensnared in Richard’s linguistic web and unable to articulate 
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their grievances against the King, it is because they are caught in an 
ideological system of which they are unaware. It is also why Jack Cade’s 
appeal to ‘ancient freedom’ (2 Henry VI, 2.8.23–7) – which explicitly 
points out what Greenblatt calls ‘the grotesque and cruelly unequal 
distribution of possessions’ – falls on deaf ears. Althusser understood 
this: ‘one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the 
ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says “I am 
ideological”. It is necessary to be outside ideology . . . to be able to say: I 
am in ideology.’64 Falstaff is a character who can say ‘I am in ideology’, 
and in that statement lie the seeds of revolution. Belsey poses the right 
questions:
In the 1590s the revolutionary struggle was half a century away. Are the 
questions posed by Shakespeare’s history plays among the conditions, nev-
ertheless, of the possibility of that struggle? If so, we are entitled to read the 
plays not only as interrogating the absolutist claims of the Tudor present, but 
as raising a broader issue for the immediate future. This is the question that 
Brecht was to reformulate in another political crisis: ‘who does the world 
belong to?’ Who is entitled to property and power?65
Falstaff himself may not be a revolutionary, but he consistently exposes 
ideology as a construct designed to further the ends of those in power, 
and he resists it because he has more to gain by doing so; he dares to take 
that to which he is not ‘entitled’.
However, the true revolutionary here is surely Shakespeare. He 
replaces the providential view of history with a Machiavellian, humanist 
history in which nothing is sacred; there can be no certainties for those 
in power. Shakespeare’s historical drama is both secular and realist; 
entitlement gained through inheritance is not a divine right granted by 
God, but an advantage that can be lost by incompetence or maintained 
by careful strategy. In the fi rst tetralogy, Shakespeare deconstructs 
monarchic power, showing it to be mutable and contingent, and open 
to abuse by the fallible individuals upon whom it depends. He shows 
monarchy to be a system that generates widespread inequality and 
class resentment, and an ineffi cient method of placing those publicly 
minded individuals with the appropriate skills of governance in the 
seat of power. In the second tetralogy, he exposes the fact that those in 
power can only survive if they are supported by a manipulative ideol-
ogy and physical force, both of which can be resisted and challenged. In 
the 1590s, all this was laid bare on stage for monarchs and commoners 
alike to view and think about. Shakespeare’s is a historical drama that 
does not seek to ratify or subvert power, but simply to depict the actions 
of those in power for all to see and in the process demystify power; it 
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shows what is possible, what has and has not worked for other rulers 
in the past. What might be taken as a warning shot for those in power 
might also serve as a call to arms for the disenfranchised or aggrieved.66 
Shakespeare’s history plays offer unique and radical insights into the 
workings of power that can just as easily be used to support rebellions as 
they can be co-opted by the state. Rather than focusing on the question 
of whether the plays ultimately support or subvert the Tudor status quo, 
as cultural historicist studies to date have tended to do, perhaps it is time 
to turn instead to the question of precisely what those insights are. This 
cannot hope to be achieved by a critical practice that remains commit-
ted to an anti-humanist theoretical framework in which Shakespeare is 
treated as the symptom or product of wider social matrices, rather than 
as a creative individual capable of producing trenchant insights into the 
fundamental questions of historical causation and drawing inferences 
from the politics of his day that still resonate with the politics of our 
own time. This book has been a contribution to developing a critical 
practice that can do justice to the revelations these extraordinary plays 
are poised to offer us.
Notes
 1. A. P. Rossiter, Angel with Horns: Fifteen Lectures on Shakespeare, ed. 
Graham Storey (1961; New York: Longman, 1989), p. 63.
 2. Norman Rabkin, Shakespeare and the Common Understanding (London 
and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 81.
 3. The phrase ‘ABC of power’ is taken from a description of The Prince in 
Wyndham Lewis, The Lion and the Fox: The Rôle of the Hero in the Plays 
of Shakespeare (1927; London: Methuen, 1966), p. 107.
 4. Jan Kott, Shakespeare Our Contemporary, 2nd edn (1967; London: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 34.
 5. Andrew Hadfi eld, Shakespeare and Renaissance Politics (London: Arden, 
2004), p. 74.
 6. Emrys Jones, Scenic Form in Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), p. 73.
 7. Wilbur Sanders, The Dramatist and the Received Idea: Studies in the Plays 
of Marlowe and Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968), p. 90.
 8. Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus’, in Lenin 
and Philosophy and Other Essays, ed. Fredric Jameson, trans. Ben Brewster 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), pp. 122–3.
 9. Hadfi eld, Shakespeare and Renaissance Politics, p. 60.
10. Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social 
Energy in Renaissance England (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 23.
11. Ibid., p. 30.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   209 17/02/2012   12:23
 210    Shakespeare’s History Plays
12. See E. M. W. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s History Plays (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1944).
13. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfi eld, ‘History and Ideology, Masculinity 
and Miscegenation: The Instance of Henry V’, in Faultlines: Cultural 
Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1992), pp. 109–42; Phyllis Rackin, Stages of History: Shakespeare’s 
English Chronicles (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Graham 
Holderness, Shakespeare’s History (New York: St Martin’s, 1985); 
Graham Holderness, Shakespeare Recycled: The Making of Historical 
Drama (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); and Graham 
Holderness, Shakespeare: The Histories (London: Macmillan, 2000).
14. Clifford Geertz, ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept 
of Man’, in The Interpretation of Cultures: Sketched Essays (New York: 
Basic, 1973), p. 48.
15. Richard Levin, Shakespeare’s Secret Schemers: The Study of an Early 
Modern Dramatic Device (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 
2001), p. 16.
16. Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare, 3rd edn (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), pp. 38, 47.
17. Ibid., p. 64.
18. Annabel Patterson, Shakespeare and the Popular Voice (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), p. 72.
19. This is not a new idea. In 1905, A. C. Bradley spotted a tendency in 
Shakespeare’s work ‘to show one set of forces advancing, in secret or 
open opposition to the other, to some decisive success, and then driven 
downward to defeat by the reaction it provokes’ (Shakespearean Tragedy: 
Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth, 2nd edn (London: 
Macmillan, 1905), p. 55). For Bradley, Shakespeare’s ‘general plan’ shows 
two forces in tension with an eventual victor. The supreme expression of 
this idea is found in the lectures of A. P. Rossiter. Rossiter’s argument, 
unlike Bradley’s, states that there is no eventual victor because the forces 
are held in a dialectical tension which constitutes an unresolved ambiva-
lence. For Rossiter, the Tillyardian approach to the history plays is guilty 
of making ‘simplifi cations which are in danger of diminishing the true 
complexity of Shakespearean History’. Rossiter argues that Shakespeare 
employs a kind of parody in the Histories that ‘operates by juxtapositions 
of opposites; by contrasts so extreme as to seem irreconcilable’. Rossiter 
continues: ‘The parallelism is manifest . . . the question of “Who is right, 
A or B?” is a no-question: the poem is ambivalent. It subsumes meanings 
which point to two opposite and irreconcilable systems of values.’ And here 
is the crucial concept: ‘I mean by “Ambivalence” that two opposed value-
judgements are subsumed, and that both are valid . . . The whole is only 
fully experienced when both opposites are held and included in a “two-
eyed” view; and all “one-eyed” simplifi cations are not only falsifi cations; 
they amount to a denial of some fact of the mystery of things’ (Angels with 
Horns, pp. 44, 46, 50, 51).
20. Norman Rabkin, Shakespeare and the Problem of Meaning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 60–1.
21. See Blair Worden, ‘Shakespeare and Politics’, in Shakespeare and Politics, 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   210 17/02/2012   12:23
Ideology in Richard II and Henry IV     211
ed. Catherine M. S. Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 22–43, especially the following passages: ‘All we have on the 
page are speeches which conform to the characterizations of their speakers. 
It is hard enough to know how far Ulysses speaking on “degree”, or Henry 
V’s Archbishop of Canterbury on the commonwealth of bees, believes in 
the vision he articulates, let alone to identify the playwright’s own “posi-
tion”’ (p. 24); ‘When Shakespeare’s characters contradict each other we 
notice how rarely or how little the feelings with which we respond to his 
plays depend on our taking sides’ (p. 28).
22. This is, of course, because cultural historicism is explicitly opposed to the 
essentialist humanist conception of the ‘genius’, which, they would argue, 
has historically been used as a convenient cover for conservative ideology. 
While this is undoubtedly true, I think the point is irrelevant to the issue 
of whether or not an individual, such as Shakespeare, can have exceptional 
ideas that are not derived from the dominant ideology or its main counter-
currents. Human history is full of such individuals, and it does not matter 
whether or not we call them ‘geniuses’; what matters is that they exist.
23. Terry Eagleton, William Shakespeare (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. ix–x.
24. Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, p. 41.
25. Ryan, Shakespeare, p. 47.
26. Harold Bloom, ‘Introduction’, in William Shakespeare: Histories and 
Poems, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), p. 6.
27. Ibid., p. 6.
28. See Patricia Parker, Shakespeare from the Margins: Language, Culture, 
Context (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
29. Rackin, Stages of History, p. 47.
30. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s History Plays, p. 244.
31. M. M. Mahood, Shakespeare’s Wordplay (London: Methuen, 1957), p. 73.
32. I will be employing the Althusserian term ‘interpellate’ throughout this 
chapter to signify the moment in which an ideology successfully makes 
an individual its subject through the ‘double-mirror’ structure I outlined 
above. However, it is worth bearing in mind that I am using this concept 
without subscribing to the anti-humanist rhetoric inherent in the theoreti-
cal system from which it is taken. Althusser, Foucault, Williams and others 
give us useful concepts with which we can think about the inner workings 
of power, but are much less helpful when it comes to describing or under-
standing the experience of individuals in society. In other words, I think it 
is perfectly possible to think about ideology and power, forces that clearly 
play vital roles in human societies, without asserting that individuals are 
entirely constituted by them.
33. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. 
Alan Sheridan (1977; rpr. New York and London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 201, 
202–3.
34. Ibid., p. 205.
35. Harry Berger Jr, ‘Psychoanalyzing the Shakespeare Text: The First Three 
Scenes of the “Henriad”’, in Shakespeare’s Histories, ed. Emma Smith 
(Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 116.
36. Rackin, Stages of History, p. 49.
37. Ronald R. Macdonald, ‘Uneasy Lies: Language and History in Shakespeare’s 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   211 17/02/2012   12:23
 212    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Lancastrian Tetralogy’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 35:1 (Spring 1984), 
p. 27. 
38. Nicholas Grene, Shakespeare’s Serial History Plays (New York and 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 182.
39. Ibid., p. 184.
40. This point warrants elaboration. Following Tillyard, critics have long 
read Richard II as a play dealing with the transition from the divinely 
ordained world of the medieval feudal order to the dog-eat-dog world of 
modern Realpolitik. In Shakespeare’s History, Graham Holderness refutes 
that argument by claiming that the confl ict in Richard II ‘is not a confl ict 
between old and new, between absolute medieval monarchy and new 
Machiavellian power-politics. It is a confl ict between the king’s sovereignty 
and the ancient code of chivalry, which is here fi rmly located in the older 
and more primitive tribal and family code of blood-vengeance’ (p. 46). 
Holderness goes on to suggest that Richard, under threat from this residual 
chivalric code, attempts to assert his authority through absolutism. In 
Holderness’s reading, Henry IV’s usurpation represents a step backwards, 
‘the victorious forces are not new but old: feudal reaction rather than politi-
cal revolution’ (p. 64). I think Holderness is right to argue that Richard’s 
absolutism is a break with the established chivalric codes of feudalism that 
almost certainly leads to some reactionary opposition, but I do not share his 
view that Bolingbroke’s victory necessarily represents the triumph of that 
reactionary opposition. I suggest, as Holderness himself later hints in his 
reading of Henry IV (pp. 65–79), that Bolingbroke does become a modern 
Machiavellian politician and so cannot be made to represent feudalism. I 
would maintain that there is no fundamental break between the reigns of 
Richard II and Henry IV, no transition from ‘old’ to ‘new’ or vice versa, 
because both kings are consciously engaged in the same political game, 
albeit using different strategies. The point is: the transition from feudalism 
to Realpolitik does occur, but it happens during Richard’s reign rather than 
after it and there is no subsequent transition back.
41. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 203.
42. Catherine Belsey, ‘Making Histories Then and Now: Shakespeare from 
Richard II to Henry V’, in Uses of History: Marxism, Postmodernism and 
the Renaissance, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 36.
43. This point is familiar to new historicists, but they often collapse physical 
action into ideology or discourse. In the hands of Leonard Tennenhouse, 
for example, ‘physical power’ becomes yet another ideological ‘display’: ‘in 
assuming the authority of blood is absolute, Richard neglects those displays 
of political authority which establish the absolute power of the monarch 
over the material body of the subject’ (Power on Display: The Politics of 
Shakespeare’s Genres (New York and London: Methuen, 1986), p. 77). 
This is a move that even Althusser, for whom ideology has a material exist-
ence, does not make; he maintains a careful distinction between the ‘ideo-
logical state apparatus’ and the ‘repressive state apparatus’.
44. Tennenhouse, Power on Display, p. 76.
45. Rackin, Stages of History, p. 50.
46. Belsey, ‘Making Histories Then and Now’, p. 42.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   212 17/02/2012   12:23
Ideology in Richard II and Henry IV     213
47. James L. Calderwood, Metadrama in Shakespeare’s Henriad (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), p. 179.
48. Tennenhouse, Power on Display, p. 81.
49. It should be noted that in suggesting that both Richard II and Henry 
IV come to understand their failings, I have departed signifi cantly from 
readings such as that found in Laurie E. Osborne, ‘Crisis of Degree in 
Shakespeare’s Henriad’, Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900, 25:2 
(Spring 1985), pp. 337–59. Osborne argues that Henry ‘holds the view that 
the supremacy of the King must rest on power and practical ability . . . [He] 
is as blind to the need for the sacred aspect of Kingship as Richard is to the 
necessity for practical superiority’ (p. 343). This conclusion is much too 
clean-cut. In contrast, I have argued that, by the start of 1 Henry IV, Henry 
is quite aware of the need for ideology (‘the sacred aspect of Kingship’) and 
that, from 3.2 of Richard II, Richard does realise that power depends as 
much on materiality and physical force as it does on form and symbolism, 
but it is too late for him by then.
50. Holderness, Shakespeare’s History, p. 67.
51. Ronald Knowles, Shakespeare’s Arguments with History (New York and 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 69.
52. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949; London: Penguin, 2003).
53. The question of whether or not Hal had ever actually committed any petty 
crimes was the subject of a memorable debate between J. Dover Wilson 
(who argued that he had not) and William Empson (who argued that 
he had). See John Dover Wilson, The Fortunes of Falstaff (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1943); John Dover Wilson, ‘Introduction’, in 1 
Henry VI, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1952), pp. i–lv; William Empson, ‘Falstaff and Mr. Dover Wilson’, Kenyon 
Review, 15:2 (Spring 1953), pp. 213–62; and a substantially revised version 
of that essay, entitled ‘Falstaff’, in Empson’s Essays on Shakespeare (New 
York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 29–78. 
On this issue, I fi nd Empson’s argument more convincing, because Dover 
Wilson’s view strikes me as the more ‘one-eyed’. Empson is broadly justi-
fi ed in his claim that Dover Wilson ‘felt a natural irritation at any intellec-
tualist fuss against a broad issue of patriotism’, because ‘he felt that Henry 
V is a very good and patriotic play, and the man Henry V is the ideal king, 
and Falstaff is a ridiculously bad man’ (Essays on Shakespeare, p. 35). 
Empson’s argument that ‘when Dover Wilson winces away from recognis-
ing the positive merits of Falstaff, he is blinding himself to the breadth and 
depth of these plays’ (p. 36) seems to me substantially correct. In 1 Henry 
IV, the line ‘Where shall we take a purse tomorrow, Jack’ (1.2.87), spoken 
by Hal to Falstaff, seems to be said in earnest, with Hal’s denial of ever 
having been a thief almost forty lines later (‘Who, I rob? I a thief? Not I, 
by my faith’ (1.2.123)) spoken ironically. To suggest that Hal really means 
it when he says, ‘Well then, once in my days I’ll be a madcap’ (1.2.127), 
as Dover Wilson does, is to ignore the discourse of sarcastic repartee that 
Falstaff and Hal establish in this short scene.
54. Raymond Williams, ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, 
in Culture and Materialism: Selected Essays (1980; New York and London: 
Verso, 2005), p. 41.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   213 17/02/2012   12:23
 214    Shakespeare’s History Plays
55. See Holderness, Shakespeare’s History, pp. 40–79.
56. Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin, Engendering a Nation: A Feminist 
Account of Shakespeare’s History Plays (New York and London: Routledge, 
1997), pp. 168, 174. Note that Howard and Rackin read this scene in terms 
of the female seduction of masculine authority through sensuality, rather 
than the radical undermining of the offi cial state ideology, but they do at 
least acknowledge that there is something subversive going on.
57. Lewis, The Lion and the Fox, p. 224.
58. Althusser, ‘Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus’, p. 109.
59. Barbara Hodgdon, The End Crowns All: Closure and Contradiction in 
Shakespeare’s History Plays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 
p. 160.
60. Belsey, ‘Making Histories Then and Now’, p. 42.
61. Empson, ‘Falstaff’, p. 38.
62. Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, pp. 52–6.
63. Note that neither the thousand pounds that Falstaff owes Shallow nor his 
sudden arrest by the Lord Chief Justice (2 Henry IV, 5.5.85) are insur-
mountable obstacles – we know that these are situations that Falstaff will 
somehow get himself out of.
64. Althusser, ‘Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus’, pp. 118–19.
65. Belsey, ‘Making History Then and Now’, p. 42.
66. This is most obviously illustrated by the much-repeated fact that support-
ers of the Essex Rebellion of 1601 paid for a performance of Richard II 
the night before they took up arms. Upon hearing of this, according to 
her archivist, William Lambarde, Elizabeth I remarked: ‘I am Richard the 
Second, know ye not that?’ (John Nichols (ed.), The Progresses and Public 
Processions of Queen Elizabeth [To which are subjoined some of the Early 
Progresses of King James I], 4 vols (London, 1788–1821), vol. 1, pp. 
325–7).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   214 17/02/2012   12:23
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This monograph makes a sustained argument against the anti- humanism 
to which, under the sway of cultural historicism, Shakespeare studies 
has been in thrall since the 1980s. It puts forward three principal objec-
tions. The fi rst of these is that the anti-humanist concept of the indi-
vidual is both under-theorised and seemingly oblivious to the facts of 
modern genetics and neurobiology. The view of individuals as having 
few innate qualities or characteristics and being almost wholly deter-
mined by cultural and ideological forces robs them of agency and strips 
history of human signifi cance. When individuals are enveloped by social 
forces which determine their thoughts and actions, we are left not with 
a history of human beings, but with a history of structures working on 
and competing with other structures, from which the individual has 
disappeared.
To the anti-humanist, it does not matter who became the king of 
England in 1603, or who wrote Measure for Measure in 1603, or who 
carried out any action in that year; what matters is that these actions 
were ‘produced’ in a certain place and time under a set of governing 
structural forces. For all that it matters to a new historicist such as the 
Jonathan Goldberg of James I and the Politics of Literature, which I 
analysed in Chapter 2, they might as well have been performed by the 
same person; what difference does it make when individuals are formed 
wholly by culture and ideology, and motivated by the same ideas and 
circumstances? Goldberg’s apparent inability to distinguish between 
James I and Shakespeare exposes the residues of formalism that new his-
toricism has never been able to abandon fully. In new historicist hands, 
history becomes a synchronic snapshot of a given culture, each part of 
which is a synecdoche that secretes the nature of the whole. So despite its 
avowed intention to view history heterogeneously, in practice new his-
toricism arbitrarily connects the disparate fi elds of a historical moment 
by assuming that they are governed by the same monolithic cultural 
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logic. This is the assumption that allows Stephen Greenblatt to ‘trans-
code’ social rituals from one sphere of action to another (for example, 
from the church to the theatre). The failure to account for individuals 
leads new historicism to create a theoretical and critical black hole of 
cultural essentialism that swallows individuals and discursive fi elds and 
annihilates difference.
My second principal objection to the anti-humanist approach is that it 
falls prey to a mode of deterministic thinking, whereby the explanatory 
power of a meta-narrative is given primacy over other explanations. As 
a result, anti-humanists are prone to become dogmatic and infl exible. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that although cultural materialism offers a more 
sophisticated, theoretically developed and properly materialist model of 
culture and ideology than new historicism, it appears unable to engage 
with its critics without accusing them of being the ideologues of essen-
tialist humanism and / or universalism, and thus reprehensible apolo-
gists for the patriarchal, class-divided status quo. This renders cultural 
materialism blind both to valid criticisms of its theory, and to recent 
developments in science that strongly suggest that individuals are not 
as passive and susceptible to the lures of ideologies, cultures and sub-
cultures as cultural materialists assume.
The third and most important objection concerns the way that anti-
humanists read Shakespeare’s plays. Because of their anti-humanism, 
cultural historicists are disposed to read Shakespeare’s plays diagnosti-
cally, as mere products of their place and time which refl ect only the ideas 
of that place and time. This effectively limits Shakespeare’s authorial 
agency to a set of established positions attributable to other sources in 
the period. I have argued that this is an inadequate critical method with 
which to approach a writer as complex and nuanced as Shakespeare, 
not only because it is so patently reductive, but also because it blinds 
us to his trenchant insights into the workings of history and ideology in 
the history plays – into the very issues with which, ironically, cultural 
historicism itself is concerned. Even more ironically, as I sought to show 
in Chapter 7, Shakespeare’s own dramatic meditations on history allow 
a scope for the role of the individual and individual agency in history, 
which anti-humanist modes of thought fi nd inconceivable. In addition, 
as Chapter 8 undertook to demonstrate, these plays also display an 
acute awareness of the importance of ideology for those in power as a 
means of maintaining control of their subjects and, of particular interest 
to cultural materialists, an equally shrewd understanding of how ideol-
ogy can fail in that endeavour.
Since Shakespeare, as I contend in Chapter 6, is a humanist and a 
political realist, his treatment of history is not constrained by the infl ex-
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ible determinism that mars cultural historicist commentaries on his 
history plays, in which he ascribes some decisions and actions to human 
nature and others to the social milieu. As I argue in Chapter 7, a criticism 
that proceeds on the assumption that Shakespeare was an exceptionally 
creative, intelligent and thoughtful individual, who was infl uenced and 
informed, but not completely ‘produced’, by the world and time in 
which he wrote, is better equipped to do justice to the complexity of 
his drama. This is not to resurrect the idea of the Universal Bard, but 
simply to treat the plays of an extraordinarily gifted individual with the 
same respect cultural historicist critics have afforded the work of Michel 
Foucault. If Foucault, writing in the twentieth century, could have origi-
nal, provocative insights into the order of things in his time, why could 
not Shakespeare writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? This 
monograph makes an argument for the agency of individuals in history 
and for Shakespeare’s agency as an individual. In doing so, it produces 
new readings of the history plays that may facilitate readings of other 
plays, readings that are historically grounded, theoretically informed, 
attuned to textual nuances, and committed to the notion that individuals 
can and will think independently. In writing this book, I hope to have 
made a signifi cant contribution to the movement to free Shakespeare 
studies from the shackles of anti-humanism.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   217 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography
Primary Texts
The 1662 Book of Common Prayer ([London]: John Baskerville, 1762).
Baldwin, William (ed.), A Myrrove For Magistrates. Wherein may be seen by 
example of other, with howe greuous plages vices are punished: and howe 
frayle and vnstable worldly prosperitie is founde, even of those, whom 
Fortune seemeth most highly to fauour (London: In aedibus Thomae Marshe, 
1559).
Camden, William, Annales the true and royall history of the famous empresse 
Elizabeth Queene of England France and Ireland &c. True faith’s defendresse 
of diuine renowne and happy memory. Wherein all such memorable things 
as happened during hir blessed raigne . . . are exactly described. (London: 
Printed [by George Purslowe, Humphrey Lownes and Miles Flesher] for 
Beniamin Fisher and are to be sould at the Talbott in Pater Noster Rowe, 
1625, 1625).
—, Britain, or A chorographicall description of the most fl ourishing kingdomes, 
England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the ilands adjoyning, out of the depth of 
antiquitie beautifi ed vvith mappes of the severall shires of England: vvritten 
fi rst in Latine by William Camden Clarenceux K. of A. Translated newly into 
English by Philémon Holland Doctour in Physick: fi nally, revised, amended, 
and enlarged with sundry additions by the said author (London: Printed by 
F. K[ingston] R. Y[oung] and I. L[egatt] for George Latham, 1637).
Calvin, John, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2002).
Capgrave, Johannis, Liber de Illustribus, ed. F. C. Hingeston (London: Roll 
Series, 1866).
Caxton, William, The Cronycles of Englond (London: Enprynted by me 
William Caxton in thabbey of Westme[n]stre by london, fynysshed, and 
accomplysshed the, viij, day of October, the yere of the incatnacyon of our 
lord God, M,CCCC,lxxxij and in the xxii yere of the regne of Kyng Edward 
the fourth [1482], 1482).
Daniel, Samuel, The Ciuile Wars betweene the Howses of Lancaster and 
Yorke corrected and continued by Samuel Daniel one of the groomes of hir 
Maiesties most honorable Priuie Chamber (London: Printed by [Humphrey 
Lownes for] Simon Watersonne, 1609).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   218 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     219
Foxe, John, Actes and monuments of matters most speciall and memorable, 
happenyng in the Church with an vniuersall history of the same, wherein is 
set forth at large the whole race and course of the Church, from the primitiue 
age to these latter tymes of ours, with the bloudy times, horrible troubles, and 
great persecutions agaynst the true martyrs of Christ, sought and wrought 
as well by heathen emperours, as nowe lately practised by Romish prelates, 
especially in this realme of England and Scotland. Newly reuised and rec-
ognised, partly also augmented, and now the fourth time agayne published 
and recommended to the studious reader, by the author (through the helpe 
of Christ our Lord) Iohn Foxe, which desireth thee good reader to helpe 
him with thy prayer. Volume 1 only (At London: Imprinted by Iohn Daye, 
dwellyng ouer Aldersgate beneath S. Martins, 1583).
Froissart, Jean, Chronicles, ed. Geoffrey Brereton (Baltimore and 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).
Hall, Edward, The vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre 
[and] Yorke, beeyng long in continual discension for the croune of this noble 
realme with all the actes done in bothe the tymes of the princes, bothe of the 
one linage and of the other, beginnyng at the tyme of kyng Henry the fowerth, 
the fi rst aucthor of this deuision, and so successiuely proceadyng to the reigne 
of the high and prudent prince kyng Henry the eight, the vndubitate fl ower 
and very heire of both the sayd linages (London: In offi cina Richardi Graftoni 
typis impress, 1548).
Holinshed, Raphael, The Third volume of Chronicles, beginning at duke William 
the Norman, commonlie called the Conqueror; and descending by degrees of 
yeeres to all the kings and queenes of England in their orderlie successions 
(London: Finished in Ianuarie 1587, and the 29 of the Queenes Maiesties 
reigne, with the full continuation of the former yeares, at the expenses of 
Iohn Harison, George Bishop, Rafe Newberie, Henrie Denham, and Thomas 
Woodcocke. At London printed [by Henry Denham] in Aldersgate street at 
the signe of the Starre], 1587).
Jowett, John, William Montgomery, Gary Taylor and Stanley Wells (eds), 
William Shakespeare: The Complete Works, 2nd edn (1986; New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Lull, Janis (ed.), King Richard III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999).
Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, trans. Geoffrey Bull, 4th edn (New York and 
London: Penguin, 2003).
Nichols, John (ed.), The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth 
[To which are subjoined some of the Early Progresses of King James I], 4 vols 
(London, 1788–1821), vol. 1.
Raleigh, Walter, The History of the World (London: Printed [by William 
Stansby] for Walter Burre [, and are to be sold at his Shop in Paules Church-
yard at the signe of the Crane, 1614 [i.e. 1617]], 1617).
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract and Discourses, ed. G. D. H. Cole 
(Toronto and London: J. M. Dent, 1923).
Stow, John, The chronicles of England from Brute vnto this present yeare of 
Christ. 1580. Collected by Iohn Stow citizen of London (London: By [Henry 
Bynneman for] Ralphe Newberie, at the assignement of Henrie Bynneman. 
Cum priuilegio Regiae Maiestatis, 1580).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   219 17/02/2012   12:23
 220    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Taylor, Thomas, The second part of the theatre of Gods ivdgments collected out 
of the writings of sundry ancient and moderne authors (London: Printed by 
Richard Herne, 1642).
Vergil, Polydore, An abridgement of the notable woorke of Polidore Vergile con-
teignyng the deuisers and fi rste fi nders out as well of artes, ministeries, feactes 
& ciuill ordinaunces, as of rites, and ceremonies, commo[n]ly vsed in the 
churche: and the originall beginnyng of the same. Co[m]pendiously gathered 
by Thomas Langley, ed. Thomas Langley (Imprinted at London : VVithin the 
precincte of the late dissolued house of the Grey Friars, by Richard Grafton 
printer to the princes grace, the. xvi daie of Aprill, the yere of our lorde 
M.D.xlvi.; London: Within the precincte of the late dissolued house of the 
grey Friers, by Richarde Grafton printer to the Princis grace, 1546).
Secondary Texts
Adelman, Janet, Margaret J. Arnold, Linda Bamber and Catherine Belsey, 
‘Feminist Criticism’, PMLA, 104:1 (January 1989), 77–9.
Alexander, Peter, Shakespeare’s Henry VI and Richard III (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1929).
Althusser, Louis, ‘Reply to John Lewis’, in Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. 
Grahame Lock (London: New Left Books, 1976), pp. 33–100.
—, ‘Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus’ (1969), in Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays, ed. Fredric Jameson, trans. Ben Brewster (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), pp. 85–126.
—, ‘A Letter on Art in Reply to André Daspre’ (1966), in Lenin and Philosophy 
and Other Essays, ed. Fredric Jameson, trans. Ben Brewster (1971; rpr. New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), pp. 151–5.
—, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (1969; New York and London: Verso,
2005).
Armstrong, Isobel, The Radical Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).
Assiter, Alison, Althusser and Feminism (London: Pluto, 1990).
Balibar, Etienne, ‘On the Basics of Historical Materialism’, in Reading Capital, 
trans. Ben Brewster (rpr. London: New Left Books, 1986), pp. 199–308.
Barash, David P., Revolutionary Biology: The New, Gene-Centered View of 
Life (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2001).
Barker, Francis, The Culture of Violence: Essays on Tragedy and History 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).
—, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen, ‘Introduction’, in Uses of History: 
Marxism, Postmodernism and the Renaissance, ed. Francis Barker, Peter 
Hulme and Margaret Iversen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1991), pp. 1–23.
Barry, Peter, Literature in Contexts (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2007).
Barthes, Roland, S / Z, trans. Richard Miller (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975).
—, Image-Music-Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill & Wang,
1978).
Bate, Jonathan, The Genius of Shakespeare (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   220 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     221
Beer, Barrett L., ‘John Stow and the English Reformation’, Sixteenth Century 
Journal, 16:2 (September 1985), 257–71.
—, ‘John Stow and Tudor Rebellions, 1549–1569’, Journal of British Studies, 
27:4 (October 1988), 352–74.
Belsey, Catherine, Critical Practice (New York and London: Methuen, 1980).
—, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama 
(London: Methuen, 1985).
—, ‘Richard Levin and Indifferent Reading’, New Literary History, 21:3 (Spring 
1990), 449–56.
—, ‘Making Histories Then and Now: Shakespeare from Richard II to Henry 
V’, in Uses of History: Marxism, Postmodernism and the Renaissance, ed. 
Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1991), pp. 24–46.
—, Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
—, Shakespeare and the Loss of Eden (London: Macmillan, 1999).
—, Culture and the Real (New York and Oxford: Routledge, 2005).
—, ‘The Role of Culture’, in Human Nature: Fact and Fiction, ed. Robin 
Headlam Wells and Johnjoe McFadden (London: Continuum, 2006), pp. 
111–27.
—, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, in Presentist Shakespeares, ed. Hugh Grady 
and Terence Hawkes (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 27–45.
Bennet, Michael, Richard II and the Revolution of 1399 (Stroud: Sutton, 1999).
Bennett, Susan, Shakespeare: The Elizabethan Play (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1993).
Berger, John, ‘The Moment of Cubism’ (1967), in The Moment of Cubism and 
Other Essays (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), pp. 1–32.
Berger Jr, Harry, ‘Psychoanalyzing the Shakespeare Text: The First Three Scenes 
of the “Henriad”’, in Shakespeare’s Histories, ed. Emma Smith (Malden, MA 
and Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 103–23.
Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969).
Berry, Edward, Patterns of Decay: Shakespeare’s Early Histories (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1975).
—, ‘Twentieth-century Shakespeare Criticism: The Histories’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Shakespeare Studies, ed. Stanley Wells (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), pp. 249–56.
Bevington, David, Tudor Drama and Politics: A Critical Approach to Topical 
Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).
Bloom, Harold, ‘Introduction’, in William Shakespeare: Histories and Poems, 
ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), pp. 1–8.
—, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (London: Fourth Estate, 1999).
Blum, Deborah, Sex on the Brain: The Biological Differences Between Men and 
Women (New York: Viking, 1997).
Born, Hanspeter, ‘The Date of 2, 3 Henry VI’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 25:3 
(Summer 1974), 323–34.
Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977).
—, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Refl exive Sociology, trans. Matthew 
Adamson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   221 17/02/2012   12:23
 222    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Boyd, Brian, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2009).
Boyd, Brian, Joseph Carroll and Jonathan Gottschall (eds), Evolution, Literature, 
and Film: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
—, ‘Introduction’, in Evolution, Literature, and Film: A Reader, ed. Brian Boyd, 
Joseph Carroll and Jonathan Gottschall (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), pp. 1–37.
Bradley, A. C., Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King 
Lear, Macbeth, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1905).
Bradshaw, Graham, Misrepresentations: Shakespeare and the Materialists 
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993).
—, ‘State of Play’, in The Shakespearean International Yearbook, Vol. 1: 
Where Are We Now in Shakespearean Studies?, ed. W. R. Elton and John M. 
Mucciolo (Brookfi eld, VT and Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 3–25.
Brannigan, John, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998).
Bristol, Michael D., Carnival and Theater: Plebeian Culture and the Structure of 
Authority in Renaissance England (New York and London: Methuen, 1985).
—, Shakespeare’s America, America’s Shakespeare (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1990).
—, Big-Time Shakespeare (New York and London: Routledge, 1996).
Brockbank, J. P., ‘The Frame of Disorder – Henry VI’, in Early Shakespeare, ed. 
John Russell Brown (London: Edward Arnold, 1961), pp. 73–99.
Brooks, Cleanth, ‘The Language of Paradox’ (1956), in Literary Theory: An 
Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 
pp. 58–69.
Brotton, Jerry, ‘Shakespeare and Islam’, paper given at Global Perspectives on 
Shakespeare, British Council Video-conference, London, Cairo, Karachi, 
Tunis, 4 December 2006.
Brown, Donald E., Human Universals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
Budra, Paul, ‘The Mirror for Magistrates and the Politics of Readership’, 
Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900, 32:1 (Winter 1992), 1–13.
Bullough, Geoffrey (ed.), Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, 
Volume III: Earlier English History Plays (New York and London: Columbia 
University Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960).
Burden, Dennis H., ‘Shakespeare’s History Plays: 1952–1983’, in Shakespeare 
Survey 38: Shakespeare and History, ed. Stanley Wells (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 1–35.
Buss, David M., Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind 
(Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999).
Butler, Judith, ‘Performativity’s Social Magic’, in Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, 
ed. Richard Shusterman (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 
113–28.
Calderwood, James L., Metadrama in Shakespeare’s Henriad (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).
Callaghan, Dympna, Shakespeare Without Women: Representing Gender and 
Race in the Renaissance (New York and London: Routledge, 2000).
Carroll, Joseph, Evolution and Literary Theory (Columbia, MO: University of 
Missouri Press, 1995).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   222 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     223
—, Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature, and Literature (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2004).
—, Reading Human Nature: Literary Darwinism in Theory and Practice 
(Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 2011).
Carroll, Joseph, Jonathan Gottschall, John Johnson and Daniel Kruger, 
‘Imagining Human Nature’, in Evolution, Literature, and Film: A Reader, ed. 
Brian Boyd, Joseph Carroll and Jonathan Gottschall (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), pp. 211–18.
Cartelli, Thomas, ‘Jack Cade in the Garden: Class Consciousness and Class 
Confl ict in Shakespeare’s 2 Henry VI’, in Enclosure Acts: Sexuality, Property, 
and Culture in Early Modern England, ed. Richard Burt and John Michael 
Archer (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 48–67.
—, ‘Suffolk and the Pirates: Disordered Relations in Shakespeare’s 2 Henry 
VI’, in A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works, Volume II: The Histories, ed. 
Richard Dutton and Jean Howard (Malden, MA and London: Blackwell, 
2003), pp. 325–43.
Case-Winters, Anna, God’s Power: Traditional Understandings and 
Contemporary Challenges (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1990).
Cavanagh, Dermot, Stuart Hampton-Reeves and Stephen Longstaffe (eds), 
Shakespeare’s Histories and Counter-Histories (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2006).
Clark, Michael P. (ed.), Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place of Literature in 
Theory Today (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
Clarke, Simon, Terry Lovell, Kevin McDonnel, Kevin Robins and Victor 
Jeleniewski Seidler, One-Dimensional Marxism: Althusser and the Politics of 
Culture (New York and London: Allison & Busby, 1980).
Cohen, Derek, The Politics of Shakespeare (London: Macmillan, 1993).
—, ‘History and Nation in Richard II and Henry IV’, Studies in English 
Literature, 1500–1900, 42:2 (Spring 2002), 293–315.
Cohen, Stephen A., ‘Introduction’, in Shakespeare and Historical Formalism, 
ed. Stephen A. Cohen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 1–27.
— (ed.), Shakespeare and Historical Formalism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007).
Cohen, Walter, ‘Political Criticism of Shakespeare’, in Shakespeare Reproduced: 
The Text in History and Ideology, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. 
O’Connor (New York and London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 18–46.
Colebrook, Claire, New Literary Histories (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1997).
Cosmides, Leda and John Tooby (eds), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary 
Psychology and the Generation of Culture (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992).
Cox, John D., Shakespeare and the Dramaturgy of Power (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989).
—, ‘Local References in 3 Henry VI’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 51:3 (Autumn 
2000), 340–52.
Cronk, Lee, The Complex Whole: Culture and the Evolution of Human 
Behaviour (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).
Darwin, Charles, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
(London: John Murray, 1872).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   223 17/02/2012   12:23
 224    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Davis, Phillip, Shakespeare Thinking (New York and London: Continuum, 2007).
Dawkins, Richard, The Selfi sh Gene, 2nd edn (1976; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989).
—, The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene, 2nd edn (1982; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Dean, Paul, ‘Shakespeare’s Henry VI Trilogy and Elizabethan “Romance” 
Histories: The Origins of a Genre’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 33:1 (Spring 
1982), 34–48.
Degler, Carl N., In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of 
Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991).
Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1978).
Dessen, Alan C., ‘Stagecraft and Imagery in Shakespeare’s Henry VI’, The 
Yearbook of English Studies, 23 (1993), 65–79.
Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the 
Last 13,000 Years (London: Vintage, 1997).
DiTomaso, Nancy, ‘“Sociological Reductionism” from Parsons to Althusser: 
Linking Action and Structure in Social Theory’, American Sociological 
Review, 47:1 (February 1982), 14–28.
Dollimore, Jonathan, ‘Introduction: Shakespeare, Cultural Materialism and the 
New Historicism’, in Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism, 
ed. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfi eld (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1985), pp. 2–17.
—, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare 
and his Contemporaries, 2nd edn (1984; Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989), p. 249.
—, ‘Shakespeare, Cultural Materialism, Feminism and Marxist Humanism’, 
New Literary History, 21:3 (Spring 1990), 471–93.
—, ‘Shakespeare, Cultural Materialism and the New Historicism’, in Political 
Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism ed. Jonathan Dollimore and 
Alan Sinfi eld, 2nd edn (1985; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1994), pp. 2–17.
—, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare 
and his Contemporaries, 3rd edn (1984; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004).
Dollimore, Jonathan and Alan Sinfi eld, ‘Culture and Textuality: Debating 
Cultural Historicism’, Textual Practice, 4:1 (1990), 91–100.
—, ‘History and Ideology, Masculinity and Miscegenation: The Instance of 
Henry V’, in Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident 
Reading (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 109–42.
— (eds), Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism, 2nd edn (1985; 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).
Donno, Elizabeth Story, ‘Some Aspects of Shakespeare’s “Holinshed”’, 
Huntington Library Quarterly, 50:3 (Summer 1987), 229–48.
Dover Wilson, John, The Fortunes of Falstaff (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1943).
—, ‘Introduction’, in 1 Henry VI, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. i–lvi.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   224 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     225
Drakakis, John (ed.), Alternative Shakespeares (New York and London: 
Methuen, 1985).
Dutton, Richard, ‘Postscript’, in New Historicism and Renaissance Drama, ed. 
Richard Wilson and Richard Dutton (New York and London: Longman, 
1992), pp. 219–26.
Eagleton, Terry, William Shakespeare (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
—, After Theory (London: Allen Lane, 2003).
Egan, Gabriel, Shakespeare and Marx (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
Elton, G. R., England Under the Tudors, 2nd edn (London: Methuen, 
1974).
Elton, W. R., ‘Shakespeare and the Thought of his Age’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Shakespeare Studies, ed. Stanley Wells (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), pp. 17–34.
Empson, William, ‘Falstaff and Mr. Dover Wilson’, Kenyon Review, 15:2 
(Spring 1953), 213–62.
—, ‘Falstaff’, in Essays on Shakespeare (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), pp. 29–87.
Erikson, Peter, ‘Rewriting the Renaissance, Rewriting Ourselves’, Shakespeare 
Quarterly, 38:3 (Autumn 1987), 327–37.
Felperin, Howard, The Uses of the Canon: Elizabethan Literature and 
Contemporary Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).
Ferguson, Arthur B., ‘The Historical Thought of Samuel Daniel: A Study in 
Renaissance Ambivalence’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 32:2 (April–June 
1971), 185–202.
Fernie, Ewan, Shame in Shakespeare (New York and London: Routledge, 
2002).
—, ‘The Last Act: Presentism, Spirituality and the Politics of Hamlet’, in 
Spiritual Shakespeares, ed. Ewan Fernie (New York and London: Routledge, 
2005), pp. 186–209.
—, ‘Shakespeare and the Prospect of Presentism’, in Shakespeare Survey 58: 
Writing About Shakespeare, ed. Peter Holland (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 169–84.
—, ‘Terrible Action: Recent Criticism and Questions of Agency’, Shakespeare, 
2:1 (June 2006), 95–118.
Fernie, Ewan and Clare McManus, ‘Materiality’, in Reconceiving the 
Renaissance: A Critical Reader (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 278–81.
Flesch, William, Comeuppance: Costly Signalling, Altruistic Punishment, and 
Other Biological Components of Fiction (Cambridge, MA and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2007).
Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (1977; rpr. New York and London: Penguin, 1991).
—, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge (1978; rpr. 
New York and London: Penguin, 1998).
—, Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (1972; New York and London: Routledge, 2002).
—, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (New York and London: Routledge, 2002).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   225 17/02/2012   12:23
 226    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Fraden, Rena, ‘Response to Professor Carolyn Porter’, New Literary History, 
21:2 (Winter 1990), 273–8.
Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free 
Press, 1992).
Gallagher, Catherine, ‘Marxism and the New Historicism’, in The New 
Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 
pp. 37–45.
—, ‘Raymond Williams and Cultural Studies’, Social Text, 30 (1992), 79–89.
—, Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in the Marketplace 
1670–1820 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).
—, ‘Counterhistory and the Anecdote’, in Practicing New Historicism (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 49–74.
Gallagher, Catherine and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
Gazzaniga, Michael S., Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique 
(New York: Ecco, 2008).
—(ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences, 4th edn (1998; Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2009).
Geertz, Clifford, ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of 
Man’, in The Interpretation of Cultures: Sketched Essays (New York: Basic, 
1973), pp. 46–54.
Gillespie, Michael Allen, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008).
Given-Wilson, Chris, Chronicles of the Revolution: The Reign of Richard II 
(New York and Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).
Goldberg, Jonathan, James I and the Politics of Literature (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).
—, ‘Making Sense’, New Literary History, 21:3 (Spring 1990), 457–62.
—, Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992).
Gottshall, Jonathan and David Sloan Wilson (eds), The Literary Animal: 
Evolution and the Nature of Narrative (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2005).
Goy-Blanquet, Dominique, ‘Elizabethan Historiography and Shakespeare’s 
Sources’, in The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare’s History Plays, ed. 
Michael Hattaway (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 55–70.
Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quintin Hoare 
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973).
Greenblatt, Stephen, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
—, ‘Invisible Bullets’, in Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social 
Energy in Renaissance England (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), pp. 21–65.
—, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance 
England (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
—, Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1990).
—, ‘The Touch of the Real’, in Practicing New Historicism, ed. Catherine 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   226 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     227
Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 20–48.
—, Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2004).
Grene, Nicholas, Shakespeare’s Serial History Plays (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Grislis, Egil, ‘Providence, Predestination, and Free Will in Richard Hooker’s 
Theology’, in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. W. J. 
Torrance Kirby (Norwell, MA and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2003), pp. 
79–95.
Gupta, S. C. Sen, Shakespeare’s Historical Plays (New York and London: 
Oxford University Press, 1964).
Hadfi eld, Andrew, ‘Shakespeare and Republicanism: History and Cultural 
Materialism’, Textual Practice, 17 (2003), 461–83.
—, Shakespeare and Renaissance Politics (London: Arden, 2004).
Halliwell, Martin and Andy Mousley, Critical Humanisms: Humanist / Anti-
Humanist Dialogues (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003).
Hamilton, Paul, Historicism (New York and London: Routledge, 1996).
Harpham, Geoffrey, ‘Foucault and the New Historicism’, American Literary 
History, 3:2 (Summer 1991), 360–75.
Hattaway, Michael, ‘Introduction’, in The Second Part of King Henry VI, ed. 
Michael Hattaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 
1–69.
—, ‘The Shakespearean History Play’, in Shakespeare’s History Plays, ed. 
Michael Hattaway (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 3–24.
Hawkes, Terence (ed.), Alternative Shakespeares, Volume 2 (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1996).
—, Shakespeare in the Present (New York and London: Routledge, 2002).
Hawthorn, Jeremy, Cunning Passages: New Historicism, Cultural Materialism 
and Marxism in the Contemporary Literary Debate (London: Arnold, 1996).
Henderson, Diana E. (ed.), Alternative Shakespeares 3 (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2008).
Herman, Peter C., ‘Rastell’s Pastyme of People: Monarchy and Law in Early 
Modern Historiography’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 
30:2 (2000), 275–308.
Hodgdon, Barbara, The End Crowns All: Closure and Contradiction in 
Shakespeare’s History Plays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
Holderness, Graham, Shakespeare’s History (New York: St Martin’s, 1985).
—, ‘Radical Potentiality and Institutional Closure: Shakespeare in Film and 
Television’, in Shakespeare on Television: An Anthology of Essays and 
Reviews, ed. J. C. Bulman and H. R. Coursen (Hanover and London: 
University of New England Press, 1988), pp. 206–25.
—, Shakespeare Recycled: The Making of Historical Drama (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
—, Shakespeare: The Histories (London: Macmillan, 2000).
—, Cultural Shakespeare (Hatfi eld: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001).
Holmwood, John, ‘Functionalism and its Critics’, in Modern Social Theory, 
ed. Austin Harrington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 87–109.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   227 17/02/2012   12:23
 228    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Holstun, James, ‘Ranting at the New Historicism’, English Literary Renaissance, 
19:2 (Spring 1989), 189–226.
Howard, Jean E., ‘Old Wine, New Bottles’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 35:2 
(Summer 1984), 234–7.
—, ‘The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies’, English Literary Renaissance, 
16 (Winter 1986), 13–43.
—, The State and Social Struggle in Early Modern England (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1994).
—, ‘The First Part of the Contention of the Two Famous Houses of York and 
Lancaster (The Second Part of Henry VI)’, in The Norton Shakespeare, ed. 
Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard and Katharine Eisaman 
Maus (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 203–12.
— and Marion F. O’Connor, ‘Introduction’, in Shakespeare Reproduced: The 
Text and Ideology, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor (London: 
Methuen, 1987), pp. 1–17.
— and Marion F. O’Connor (eds), Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in 
History and Ideology (London: Methuen, 1987).
— and Phyllis Rackin, Engendering a Nation: A Feminist Account of 
Shakespeare’s History Plays (New York and London: Routledge, 1997).
Hunter, G. K., ‘The Royal Shakespeare Company Plays Henry VI’, Renaissance 
Drama, 9 (1978), 91–108.
Iser, Wolfgang, Staging Politics: The Lasting Impact of Shakespeare’s History 
Plays, trans. David Henry Wilson (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993).
Jameson, Fredric, The Prison-house of Language (Princeton and Chichester: 
Princeton University Press, 1972).
—, ‘Marxism and Historicism’, New Literary History, 11:1 (1979), 
41–73.
—, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1981).
—, ‘Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, New Left 
Review, 146 (November–December, 1984), 53–64.
Jardine, Lisa, Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance (London: 
Macmillan, 1996).
— and Jerry Brotton, Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West 
(London: Reaktion, 2000).
Jenkins, Harold, ‘Shakespeare’s History Plays: 1900–1951’, in Shakespeare 
Survey 6: The Histories, ed. Allardyce Nicoll (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1953), pp. 1–15.
Jones, Emrys, Scenic Form in Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1971).
Joughin, John J. and Simon Malpas (eds), The New Aestheticism (New York 
and Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
Kamps, Ivo (ed.), Shakespeare Left and Right (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1991).
—, ‘Introduction’, in Materialist Shakespeare: A History, ed. Ivo Kamps (New 
York and London: Verso, 1995), pp. 1–19.
—, Historiography and Ideology in Stuart Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   228 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     229
—, ‘Possible Pasts: Historiography and Legitimation in Henry VIII’, College 
English, 58:2 (February 1996), 192–215.
—, ‘The Writing of History in Shakespeare’s England’, in A Companion to 
Shakespeare’s Works, Volume II: The Histories, ed. Richard Dutton and Jean 
E. Howard (Malden, MA and London: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 4–25.
Kastan, David Scott, Shakespeare and the Shapes of Time (Hanover, NH: 
University Press of New England, 1982).
—, Shakespeare After Theory (New York and London: Routledge, 1999).
Kennair, Leif Edward Ottesen, ‘Review of Human Nature and the Limits of 
Science by John Dupré’, Human Nature Review, 2 (January 2002), 7–16.
Knowles, James, ‘1 Henry IV’, in A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works, 
Volume II: The Histories, ed. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003), pp. 412–31.
Knowles, Ronald, Shakespeare’s Arguments with History (New York and 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
Kott, Jan, Shakespeare Our Contemporary, 2nd edn (1967; London: Routledge, 
1991).
LaClau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd edn (New York and London: 
Verso, 2001).
Laden, Sonja, ‘Recuperating the Archive: Anecdotal Evidence and Questions of 
“Historical Realism”’, Poetics Today, 25:1 (Spring 2004), 1–28.
Landes, David S., The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (London: Abacus, 
1999).
Lane, Anthony N. S., John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers (Glasgow: Bell 
& Bain, 1999).
Law, Robert Adger, ‘Links between Shakespeare’s History Plays’, Studies in 
Philology, 50 (1953), 168–87.
—, ‘Shakespeare’s Historical Cycle: Rejoinder’, Studies in Philology, 51 (1954), 
40–1.
Lee, Patricia-Ann, ‘Refl ections of Power: Margaret of Anjou and the Dark Side 
of Queenship’, Renaissance Quarterly, 39:1 (Summer 1986), 183–217.
Lehan, Richard, ‘The Theoretical Limits of New Historicism’, New Literary 
History, 21:3 (Spring 1990), 533–53.
Lentricchia, Frank, ‘Foucault’s Legacy: A New Historicism?’, in The New 
Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 
pp. 231–42.
Levin, Richard, ‘The Poetics and Politics of Bardicide’, PMLA, 150:3 (May 
1990), 491–504.
—, ‘Unthinkable Thoughts in the New Historicizing of English Renaissance 
Drama’, New Literary History, 21:3 (Spring 1990), 433–47.
—, ‘The Cultural Materialist Attack on Artistic Unity, and the Problem of 
Ideological Criticism’, in Ideological Approaches to Shakespeare, ed. R. P. 
Merrix and N. Ranson (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1992), pp. 39–56.
—, ‘The Old and the New Materialising of Shakespeare’, in The Shakespearean 
International Yearbook, Vol. 1: Where Are We Now in Shakespearean 
Studies?, ed. W. R. Elton and John M. Mucciolo (Brookfi eld, VT and 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 87–107.
—, ‘Selective Quotations and Selective Marxisms: A Response to Alan Sinfi eld 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   229 17/02/2012   12:23
 230    Shakespeare’s History Plays
and David Siar’, Early Modern Culture, issue 2 (updated 2001) <http://emc.
eserver.org/1–2/levin.html>, accessed 18 March 2007.
—, Shakespeare’s Secret Schemers: The Study of an Early Modern Dramatic 
Device (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2001).
Lewis, Wyndham, The Lion and the Fox: The Rôle of the Hero in the Plays of 
Shakespeare (1927; London: Methuen, 1966).
Liu, Alan, ‘The Power of Formalism: The New Historicism’, English Literary 
History, 56:4 (Winter 1989), 721–71.
Loades, D. M., ‘The Press under the Early Tudors’, Transactions of the 
Cambridge Bibliographical Society, 4 (1964), 29–50.
Loomba, Ania, ‘“Delicious Traffi ck”: Racial and Religious Difference on Early 
Modern Stages’, in Shakespeare and Race, ed. Catherine Alexander and 
Stanley Wells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 203–24.
Lyotard, Jean-François, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi (1979; Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984).
Macdonald, Ronald R., ‘Uneasy Lies: Language and History in Shakespeare’s 
Lancastrian Tetralogy’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 35:1 (Spring 1984), 22–39.
Macherey, Pierre, A Theory of Literary Production, trans. Geoffrey Wall 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
—, The Object of Literature, trans. David Macey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
MacLean, Gerald, ‘Introduction: Re-Orienting the Renaissance’, in Re-Orienting 
the Renaissance: Cultural Exchanges with the East, ed. Gerald MacLean 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 1–28.
Mahood, M. M., Shakespeare’s Wordplay (London: Methuen, 1957).
Manheim, Michael, ‘Silence in the Henry VI Plays’, Educational Theatre 
Journal, 29:1 (1977), 70–6.
Marcus, Leah S., Puzzling Shakespeare: Local Reading and its Discontents 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1988).
Martin, G. K., ‘Narrative Sources for the Reign of Richard II’, in The Age of 
Richard II, ed. James L. Gillespie (New York: St Martin’s, 1997).
Martinade, Joanna (ed.), English Humanism: Wyatt to Cowley (London: 
Croom Helm, 1985).
Marx, Karl, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ (1869), in Karl 
Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 300–25.
—, Capital, ed. David McLennan (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995).
Masterson, Lister M., ‘English Chronicle Contexts for Shakespeare’s Death of 
Richard II’, in From Page to Performance: Essays in Early English Drama, 
ed. John A. Alford (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 1995), pp. 
195–220.
Matar, Nabil, Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
Meron, Theodor, ‘Crimes and Accountability in Shakespeare’, American 
Journal of International Law, 92:1 (January 1998), 1–40.
Montrose, Louis, ‘“Eliza, Queen of shepheardes,” and the Pastoral of Power’, 
English Literary Renaissance, 10 (Spring 1980), 153–82.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   230 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     231
—, ‘“Shaping Fantasies”: Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan 
Culture’, Representations, 2 (Spring 1983), 61–94.
—, ‘Renaissance Literary Studies and the Subject of History’, English Literary 
Renaissance, 16 (Winter 1986), 5–12.
—, ‘Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture’, in The 
New Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 
1989), pp. 15–36.
—, The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics of the 
Elizabethan Theatre (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1996).
Mousley, Andy, Re-Humanising Shakespeare: Literary Humanism, Wisdom 
and Modernity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
Mullaney, Steven, ‘After the New Historicism’, in Alternative Shakespeares, 
Volume 2, ed. Terence Hawkes (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 17–37.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil (New York: Dover Thrift, 
1997).
Nordlund, Marcus, Shakespeare and the Nature of Love: Literature, Culture, 
Evolution (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007).
Nuttall, A. D., Shakespeare the Thinker (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2007).
Orwell, George, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949; London: Penguin, 2003).
Osborne, Laurie E., ‘Crisis of Degree in Shakespeare’s Henriad’, Studies in 
English Literature, 1500–1900, 25:2 (Spring 1985), 337–59.
Parker, Patricia, Shakespeare from the Margins: Language, Culture, Context 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action (1938; New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1967).
Parvini, Neema, Shakespeare and Contemporary Theory: New Historicism and 
Cultural Materialism (New York and London: Continuum, 2012).
Patterson, Annabel, Shakespeare and the Popular Voice (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989).
—, Reading Holinshed’s Chronicles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994).
Payne, Michael, ‘Introduction: Stephen Greenblatt and New Historicism’, in 
The Greenblatt Reader, ed. Michael Payne (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 
1–7.
Pechter, Edward, ‘The New Historicism and its Discontents: Politicizing 
Renaissance Drama’, PMLA, 102:3 (May 1987), 292–303.
—, ‘Against “Ideology”’, in Shakespeare Left and Right, ed. Ivo Kamps (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 79–98.
—, What Was Shakespeare? Renaissance Plays and Changing Critical Practice 
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1995).
—, ‘Misrepresentation, Ego, Nostalgia: Misreading “Misreading the Postcolonial 
Tempest”’, Early Modern Culture, issue 3 (updated 2003) <http://emc.
eserver.org/1–3/pechter_response.html>, accessed 27 March 2007.
Pecora, Vincent P., ‘The Limits of Local Knowledge’, in The New Historicism, 
ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 243–76.
Pick, H. G., ‘Thomas Blundeville’s The True Order and Methode of Wryting 
PARVINI PRINT.indd   231 17/02/2012   12:23
 232    Shakespeare’s History Plays
and Reading Hystories’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 3:2 (January 1940), 
149–70.
Pieters, Jürgen, ‘New Historicism: Post-modern Historiography between 
Narrativism and Heterology’, History and Theory, 39:1 (February 2000), 
21–38.
Pincombe, Mike, Elizabethan Humanism: Literature and Learning in the Later 
Sixteenth Century (London: Pearson, 2001).
Pinker, Steven, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Behaviour 
(New York and London: Penguin, 2002).
Porter, Carolyn, ‘History and Literature: After New Historicism’, New Literary 
History, 21:2 (Winter 1990), 252–72.
Prior, Moody E., The Drama of Power: Studies in Shakespeare’s History Plays 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
Rabkin, Norman, Shakespeare and the Common Understanding (London and 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
—, Shakespeare and the Problem of Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981).
Rackin, Phyllis, Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
Rasmussen, David (ed.), Renaissance Literature and its Formal Engagements 
(New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
Rees, Joan, Samuel Daniel: A Critical and Biographical Study (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1964).
Reese, M. M., The Cease of Majesty: A Study of Shakespeare’s History Plays 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1961).
Ribner, Irving, ‘The Tudor History Play: An Essay in Defi nition’, PMLA, 69:3 
(June 1954), 591–609.
—, The English History Play in the Age of Shakespeare (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957).
Rossiter, A. P., Angel with Horns: Fifteen Lectures on Shakespeare, ed. Graham 
Storey (1961; New York: Longman, 1989).
Ryan, Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, in New Historicism and Cultural Materialism: A 
Reader, ed. Kiernan Ryan (London: Arnold, 1996), pp. ix–xviii.
— (ed.), New Historicism and Cultural Materialism: A Reader (London: 
Arnold, 1996).
—, ‘Measure for Measure: Marxism Before Marx’, in Marxist Shakespeares, 
ed. Jean E. Howard and Scott Cutler Shershow (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 227–44.
—, Shakespeare, 3rd edn (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002).
—, ‘Literature as History: Shakespeare and the Politics of Appropriation’, paper 
given at Annual Conference of German University Teachers of English, Halle, 
Germany, 18 September 2006.
—, ‘Troilus and Cressida: The Perils of Presentism’, in Presentist Shakespeares, 
ed. Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes (New York and London: Routledge, 
2007), pp. 164–83.
Sanders, Wilbur, The Dramatist and the Received Idea: Studies in the Plays 
of Marlowe and Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   232 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     233
Sartre, Jean-Paul, ‘What is Literature?’ and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988).
Saul, Nigel, Richard II (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 
1997).
Senior, Michael, The Life and Times of Richard II (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, 1981).
Shershow, Scott Cutler, ‘Shakespeare Beyond Shakespeare’, in Marxist 
Shakespeares, ed. Jean E. Howard and Scott Cutler Shershow (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 245–64.
Siemon, James, ‘“The power of hope?” An Early Modern Reader of Richard 
III’, in A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works, Volume II: The Histories, ed. 
Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003), pp. 361–78.
Sinfi eld, Alan, ‘Power and Ideology: An Outline Theory and Sidney’s Arcadia’, 
ELH, 52:2 (Summer 1985), 259–77.
—, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).
—, ‘Counter-response to Richard Levin’, Early Modern Culture, issue 2 (updated 
2001) <http://emc.eserver.org/1–2/sinfi eld2.html>, accessed 18 March 2007.
—, ‘Selective Quotation’, Early Modern Culture, issue 2 (updated 2001) <http://
emc.eserver.org/1–2/sinfi eld.html>, accessed 18 March 2007.
—, Shakespeare, Authority, Sexuality: Unfi nished Business in Cultural 
Materialism (New York and London: Routledge, 2006).
Smith, Paul, Discerning the Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989).
Spargo, Tamsin, ‘Introduction: Past, Present and Future Pasts’, in Reading 
the Past: Literature and History, ed. Tamsin Spargo (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000), pp. 1–11.
Swander, Homer D., ‘The Rediscovery of Henry VI’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 
29:2 (Spring 1978), 146–63.
Swayne, Mattie, ‘Shakespeare’s King Henry VI as a Pacifi st’, College English, 
3:2 (November 1941), 143–9.
Taylor, Gary, ‘Shakespeare and Others: The Authorship of Henry the Sixth, 
Part One’, Medieval and Renaissance Drama, 7 (1995), 145–205.
Tennenhouse, Leonard, ‘Representing Power: Measure for Measure in its Time’, 
in The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance, ed. Stephen Greenblatt 
(Norman, OK: Pilgrim, 1982), pp. 139–56.
—, Power on Display: The Politics of Shakespeare’s Genres (New York and 
London: Methuen, 1986).
Thompson, E. P., The Poverty of Theory (London: Merlin, 1978).
Tillyard, E. M. W., Shakespeare’s History Plays (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1944).
—, ‘Shakespeare’s Historical Cycle: Organism or Compilation?’, Studies in 
Philology, 51 (1954), 34–9.
Tooby, John and Leda Cosmides, ‘On the Universality of Human Nature and 
the Uniqueness of the Individual: The Role of Genetics and Adaptation’, 
Journal of Personality, 58 (1990), 17–67.
Tyacke, Nicholas, Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1987).
PARVINI PRINT.indd   233 17/02/2012   12:23
 234    Shakespeare’s History Plays
Veeser, H. Aram, ‘Introduction’, in The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1989), pp. ix–xvi.
— (ed.), The New Historicism (New York and London: Routledge, 1989).
—, ‘The New Historicism’, in The New Historicism Reader, ed. H. Aram Veeser 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1–34.
— (ed.), The New Historicism Reader (New York and London: Routledge, 
1994).
Vickers, Brian, ‘Incomplete Shakespeare: Or, Denying Coauthorship in Henry 
the Sixth, Part 1’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 58:3 (Fall 2007), 311–52.
Vincent, Paul J., ‘Structuring and Revision in 1 Henry VI’, Philological 
Quarterly, 84:4 (Fall 2005), 377–402.
Vitkus, Daniel, ‘Turning Turk in Othello: The Conversion and Damnation of 
the Moor’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 48 (1997), 145–76.
Voak, Nigel, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, 
Will, and Grace (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Wayne, Don E., ‘Power, Politics, and the Shakespearean Text: Recent Criticism 
in England and the United States’, in Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in 
History and Ideology, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor (New 
York and London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 47–67.
Wells, Robin Headlam, Shakespeare’s Humanism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).
White, Hayden, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century 
Europe (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
—, ‘New Historicism: A Comment’, in The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram 
Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 293–303.
Widdowson, Peter, ‘Introduction: The Crisis in English Studies’, in Re-Reading 
English, ed. Peter Widdowson (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 1–14.
Williams, Raymond, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977).
—, Culture and Materialism: Selected Essays (New York and London: Verso, 
2005).
Wilson, Richard, ‘Introduction: Historicising New Historicism’, in New 
Historicism and Renaissance Drama, ed. Richard Wilson and Richard 
Dutton (New York and London: Longman, 1992), pp. 1–18.
—, Will Power: Essays on Shakespearean Authority (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
— and Richard Dutton (eds), New Historicism and Renaissance Drama 
(London: Longman, 1992).
Wilson, Scott, Cultural Materialism: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1995).
Wolfson, Susan J., ‘Reading for Form’, Modern Language Quarterly, 61:1 
(March 2000), 1–16.
Woolf, D. R., Reading History in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Worden, Blair, ‘Shakespeare and Politics’, in Shakespeare and Politics, ed. 
Catherine M. S. Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
pp. 22–43.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   234 17/02/2012   12:23
Bibliography     235
Websites
Connor, Steven, ‘History in Bits’, <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/skc/histbits.
htm>, accessed 21 December 2007.
Grady, Hugh, ‘Why Presentism Now’, SHAKSPER 2007: SHAKSPER 
Roundtable: Presentism (updated 29 January 2007) <http://www.shaksper.
net/archives/2007/0065.html>, accessed 18 February 2007.
PARVINI PRINT.indd   235 17/02/2012   12:23
Index
Bold indicates pages that deal with the topic or person’s work in detail
Althusser, Louis, 1, 5, 11, 13, 24, 27, 
33–4, 38–9, 41, 43, 48, 54–5, 58, 
62, 65–6, 74, 76–7, 112–14, 150, 
176, 179, 204, 208
 epistemological break, 11–12, 26, 
105, 112, 120n
 Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), 
176
 interpellation, 54, 77, 150, 176, 
184, 195, 202
 Repressive State Apparatus (RSA), 
176
anti-humanism, 37, 52–68, 105–14, 
215–17
antiquarianism, 87, 89, 99, 102, 105
Aquinas, Thomas, 82, 104, 120n
Assiter, Alison, 43
Aumerle, 189, 194
autonomy of the individual, 5, 58–60, 
63, 67, 76, 97, 112, 179–80
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 19
Balzac, Honoré de, 27, 47
Barker, Francis, 85, 115
Barthes, Roland, 21, 27, 47, 56, 76
Bate, Jonathan, 28
Beard, Thomas, 96
Beer, Barrett L., 88, 101
Belsey, Catherine, 1, 4, 6, 15, 23, 26, 
34, 43, 52, 57–67, 85, 188, 193, 
204, 208
Bentham, Jeremy, 165, 184
Berger Jr., Harry, 185
Berry, Edward, 158, 167
Bevington, David, 4
Bloom, Harold, 4, 48, 181
Blundeville, Thomas, 95, 98
Blunt, Sir Walter, 197, 201
Bolingbroke, Henry, 85–8, 90–5, 115, 
136, 181–93, 199, 203
 as Henry IV, 193–4, 196–7, 
199–202, 204–6
Bourdieu, Pierre, 77–8, 112
Boyd, Brian, 4, 56–7, 77, 168
Bradshaw, Graham, 4, 35–7, 39, 
45–6, 48
Brecht, Bertolt, 208
Bristol, Michael D., 4, 33–4, 144
Brotton, Jerry, 4
Buckingham, Duke of, 128, 132, 151, 
175–6
Budra, Paul, 87, 96, 115
Bullough, Geoffrey, 89
Cade, Jack, 124, 129, 137, 142–53, 
174, 203, 207–8
Callaghan, Dympna, 4, 44
Calvin, John, 97, 103–4, 120n
Camden, William, 89–91, 95, 100
Capgrave, John, 91
Carlisle, Bishop of, 84–7, 102, 115




censorship, 86, 89, 145
Clarence, George, Duke of, 111, 113, 
126, 138, 155–6, 162–4
Clifford, Lord, 138–40, 151, 155–8, 
179
PARVINI PRINT.indd   236 17/02/2012   12:23
Index     237
Cohen, Derek, 101, 144
Cohen, Stephen, 2–5
Cohen, Walter, 4, 5, 11–17, 25, 33, 
74, 75






Cox, John D., 133, 140
Cranmer, Thomas, 102
Creton, Jean, 92
cultural materialism, 1–4, 6, 10–12, 
26–7, 33–48, 52, 55, 62–4, 72, 
74, 77, 79, 81–2, 85–7, 100, 107, 
111–12, 115, 123, 125, 143, 
178–9, 197, 216
culturalism, 26–7, 29, 73
Daniel, Samuel, 90–5
Davis, Phillip, 78–9
deconstruction, 12, 16, 26, 29
Dekker, Thomas, 181
Derrida, Jacques, 16, 56, 65, 180
Descartes, René, 16
Dessen, Alan C., 122, 168
determinism, 52, 57–63, 65–6, 112, 
216–17
diachronic history, 11–12, 17–18, 26, 
29, 73–4, 112
Diamond, Jared, 61–2
Dick the butcher, 145–7, 149
dissidence, 34, 46–7, 60, 62, 64, 76, 
82, 115
Dollimore, Jonathan, 1, 4, 6, 26, 27, 
33–48, 52, 63, 64, 85, 100, 112, 
113, 114, 122, 178, 180
Donno, Elizabeth Story, 101
Dover Wilson, J., 167
Drakakis, John, 6
Dutton, Richard, 6, 115
Eagleton, Terry, 5, 180
Edward, Prince (Edward V), 113, 138, 
163–4
Edward III, 188
Edward IV, 78, 111, 126, 161–6, 
174–6
Edward VI, 28, 97
Egan, Gabriel, 4, 54–5, 57
Eleanor of Gloucester, 108–9, 111, 
127–31, 135–6, 139–40, 153
Elizabeth I, 28, 42–3, 85, 97, 102–3, 
161, 164
Empson, William, 206
Erikson, Peter, 1, 6, 28
essentialism, 1–3, 5, 25–7, 35–6, 46, 
52, 54, 58, 73, 78, 123, 216
evolutionary biology, 3–4, 23, 52–3, 
56–8, 60, 62–3, 65–7
existentialism, 37, 55, 79, 112, 125
Falstaff, 80, 181, 197–9, 201, 203–8
Felperin, Howard, 15, 27
feminism, 1, 4, 19, 43–5, 48, 59, 
74–6, 109, 115, 123
Ferguson, Arthur B., 88
Fernie, Ewan, 3–4, 65–6
feudalism, 142, 149–50, 152–3, 174, 
193
formalism, 1, 3–4, 10–12, 15–19, 
25–9, 33, 36, 72–3, 77, 114–15, 
215
Foxe, John, 96, 128
Foucault, Michel, 1, 5, 11–16, 24, 27, 
29, 34, 56, 65, 73–4, 77, 105, 
112–14, 149–50, 177, 179, 184, 
188, 205, 217
 panopticism, 77, 184, 205
 power relations, 27
 Power-Knowledge, 149
freedom, 29, 63, 66, 151, 208
Freud, Sigmund, 65–6, 113, 180
Froissart, Jean, 92, 94–5
Fukuyama, Francis, 47
functionalism, 23–5, 29, 39, 43, 57, 
73
Gallagher, Catherine, 4, 115
Gaunt, John of, 86–7, 93, 102, 182–4, 
186–7, 192, 197, 200, 203–4, 
207
Geertz, Clifford, 27–9, 52, 55, 73–4, 
179
gender, 1, 20–1, 34, 37, 43–4, 54, 76, 
108, 124–5
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